Yvonne Barbara Alvarado v. General Motors, Inc.

Opinion

1 2

4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8

9 10 YVONNE BARBARA ALVARADO, Case No. 2:25-cv-09414-MAR 11 Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND, DKT. 10

14 Defendant. 15 16 I. 18 Plaintiff Yvonne Barbara Alvarado (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action in Los 19 Angeles County Superior Court on April 3, 2025. ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1-1 20 (“Complaint”). Defendant removed the matter to this Court several months later, on 21 October 2, 2025. Dkt. 1 (“Notice of Removal”). Plaintiff now moves to remand to 22 state court, arguing that Defendant’s removal was untimely. Dkt. 10. For the reasons 23 stated below, the motion is DENIED. 24 II. 26 On April 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Los Angeles County Superior 27 Court alleging violations of California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, 1 Complaint also alleged a single cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 2 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. eq. Id. at 16. The Complaint alleged that Plaintiff 3 purchased a 2020 Chevrolet Colorado manufactured by Defendant General Motors, 4 Inc. (“GM”), and that the vehicle was covered by a GM warranty. Id. at 13. Plaintiff 5 further alleged that, although the vehicle suffered from transmission and engine 6 defects, GM failed to repair or replace the vehicle, as required under the warranty. Id. 7 Although the Complaint’s cover sheet indicated that Plaintiff was demanding 8 an amount that “exceeds $35,000,” the Complaint itself did not state the amount of 9 damages sought, the amount paid for the vehicle, or any other figure. Compl. at 4. 10 The Complaint’s prayer for relief, however, did seek actual damages, restitution, “a 11 civil penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s actual damages,” consequential and 12 incidental damages, attorneys’ fees, and prejudgment interest. Id. at 17. 13 On October 2, 2025 Defendant removed the matter to this Court pursuant to 14 28 U.S.C. §§ 1336 and 1446. Notice of Removal (“NOR”) at 1. Defendant 15 represented that, sometime in the thirty days prior to its filing of the Notice of 16 Removal, GM’s own investigation revealed that the matter was removable from state 17 court. Id. at 2. Plaintiff now moves to remand to state court, arguing that (1) 18 Defendant’s removal was untimely, and (2) Defendant has failed to establish that the 19 amount in controversy requirement is met. Motion (Dkt. 10) at 4, 9. 22 District courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions “arising under the 23 laws . . . of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and over “all civil actions where the 24 matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 25 costs, and is between citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). A defendant 26 may remove a case from state court to federal court if the case could have originally 27 been filed in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The case must, however, be 1 remanded to state court if, at any time before final judgment, it appears that the 2 federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Int’l Primate 3 Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 87 (1991). Federal courts 4 “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” such that any 5 doubt as to the propriety of removal is resolved in favor of remanding the case to 6 state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). A removing 7 defendant bears the burden of proving federal jurisdiction. See Luther v. 8 Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008); Gaus, 9 980 F.2d at 566. 10 IV. 13 In general, a defendant seeking to remove a state case to federal court must file 14 a notice of removal within thirty days of receiving the state court complaint. 28 15 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) (“The notice of removal . . . shall be filed 16 within 30 days after the receipt . . . of the initial pleading.”). But where the allegations 17 of an initial complaint are not sufficient to establish removability, the statute provides 18 a “second pathway to removal” upon later “receipt by the defendant . . . of an 19 amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be 20 ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” Dietrich v. 21 Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2021); 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). In such 22 instances, the defendant must file a notice of removal within thirty days of receipt of 23 any such document establishing removability. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Although this 24 time limit is not jurisdictional, it “is mandatory[,] and a timely objection to a late 25 petition will defeat removal.” Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 26 (9th Cir. 1980). But “[b]eyond those two deadlines, a defendant may remove a case 27 [even] where it could have demonstrated removability earlier based on its [own] 1 knowledge beyond the pleadings.” Gomez v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 2:24-CV- 2 09020-SVW, 2025 WL 26368, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2025) (quoting Kuxhausen v. 3 BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1141 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal 4 quotation marks omitted); see also Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 5 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]hese two periods do not otherwise affect the time 6 during which a defendant may remove.”) (emphasis original). 7 Here, Plaintiff argues that because her federal Magnuson-Moss claim was 8 apparent from the face of the Complaint, Defendant was required to take the “first 9 pathway to removal” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1090; 10 Mot. at 4. And, the argument goes, because Defendant’s October 2 removal came far 11 more than thirty days after service of the initial Complaint, remand is required. Mot. 12 at 5. As Plaintiff only implicitly acknowledges, however, even though a federal 13 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“the Act”) claim arises under the laws of the United 14 States, “no claim shall be cognizable in a suit brought under [the Act] . . . if the 15 amount in controversy is less than the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests 16 and costs) computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in this suit.” 15 17 U.S.C.A. § 2310(d). Thus, “[b]efore subject matter jurisdiction can be invoked by the 18 federal courts under the Act, . . . a plaintiff must meet an amount in controversy 19 requirement of $50,000.” Romo v. FFG Ins. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1239 (C.D. 20 Cal. 2005); see also Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 377 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 21 2004) (“The Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act permits a consumer . . . to sue in United 22 States district court provided that the amount in controversy is not less than the sum 23 or value of $50,000.”) (internal quotation mark and alteration omitted); Khachatryan 24 v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. CV 21-1290 PA (PDX), 2021 WL 927266, at *2 (C.D. 25 Cal. Mar. 10, 2021) (“Put another way, federal courts only have jurisdiction over 26 Magnuson-Moss claims if the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.”). 27 1 The question, then, is whether the Complaint made clear that Plaintiff’s 2 Magnuson-Moss claim involved an amount in controversy over $50,000. See 3 Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1090. “There is nothing in the text of the Magnuson–Moss Act 4 that would indicate that the amount in controversy for that statute is assessed any 5 differently than the diversity jurisdiction requirement found in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.” 6 Romo, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. Although Plaintiff’s asserts that “it is impossible to 7 believe that Defendant could not ascertain the amount in controversy exceeded 8 $50,000,” the Court disagrees. Mot. at 6:13-14. First, although Plaintiff essentially 9 repeats the prayer for relief’s claims for damages, penalties, and fees, she concedes 10 that the “complaint does not allege a specific dollar amount in controversy.” Id. at 11 6:12. Second, to the extent Plaintiff argues that an amount over $50,000 can be 12 inferred or ascertained from the conjunction of the relief sought with the “explicit” 13 allegation “that Plaintiff’s claims arise out of his [sic] purchase of a new 2020 14 Chevrolet Colorado,” Plaintiff misstates her own allegations. Mot. at 6:15-16. 15 Contrary to Plaintiff’s characterization, the Complaint at no point alleges that she 16 purchased a new vehicle. Rather, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff purchased her 17 2020 model-year vehicle in May 2022, suggesting that Plaintiff purchased the vehicle 18 used.1 Complaint ¶ 9. As such, the Complaint provides no clear basis to conclude 19 that the $50,000 threshold for Magnuson-Moss jurisdiction is met. Absent such an 20 indication, Defendant was not required to remove the matter to this Court within 21 thirty days of receiving Plaintiff’s Complaint. 22 Plaintiff also appears to suggest that Defendant missed the “second pathway” 23 to removal. Mot. at 8. As stated above, even if removability is not apparent from the 24 initial complaint, the “second pathway” requires a defendant to remove within thirty 25

26 1 Defendant, moreover, has submitted the vehicle Retail Installment Sale Contract (“RISC”), which clearly indicates that Plaintiff purchased a used vehicle with 21,841 27 miles on it at the time of purchase. Declaration of Thomas V. Wynsma in Opposition 1 days of receiving “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it 2 may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” 3 Dietrich., 14 F.4th at 1090; 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). According to Plaintiff, GM’s 4 failure to identify any such “other paper” “renders Defendant’s justification facially 5 deficient.” Mot. at 9:2. This argument mischaracterizes the Notice of Removal and 6 mistakenly attempts to impose timing restrictions regardless of the fact that Plaintiff 7 did not (or does not claim to have) served or provided Defendant with any other 8 paper from which removability could have been ascertained. As explained above, 9 aside from the thirty-day requirement applicable to the first and second removal 10 pathways, “a defendant may remove a case [even] where it could have demonstrated 11 removability earlier based on its knowledge beyond the pleadings.” Gomez, 2025 WL 12 26368, at *2 (quoting Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1141 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal 13 quotation marks omitted); see also Roth, 720 F.3d at 1123 (“[T]hese two periods do 14 not otherwise affect the time during which a defendant may remove.”) (emphasis 15 original). As stated in the Notice of Removal, Defendant determined that this matter 16 was removable through GM’s own investigation, not from any paper provided by 17 Plaintiff. NOR at 2. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, [A] defendant may “remove outside the two thirty-day periods on the 18 basis of its own information, provided that it has not run afoul of either 19 of the thirty-day deadlines. For good reason, § 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) place strict limits on a defendant who is put on notice of removability by a 20 plaintiff. A defendant should not be able to ignore pleadings or other 21 documents from which removability may be ascertained and seek removal only when it becomes strategically advantageous for it to do so. But 22 neither should a plaintiff be able to prevent or delay removal by failing to 23 reveal information showing removability and then objecting to removal when the defendant has discovered that information on its own.” 24 Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125 (emphasis added). 25 Defendant has adequately demonstrated that its removal was timely. 26 /// 27 2 Even where removal is timely, however, a removing defendant bears the 3 burden of proving federal jurisdiction. Luther, 533 F.3d at 1034; Gaus, 980 F.2d at 4 566. Somewhat counterintuitively, in light of her primary argument that the 5 Complaint did clearly indicate an amount in controversy greater than $50,000, Plaintiff 6 proceeds to also argue that Defendant has not demonstrated that the amount in 7 controversy exceeds $50,000. Mot. at 9. The Court disagrees. 8 Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks, among other things, actual damages, civil penalties, 9 and attorney’s fees. Compl. at 17. “Actual damages under the Song-Beverly Act are 10 equal to the actual price paid or payable by the buyer, minus the reduction in value 11 directly attributable to use by the buyer.” Lukas v. Gen. Motors, LLC., No. 2:25-CV- 12 08305-WLH-MAA, 2025 WL 3456648, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2025) (quoting Cal. 13 Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)–(C) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff who 14 shows a willful violation of the Song-Beverly Act may recover a civil penalty of up to 15 two times the amount of actual damages. Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c). A prevailing 16 plaintiff is also entitled to attorney’s fees. Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). 17 The RISC indicates a total sale price for the vehicle of $45,845.25 and a “total 18 cash price” of $30.988.00, exclusive of accessories. Wynsma Decl., Ex A. Defendant 19 has also submitted the entire dealer repair history for the subject vehicle, which 20 includes the vehicle mileage at the time of each service visit. Wynsma Decl., Ex B. 21 Mileage bears on actual damages insofar as it translates to a reduction in a vehicle’s 22 value attributable to a “buyer prior to the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle . . . 23 for correction of the problem that gave rise to the [warranty dispute].” Cal. Civ. Code 24 § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). By statute, that reduction in value is calculated “by multiplying the 25 actual price of the new motor vehicle . . . by a fraction having as its denominator 26 27 1 120,000 and having as its numerator the number of miles traveled.”2 Id. Thus, the 2 higher the mileage, the higher the reduction in value, and the lower a plaintiff’s actual 3 damages. 4 Here, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has “arbitrarily chosen a repair visit,” and 5 associated mileage figure, without demonstrating that that visit represents Plaintiff’s 6 first attempt to repair the defect alleged. Reply at. 2:20. Not so. The repair history 7 lists but a single attempted dealer repair during the time of Plaintiff’s ownership of the 8 vehicle, on January 7, 2025. Wynsma Decl., Ex. B. at 1. The basis for Plaintiff’s 9 argument that “[t]emporally, it’s unclear whether this was, indeed, the first repair visit 10 for this alleged defect” is therefore not apparent to the Court. Reply at 3:10-11. The 11 next most recent entry on the service history, for “factory maintenance,” is dated June 12 9, 2020, approximately two years before Plaintiff alleges that she purchased the 13 vehicle. Id. at 2. Thus, Defendant’s “choice” of the January 7, 2025 repair date was 14 hardly arbitrary, but rather was the only possible option. At the time of the January 7, 15 2025 repair attempt, Plaintiff’s vehicle had 56,688 miles on the odometer. Wynsma 16 Decl., Ex. B. at 1. Plaintiff purchased the vehicle with 21,841 miles on it. Wynsma 17 Decl., Ex. A. Therefore, 34,847 miles are attributable to Plaintiff prior to the time she 18 first brought the vehicle in for a warranty repair. 19 In determining the starting value of a vehicle, courts often look to the “total 20 cash price” as the “most appropriate measure of actual damages.” Cabrera v. FCA US 21 LLC, No. EDCV-21-1501-JGBS, 2022 WL 310133, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2022); see 22 also Luna v. FCA US LLC, No. 21-CV-01230-LHK, 2021 WL 4893567, at *7 (N.D. 23 Cal. Oct. 20, 2021) (explaining difficulty of determining finance charges actually paid). 24

2 “The Ninth Circuit has held that § 1446(b)(1) requires a defendant to apply a 26 reasonable amount of intelligence in ascertaining removability[,] and that multiplying figures . . . is an aspect of that duty.” Perry v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:24-CV-03197- 27 WLH-MAR, 2024 WL 3879142, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2024) (quoting Kuxhausen, 1 Here, that figure is $30,988. Wynsma Decl., Ex. B. at 1. The corresponding 2 reduction in value attributable to mileage is $8,998.66, resulting in a vehicle value of 3 $21,999.34 at the time of the first repair attempt.3 Defendant also represents, and 4 Plaintiff does not appear to dispute, that a further offset of $800 applies.4 See Stewart 5 v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 2:25-CV-07153-SPG-MAA, 2025 WL 2848991, at *3 (C.D. 6 Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) (describing statutory offsets for rebates, unpaid finance charges, 7 etc.) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 871.27). Plaintiff’s actual damages, therefore, total 8 $21,199.34.5 9 Those damages alone do not cross the $50,000 jurisdictional threshold for a 10 Magnuson-Moss claim. Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, also seeks civil penalties of up 11 to two times Plaintiff’s actual damages. “The Ninth Circuit routinely considers civil 12 penalties when deciding whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been 13 satisfied.” Wang v. FCA US LLC, No. 8:24-CV-02060-JWH-KES, 2025 WL 14 1218745, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2025) (collecting cases). Taking those penalties 15 into account yields a figure of $63,598.02, an amount sufficient to establish the 16 requisite amount in controversy to bring a Magnuson-Moss claim, even without 17 consideration of the attorney’s fees and other monetary relief Plaintiff seeks. 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 22

3 $30,988 - (34,847 miles/120,000 miles) = $8,998.66. 24 4 Defendant identifies this as an “optional third party contract,” (Opp. at 19:16-17), 25 which is listed on the RISC as “Debt Cancellation Agreement.” Wynsma Decl., Ex. A. 26 5 Although Defendant’s calculations match the Court’s with respect to mileage offsets, Defendant proceeds to examine finance charges and perform a series of 27 calculations that are not clear to the Court to arrive at a damages figure of $28,040.88. 1 V. 3 Because the amount in controversy was not clear from the four corners of 4 | Plaintiffs initial Complaint, Defendant’s removal to this Court was not untimely. 5 | Defendant has, however, demonstrated that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act’s 6 | $50,000 jurisdictional threshold is satisfied here. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to 7 | Remand is DENIED. 8 9 | Dated: February 19, 2026 10 HONORABEE MARGO A. ROCCONI United States Magistrate Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10