UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ZAINAB YUSUFF, Pro Se Plaintiff, v. Civ. Action No. 25-00309(EGS)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Zainab Yusuff (“Ms. Yusuff”) sued Defendant
District of Columbia (“the District”) for unlawful employment
practices in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia
(“D.C. Superior Court”), case number 2024-CAB-005229. On
February 3, 2025, the District removed Ms. Yusuff’s case to this
Court. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.1 Now pending before the
Court are: (1) Ms. Yusuff’s Motion to Remand to State Court
(“Motion to Remand”), see Pl.’s Mot. to Remand to State Court
(“Mot. to Remand”), ECF No. 12; and (2) the District’s Motion to
Dismiss Ms. Yusuff’s Amended Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”),
see Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot. to Dismiss”), ECF No. 15. Upon
careful consideration of the motions, the oppositions thereto,
the replies, and the entire record, Ms. Yusuff’s Motion to
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the page number of the filed document. 1 Remand is DENIED and the District’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED
IN PART, and Ms. Yusuff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
I. Background
A. D.C. Superior Court Litigation
As set forth in her Amended Complaint, Ms. Yusuff
previously worked for various District agencies. See Def.’s Ex.
1 to Notice of Removal (“Def.’s Ex. 1”), ECF No. 1-2 at 661.2 She
claims that “her employment was marred by retaliatory actions,
discriminatory practices, and psychological abuse.” Id. On
August 16, 2024, Ms. Yusuff filed a complaint, pro se, in the
Civil Division of the D.C. Superior Court against the District
and District agencies, specifically the Alcoholic Beverage and
Cannabis Administration (“ABCA”); Board of Ethics and Government
Accountability (“BEGA”); Department of Insurance, Securities,
and Banking (“DISB”); Office of Employee Appeals (“OEA”);
Department of Human Resources (“DCHR”); and Office of Human
Rights (“OHR”). See id. at 2, 637.3
On November 12, 2024, the District filed a Motion to
Dismiss in D.C. Superior Court. See id. at 570-80. It argued
2 The District filed the documents from Ms. Yusuff’s D.C. Superior Court case as Exhibit 1 to its Notice of Removal. See Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-2. 3 Ms. Yusuff dated her complaint on August 9, 2024, but the Clerk
of the D.C. Superior Court stamped it as filed on August 16, 2024. See Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-2 at 2–3. 2 that: (1) Ms. Yusuff’s complaint did not allege facts sufficient
to show a plausible claim for relief; (2) the District agencies
were non sui juris and therefore could not be sued; and (3) Ms.
Yusuff’s wrongful termination claim, to the extent she alleges
it, is barred by the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (“CMPA”),
D.C. Code § 1-601 et seq. See id. at 637.
On December 31, 2024, D.C. Superior Court granted the
District’s motion in part and denied it in part. See id. at 637–
714. The Court held that “the complaint must be dismissed as to
defendants ABCA, BEGA, DISB, DCHR, and OHR because they are non
sui juris and cannot be sued in their own right, and that [Ms.
Yusuff’s] claim of wrongful termination is barred by the CMPA.”
Id. at 638. But it “den[ied] the motion without prejudice,
however, to the extent [Ms. Yusuff] has attempted to allege
discrimination claims based on District or federal law and
direct[ed] [Ms. Yusuff] to file an amended complaint clearly
alleging any such causes of action and the essential facts
supporting them.” Id.
On January 18, 2025, Ms. Yusuff filed her Amended Complaint
in D.C. Superior Court. See id. at 661. She brought claims “for
violations of anti-discrimination, anti-retaliation, and
whistleblower protection laws under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),
D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA), and applicable whistleblower
3 statutes.” Id. She “allege[d] that Defendant systematically
failed to fulfill its mandated duties, engaged in negligence,
and allowed systemic abuse, retaliation, and harassment to
persist, resulting in professional, emotional, and financial
harm.” Id. She alleges that she suffered these unlawful
employment actions during “her employment with ABRA/ABCA from
February 18, 2020, to February 24, 2023, and subsequently with
DISB from February 27, 2024, until her wrongful termination on
March 27, 2024.” Id.4 These include, according to Ms. Yusuff,
“ABRA engag[ing] in retaliatory discussions with DISB prior to
her onboarding, directly influencing the adverse actions she
faced at DISB.” Id.
B. Removal and Motion to Dismiss
On February 3, 2025, the District removed Ms. Yusuff’s case
to this Court. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. Ms. Yusuff
filed her Motion to Remand on February 12, 2025. See Mot. to
Remand, ECF No. 12. The District filed its Opposition to Ms.
Yusuff’s Motion to Remand on February 24, 2025. See Def.’s Opp’n
to Mot. to Remand (“Opp’n to Mot. to Remand”), ECF No. 13. On
February 25, 2025, Ms. Yusuff filed her Reply. See Pl.’s Reply
to Mot. to Remand (“Reply to Mot. to Remand”), ECF No. 14.
4 The District notes that “the Amended Complaint erroneously states that Plaintiff began her employment at DISB on February 27, 2024. Her employment there began in February 2023.” Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15 at 7 n.1 (citations omitted). 4 On March 12, 2025, the District filed a Motion to Dismiss
Ms. Yusuff’s Amended Complaint. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15.
Ms. Yusuff filed her opposition to the District’s Motion to
Dismiss on March 13, 2025. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss
(“Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss”), ECF No. 16. On March 20, 2025, the
District filed its Reply. See Def.’s Reply to Mot. to Dismiss
(Reply to Mot. to Dismiss”), ECF No. 18. Both motions are now
ripe for this Court to resolve.
II. Standard of Review
A. Remand
The right to remove cases from state to federal court is
derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Int'l Union of Bricklayers &
Allied Craftworkers v. Ins. Co. of the W., 366 F. Supp. 2d 33,
36 (D.D.C. 2005). “The party opposing a motion to remand bears
the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction
exists in federal court.” Id. Further, “‘the removal statute is
to be strictly construed.’” Id. (quoting Kopff v. World Research
Grp., LLC, 298 F. Supp. 2d 50, 54 (D.D.C. 2003)). Consequently,
“the court must resolve any ambiguities concerning the propriety
of removal in favor of remand.” Johnson–Brown v. 2200 M St. LLC,
257 F. Supp. 2d 175, 177 (D.D.C. 2003). Defendants may only
remove state-court actions that originally could have been filed
in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Absent diversity of
5 citizenship, federal-question jurisdiction is required to
establish that the case could have originally been filed in
federal court. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.
B. Jurisdiction
“The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter
jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.”
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006). “Section 1331
provides for ‘[f]ederal-question’ jurisdiction, § 1332 for
‘[diversity of citizenship’ jurisdiction.” Id. (alterations in
original). “A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331 jurisdiction
when she pleads a colorable claim ‘arising under’ the
Constitution or laws of the United States.” Id. (quoting Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681–85 (1946)). A court has supplemental
jurisdiction over claims that would otherwise not be under its
subject-matter jurisdiction if the other claims ‘“are so
related”’ to the federal claims ‘“that they form part of the
same case or controversy.”’ Searcy v. DeMaurice Fitzgerald
Smith, 111 F.4th 111, 117 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1376(a)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (“Except as provided in
[28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(b) and (c)], or as expressly provided
otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts
shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are so
related to the claims in the action within such original
6 jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution.”).
C. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning
v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). To survive a
12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal (“Iqbal”), 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly (“Twombly”),
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. The standard does not amount to a
“probability requirement,” but it does require more than a
“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
When evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “may consider
only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either
attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of
which [courts] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis
Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Furthermore, the court “must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint.” Atherton v. D.C. Off.
7 of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal
quotations omitted). The court must also give the plaintiff the
“benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts
alleged.” Id. at 677 (internal quotations omitted). However, the
court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986). And “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are not
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678.
III. Analysis
Ms. Yusuff raises several arguments in support of her
Motion to Remand. See Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 12 at 2.5 Some of
these arguments are based on her mistaken understanding of
whether a plaintiff must consent to removal or choose to
litigate her case in federal court, which is not required under
the law. See Reply to Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 14 at 3. Ms.
Yusuff argues that the District’s “removal was procedurally and
substantively defective, and prejudicial to [her] ability to
fairly litigate her claims.” Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 12 at 2.
5 Ms. Yusuff reiterates her arguments for remand in her Opposition to the District’s Motion to Dismiss. See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 16 at 2. The Court focuses its analysis here on those arguments properly raised in her Motion to Remand. 8 She further claims that “[the District’s] removal is an improper
attempt to delay and obstruct [her] access to justice, as this
case is primarily based on violations of D.C. laws, including
the D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA) and the D.C. Whistleblower
Protection Act (DCWPA).” Id. She argues that “[t]hese claims do
not require federal jurisdiction, making the [D.C.] Superior
Court . . . the proper forum for adjudication.” Id. None of
these arguments is persuasive.
1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Before the Court reviews the merits of Ms. Yusuff’s
arguments, it first addresses its jurisdiction. This Court has
jurisdiction over Ms. Yusuff’s claims that arise under federal
law, specifically the ADA and the FMLA, which are Counts I, II,
and III of the Amended Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It also
has supplemental jurisdiction over her D.C. law claims brought
under the DCHRA and the DCWPA, which are Counts IV and V of the
Amended Complaint.6 There is no dispute regarding federal
jurisdiction over Ms. Yusuff’s claims that arise under federal
law, and it appears that Ms. Yusuff also does not dispute
supplemental jurisdiction over her D.C.-law claims. See Mot. to
Remand, ECF No. 12 at 2–3; Reply to Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 14
at 4 (“Even assuming that this Court might assert supplemental
6 The word “State” in the relevant jurisdictional statutes “includes the District of Columbia . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(e). 9 jurisdiction over Ms. Yusuff’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367, such jurisdiction does not negate her right to litigate
in the forum where the case was originally filed.”).7 Her
argument instead focuses on why her case should be remanded
notwithstanding federal jurisdiction. Primarily, she argues that
the state-law aspects of her claims predominate over federal
aspects. See Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 12 at 2–3. Before
addressing whether state law predominates, the Court will
briefly explain why it has supplemental jurisdiction over Ms.
Yusuff’s D.C.-law claims.
Supplemental jurisdiction is proper here because the claims
that Ms. Yusuff raises under the DCHRA and DCWPA arise under the
same “common nucleus of operative fact” as her federal claims
under the ADA and FMLA. See Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547
U.S. 332, 351 (2006) (citing United Mine Workers of America v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). This standard is met when
7 Elsewhere in her Reply, Ms. Yusuff asserts that “[t]his case was originally and properly filed in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia—a court that has long been recognized as having exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Reply to Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 14 at 2. But she cites to no authority supporting this proposition and ignores the many cases in which federal courts have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over employment-related cases originally brought in D.C. Superior Court. See, e.g., Lott v. Not-for-Profit Hospital Corp., 319 F. Supp. 3d 277 (D.D.C. 2018) (exercising jurisdiction over sufficiently pled DCHRA and DCWPA claims, as well as FMLA and D.C. FMLA claims); Martin v. District of Columbia, 78 F. Supp. 3d. 279 (D.D.C. 2015). 10 ‘“without regard to their federal or state character, a
plaintiff’s claims are such that [s]he would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding . . . .”’
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371
(1978) (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725).
Here, Ms. Yusuff’s claims all arise from the same operative
facts, the District and its agencies’ allegedly unlawful
employment actions against her. See Def. Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-2 at
661-64. Ms. Yusuff relies on the same factual support for both
her federal and state law claims. See id. In support of each of
her federal and state law claims, Ms. Yusuff incorporates all of
the facts from her Amended Complaint. See id. All Counts allege
that the District discriminated and/or retaliated against her.
See id. Therefore, these are the types of claims that would
ordinarily be expected to be tried in one judicial proceeding.
See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 371.
2. State Law Does Not Predominate
Even though Ms. Yusuff essentially concedes supplemental
jurisdiction, she argues that removal is improper because state
law predominates her claims. See Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 12 at
2–3. Specifically, she argues that the DCHRA and DCWPA “provide
broader protections than their federal counterparts” and that
other courts have held that “claims under these laws are best
11 adjudicated in D.C. Superior Court.” Id.8 Ms. Yusuff argues that
“The [DCHRA] provides broader protections than the ADA and
should be interpreted in D.C. courts where it was legislated and
where judges are familiar with its application.” Id. (citing
Estate of Wallace v. D.C., 32 A.3d 147 (D.C. 2011)).9 She also
contends that her “[DCWPA] claims require interpretation of
local statutes, best suited for the Superior Court.” Id.
Ms. Yusuff is correct that “the mere presence of federal
claims does not mandate removal”, see Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 12
at 1 (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
(1987)); “federal claims do not automatically grant federal
question jurisdiction when they are intertwined with state-based
rights and remedies”, id. (citing Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986)); and that “federal courts may
decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law issues
predominate”, id. (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 715). But she fails
to show how these cases and principles require remand here.
As the District points out, three of Ms. Yusuff’s five
claims arise under federal law. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 101-2 at
663–64. Count I and Count II of the Amended Complaint arise
8 Ms. Yusuff cite to a case Johnson v. D.C., 935 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2013), but no such case appears in the Westlaw database. 9 Nor does Estate of Wallace appear in the Westlaw database.
Indeed, the citation listed, 32 A.3d 147, is included in a Maryland state case: Carroll Indep. Fuel Co. v. Washington Real Est. Inv. Tr., 202 Md. App. 206, 32 A.3d 128 (2011). 12 under the ADA; Count III arises under the FMLA; and Counts IV
and V arise under the DCHRA and “Whistleblower Protection Laws”,
respectively. See id. As such, it is simply incorrect for Ms.
Yusuff to argue that her “[DCHRA] and [DCWPA] claims (state law
claims) form the core of this case” or that “[a]ny reliance on
federal statutes is supplemental . . . .” Mot. to Remand, ECF
No. 12 at 1. Ms. Yusuff is correct that she is the “master of
her complaint”, but here, she has chosen to allege three federal
causes of action out of the five total claims in her Amended
Complaint.
The cases on which Ms. Yusuff relies do not help her
argument; rather, they demonstrate why remand is not required.
In Caterpillar, the question before the Supreme Court was
“whether [the employees’] state-law complaint for breach of
individual employment contracts is completely pre-empted by §
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA) . . . 29
U.S.C. § 185, and therefore removable to Federal District
Court.” 482 U.S. at 388. The plaintiffs/respondents had “filed
an action based solely on state law in California state court”
alleging Caterpillar breached their individual employment
agreements. Id. at 390. Caterpillar removed to federal court,
arguing that the individual employment contracts were “as a
matter of federal substantive labor law, merged into and
superseded by the . . . collective bargaining agreements [that
13 existed for certain, unionized positions].” Id. The Supreme
Court rejected Caterpillar’s arguments that the state claims
were fully preempted by federal law, or that the individual
contracts were subsumed into the collective bargaining
agreement; holding that remand was appropriate because
plaintiffs/respondents could have brought their claims under
state law or federal law, and they chose to bring state law
claims only. See id. at 394–96. Here, it is Ms. Yusuff who
raises federal claims in her Amended Complaint; this is not a
situation where the only federal questions that arise are as a
result of the District’s defenses.
In Merrell Dow, plaintiffs/respondents had filed complaints
against Merrell Dow in state court alleging “common-law theories
of negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, fraud, and
gross negligence” related to Merrell Dow’s manufacturing and
distribution of the drug Bendectin. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at
805. They also included a count of misbranding under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). Id. Merrell Dow sought to
remove to federal court by arguing that the FDCA claim arose
under federal law. See id. at 806. But the Supreme Court held
remand was appropriate because it determined that Congress did
not provide a “private, federal cause of action for” violating
the FDCA, and therefore, there was no federal-question
jurisdiction. Id. at 817. Here, in contrast, no party disputes
14 that individuals may bring claims under the ADA and the FMLA in
federal court.
As discussed, Ms. Yusuff chose to include three federal
claims out of her five total causes of action in her Amended
Complaint, all based on the same factual allegations. The
federal causes of action that Ms. Yusuff pled are routinely
litigated in federal court, and Ms. Yusuff has failed to show
that the state law claims she also raised predominate over the
federal claims so as to warrant remand. See Busby v. Capital
One, N.A., 759 F. Supp. 2d 81, 85 (D.D.C. 2011).
3. The District Has Not Evidenced Bad Faith
Ms. Yusuff also argues that the District acted out of bad
faith when it removed her case “only after [she] amended her
complaint to clarify federal claims, despite having had full
knowledge of the claims from the outset.” Id. at 3. She argues
that “[t]his deliberate maneuvering serves no legitimate purpose
other than to delay litigation and impose additional burdens on
a pro se litigant.” Id. (invoking cases in which courts have
“condemned such tactics”) (citing Williams v. Int’l Paper Co.,
556 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2009); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.,
546 U.S. 132 (2005)). She urges that because she has “already
suffered delays due to the [District’s] misconduct, this Court
must not allow further prejudicial delays by permitting removal
to stand.” Id.
15 This argument is unpersuasive for a number of reasons.
First, the District timely filed a notice of removal after Ms.
Yusuff filed her Amended Complaint—there is no indication that
the District unnecessarily delayed removal. See Def. Ex. 1, ECF
No. 1-2 at 661 (dating the Amended Complaint as filed on January
18, 2025); Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 (filed on February 3,
2025). Second, the procedural background of this case in D.C.
Superior Court makes clear that the legal bases for Ms. Yusuff’s
claims were not made clear until after she filed her Amended
Complaint. Indeed, when the D.C. Superior Court judge granted in
part and denied in part the District’s Motion to Dismiss in that
case, it ordered Ms. Yusuff to specify the bases of her claims
in her Amended Complaint. See Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-2 at 638.
Therefore, Ms. Yusuff’s assertion that the District acted in bad
faith because it “had full knowledge of the [federal] claims
from the outset” is incorrect. Moreover, it cannot be that any
time a defendant timely removes to federal court after a
plaintiff files an amended complaint that includes federal
claims not clearly stated in their original complaint, the
timeline for doing so shows bad faith. For all these reasons,
Ms. Yusuff has not shown that the District acted in bad faith
here.
16 4. Remand is Not Required in the Interests of Justice
Ms. Yusuff argues that remand is “necessary to ensure 1.
[p]roper adjudication of [her] claims under D.C. laws; 2.
[e]limination of unnecessary delays caused by [the District’s]
bad-faith removal; and 3. [f]air access to justice for a pro se
litigant facing obstructionist litigation tactics.” Mot. to
Remand, ECF No. 12 at 3. In support, she argues that “[f]ederal
courts routinely remand cases where state or local interests
predominate to avoid unnecessary federal intervention.” Id. at 4
(citing Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012)).
Again, Ms. Yusuff’s arguments are unpersuasive. As
discussed above, there is no indication of the District’s bad-
faith in the timing or procedural posture of this case. For
similar reasons, it does not appear that Ms. Yusuff is facing
“obstructionist litigation tactics.” The Court is sensitive to
Ms. Yusuff’s interests in “fair access to justice” and having
her local claims litigated in D.C. Superior Court, especially
given her pro se status, but Ms. Yusuff is the party who decided
to include federal claims in her Amended Complaint, thus opening
the door to federal jurisdiction. Therefore, the interests of
justice do not require remand to D.C. Superior Court.
17 5. Ms. Yusuff’s Procedural and Other Claims are Meritless
Finally, Ms. Yusuff argues that the District’s removal is
procedurally defective, and should be rejected for several other
reasons.
On the procedural arguments, Ms. Yusuff claims that the
District’s removal was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
because “Plaintiff was never properly served, and [the District]
is attempting to manipulate procedural timing in its favor.”
Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 12 at 4 (citing Murphy Bros., Inc. v.
Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999)) (claiming
that “Courts have ruled that failure to effectuate proper
service can render removal improper”). She also contends that
that District failed to obtain consent from all defendants. See
id. She acknowledges that “[t]he notice states that the District
is the only remaining defendant” but asserts that “it is unclear
whether all prior defendants have properly exited the case.” Id.
As discussed above, the D.C. Superior Court granted the
District’s motion to dismiss as to the other defendants so the
only defendant left in this case is the District. Therefore, no
other consent to remove is possible.
In addition to these procedural arguments, Ms. Yusuff
argues that the District’s inconsistent document handling
undermines its positions; its request for her “broad medical
18 records violates HIPPA and ADA protections”; and that the
District has engaged in pretextual justifications and
retaliatory patterns. Id. at 4–5. Ms. Yusuff includes a final
line in her request for relief that she seeks sanctions against
the District under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for
“abusing the removal process in an attempt to delay litigation
and intimidate plaintiff.” Id. at 6.
None of these arguments is persuasive. First, Defendant has
certified that Ms. Yusuff was properly served its notice of
removal and accompanying exhibit. See Opp’n to Mot. for Remand,
ECF No. 113 at 7 (citing Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1 at 4
(certifying that Plaintiff was mailed and emailed the Notice of
Removal and accompanying attachments on February 3, 2025); Ex.
A, Def.’s Not. of Removal (Sup. Ct., Feb. 3, 2025) (certifying
that Plaintiff was mailed and emailed the Superior Court Notice
of Removal and accompanying exhibit on February 3, 2025)). The
District also points out that Ms. Yusuff filed her Motion to
Remand only a few days after the government removed this case,
further showing that she had been served. See id.
Second, the District also points out that there were no
other defendants remaining to consent to removal because the
D.C. Superior Court judge had dismissed the other District
agencies from the suit. See id. at 7-8; Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-
2 at 638 (dismissing other district agencies with prejudice).
19 Third, the District argues that Ms. Yusuff’s arguments that
it engaged in bad faith and sought invasive information from her
are unfounded. See Opp’n to Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 13 at 8. The
Court already rejected Ms. Yusuff’s argument about bad faith,
and the District represents that it “has not engaged in or made
any requests for discovery from [Ms. Yusuff] in this case—
indeed, this case has not moved beyond the pleadings stage.” Id.
at 8. Ms. Yusuff does not dispute this representation in her
Reply. See Reply to Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 14.
Fourth, Ms. Yusuff has not shown that sanctions are
appropriate at this point, let alone warranted. Putting aside
for the sake of argument how Ms. Yusuff has not followed the
proper process to seek Rule 11 sanctions, see Opp’n, ECF No. 13
at 8; there is no indication that the District has acted in bad
faith throughout this removal process and therefore her request
would fail even if properly made.
The District has shown that this Court has Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction over Ms. Yusuff’s claims; and this is not a case
where state law questions predominate over the federal
questions. Additionally, there were no procedural defects in the
District’s removal to this Court, nor evidence of bad faith. For
all the reasons explained above, Ms. Yusuff’s Motion to Remand
is DENIED.
20 B. Motion to Dismiss
The District argues that Ms. Yusuff’s Amended Complaint
should be dismissed for: (1) failure to administratively exhaust
her ADA claim; and (2) failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. See generally Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No.
15; Reply to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 18. Ms. Yusuff disagrees
and asserts that she sufficiently exhausted her claims and
stated plausible claims, though she only provides specific
support for her exhaustion argument. See generally Opp’n to Mot.
to Dismiss, ECF No. 16. Additionally, Ms. Yusuff reiterates some
of her arguments for removal to state court in her Opposition to
the District’s Motion to Dismiss. See id.
The Court is mindful of the latitude afforded to pro se
plaintiffs when evaluating motions to dismiss. Indeed, the
issues that Ms. Yusuff raises in her Amended Complaint, if
supported, would be serious concerns. But even so, Ms. Yusuff
must still demonstrate in response to the District’s Motion to
Dismiss how she survives this stage of litigation, which means
in this case, she must explain how she states claims upon which
relief can be granted. Because Ms. Yusuff fails to do so, the
Court must GRANT the District’s Motion to Dismiss, but it
dismisses her case WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
21 A. Failure to State a Claim
The Court addresses Ms. Yusuff’s response to the District’s
failure to state a claim argument first because that alone is
dispositive of her case. The entirety of Ms. Yusuff’s response
on this point is:
Plaintiff’s Claims Are Well-Pleaded and Plausible – Defendant’s motion misapplies the pleading standard under Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly.
Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 16 at 1 (emphasis in
original).
The Court disagrees with the District’s assertion that Ms.
Yusuff necessarily conceded that she failed to state a claim for
any of the counts in her Amended Complaint because this was the
extent of her counterargument. See Reply to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
No. 18 at 2 (citing Lockhart v. Coastal Int’l Sec., 905 F. Supp.
2d 105, 118 (D.D.C. 2012); Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of
Global Ministries, 238 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2002)). It
is clear that Ms. Yusuff does not concede this point. But, she
fails to make any effort to support her broad assertion. Indeed,
nowhere does Ms. Yusuff explain how Defendant “misapplie[d] the
pleading standard under [Iqbal] and [Twombley]”, nor how she
satisfies this standard for any of her five claims.
In its Motion to Dismiss, the District went through each of
Ms. Yusuff’s five counts and explained the legal requirements to
22 state a claim under those laws; what facts Ms. Yusuff alleges in
her Amended Complaint that could relate to that specific count;
and its argument for why Ms. Yusuff fails to satisfy the legal
requirements for that count based on what she alleges in her
Amended Complaint. See generally Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15 at
12-22. Ms. Yusuff does not address any of these points.
For Count I, Retaliation under the ADA, the District
explained the legal elements that a plaintiff must show to state
a prima facie case, and it argued why Ms. Yusuff “has not
plausibly alleged that she engaged in protected activity”; “has
not shown a causal link between her OHR and ODR complaints and
any materially adverse action”; and “has not shown any temporal
proximity between protected activity (even if she had engaged in
any) and any materially adverse action.” Id. at 12-13. As such,
the District argued that Ms. Yusuff’s “allegations do not show
causation” nor “materially adverse actions”, meaning her Amended
Complaint fails to state a claim under Count I. Ms. Yusuff
refutes none of these assertions in her Opposition, and her
Amended Complaint lacks non-conclusory statements to support
this cause of action.
For Count II, Discrimination under the ADA, the District
similarly laid out the legal requirements for the claim and why
it alleges Ms. Yusuff fell short of these requirements. See id.
23 at 13-16.10 Specifically, it cites to inconsistencies between Ms.
Yusuff’s Amended Complaint and her EEOC Charge as to whether she
was indeed granted accommodations, the denial of which is an
element of an ADA discrimination claim. See id. at 14.
Additionally, the District argues that Ms. Yusuff has not
alleged that she meets the definition of a person with a
disability under the ADA; nor that she was “subjected to a
hostile work environment based on disability.” Id. at 14-16.
Again, Ms. Yusuff disputes none of these arguments, and her
Amended Complaint fails to allege how she qualifies for an ADA
claim.
For Count III, Violations of the FMLA, the District states
the purpose of FMLA leave and protections, then defines what the
law requires to show an FMLA violation and why it asserts that
Ms. Yusuff has failed to do so. See id. at 16-17. Specifically,
it argues that Ms. Yusuff “does not plead facts necessary to
establish either an FMLA interference claim [n]or a[n] FMLA
retaliation claim.” Id. at 17. It faults Ms. Yusuff for failing
to state with any specificity how she faced harassment or
10The District also notes that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (“D.C. Circuit”) has not yet determined whether a hostile work environment claim is actionable under the ADA. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 16 at 15 n. 4 (citations omitted); see also Hill v. Assocs. for Renewal in Educ., Inc., 897 F.3d 232, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (acknowledging and not reaching the question). 24 retaliation, “when she sought FMLA leave, what her serious
health condition was, or whether she gave her employer adequate
notice of her intention to take leave.” Id. Again, Ms. Yusuff
offers no response to any of these arguments, and the facts
alleged in her Amended Complaint, see Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-2
at 662–63, are not enough to make this claim facially plausible.
For Count IV, Violations of the DCHRA, the District again
explains what legal elements are required for such a claim and
argues that Ms. Yusuff’s claims here fail for the same reason as
her ADA claims. See id. at 17-20. Specifically, it argues that
Ms. Yusuff “has not alleged that she is a member of a protected
class, that she suffered harassment as a result of her
membership in that class, or that the alleged harassment was
severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive working
environment.” Id. at 19. Additionally, it contends that Ms.
Yusuff “does not allege an actionable hostile work environment .
. . .” and that “even if the Court were to find that [Ms.
Yusuff’s allegations of workplace hostility] are the result of
discriminatory conduct,” they “are not enough to show pervasive,
workplace abuse as required to successfully state a hostile work
environment claim.” Id. at 19-20 (citation omitted). Once more,
Ms. Yusuff fails to dispute any of these arguments, and her
Amended Complaint lacks sufficient factual support for these
claims.
25 Finally, for Count V, Violations of the DCWPA, the District
again shows the legal requirements for a DCWPA claim and
provides its argument for why Ms. Yusuff fails to plausibly
allege these elements. See id. at 20-22. It asserts that Ms.
Yusuff “includes virtually no facts in support of her purported
DCWPA claim.” Id. at 21. The District argues that Ms. Yusuff
gives no details that would show she “made a protected
disclosure under the DCWPA” and fails to show a causal link
“between the alleged retaliatory actions and her OHR and ODR
complaints.” Id. Again, Ms. Yusuff declines to refute any of
these specific arguments in her Opposition, and her Amended
Complaint lacks any relevant details.
Ms. Yusuff’s failure to dispute any of the District’s
arguments, or attempt to justify her claims, with any degree of
specificity in her Opposition is especially notable when
considering the procedural background of her case. When Ms.
Yusuff first brought her Complaint in D.C. Superior Court and
the District filed its Motion to Dismiss there, it argued in
part in its Reply brief that Ms. Yusuff had conceded certain
arguments by failing to dispute them. See Def. Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-
2 at 633. The D.C. Superior Court ultimately agreed with the
District’s arguments, but did not say whether it agreed that Ms.
Yusuff conceded these arguments. See id. at 638. The D.C.
Superior Court also agreed with the District that Ms. Yusuff
26 could not attempt to amend her complaint and add causes of
action through her Opposition to the District’s Motion to
Dismiss in D.C. Superior Court, but it dismissed without
prejudice and allowed Ms. Yusuff to file an amended complaint
“clearly alleging any such causes of action [, Discrimination
claims based on District or federal law,] and the essential
facts supporting them.” Id. at 638.
Ms. Yusuff therefore would have reasonably known that she
had to demonstrate the legal bases and facts of her claims in
her Amended Complaint. But instead of explaining how she did so
in her Opposition to the District’s Motion to Dismiss in this
Court, Ms. Yusuff chose to make a broad statement of
disagreement, then focus much of her response on why her case
should be remanded to D.C. Superior Court. Even though the Court
is mindful of the need to give Ms. Yusuff latitude as a pro se
plaintiff, it is clear on this record that she had notice of her
requirements to allege sufficiently-supported and specific
counts in her Amended Complaint, and how to survive a motion to
dismiss, but failed to do so.
Aided in its review of Ms. Yusuff’s Amended Complaint only
by the District’s arguments and lacking any specific response
from Ms. Yusuff, the Court agrees that she fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted for any of these counts.
27 Therefore, Ms. Yusuff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED in its
entirety.
The District asks that the Court dismiss Ms. Yusuff’s
complaint with prejudice. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15 at 22.
Ms. Yusuff does not make any request nor argument that if the
Court dismisses her Amended Complaint, it should do so without
prejudice; nor has she sought leave to amend her Amended
Complaint. But the D.C. Circuit has held that dismissal with
prejudice is “warranted only when a trial court determines that
the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged
pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Rollins v.
Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 131 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Because it is possible that additional factual allegations could
cure some of the deficiencies in Ms. Yusuff’s Amended Complaint,
the Court will dismiss it WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
B. Exhaustion
The Court need not reach the question of exhaustion of Ms.
Yusuff’s ADA claim because it dismisses the entirety of her
Amended Complaint on the grounds stated above.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the Court DENIES Ms.
Yusuff’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 12; and GRANTS IN PART the
District’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 15, and DISMISSES Ms.
Yusuff’s Amended Complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
28 An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge April 29, 2025