BLD-113 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 21-3209 ___________
ZACHARY CHAMBERS, Appellant
v.
WARDEN ALLENWOOD FCI ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-21-cv-01654) District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner ____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 March 31, 2022
Before: MCKEE, GREENAWAY, JR. and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 5, 2022) _________
OPINION* _________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Zachary Chambers, a federal prisoner incarcerated in Pennsylvania, appeals pro se
from the order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the
following reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in 2013, Chambers was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 5 kilograms or
more of cocaine, 280 grams or more of crack cocaine base, and marijuana, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; and attempted possession with the intent to distribute
500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and 18
U.S.C. § 2. The District Court sentenced him to 330 months’ imprisonment followed by
five years’ supervised release. We affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
See United States v. Chambers, 587 F. App’x 22, 26 (3d Cir. 2014).
In 2015, Chambers filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and withholding
of evidence by the prosecution. The District Court denied his motion, but we granted him
a certificate of appealability and remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing on one of
his claims. Following that hearing, the District Court again denied Chambers’s motion,
and we declined to issue him a certificate of appealability. See United States v.
2 Chambers, No. 17-3358 (3d Cir. Jan. 18), 2018 WL 11395021, cert. denied 139 S. Ct.
435 (2018).
In September 2021, Chambers filed the instant § 2241 petition, in which he claims
that a change in law brought about by Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019),
renders invalid the imposition of a sentencing enhancement for possession of a firearm
during the commission of the offenses for which he was convicted. See U.S. Sent’g
Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2012). The District Court
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that it could not entertain the
§ 2241 petition because § 2255 was not an inadequate or ineffective remedy for
Chambers to challenge his detention. Chambers timely filed a notice of appeal and a
response to our notice of possible summary action.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and review its factual findings for clear
error. See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per
curiam). We may summarily affirm a District Court’s decision “on any basis supported
by the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. Murray v. Bledsoe, 650
F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Motions under § 2255 are generally the presumptive means by which federal
prisoners may collaterally challenge their sentences. See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S.
333, 343 (1974); Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). A habeas
3 corpus petition brought by a federal prisoner under § 2241 accordingly “shall not be
entertained” unless a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of [the petitioner’s] detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). This exception, known as
the “safety-valve clause,” is narrow and applies “where the petitioner demonstrates that
some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording
[the petitioner] a full hearing and adjudication of [the] wrongful detention claim.” Cradle,
290 F.3d at 538. We have found such circumstances exist only in rare situations, such as
where a petitioner has “had no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime
that an intervening change in substantive law may negate.” In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d
245, 252 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Cordaro v. United States, 933 F.3d 232, 239 (3d Cir.
2019).
While Chambers invokes the Dorsainvil rule, he has not demonstrated such a
limitation. As the District Court noted, he has not alleged any change in statutory
interpretation that would render the conduct for which he was convicted non-criminal.
See Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 2017). Chambers does
not challenge his conviction. He alleges only that the sentencing enhancement for
possession of a firearm during the commission of his offenses now cannot apply to him
based on Rehaif, where the Supreme Court held that “in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he
4 possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons
barred from possessing a firearm.” 139 S. Ct. at 2200.
This argument is unavailing. Chambers was not charged with or convicted of an
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), so Rehaif is inapplicable to him by its
terms. Nor can his argument be construed to advocate for a logical extension of Rehaif,
because the sentencing guideline enhancement in question does not require the defendant
to have been convicted of any prior offense, occupy any particular status, or have
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
BLD-113 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 21-3209 ___________
ZACHARY CHAMBERS, Appellant
v.
WARDEN ALLENWOOD FCI ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-21-cv-01654) District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner ____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 March 31, 2022
Before: MCKEE, GREENAWAY, JR. and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 5, 2022) _________
OPINION* _________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Zachary Chambers, a federal prisoner incarcerated in Pennsylvania, appeals pro se
from the order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the
following reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in 2013, Chambers was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 5 kilograms or
more of cocaine, 280 grams or more of crack cocaine base, and marijuana, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; and attempted possession with the intent to distribute
500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and 18
U.S.C. § 2. The District Court sentenced him to 330 months’ imprisonment followed by
five years’ supervised release. We affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
See United States v. Chambers, 587 F. App’x 22, 26 (3d Cir. 2014).
In 2015, Chambers filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and withholding
of evidence by the prosecution. The District Court denied his motion, but we granted him
a certificate of appealability and remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing on one of
his claims. Following that hearing, the District Court again denied Chambers’s motion,
and we declined to issue him a certificate of appealability. See United States v.
2 Chambers, No. 17-3358 (3d Cir. Jan. 18), 2018 WL 11395021, cert. denied 139 S. Ct.
435 (2018).
In September 2021, Chambers filed the instant § 2241 petition, in which he claims
that a change in law brought about by Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019),
renders invalid the imposition of a sentencing enhancement for possession of a firearm
during the commission of the offenses for which he was convicted. See U.S. Sent’g
Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2012). The District Court
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that it could not entertain the
§ 2241 petition because § 2255 was not an inadequate or ineffective remedy for
Chambers to challenge his detention. Chambers timely filed a notice of appeal and a
response to our notice of possible summary action.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and review its factual findings for clear
error. See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per
curiam). We may summarily affirm a District Court’s decision “on any basis supported
by the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. Murray v. Bledsoe, 650
F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Motions under § 2255 are generally the presumptive means by which federal
prisoners may collaterally challenge their sentences. See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S.
333, 343 (1974); Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). A habeas
3 corpus petition brought by a federal prisoner under § 2241 accordingly “shall not be
entertained” unless a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of [the petitioner’s] detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). This exception, known as
the “safety-valve clause,” is narrow and applies “where the petitioner demonstrates that
some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording
[the petitioner] a full hearing and adjudication of [the] wrongful detention claim.” Cradle,
290 F.3d at 538. We have found such circumstances exist only in rare situations, such as
where a petitioner has “had no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime
that an intervening change in substantive law may negate.” In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d
245, 252 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Cordaro v. United States, 933 F.3d 232, 239 (3d Cir.
2019).
While Chambers invokes the Dorsainvil rule, he has not demonstrated such a
limitation. As the District Court noted, he has not alleged any change in statutory
interpretation that would render the conduct for which he was convicted non-criminal.
See Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 2017). Chambers does
not challenge his conviction. He alleges only that the sentencing enhancement for
possession of a firearm during the commission of his offenses now cannot apply to him
based on Rehaif, where the Supreme Court held that “in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he
4 possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons
barred from possessing a firearm.” 139 S. Ct. at 2200.
This argument is unavailing. Chambers was not charged with or convicted of an
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), so Rehaif is inapplicable to him by its
terms. Nor can his argument be construed to advocate for a logical extension of Rehaif,
because the sentencing guideline enhancement in question does not require the defendant
to have been convicted of any prior offense, occupy any particular status, or have
knowledge of either.1 See § 2D1.1(b)(1) (instructing courts to increase the offense level
by two levels “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed” by the
defendant during the commission of an offense of conviction for unlawful manufacturing,
importing, exporting, or trafficking of drugs); see generally United States v. Denmark, 13
F.4th 315, 318–321 (3d Cir. 2021) (discussing the required proof and procedure for
imposing the enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1)); U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1
cmt. n.11 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2012).2 We are unconvinced by Chambers’s petition that
Rehaif has any impact on the applicability of this enhancement to him.3
1 We acknowledge Chambers’s evidence that there was some discussion of his prior convictions at his sentencing hearing. See Mem. L. Supp. § 2241 Pet., ECF No. 2 at 12– 13, 18–19. However, the transcript also indicates that his history was “not being introduced [by the Government at sentencing] in support of that enhancement . . . . It’s being introduced as part of the defendant’s conduct, his nature and characteristics that the court can take into consideration” under the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. Id. at 14–15. 2 However, we find it unnecessary to decide whether a change in statutory interpretation 5 For the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails to present a substantial question, and
we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
that does affect the Sentencing Guidelines might ever implicate the safety-valve clause of § 2255. See United States v. Doe, 810 F.3d 132, 160–61 (3d Cir. 2015). 3 To the extent that Chambers argues for unrelated reasons that the enhancement should not apply to him—such as that there was either insufficient nexus between the gun possession and the drug trafficking, or insufficient evidence to support the enhancement—such arguments were available to him on direct appeal and his remedies under § 2255 are not inadequate or ineffective within the meaning of the safety valve. 6