Zetor North America, Inc. v. Rozeboom

District Court, W.D. Arkansas·Decided August 23, 2018·No. 3:15-cv-03035·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS HARRISON DIVISION ZETOR NORTH AMERICA, INC. and HTC INVESTMENTS, INC. PLAINTIFFS V. CASE NO. 3:15-CV-03035 BRENT ROZEBOOM, individually and d/b/a Ridgeway Enterprises, and as director of Alberni Enterprises; GLENDA ROZEBOON, individually and d/b/a Ridgeway Enterprises; RIDGEWAY ENTERPRISES, a private trust company; ALAN SCOTT PETERSON, individually and as Executive Trustee of Ridgeway Enterprises; ANTONIE (a.k.a. Tony) ROZEBOOM; and ALBERNI ENTERPRISES, a private trust company DEFENDANTS OPINION AND ORDER Now pending before the Court are a Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 189) by Defendants Brent Rozeboom, Glenda Rozeboom, Alan Scott Peterson, and Ridgeway Enterprises (collectively, “the Ridgeway Defendants”) and a Response in Opposition (Doc. 194) by Plaintiffs Zetor North America, Inc. (“Zetor NA”) and HTC Investments, Inc. (“HTC”). The Ridgeway Defendants request that the Court reconsider its decision to allow HTC, the owner of the trademark at issue in the lawsuit, to be added to the case as a plaintiff for the purpose of curing the standing problem present in Counts | and Il. This decision was made in the context of the Court’s issuance of its Memorandum Opinion and Order (“Order”) (Doc. 187), filed on August 14, 2018, which disposed of two motions for summary judgment, a motion to dismiss, and a motion in limine."

" As best the Court can tell, the Motion does not request reconsideration of any other decision made by the Court, and instead confines itself only to the subject of the Ridgeway

The Order explained in detail why Zetor NA lacked both statutory and contractual standing to sue for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. The Court then found that dismissing the infringement claims without prejudice after three years of litigation and on the eve of trial “would serve no constructive purpose and would only protract the litigation further.” /d. at 23. So the Court directed Zetor NA to file an amended complaint that added HTC as a plaintiff but did not add any other factual allegations, claims, or causes of action. /d. In coming to the conclusion that adding HTC as a nominal party was far preferable to dismissing the trademark claims without prejudice, the Court considered whether the Ridgeway Defendants would suffer any potential prejudice as a result of this decision. The only argument the Ridgeway Defendants offered in opposition to adding HTC was that they would “not have the opportunity to depose anyone from HTC or Zetor a.s. before the trial of this matter or otherwise sonnet discovery with respect to these entities.” (Doc. 185, p. 5). Tellingly, the Ridgeway Defendants failed to mention any particular areas of discovery that they wished to obtain from HTC, if given the opportunity to do so at this late stage. Further, they offered no reasonable explanation as to why they apparently failed to take such discovery during the three years this litigation was pending, particularly in light of the fact that HTC was identified as the owner of the trademark at least as early as June 1, 2015, when the case was first filed. The Court ultimately decided in its Order that the Ridgeway Defendants’ claim of prejudice was meritless and ordered HTC to be joined. Now the Ridgeway Defendants

Defendants’ alleged prejudice resulting from HTC’s joinder as a plaintiff.

contend that this decision relied on certain material mistakes of fact, and if the Court were to reconsider those facts, it would come to the opposite conclusion and find that the Ridgeway Defendants would, indeed, suffer prejudice through the joinder of HTC. As is discussed below, the Court finds that none of the Ridgeway Defendants’ arguments in favor of reconsideration are persuasive. Before considering the particular “mistakes” highlighted by the Ridgeway Defendants in their Motion, the Court notes that a motion for reconsideration of a court order may be made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which provides that a party may be relieved from an order of the Court under certain enumerated circumstances, including the existence of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” or “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (6). Of course, not every “mistake” will justify amending the order or granting the particular relief requested by the moving party. The Court's first observation is an overarching one that was made in its Order but omitted from Defendants’ Motion: that the standing argument should have been raised sooner by Defendants, and not on summary judgment three years after the lawsuit began. In particular, when the Court confronted Defendants’ Rule 19 argument in the context of their Rule 56 motion, the Court explained: Rule 19 arguments are ordinarily asserted in the context of a Rule 12(b)(7) motion to dismiss, and the Ridgeway Defendants failed to make such a motion or make a failure-to-join claim as an affirmative defense to the Amended Complaint in either their original answer (Doc. 27) or their Amended Answer (Doc. 136). In their Motion for Summary Judgment, they do not suggest that joinder of HTC is somehow infeasible due to the proposed joined party’s objection to venue, or because joinder would rob the Court of jurisdiction. In general, when a necessary party is identified by the court, the ordinary remedy is to dismiss the matter without prejudice and afford the plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint to

include the necessary party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (‘If a person has not been joined as required, the court must order that the person be made a party.”); Sladek v. Bell Sys. Mgmt. Pension Plan, 880 F.2d 972, 980 (7th Cir. 1989) (‘The dismissal of a complaint for failure to join an indispensable party is entirely appropriate under Rule 12(b)(7), but dismissal with prejudice should ordinarily result only after the court has ordered the party joined and the plaintiff has failed to do so.” (emphasis in original)). (Doc. 187, p. 22). Of course, prior to the Ridgeway Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court had not been asked to review the underlying contractual documents that disclosed the nature of HTC’s right to enforce the mark, and the Court had assumed up until that point that Zetor NA had standing to sue on HTC’s behalf or in its own right as assignee of the mark. Although the Ridgeway Defendants in their current Motion protest that the Court has wrongly characterized their discovery efforts, they admit that they only obtained copies of the relevant contractual documents on May 11, 2018—just three weeks prior to the dispositive motion deadline and just two months before the originally-scheduled trial date of July 23, 2018. See Doc. 189, pp. 4-5. They offer no explanation as to why they obtained and reviewed the documents so late in the litigation, and they must, of course, concede that they never alerted the Court as to any concerns regarding Plaintiff's timely production of documents. Moving on to the mistakes of fact the Ridgeway Defendants identify in the Motion, the first is the issue of the identity of the author of an affidavit (Doc. 176-1) that Zetor NA submitted as an exhibit in support of its response to summary judgment. The author of the affidavit was Martin Blaskovic, who self-identified as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of both HTC and Zetor Tractors. The Court in its Order pointed out

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