Watson,
Judge:
This consolidated action is a judicial review of a determination by the International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce (ITA). It is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment.
The determination in dispute
fixed the antidumping duties due on television sets from Japan that were entered or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption between April 1, 1979 and March 31, 1980.
Under the law, if the United States Price is less than the Foreign Market Value the difference between the two is a margin of dumping
in the United States and antidumping duties must be paid to eliminate it. 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
The determination of Foreign Market Value starts with the price in the producer’s home market. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)(A).
Certain costs (such as containers and coverings) are then added to the price. Finally, "adjustments” may be made to the price for those elements in the price which are "differences in circumstances of sale.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4).
If the price method cannot be applied with information from home market sources, the Foreign Market Value can be determined from a price method using sales to third countries other than the United States (19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)(B)) or from a non-price method known as Constructed Value, in which the value is built up from the elements of costs of materials, cost of production and general expenses and profit. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(2)
and 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e).
The plaintiffs claim that the ITA committed errors of law in its determination of the Foreign Market Value of the television sets under investigation.
I
Plaintiffs first argue that the ITA erred when it used constructed value to find the Foreign Market Value of television sets produced by-Sharp Corporation (Sharp). They contend that, after the ITA declined to use the prices submitted by Sharp, it should have used the evidence of the declared amounts on which Sharp paid the Japanese Commodity Tax on the television sets it sold in Japan.
The Court is of the opinion that, although the use of the commodity tax information would have been lawful and had much to recommend it,
the ITA was under no statutory obligation to use it,
The ITA apparently thought that if it had no direct evidence of prices in transactions for sale in the Japanese market, the statute would obligate it to turn immediately to sales to third countries or to constructed value. This belief was expressed at 42 Fed. Reg. 30164 ¶4. Although this understanding was wrong, it did not amount to harmful error in the administration of the law.
In reality, the ITA has the authority to go beyond direct evidence of relevant matters in appropriate situations. This is part of its inherent power to make these determinations so long as they are lawful and based on substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not have to be perfect evidence. The ITA is even empowered to utilize information which might be less than satisfactory in normal situations. Thus, in 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)
the agencies are allowed to base their determinations on "the best information otherwise available” when a party refuses or is unable to produce information. By
a fortiori
reasoning they are certainly authorized to use secondary evidence of price (such as the commodity tax information) when direct evidence is not sufficient or usable.
Consequently, it is puzzling that the ITA did not utilize its authority to rely on good secondary evidence of price. It is even more
bewildering to note that by turning to the complicated use of constructed value the ITA lost an opportunity to promote its administrative efficiency, a point which has recently been stressed as an important factor in the administration of this law.
Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp.
v.
Silver Reed America, Inc.,
753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The use of the commodity tax information would have been markedly simpler than the use of constructed value.
Nevertheless, the failure to use a discretionary alternative form of proof for one type of valuation does not amount to error when the agency uses a lawful second means of valuation.
In short, if the ITA had seen fit to use the commodity tax information in the case of Sharp, its action would have been unassailable. Even though it displayed a curious restraint in the use of its discretion, it did not violate a requirement of the law by failing to use secondary evidence of price.
In sum, it can be said that the authority to use secondary sources of information is part of the power of the agency to use all reasonable ways and means to accomplish its task. 19 U.S.C. § 1673h.
This authority does not create an obligation to turn to secondary sources before using an alternative statutory method of valuation.
For the producers other than Sharp, alternative information would not come into play if their actual prices were being properly used. For those producers the dispute centers on the use of their prices in sales to related parties in Japan and the general question of whether the relationship between parties was adequately investigated.
Plaintiffs next turn to the foreign market value determinations made for the remaining Japanese producers of television sets. For these producers, direct proof of prices in the home market was found to be satisfactory.
Plaintiffs claim that the ITA did not eliminate the taint of relationship from the information used to determine Foreign Market Value. Plaintiffs argue that limiting the investigation of relationships to
financial
connections was improper. Zenith presented a scholarly argument that Japanese business relationships are governed by a tradition of conduct known as
keiretsu,
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Watson,
Judge:
This consolidated action is a judicial review of a determination by the International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce (ITA). It is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment.
The determination in dispute
fixed the antidumping duties due on television sets from Japan that were entered or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption between April 1, 1979 and March 31, 1980.
Under the law, if the United States Price is less than the Foreign Market Value the difference between the two is a margin of dumping
in the United States and antidumping duties must be paid to eliminate it. 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
The determination of Foreign Market Value starts with the price in the producer’s home market. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)(A).
Certain costs (such as containers and coverings) are then added to the price. Finally, "adjustments” may be made to the price for those elements in the price which are "differences in circumstances of sale.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4).
If the price method cannot be applied with information from home market sources, the Foreign Market Value can be determined from a price method using sales to third countries other than the United States (19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)(B)) or from a non-price method known as Constructed Value, in which the value is built up from the elements of costs of materials, cost of production and general expenses and profit. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(2)
and 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e).
The plaintiffs claim that the ITA committed errors of law in its determination of the Foreign Market Value of the television sets under investigation.
I
Plaintiffs first argue that the ITA erred when it used constructed value to find the Foreign Market Value of television sets produced by-Sharp Corporation (Sharp). They contend that, after the ITA declined to use the prices submitted by Sharp, it should have used the evidence of the declared amounts on which Sharp paid the Japanese Commodity Tax on the television sets it sold in Japan.
The Court is of the opinion that, although the use of the commodity tax information would have been lawful and had much to recommend it,
the ITA was under no statutory obligation to use it,
The ITA apparently thought that if it had no direct evidence of prices in transactions for sale in the Japanese market, the statute would obligate it to turn immediately to sales to third countries or to constructed value. This belief was expressed at 42 Fed. Reg. 30164 ¶4. Although this understanding was wrong, it did not amount to harmful error in the administration of the law.
In reality, the ITA has the authority to go beyond direct evidence of relevant matters in appropriate situations. This is part of its inherent power to make these determinations so long as they are lawful and based on substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not have to be perfect evidence. The ITA is even empowered to utilize information which might be less than satisfactory in normal situations. Thus, in 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)
the agencies are allowed to base their determinations on "the best information otherwise available” when a party refuses or is unable to produce information. By
a fortiori
reasoning they are certainly authorized to use secondary evidence of price (such as the commodity tax information) when direct evidence is not sufficient or usable.
Consequently, it is puzzling that the ITA did not utilize its authority to rely on good secondary evidence of price. It is even more
bewildering to note that by turning to the complicated use of constructed value the ITA lost an opportunity to promote its administrative efficiency, a point which has recently been stressed as an important factor in the administration of this law.
Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp.
v.
Silver Reed America, Inc.,
753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The use of the commodity tax information would have been markedly simpler than the use of constructed value.
Nevertheless, the failure to use a discretionary alternative form of proof for one type of valuation does not amount to error when the agency uses a lawful second means of valuation.
In short, if the ITA had seen fit to use the commodity tax information in the case of Sharp, its action would have been unassailable. Even though it displayed a curious restraint in the use of its discretion, it did not violate a requirement of the law by failing to use secondary evidence of price.
In sum, it can be said that the authority to use secondary sources of information is part of the power of the agency to use all reasonable ways and means to accomplish its task. 19 U.S.C. § 1673h.
This authority does not create an obligation to turn to secondary sources before using an alternative statutory method of valuation.
For the producers other than Sharp, alternative information would not come into play if their actual prices were being properly used. For those producers the dispute centers on the use of their prices in sales to related parties in Japan and the general question of whether the relationship between parties was adequately investigated.
Plaintiffs next turn to the foreign market value determinations made for the remaining Japanese producers of television sets. For these producers, direct proof of prices in the home market was found to be satisfactory.
Plaintiffs claim that the ITA did not eliminate the taint of relationship from the information used to determine Foreign Market Value. Plaintiffs argue that limiting the investigation of relationships to
financial
connections was improper. Zenith presented a scholarly argument that Japanese business relationships are governed by a tradition of conduct known as
keiretsu,
which produces coordinated action and the practical effects of relationship without the presence of equity connections.
The Court is of the opinion that the requirements of our law are satisfied when the ITA investigates whether there is any financial relationship between the producer and the purchaser in the home
market. This goes to the essence of those relationships which the law details in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(13)
and which would obviously tend to undermine the acceptability of a sale price. The question posed by the ITA was adequate to explore the full range of possible financial relationships involved in the enforcement of the law.
The discernment of relationships which do not find expression in concrete financial terms is not something which can be posited as a mandatory duty, and is not required of the ITA by law. In this case the ITA’s determinations on the question of relationship were supported by substantial evidence and were in accordance with the law.
The plaintiffs have also challenged the validation of prices between related parties by means of prices to unrelated parties, claiming that the ITA did not determine that the volume of sales to unrelated parties was sufficient to serve as validation. However, this process of validation is not dependent on any fixed relative volume of sales. In the absence of any indication that the unrelated sales are arranged solely to validate the price to related parties, the ITA is within its authority to use such sales as are commercially significant.
The record shows that for Hitachi, Matsushita, and Mitsubishi, sales to unrelated parties were at prices identical to the prices to related purchasers. In the case of Sanyo, whose prices to unrelated purchasers were higher, the ITA used the higher prices and did not use the prices to related purchasers. For Toshiba, which sold only to related purchasers in Japan, the ITA compared its prices to those of manufacturers selling comparable television sets in arms-length transactions. This manner of proceeding accords with the law and its results are supported by substantial evidence.
As a final point on the subject of related parties, the plaintiffs claim that special verification should have been undertaken by the ITA after the matter became an issue in the proceeding. The Court does not believe that in the circumstances of this proceeding a duty arose to conduct a specific, additional verification of the relationship issue. In the opinion of the Court, the record before the ITA was sufficient to permit it to draw sound conclusions on the issue of relationships. This was not a case in which the verification duty was abdicated or violated to the point of eroding the legitimacy of the
proceeding.
See, Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp.,
v.
United States,
6 CIT 245 (Slip Op. 83-119), 575 F. Supp. 1277,
affirmed,
745 F2d 632 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
I — I
Plaintiffs third area of disagreement with the determination involves the ITA’s use of discounts and rebates to lower the foreign market value of television sets sold in Japan.
According to plaintiffs, if discounts and rebates are to enter into the calculation of foreign market value at all, it must be by means of deductions from
price
for those discounts and rebates that are
available to all purchasers.
In the opinion of the Court this seemingly plausible claim has been precluded by the decision of our appellate court in
Smith-Corona Group Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp.,
v.
United States,
713 F.2d 1568 (C.A.F.C. 1983),
cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1274 (1984). In that opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) characterized the offer of a rebate in Japan as a difference in the
circumstance of sale
in Japan as opposed to the sale in the United States. The CAFC further discussed rebates as increasing the effective cost to the manufacturer of the transactions under scrutiny. 713 F2d at 1850. This means that to the extent that rebates and discounts are considered differences in circumstances of sale they are adjustments made for the exigencies of particular transactions under the authority of 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4).
As such, they do not have to meet the same requirements as would a "price,” that is to say, they do not have to be given to "aZZ purchasers.” As items unrelated to price, rebates and discounts are not subject to the limitations on price of 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(A)
or 19 U.S.C. § 1677(14).
Before the decision in
Smith Corona, supra,
the plain meaning of the law, force of logic, and the teaching of analogous case law would have compelled the Court to reason as follows: Discounts and rebates are practices which relate directly to price. The law depends on the determination of a single price which must be the price available to
all
purchasers. If discounts and rebates are given to some purchasers and not to others they ought not to figure in the price. "All purchasers” cannot necessarily obtain the discounted price or the
rebates, nor can "all purchasers” obtain any "average” price into which the discounts or rebates are averaged.
A corrolary of this point would be that the authority of the agency to utilize techniques of averaging or sampling under 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)
could not justify the use of prices which are not available to all purchasers. This standard also has the advantage of immensely simplifying the administration of the law — a point which has come to figure prominently in analysis of administrative action in this area.
Consumer Products Div., SCM Corp.
v.
Silver Reed America, Inc.,
753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
At this time however, the holding of our appellate court has eliminated this line of reasoning. The claim by plaintiffs that discounts and rebates were improperly used in the calculation of foreign market value is rejected.
IV
As a fourth issue Zenith has maintained its claim that the so-called exporter’s sales price offset (the ESP offset) is erroneous as a matter of law. Zenith acknowledges that this issue was decided in
Smith Corona Group Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp.
v.
United States,
713 F.2d 1568,
cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1274 (1984). In that opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated that:
Were it not for the exporter’s sale price offset, comparisons based on purchase price would be fair, yet comparisons based on exporter’s sales price would be skewed in favor of a higher dumping margin.
713 F.2d at 1578
The Appellate Court further stated that:
In view of the discretion accorded the Secretary under the statute to make adjustments to foreign market value, we conclude that the exporter’s sale price offset, 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) is a proper and reasonable exercise of the Secretary’s authority to administer the statute fairly.
713 F.2d at 1579
It must be observed however that the result to which this Court is directed appears to nullify a fundamental statutory provision for determining United States price when the producer and the importer are related. In good conscience and with all due respect the Court must state that it does not see the unfairness which supposedly justifies the offset. This Court sees only a cancellation of an
important part of the operation of the exporter’s sales price method of finding a U.S. price. This amounts to a thwarting of Congressional intention.
The ITA evidently thinks that because selling expenses were extracted from the price of the first transaction inside the United States (as part of the technique of going back to what would be the true price in a transaction between the exporter and importer) there is something unfair in leaving selling expenses "inside” the price at which the exporter-producer sells to its customers in japan. It therefore allows an equal amount to be deducted from that foreign market value in 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c).
But this is nothing less than the nullification of the step specifically provided by law to help arrive at a fair price in related party transactions.
As noted earlier, the dumping margin in the United States is the amount by which the United States price is lower than the Foreign Market Value. When the United States price can’t be obtained from the purchase price (the sale between the importer and exporter) because the parties are related, it has to be extracted from a later price (the sale from the related importer to an unrelated U.S. purchaser, i.e., the sale
after
importation). That price must be cleansed of the selling expenses of the importer in order to help arrive at what would be the real price between an exporter and importer. This is essential to arriving at a fair U.S. Price, unaffected by special relationships. That is where the adjustment for selling expenses ought to stop. At that point the law has operated to bring the price found in the first U.S. transaction back to what it would be in an importation transaction. Then, both the purchase price (in the sale between unrelated importer and exporter) and the exporter’s sales price (arrived at by the "extraction” method) are subject to adjustments which bring them further back to the equivalent of an ex-factory price in the home market for sales in exportation to the United States. At that point the operation of the alternative methods of finding a
U.S. Price
is complete and harmonious. Those prices may then be compared with the producers foreign market value in each instance to see whether the U.S. price is lower.
The ITA’s creation of an "offset,” does violence to this carefully worked-out statutory method. It disrupts the balanced statutory scheme and allows foreign market value to be unjustifiably reduced by selling expenses in the home market when the foreign market value is being used in a related party situation.
The Court is unable to see any unfairness resulting from the statutory method or any "skewing” in favor of higher dumping margins when it is used. In the related party situation the related exporter has no usable price to the U.S. until the exporter’s sales price method is applied. To say that a crucial element of its application is a "skewing” is nothing less than a straightforward disagreement with the plain meaning of the law, a judgment that exporter’s sales price should not work the way it was intended to.
The removal of selling expenses from the U.S. side of the equation is essential to finding a fair U.S. price. The related exporter is told that its price is actually the next transaction price of its related importer, but only after those elements are removed which would not be in the exporter’s price in a transaction with the importer. If that exporter is then allowed to deduct from his home market price an equivalent element of selling expenses the entire special statutory method is being negated. In short, the "offset” restores an element of one of the very items that Congress wanted to remove from U.S. Price in related party transactions.
To allow the ITA the discretion to promulgate rules which alter this method of statutory valuation, and to do so based on a misconception of what if fair, amounts to a grant of authority to freely amend the law. This result creates two foreign market values where
one
was intended, destroys the operation of exporter’s sales price and represents the ultimate extension of discretion to the ITA.
In the shadow of these developments it becomes difficult to imagine what judicial control remains on the administration and interpretation of this law. It must be remembered that this entire administrative novelty has emerged from a regulation assertedly based on the authority to make adjustments due to "circumstances of sale.” From this limited category of authority, intended only for proper adjustments to
foreign
market value, major surgery has been accomplished on the important statutory section dealing with the exporter’s sales price method for determining a U.S. price.
With these comments in mind, the Court conforms to the ruling of the appellate court and rejects plaintiffs claim that the ESP offset is invalid.
V
The plaintiff unions have claimed that the ITA used a weighted average technique to determine U.S. price when it used the exporter’s sale price method for Sharp. Obviously, a weighted average can eliminate dumping margins at one point in time by averaging in higher prices from a later time. That would clearly be unacceptable.
The government points out, however, that the technique used weight averaging only within each entry, in a manner that did not alter the amount of the margin. The method is found acceptable by the Court insofar as its results do not differ from what would result from the sum of exporter’s sales price for each selling price in each
entry. In short, the Court is satisfied that the method did not conceal dumping margins and is in accordance with the law.
For the reasons expressed in this opinion the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment must be, and hereby are, Denied. On the grounds expressed, the cross-motions for summary judgment are hereby Granted.