1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ZHANG DONG, C ase No. 5:26-cv-00887-MRA-MAA
11 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY 12 v. RESTRAINING ORDER AND
13 D. MARIN, Warden, Adelanto, et al., ORDERING IMMEDIATE RELEASE FROM CUSTODY [4] 14 Respondents.
16 17 Before the Court is Petitioner’s Ex Parte Application for a Temporary Restraining 18 Order (“TRO”) pending adjudication of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “TRO 19 Application”). ECF 4. Petitioner requests that the Court order his immediate release from 20 custody. Id. at 2. The Court read and considered the moving papers and Respondents’ 21 Notice of Non-Opposition and deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral 22 argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L.R. 7-15. For the reasons stated herein, the Court 23 GRANTS the TRO Application. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Petitioner Zhang Dong (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ 26 of habeas corpus on February 20, 2026. ECF 1 (“Pet.”). Petitioner is a citizen of China 27 and first entered the United States in 2010 with a student visa. Id. at 4. Petitioner has 28 resided in the United States for over 15 years. Id. at 5. On September 11, 2018, an 1 immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed and designated China as the country of 2 removal. Id. at 2. Petitioner then spent 190 days at the Adelanto ICE Detention Center. 3 Id. at 5. ICE was unable to effect his removal to China, and Petitioner was released on 4 March 22, 2019, on an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”). Id. at 2. 5 In the six years that followed, ICE was unable to obtain travel documents from China 6 on behalf of Petitioner. Id. On August 14, 2025, when Petitioner arrived at a federal 7 government building for his routine check-in with ICE, Petitioner was detained. Id. at 2. 8 Petitioner was not given any notice as to why his OSUP was revoked or given any 9 opportunity to respond. Id. at 5–6. 10 Petitioner “was not provided [a] proper place to sleep for 6 days,” and was instead 11 housed “in a holding tank at the federal building without a change of clothes, shower, or 12 regular meal.” Id. Petitioner was then transferred to the Adelanto ICE Detention Center 13 on August 21, 2025. Id. at 2. 14 Since Petitioner was released on the OSUP in 2018, he has since complied with all 15 conditions of the order, including periodic check-ins with ICE. Id. at 5. Petitioner has not 16 committed or been convicted of any criminal activity, and he has since “worked steadily 17 and paid taxes and contributed to society.” Id. at 3. 18 In the instant TRO Application, which was filed the same day as the habeas petition, 19 Petitioner requests that the Court enjoin Respondents D. Marin, Warden, Adelanto ICE 20 Processing Center; Thomas P. Giles, Acting Field Office Director of the Los Angeles ICE 21 Field Office; Todd Lyons, Acting Director of ICE; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the 22 Department of Homeland Security; and Pamela Bondi, United States Attorney General 23 (collectively, “Respondents” or the “government”) from continuing to detain him. ECF 4. 24 On February 26, 2026, the government filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to the TRO 25 Application. ECF 9. The Non-Opposition acknowledged Petitioner’s petition, the TRO 26 Application, and the Court’s order requiring a response to the TRO Application and stated 27 only: “Respondents do not have an opposition argument.” Id. at 2 (internal citations 28 omitted). 1 // 2 II. DISCUSSION 3 The same standard applies to issuing a TRO or a preliminary injunction under 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Six v. Newsom, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 5 2020) (citation omitted); see also Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 6 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that a TRO and preliminary injunction involve 7 “substantially identical” analysis). Like a preliminary injunction, a TRO is “an 8 extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 9 entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). Under 10 Winter, a plaintiff seeking a TRO must establish four elements: “(1) a likelihood of success 11 on the merits, (2) that the plaintiff will likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 12 preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tip in its favor, and (4) that the public 13 interest favors an injunction.” Wells Fargo & Co. v. ABD Ins. & Fin. Servs., Inc., 758 F.3d 14 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 15 The authority of ICE to detain noncitizens subject to final orders of removal derives 16 from 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which directs the Attorney General to cause the removal of any 17 noncitizen from this country within 90 days of any order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1). 18 Once that time passes, however, and it is determined that “removal is no longer reasonably 19 foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 20 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001). The noncitizen must be released on appropriate terms of 21 supervision, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3), which appears to be what happened in this case at some 22 point after Petitioner was ordered removed. The revocation of that release is governed by 8 23 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), which authorizes ICE to revoke a noncitizen’s release if the noncitizen 24 violates any conditions of release and for purposes of removal. Specifically, a noncitizen’s 25 supervision may be revoked “if, on account of changed circumstances,” it is determined 26 that “there is a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the 27 reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). 28 Given the government’s non-opposition to the TRO Application, the Court finds that 1 Petitioner is clearly entitled to immediate release from custody. The government has 2 detained Petitioner without due process of law, without demonstrating that there is any 3 significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, and without 4 demonstrating that Petitioner violated any term of his supervision. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 5 at 693 (explaining that noncitizens within the United States are entitled to due process 6 “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”). Moreover, 7 Petitioner was detained without notice and an opportunity to be heard on the revocation of 8 his supervision in violation of the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). It is black letter 9 law that government agencies are required to follow their own regulations. United States 10 ex rel Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954). This is especially true when the 11 regulation provides for procedural due process. See Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ZHANG DONG, C ase No. 5:26-cv-00887-MRA-MAA
11 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY 12 v. RESTRAINING ORDER AND
13 D. MARIN, Warden, Adelanto, et al., ORDERING IMMEDIATE RELEASE FROM CUSTODY [4] 14 Respondents.
16 17 Before the Court is Petitioner’s Ex Parte Application for a Temporary Restraining 18 Order (“TRO”) pending adjudication of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “TRO 19 Application”). ECF 4. Petitioner requests that the Court order his immediate release from 20 custody. Id. at 2. The Court read and considered the moving papers and Respondents’ 21 Notice of Non-Opposition and deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral 22 argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L.R. 7-15. For the reasons stated herein, the Court 23 GRANTS the TRO Application. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Petitioner Zhang Dong (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ 26 of habeas corpus on February 20, 2026. ECF 1 (“Pet.”). Petitioner is a citizen of China 27 and first entered the United States in 2010 with a student visa. Id. at 4. Petitioner has 28 resided in the United States for over 15 years. Id. at 5. On September 11, 2018, an 1 immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed and designated China as the country of 2 removal. Id. at 2. Petitioner then spent 190 days at the Adelanto ICE Detention Center. 3 Id. at 5. ICE was unable to effect his removal to China, and Petitioner was released on 4 March 22, 2019, on an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”). Id. at 2. 5 In the six years that followed, ICE was unable to obtain travel documents from China 6 on behalf of Petitioner. Id. On August 14, 2025, when Petitioner arrived at a federal 7 government building for his routine check-in with ICE, Petitioner was detained. Id. at 2. 8 Petitioner was not given any notice as to why his OSUP was revoked or given any 9 opportunity to respond. Id. at 5–6. 10 Petitioner “was not provided [a] proper place to sleep for 6 days,” and was instead 11 housed “in a holding tank at the federal building without a change of clothes, shower, or 12 regular meal.” Id. Petitioner was then transferred to the Adelanto ICE Detention Center 13 on August 21, 2025. Id. at 2. 14 Since Petitioner was released on the OSUP in 2018, he has since complied with all 15 conditions of the order, including periodic check-ins with ICE. Id. at 5. Petitioner has not 16 committed or been convicted of any criminal activity, and he has since “worked steadily 17 and paid taxes and contributed to society.” Id. at 3. 18 In the instant TRO Application, which was filed the same day as the habeas petition, 19 Petitioner requests that the Court enjoin Respondents D. Marin, Warden, Adelanto ICE 20 Processing Center; Thomas P. Giles, Acting Field Office Director of the Los Angeles ICE 21 Field Office; Todd Lyons, Acting Director of ICE; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the 22 Department of Homeland Security; and Pamela Bondi, United States Attorney General 23 (collectively, “Respondents” or the “government”) from continuing to detain him. ECF 4. 24 On February 26, 2026, the government filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to the TRO 25 Application. ECF 9. The Non-Opposition acknowledged Petitioner’s petition, the TRO 26 Application, and the Court’s order requiring a response to the TRO Application and stated 27 only: “Respondents do not have an opposition argument.” Id. at 2 (internal citations 28 omitted). 1 // 2 II. DISCUSSION 3 The same standard applies to issuing a TRO or a preliminary injunction under 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Six v. Newsom, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 5 2020) (citation omitted); see also Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 6 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that a TRO and preliminary injunction involve 7 “substantially identical” analysis). Like a preliminary injunction, a TRO is “an 8 extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 9 entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). Under 10 Winter, a plaintiff seeking a TRO must establish four elements: “(1) a likelihood of success 11 on the merits, (2) that the plaintiff will likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 12 preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tip in its favor, and (4) that the public 13 interest favors an injunction.” Wells Fargo & Co. v. ABD Ins. & Fin. Servs., Inc., 758 F.3d 14 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 15 The authority of ICE to detain noncitizens subject to final orders of removal derives 16 from 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which directs the Attorney General to cause the removal of any 17 noncitizen from this country within 90 days of any order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1). 18 Once that time passes, however, and it is determined that “removal is no longer reasonably 19 foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 20 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001). The noncitizen must be released on appropriate terms of 21 supervision, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3), which appears to be what happened in this case at some 22 point after Petitioner was ordered removed. The revocation of that release is governed by 8 23 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), which authorizes ICE to revoke a noncitizen’s release if the noncitizen 24 violates any conditions of release and for purposes of removal. Specifically, a noncitizen’s 25 supervision may be revoked “if, on account of changed circumstances,” it is determined 26 that “there is a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the 27 reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). 28 Given the government’s non-opposition to the TRO Application, the Court finds that 1 Petitioner is clearly entitled to immediate release from custody. The government has 2 detained Petitioner without due process of law, without demonstrating that there is any 3 significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, and without 4 demonstrating that Petitioner violated any term of his supervision. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 5 at 693 (explaining that noncitizens within the United States are entitled to due process 6 “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”). Moreover, 7 Petitioner was detained without notice and an opportunity to be heard on the revocation of 8 his supervision in violation of the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). It is black letter 9 law that government agencies are required to follow their own regulations. United States 10 ex rel Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954). This is especially true when the 11 regulation provides for procedural due process. See Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 12 172 (2021) (“If men must turn square corners when they deal with the government, it 13 cannot be too much to expect the government to turn square corners when it deals with 14 them.”). 15 The government presents no defense or explanation for its actions despite freedom 16 from detention being “the most elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 17 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). Nor does the government dispute that “[d]eprivation of physical 18 liberty by detention constitutes irreparable harm.” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 767 19 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017). As for 20 the final Winter factors, the balance of equities and the public interest overwhelmingly 21 weigh in favor of granting the TRO because it obviously would be neither equitable nor in 22 the public interest to allow the government to continue to violate federal law. 23 Despite effectively conceding that Petitioner has been unlawfully detained, 24 Respondents make no effort to release him. Given its prerogative, the government would 25 continue to deprive Petitioner of his most fundamental liberty interest, keeping him 26 unlawfully detained until this Court orders his release. This approach not only squanders 27 finite judicial resources, but more importantly, it offends the Constitution. See Zadvydas, 28 533 U.S. at 679 (“Freedom from imprisonment lies at the heart of the liberty protected by 1 the Due Process Clause.”). Thus, this Court enforces the Constitution as it must even when 2 the government chooses to ignore it.1 3 III. CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, the TRO Application is GRANTED. The Court hereby 5 ORDERS as follows: 6 1. Respondents shall IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner from custody; 7 2. Respondents shall REINSTATE Petitioner’s prior order of supervision under the 8 same terms and conditions without additional restrictions, such as electronic 9 monitoring, if not previously imposed; 10 3. Respondents are ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner without notice and 11 opportunity to be heard consistent with the Due Process Clause and immigration 12 law and regulations; 13 4. Respondents are ORDERED to file reliable proof with this Court that Petitioner 14 has been released by no later than March 2, 2026, at 8:00 a.m. – failure to do so 15 may result in sanctions; 16 5. Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why a preliminary injunction 17 should not issue. See L.R. 65-1. Respondents shall file any written response to 18 the Order to Show Cause no later than March 6, 2026. Failure to file a response 19 will be deemed consent to the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Upon 20 receipt of Respondents’ response, the Court may order Petitioner to file a reply if 21 necessary. If the parties agree that the TRO should be converted into a 22
23 1 Any efforts to remove Petitioner to a third country must also comport with due process. ICE is required as a matter of law and protocol to afford Petitioner a meaningful 24 opportunity to contest his removal to a third country on the basis of fear of persecution or 25 torture. ECF 14 at 12; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 28 C.F.R. § 200.1; 8 C.F.R. 26 § 208.16-18, 1208.16-18. “In other words, third-country removals are subject to the same mandatory protections that exist in removal or withholding-only proceedings.” D.V.D. v. 27 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. CV 25-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1142968, at *3 (D. Mass. 28 Apr. 18, 2025). 1 preliminary injunction and/or that dismissal of the habeas petition is warranted 2 because the relief sought is now moot, they shall file a joint stipulation no later 3 than February 24, 2026. The Court will order an OSC hearing only if necessary. 4 This TRO shall take immediate effect on February 27, 2026, and expires at 3:00 5 on March 13, 2026. The TRO may be extended for good cause or upon Respondents’ 6 || consent. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 9 || Dated: February 27, 2026 na ‘ AC 10 HO MONICA RAMIREZ ALMADANI 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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