Zamora v. State

846 P.2d 194, 123 Idaho 192, 1993 Ida. LEXIS 52

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: January 29, 1993
• Docket: 18793
• Status: Published

Opinions

I. BACKGROUND

PER CURIAM.¹

John Zamora, as a seventeen year old attending high school, on the verge of reaching the age of eighteen, was charged by the State of Idaho of violating I.C. § 18-8006 (aggravated DUI) and I.C. § 18-8007 (leaving the scene of an injury causing accident) under a petition pursuant to the Youth Rehabilitation Act. The State charged that he was the driver of a GMC Jimmy which was involved in a one vehicle accident wherein Zamora and two passengers in the vehicle were injured.

The State also petitioned the court for a waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. Magistrate Roy Holloway granted the motion. After the order waiving jurisdiction was entered, the State refiled the charges against Zamora, charging him as an adult.

Zamora appealed the magistrate’s order to the district court which, in affirming the waiver of jurisdiction, held that the juvenile court did not have original jurisdiction in this case because traffic violations are exempted from the Youth Rehabilitation Act (“YRA”). Even though the district court found the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction by operation of statute, it went on to affirm the order on the merits.

Zamora argues on appeal that: (1) the district court erred in concluding that the juvenile court did not have original jurisdiction over the cause; (2) the findings of the magistrate do not support the decision to waive jurisdiction; and (3) the magistrate did not conduct the “full investigation” required by I.C. § 16-1806.

The Court has concluded that the magistrate’s order should be affirmed for the reasons expressed below.

II. DISCUSSION

1. The Juvenile Court Had Original Jurisdiction Over This Cause Because Neither of The Charges Here Is a “Traffic Offense” as That Term is Used in I.C. § 16-1803.

Idaho Code § 16-1803 provides, in relevant part:

[T]he court shall have exclusive, original jurisdiction over any child and over any adult who was a child at the time of any act, omission or status ... in the following cases:

2. Where the act or omission is a violation of any federal, state, local or municipal law or ordinance which would be a crime if committed by an adult, regardless of where the same occurred, except traffic, watercraft ... [and] fish and game violations.

The district court found, and the State contends, that there is no juvenile jurisdiction over the charges alleged here because they are “traffic violations” for purposes of I.C. § 16-1803(2). After examining the relevant statutes, we conclude that the juvenile court did have original jurisdiction over the criminal charges alleged to have been committed by Zamora.

The phrase “traffic violation” is not defined in the YRA. See Idaho Code tit. 16, ch. 18 (Youth Rehabilitation Act of 1989). However, the Motor Vehicle Code, I.C. § 49-123(5), defines “violation” as “a conviction of a misdemeanor charge involving a moving traffic violation, or an admission or judicial determination of the commission of an infraction involving a moving traffic infraction____” The Penal Code defines the term somewhat differently, to wit: “[w]henever the word[ ] ... violation [is] used in the entire Idaho Code ... [it] shall be construed to mean a misdemeanor____” 1.C. § 18-111B. The offenses charged here are felonies.

Thus, even though it is not clear whether the legislature intends the term “violation” to mean a misdemeanor (per I.C. § 18-11 IB) or a misdemeanor or traffic infraction (per I.C. § 49-123(5)), it is clear that a felony is not included within either statute. Accordingly, we interpret I.C. § 16-1804 to divest the court of juvenile jurisdiction over traffic offenses which are misdemeanors (e.g., reckless driving), but not to divest the court of jurisdiction over traffic offenses which are felonies.² Otherwise stated, felony traffic offenses are not excluded from juvenile jurisdiction as traffic violations because felonies are not “violations” under the YRA.

We hold that the district court erred in holding that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over the charges laid against Zamora; hence the order waiving jurisdiction cannot be upheld on that basis. Nevertheless, the Court has determined that the order of the magistrate judge should be affirmed for the reasons expressed below.

2. The Magistrate’s Findings Support the Order.

An order waiving juvenile jurisdiction is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Christensen, 100 Idaho 631, 633, 603 P.2d 586, 588 (1979). To determine whether discretion has been abused, the Court must ascertain: first, whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one requiring the exercise of discretion; second, whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and, third, whether the court reached its conclusion by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).

The magistrate based his decision on I.C. § 16-1806(8), which provides:

(8) In considering whether or not to waive juvenile jurisdiction over the child, the juvenile court shall consider the following factors:

(a) The seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community requires isolation of the child beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities;

(b) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner;

(c) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons;

(d) The maturity of the child as determined by considerations of his home, environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living;

(e) The child’s record and previous history of contacts with the juvenile justice system;

(f) The likelihood of rehabilitation of the child by use of facilities available to the court;

(g) The amount of weight to be given to each of factors listed in subsection (8) of this section is discretionary with the court, and a determination that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile law may be based on any one or a combination of the factors set forth above, which shall be recited in the order of waiver.

The magistrate’s findings track the factors listed in I.C. § 16-1806(8). He found:

(a) that the offenses were of a substantially serious nature but that the protection of society did not necessarily require incarceration of Zamora;

(b) that the offenses were not committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or wilful manner but were the result of alcohol consumption exhibiting a gross disregard for the rights and safety of others;

(c) that the offense was against persons, but that Zamora did not intend to inflict injury upon the passengers in the truck;

(d) that Zamora is a mature, responsible individual who is married and living on his own;

(e) that Zamora has a ‘very good record’ and his previous contacts with the juvenile system were of ‘no particular concern’;

(f) that, although ‘the court [was] without specific information regarding the need for “rehabilitation” in this particular case,’ it appeared that the juvenile facilities available were not designed for an individual the age and maturity level of Zamora.

The magistrate noted that Zamora’s high level of maturity was a particularly compelling factor in his decision to waive juvenile jurisdiction. He wrote that “[t]his factor, coupled with the serious nature of the offenses, convinces this court that it is a compelling case for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction.”

In cases like this one, where a youth has allegedly committed an offense before reaching eighteen years of age but is not charged until after reaching adulthood, a court must first refer to I.C. § 16-1806(1) when deciding whether to waive jurisdiction. That section provides:

(1) After the filing of a petition and after full investigation and hearing, the court may waive jurisdiction under the youth rehabilitation act over the child and order the child to be held for adult criminal proceedings when:

(a) A child is alleged to have committed an act after he or she became fourteen (14) years of age which would be a crime if committed by an adult; or

(b) An adult at the time of the filing of the petition is alleged to have committed an act prior to his having become eighteen (18) years of age which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the court finds that the adult is not committable to an institution for the mentally deficient or mentally ill, is not treatable in any available institution or facility available to the state designed for the care and treatment of children, or that the safety of the community requires the adult continue under restraint; or

(c) An adult already under the jurisdiction of the court is alleged to have committed a crime while an adult.

The court, as a threshold matter, must determine whether the accused falls within subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c). Only those individuals who fall “into” or “within” one of those three categories are subject to waiver. If the accused falls within subsection (l)(a), the court may waive jurisdiction, but only after considering the subsection (8) factors (as noted above, subsection (8) contains the mandatory language “shall” in considering the factors listed when deciding whether to waive juvenile jurisdiction).

In this case, Zamora falls within subsection (l)(b) because the charged act occurred when he was seventeen, but he was not charged until he was eighteen. Pursuant to subsection (l)(b), the magistrate was required to find that: 1) Zamora was not committable to an institution for the mentally ill or deficient, 2) he was not treatable in the juvenile system, or, 3) the safety of the community required that Zamora remain under restraint before he could be considered for waiver. Instead, the magistrate focused exclusively on the subsection (8) factors and did not address the subsection (l)(b) factors at all. This error, however, did not prejudice Zamora because the magistrate, in considering subsection (8)(f) (the likelihood of rehabilitation by the use of facilities available to the court) found one of the required subsection (1) factors, that it appeared that Zamora could not benefit from any treatment programs available in the juvenile system. Because the magistrate made all of the findings required to waive jurisdiction, and because it appears that the magistrate’s failure to separately consider the subsection (l)(b) waiver factors before considering the subsection (8) factors had no effect on the magistrate’s ultimate decision, a reversal cannot be predicated upon that error.

We have reviewed the record and have determined that the magistrate was aware that the decision whether to waive jurisdiction was one of discretion; that he acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to it; and that he reached his decision by the exercise of reason. Based upon the factors set forth in Sun Valley Shopping Center, 119 Idaho at 94, 803 P.2d at 1001, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it waived jurisdiction based upon the seriousness of the offense and the maturity factor.

3. The Court Conducted the Required Investigation.

Zamora also argues that the court did not conduct a “full investigation” as required by I.C. § 16-1806. In Gibbs we said that “[a] valid waiver must be based on a specific finding, supported by substantial and competent evidence obtained in the “full investigation” required by statute, that the defendant is not amenable to rehabilitative treatment under the juvenile court jurisdiction.” State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 917, 500 P.2d 209, 218 (1972). Zamora notes that the investigation submitted to the court does not address Zamora’s need for rehabilitation or the rehabilitative services available to Zamora through the court.

Again, Gibbs does not control because of the 1977 amendments. At the time Gibbs was decided, there was no statutory definition of “full investigation.” We held as a matter of statutory interpretation that a full investigation must include information about the youth’s amenability to the treatment that is available to the youth through juvenile court. The 1977 amendment to the statute requires a “full and complete investigation” only “of the circumstances of the alleged offense____” I.C. § 16-1806(3). The magistrate here did order a full investigation of the circumstances of the alleged offenses, and considered the investigation before arriving at his ruling. Thus, he complied with I.C. § 16-1806(3).

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the magistrate’s order waiving jurisdiction and remand the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

1 . BOYLE, J. sat, but did not participate due to his resignation on March 31, 1992.

2 . All traffic infractions are excluded from juvenile jurisdiction because infractions are civil in nature. I.C. § 49-1502. Idaho Code § 16-1803 limits juvenile jurisdiction to acts which would be a crime if committed by an adult.