Zapata Haynie Corp. v. Larpenter
This text of 583 So. 2d 867 (Zapata Haynie Corp. v. Larpenter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
ZAPATA HAYNIE CORPORATION
v.
Jerry J. LARPENTER, Sheriff and Ex-Officio Tax Collector for Terrebonne Parish.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
*868 Patrick M. Gusman, New Orleans, Christopher Dicharry, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff and appellant, Zapata Haynie Corp.
Jerri G. Smitko, William F. Dodd, Houma, for defendant and appellee, Jerry J. Larpenter, Sheriff.
Before SAVOIE, CRAIN and FOIL, JJ.
SAVOIE, Judge.
This case involves the issue of whether LSA Const. art. VII § 21(C)(15) (hereinafter referred to as the "commercial seafood exemption"), an exemption from ad valorem taxes for commercial vessels used to gather seafood for human consumption, applies to vessels which engage in menhaden fishing.
Zapata Haynie Corporation, plaintiff, paid under protest $43,758.83 to the Sheriff of Terrebonne Parish, defendant, for 1988 ad valorem taxes on its fishing vessels. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant for a refund of the taxes. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. From the granting of summary judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff has appealed.
FACTS
Plaintiff engages in the harvesting, processing and marketing of menhaden, a species of fish which it processes into fish oil, fish meal and fish solubles.[1] Although it is possible for menhaden to be cooked and eaten by humans, they are not because of their oily and bony characteristics. The fish meal produced by plaintiff is used, domestically and abroad, in the production of poultry and hog food, and for aquaculture feed used in shrimp, trout and catfish farming. Plaintiff also sells fish solubles, a liquid protein, to feed companies. However, the fish solubles produced by plaintiff comprise an insignificant portion of its operations.
Plaintiff exports ninety-five percent of its fish oil to European processors.[2] The processors use almost 100% of the fish oil as ingredients in margarine, cooking oil, and other oil based products which are consumed by humans. The fish oil used in the production of inedible products (i.e. cosmetics, paints and industrial coatings) is the result of plaintiff's operations at its Reedville, Virginia plant.
ACTION OF THE TRIAL COURT
The trial court found that plaintiff's menhaden fishing operation was not exempt from ad valorem taxes because it did not *869 think that the redactors of the constitution meant to include menhaden under the commercial seafood exemption. The trial court stated in its reasons for judgment that it relied heavily on the excerpts from the transcripts of the 1973 Constitutional Convention in making its decision.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Plaintiff has assigned the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in finding that the gathering of menhaden as a source of fish oil for use in margarine and cooking oil in Europe does not constitute gathering seafood for human consumption pursuant to the Commercial Fishing Vessel Exemption.
2. The lower court erred in finding that the Commercial Fishing Vessel Exemption requires the seafood to be consumed in Louisiana or consumed in a manner commonly done in Louisiana.
3. The lower court erred in ignoring the plain, unambiguous language of the Commercial Fishing Vessel Exemption by considering the constitutional transcripts.
4. The lower court erred in considering the constitutional transcripts which dealt with another exemption.
5. Assuming arguendo that the constitutional transcripts are relevant, the lower court erred in relying on the transcripts which are not dispositive of the delegates [sic] intent because the delegates did not discuss the edibility of fish oil.
The sole issue before this court is whether the commercial seafood exemption is applicable to vessels which engage in menhaden fishing.
The commercial seafood exemption, LSA Const. art. VII, § 21(C)(15), provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Section 21. In addition to the homestead exemption provided for in Section 20 of this Article, the following property and no other shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation.
* * * * * *
(C) Commercial vessels used for gathering seafood for human consumption.
The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in ignoring the plain and unambiguous language of the commercial seafood exemption by considering the constitutional transcripts. LSA-C.C. art. 9 provides that when a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.
We do not agree that the language of the commercial seafood exemption is plain and unambiguous. Seafood means "edible marine fish and shellfish" and edible is defined as "fit to be eaten". Webster's Ninth Edition New Collegiate Dictionary 1058, 396, respectively (1984). It is not clear to this court whether the definition of seafood for human consumption would include something which is produced and subsequently processed from a marine fish or shellfishsuch as the menhaden fish oil or only that seafood whose flesh is used for human consumption.
The Civil Code suggests that an ambiguous text should be interpreted according to the general and popular use of the words employed at the time the statute was passed. See LSA-C.C. art. 11; W.C. Bradford v. City of Shreveport, 305 So.2d 487, 493 (La.1974).[3] Only when a statute is ambiguous and subject to two different interpretations can legislative intent be considered. Adoption of Edwards, 369 So.2d 210 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1979). Since the language of the commercial seafood exemption is ambiguous, this court must determine *870 whether the redactors of the 1974 Constitution intended the definition of seafood for human consumption to include menhaden, and in that determination the constitutional transcripts may properly be considered.
During the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973, the commercial seafood exemption was discussed briefly by delegate Buddy Roemer at 8 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts, at 1906:
Mr. Roemer Right. Then again, on lines 18 and 19, commercial vessels used for gathering seafood for human consumptionI'm assuming we're excluding the menhaden boats, and that sort of thing. Isn't that an addition to this constitution?
Mr. Planchard Yes, that's an additional wording. Right. The above question by delegate Roemer was the only one asked about menhaden in connection with the commercial seafood exemption.
The delegates further expressed their intentions on menhaden when they discussed several amendments to what is now LSA Const. art. 7 § 21(C)(11) (hereinafter referred to as the "inventory exemption").[4] Thus, the meaning intended for the commercial seafood exemption by the redactors of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution can best be gleaned from the following discussion on several amendments to the inventory exemption found at 8 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts, at 1984-1986:
Amendment
Mr. Poynter Amendment No. 1 [by Mr. Nunez]. On page 4, line 7, in Floor Amendment No.
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583 So. 2d 867, 1991 WL 119708, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/zapata-haynie-corp-v-larpenter-lactapp-1991.