Zaji O. Zajradhara v. Scott Turner, in his official capacity; Kevin Cooke, in his official capacity; Rebecca Borja, in her official capacity; Claudette Fernandez, in her official capacity; and Does 1-10, in their official or individual capacities as HUD or NMHC employees

• Court: District Court, Northern Mariana Islands
• Decided: February 2, 2026
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00004
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

FILED Clerk District Court FEB 02 2026 1 for the Northern Mariana Islands (Deputy Clerk) 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 4 ZAJI O. ZAJRADHARA, Case No. 1:25-cv-00004 5 Plaintiff, 6 5 Vv. a SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING g || SCOTT TURNER, in his official capacity; | COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND KEVIN COOKE, in his official capacity; 9 REBECCA BORJA, in her official capacity; CLAUDETTE FERNANDEZ, in her official 10 capacity; and DOES 1-10, in their official or individual capacities as HUD or NMHC employees, 12 Defendants. 13 Before the Court is Plaintiff Zaji O. Zajradhara’s pro se complaint for damages and injunctive 14 relief asserting Bivens claims for alleged violations of his First Amendment and Fifth Amendment 15 6 rights,! and alleging that a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”) House

7 Resolution serves as an unconstitutional bill of attainder. (Compl., ECF No. 2.) Zajradhara brings ig ||these claims against four employees of the United States Department of Housing and Urban 19 20 21 ' Significant sections of the complaint also discuss the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Compl. 7-11, ECF No. 2.) 22 || However, that discussion arises in the context of Zajradhara’s characterization that the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”) is excluded from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 23 || (see id.), and accordingly, Zajradhara has not asserted any legal claims under the Fourteenth Amendment (see id. at 1-2, 16-18). Thus, the Court will not address any Fourteenth Amendment claims in this screening order. 24

Development (“HUD”)––Scott Turner, in his official capacity as Secretary of HUD, Kevin Cooke, in 1 his official capacity as General Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity 2 (“FHEO”) and Senior Community Planning and Development (“CPD”) Representative, Rebecca 3 4 Borja, in her official capacity as Senior CPD Representative, and Claudette Fernandez, in her official 5 capacity as General Deputy Assistant Secretary for CPD. (Id. at 1–3.) The complaint also names ten 6 Doe Defendants, “[s]ued in their official or individual capacities as HUD or [Northern Marianas 7 Housing Corporation (“NMHC”)] employees[.]” (Id.) Zajradhara claims to be indigent and seeks to 8 proceed in forma pauperis, asking this Court to waive the filing fees and payment of litigation costs. 9 (Id.; ECF No. 1.) The Court granted Zajradhara’s application to proceed in forma pauperis on July 17, 10 2025 and took the screening of his complaint under submission. (ECF No. 3.) 11 For the following reasons, the Court now DISMISSES Zajradhara’s complaint without 12 prejudice, and grants him leave to amend his complaint consistent with the provisions of this order. 13 14 I. BACKGROUND 15 The factual basis for Zajradhara’s Bivens claims is alleged “persistent discrimination by HUD 16 officials and NMHC, including exclusion from employment, denial of Community Development 17 Block Grant [(“CDBG”)] funding, and retaliation for exposing corruption and advocating for equitable 18 resource access . . . .”2 (Id. at 1.) With respect to employment discrimination, Zajradhara alleges that 19 20

21 2 The complaint provides information about numerous Memoranda of Understanding (“MOUs”) and agreements between federal agencies and the CNMI. (See id. at 4–7.) Zajradhara explains that “[t]hese MOUs 22 and agreements are central to understanding the scope of HUD’s obligations and the failures of its officials to uphold constitutional and statutory mandates.” (Id. at 2.) However, because Zajradhara has not alleged that he 23 has any enforceable legal right with respect to the agreements, the Court will only consider information about the agreements as part of the factual background for Zajradhara’s claims. he was discriminatorily denied employment “despite [his] exemplary qualifications” for three 1 positions between 2023 to 2024. (Id. at 3–4.) As evidence of “discriminatory animus[,]” Zajradhara 2 alleges that during an interview for one position on May 17, 2024, “an NMHC employee who had 3 4 previously used racial slurs against Plaintiff in a social setting was present . . . .” (Id. at 4.) With respect 5 to the denial of his applications for CDBG funding, Zajradhara alleges that he “submitted four CDBG 6 funding proposals in 2025, encountering delays and excuses.” (Id.) After requesting “an audit of 7 NMHC and HUD-Hawaii practices from Rebecca Borja” on February 25, 2025, Zajradhara alleges 8 that “[h]e received dismissive remarks about his English proficiency rather than a substantive 9 response.” (Id.) As to both the employment and funding denials, Zajradhara alleges that the “denials 10 intensified” after he engaged in protected First Amendment activities––namely, by raising nepotism 11 concerns on April 8, 2023, “filing a Fair Housing complaint (January 22, 2021), submitting public 12 comments (e.g., Regulations.gov, May 3, 2025), and requesting audits . . . .” (Id.) 13 14 Zajradhara’s bill of attainder claim is premised upon the CNMI legislature’s alleged adoption 15 of House Resolution (“HR”) 21-5, which declared “Zaji O. Zajradhara, formerly known as Steven Carl 16 Farmer, a persona non grata in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.” (Id. at 12.) The 17 complaint alleges that, “[t]hough styled as a resolution, HR 21-5 carries the force of law by directing 18 administrative actions––transmitted to the Governor, Attorney General, and Bureau of Immigration– 19 –that exclude Plaintiff from employment, funding, and residency rights.” (Id.) Zajradhara alleges that 20 the CNMI legislature passed HR 21-5 in retaliation for his whistleblowing regarding “corruption in 21 HUD’s CDBG programs, CW-1 visa fraud, ARPA/CARES ACT and mismanagement of disaster 22 relief funds post-Typhoon Yutu.” (Id. at 13.) Lastly, Zajradhara alleges that HR 21-5 “triggered 23 administrative actions: NMHC barred him from employment, and HUD-funded programs rejected his 1 applications.” (Id. at 12–13.) 2 Zajradhara seeks relief in the form of: 1) declaratory relief that HR 21-5 is void as a bill of 3 4 attainder; 2) injunctive relief permanently enjoining the enforcement of HR 21-5; 3) expungement of 5 related records; 4) compensatory damages of $2,400,000; 5) punitive damages on individual 6 defendants; 6) an order of compliance monitoring; and 7) declaratory relief that future “persona non 7 grata” designations are unconstitutional. (Id. at 17.) 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 Because this is a civil action initiated by a pro se party filing in forma pauperis, the Court will 10 screen the complaint to determine if the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which 11 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 12 2000) (en banc), overruled in part on other grounds by, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 13 14 2014). A complaint fails to state a claim if it lacks a cognizable legal theory or does not allege enough 15 facts under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 16 1988). As a baseline requirement, a complaint must include a “short and plain statement of the claim 17 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint need not include 18 detailed allegations, but it must contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed- 19 me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, “a complaint must contain 20 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. 21 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the 22 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 23 is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 1 “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards 2 than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal 3 4 citation omitted). Even under the heightened Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard, the “‘obligation’ 5 remains, ‘where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings 6 liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.’” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th 7 Cir. 2010) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). However, the court 8 “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Pena v. Gardner, 976 9 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal citation omitted). Leave to amend should be granted “if it 10 appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect” in the complaint. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 11 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 14 The Court must first consider whether it has jurisdiction over Zajradhara’s claims. Under 28 15 U.S.C. § 1331, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under 16 the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” As discussed in greater detail below, the Court 17 finds that it lacks jurisdiction over all of Zajradhara’s claims: 1) Zajradhara fails to state Bivens claims 18 against the Defendants in their official capacities because Bivens actions may only be brought against 19 federal officials in their individual capacities; 2) Zajradhara fails to state Bivens claims against the 20 Doe Defendants in their individual capacities because his allegations are insufficiently specific; and 21 3) Zajradhara’s bill of attainder claim fails because it is improperly alleged under Article I, Section 9 22 23 of the United States Constitution and Zajradhara has not provided sufficient evidence that HR 21-5 1 was enacted into law. 2 A. The complaint fails to state Bivens claims against the Defendants who are sued in their 3 official capacities. 4 “Bivens created a remedy for violations of constitutional rights committed by federal officials 5 acting in their individual capacities.” Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United 6 States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007). “In a paradigmatic Bivens action, a plaintiff seeks to 7 impose personal liability upon a federal official based on alleged constitutional infringements he or 8 9 she committed against the plaintiff.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “[A] Bivens action can be 10 maintained against a defendant in his or her individual capacity only, and not in his or her official 11 capacity.” Id. (quoting Daly–Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir.1987)). “This is because 12 a Bivens suit against a defendant in his or her official capacity would merely be another way of 13 pleading an action against the United States, which would be barred by the doctrine of sovereign 14 immunity.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Here, because Zajradhara has sued all Defendants in their 15 official capacities (Compl. 1–2 (suit against “Defendants in their professional capacities to ensure 16 governmental accountability without imposing personal financial burdens on individual defendants”)) 17 and the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity in this case, the Court lacks jurisdiction 18 19 to consider Zajradhara’s Bivens claims against all Defendants in their official capacities. 20 Even if Zajradhara had properly brought his Bivens claims against the Defendants in their 21 individual capacities, the Court is skeptical of the linkage between the named Defendants and the 22 alleged violations of Zajradhara’s constitutional rights set forth in the complaint. “To state a claim, 23 Plaintiff must link each named defendant to a violation of his constitutional rights; there is no respondeat superior liability under Bivens.” Lopez-Rangel v. Copenhaver, No. 1:14-CV-01175 DLB 1 PC, 2016 WL 8730721, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2016) (citing Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–08 2 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012); Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 3 4 2010)). Here, Zajradhara has failed to allege any specific facts against each of the named Defendants. 5 The complaint alleges that the named Defendants “personally contributed to [constitutional] violations 6 by failing to investigate or remedy known discriminatory practices, despite their supervisory roles and 7 legal obligations,” but has not offered any specific facts establishing that the named Defendants indeed 8 knew about Zajradhara’s alleged whistleblowing activity,3 his applications for employment and 9 funding, or the ultimate denials of his applications.4 “Legal conclusions, without factual support, are 10 insufficient to state a claim.” Id. 11 12 13 14 3 Zajradhara only alleges specific facts with respect to Defendant Rebecca Borja’s knowledge of alleged 15 whistleblowing activity––namely, that Zajradhara had “requested an audit for NMHC and HUD-Hawaii practices from Rebecca Borja” and “received dismissive remarks about his English proficiency rather than a 16 substantive response.” (Compl. 4.) Notwithstanding these allegations, the Court is concerned about the lack of evidence regarding Defendant Borja’s knowledge of Zajradhara’s employment and funding applications, and 17 the ultimate denials of those applications.

18 4 Zajradhara also appears to rely on the CNMI Legislature’s alleged adoption of HR 21-5 to support his Bivens claims against the named Defendants––federal employees. (See Compl. 12.) The complaint alleges that, 19 “[t]hough styled as a resolution, HR 21-5 carries the force of law by directing administrative actions–– transmitted to the Governor, Attorney General, and Bureau of Immigration––that exclude Plaintiff from 20 employment, funding, and residency rights.” (Id.) Again, the Court fails to see how HR 21-5––a CNMI House Resolution––is linked to the federal Defendants named in this case. Further, as the Court has expressed on prior 21 occasion in another action brought by Zajradhara, the Court is skeptical of Zajradhara’s legal conclusion that HR 21-5, a House Resolution and not a public law based on its own title, “carries the force of law.” See N. Mar. 22 I. Const. art. II, § 5(c) (“The legislature may not enact a law except by bill and no bill may be enacted without the approval of at least a majority of the votes cast in each house of legislature.”) (Atalig SAC Scr. Order 12– 23 14, ECF No. 15 in 1:22-cv-00014.) To the extent Zajradhara wishes to rely on HR 21-5 to support his first amended complaint, he is directed to file a copy of the Resolution that shows its passage into a public law. Accordingly, Zajradhara’s Bivens claims against all Defendants in their official capacities are 1 DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to amend consistent with the provisions of and 2 concerns raised in this order. 3 4 B. The complaint fails to state Bivens claims against Doe Defendants one through ten in their individual capacities. 5 After dismissing Zajradhara’s Bivens claims against all Defendants in their official capacities, 6 only Zajradhara’s Bivens claims against Doe Defendants one through ten in their individual capacities 7 remain. The complaint describes the Doe Defendants as “unidentified employees of HUD or NMHC 8 9 who participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. . . . [T]hey include staff involved in program 10 administration, complaint processing, and oversight in the CNMI and Honolulu offices.” (Compl. 3.) 11 Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff to include the names of 12 all parties sued in an action. “As a practical matter, it is impossible for the United States Marshal to 13 serve a summons and complaint on an anonymous defendant.” Grindling v. Cnty. of Maui Doe 14 Prosecutors 1-10, Civ. No. 18-00235 JMS-RLP, 2018 WL 3213605, at *2 (D. Haw. June 29, 2018). 15 “The use of doe defendants is therefore disfavored in federal court.” Id. (citing Gillespie v. Civiletti, 16 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). Although a plaintiff may refer to unknown defendants as doe 17 defendants, “he must allege facts to show how each individual doe defendant violated the plaintiff’s 18 19 constitutional rights.” Id. at *3. Here, the complaint alleges that Doe Defendants one through ten 20 “participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct” (Compl. 3) but “fails to allege how each 21 individual Doe [Defendant] violated [Zajradhara’s] rights . . . based on any other specific conduct.” 22 See id. Thus, Zajradhara fails to state a claim against Doe Defendants one through ten in their 23 individual capacities, and these claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with leave to amend. Zajradhara may reallege claims against the Doe Defendants in their individual capacities, but 1 “he must allege specific facts showing what each particular Doe Defendant did to violate his rights.” 2 See id. 3 4 C. The complaint fails to allege a bill of attainder claim based on HR 21-5. 5 As an initial matter, Zajradhara’s bill of attainder claim improperly relies upon Article I, 6 Section 9 of the United States Constitution, which states in pertinent part that “[n]o Bill of Attainder 7 or ex post facto Law shall be passed.” Section 9 addresses acts of Congress, not state governments. 8 See SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The Constitution 9 instructs Congress that ‘No Bill of Attainder … shall be passed.’”). Article I, Section 10 prohibits 10 states from passing “any Bill of Attainder[.]” 11 Even if the Court were to construe the complaint to allege a claim under Article I, Section 10, 12 which prohibits a state from passing any bill of attainder, Zajradhara’s bill of attainder claim still fails. 13 14 “[A]n impermissible bill of attainder is presented when a legislature passes a statute that inflicts a 15 punishment on specified persons without a judicial trial.” Lewis v. Nevada, No. 3:13-CV-00312- 16 MMD-WGC, 2014 WL 65799, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 7, 2014) (emphasis omitted) (citing SeaRiver, 309 17 F.3d at 668–69). As noted supra, § III.A. n.4, the Court finds that Zajradhara has not provided 18 sufficient evidence that HR 21-5, a House Resolution based on its own title, has been enacted into law 19 by the CNMI legislature––notwithstanding Zajradhara’s conclusory assertion that HR 21-5 “carries 20 the force of law” (see Compl. 12). See N. Mar. I. Const. art. II, § 5(c) (“The legislature may not enact 21 a law except by bill and no bill may be enacted without the approval of at least a majority of the votes 22 cast in each house of legislature.”) (See also Atalig SAC Scr. Order 12–14.) If Zajradhara wishes to 23 rely on HR 21-5 to support a bill of attainder claim properly brought under Article I, Section 10 of the

5 United States Constitution in his first amended complaint, he is directed to file a copy of the Resolution

3 || and evidence of its passage into law. 4 ||} IV. CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, Zajradhara’s complaint fails to state a Bivens and bill of attainder 6 |) claim against all Defendants, and is therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If Zajradhara 7 |! seeks to pursue any claim, he must file a first amended complaint no later than March 4, 2026. In his first amended complaint, Zajradhara must cure any deficiencies noted in this order and allege sufficient facts regarding each named Defendant if he seeks to establish any liability on them. Further, to the extent Zajradhara wishes to rely on HR 21-5 to support any claims, he is directed to file a copy of the

Resolution along with any indicia of its passage into law with his first amended complaint. Failure to

13. || comply with the provisions of this order may result in dismissal of this case with prejudice. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED this 2nd day of February, 2026. 15

RAMONA V. MANGLONA Chief Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 10