[553]*553JOHNSON, J.
Plaintiff instituted this cause against defendant Mathews for payment of a promissory note in the amount of $5,000 and for foreclosure of his security interest in an automobile formerly owned by defendant Mathews. He also sought an order directing defendants Baumgartner and Multnomah County to deliver the subject vehicle to plaintiff, or if they were unable to deliver the vehicle, a judgment against Baumgartner and the county for $5,000 plus interest. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiff against Mathews for $5,000 plus interest, but against plaintiff with respect to Baumgartner and the county. Plaintiff appeals the latter judgment.
The Multnomah County District Attorney seized the vehicle in June 1974 and held it in custodia legis pursuant to a criminal proceeding. Plaintiffs security interest attached on December 3, 1974. Plaintiff notified county counsel by letter dated May 29,1975 of his security interest and filed his initial complaint on June 13, 1975, seeking foreclosure against the county and Mathews. The district attorney released the vehicle from custodia legis to the county sheriff on August 22, 1975. On September 9, 1975, the county sold the vehicle to Baumgartner pursuant to writ of execution by a judgment creditor of Mathews. We concur with the trial court that Baumgartner purchased the vehicle free and clear of plaintiffs security interest since the security interest was not perfected at that time and Baumgartner had no knowledge thereof.
Although plaintiff attempts to characterize his claim for damages against the county as a contract action, it was in fact a tort action for conversion, i.e. for unlawfully depriving plaintiff of his property interest in the vehicle. The trial court concluded that the action was barred by ORS 30.275(1)1 because the [554]*554first notice to the county of the damage claim did not occur until plaintiff filed his second amended complaint on April 9, 1976, more than 180 days after the sale. We agree with the trial court that the letter to county counsel and plaintiffs initial complaint did not constitute a notice of a tort claim under ORS 30.275(1) because at that time the county had legal possession of the vehicle. However, the trial court overlooked the fact that plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 26,1975, 78 days following the judicial sale to Baumgartner.* 2 The amended complaint described the plaintiffs security interest in the vehicle and further alleged:
[553]*553"(1) Every person who claims damages from a public body for or on account of any loss or injury within the scope of ORS 30.260 to 30.300 [554]*554shall cause to be presented to the public body within 180 days after the alleged loss or injury a written notice stating the time, place and circumstances thereof, and the amount of compensation or other relief demanded. Claims against the State of Oregon or a state officer, employe or agent acting within the scope of his employment or duties shall be presented to the Attorney General. Claims against any other public body shall be presented to a person upon whom process could be served in accordance with subsection (3) of ORS 15.080. Failure to state the amount of compensation or other relief demanded does not invalidate the notice.”
"That the defendant Multnomah County since the filing and service of the complaint and summons herein and on or about September 9,1975 wrongfully delivered the aforedescribed vehicle to the defendant Jerry Baumgartner and the said Jerry Baumgartner is now in the possession thereof.”
We hold that this was sufficient notice under ORS 30.275(1) which provided prior to amendment in pertinent part:
"(1) Every person who claims damages from a public body * * * shall cause to be presented to the public body within 180 days after the alleged loss or injury a written notice stating the time, place and circumstances thereof, [555]*555and the amount of compensation or other relief demanded. * * * Failure to state the amount of compensation or other relief demanded does not invalidate the notice.”
The amended complaint alleges "the time, place and circumstances” of the alleged conversion. The prayer for relief is for return of the vehicle and there is no allegation of damages. ORS 30.275(1) expressly provides that "failure to state the amount of compensation or other relief demanded does not invalidate the notice.” The county argues that, in spite of this provision, the notice must indicate that a claim for damages is being asserted. We disagree. In Urban Renewal Agency v. Lackey 275 Or 35, 549 P2d 657 (1976) the court stated that substantial compliance with the statutory notice requirements is sufficient to satisfy ORS 30.275(1). In that case, the court held that a counterclaim to a suit by a governmental body containing the requisite information was sufficient notice. There is some suggestion in the Supreme Court’s opinion that under other circumstances there might be a requirement of written notice filed separately from the complaint in order to encourage out of court settlements. However, the court pointed out that the purpose of the notice requirement is to enable public bodies to make timely investigation. That purpose is served whether the notice is given in a separate writing or in a complaint. ORS 30.275(1) merely requires that the notice be in writing. It is difficult to see how separate notice will encourage out of court settlements. A claimant could submit his notice and a moment later file a complaint. The filing of a complaint does not deter settlement of claims. We see no reason for judicially engrafting upon the written notice requirements of ORS 30.275(1) an additional requirement that the notice be submitted separately from the complaint.3 The amended com[556]*556plaint was sufficient notice because it set forth the time, place and circumstances and advised the county that plaintiff was seeking legal redress against it for the alleged tortious act. The county was adequately advised that there was a potential claim for damages.
A corollary issue, however, is whether plaintiff was required to plead the notice. In Johnson v. Smith, 24 Or App 621, 625-26, 546 P2d 1087, rev den (1976), we held that pleading timely notice of the claim is jurisdictional under the Tort Claims Act. There is no allegation of timely notice in the complaint here. In [557]*557Urban Renewal Agency v. Lackey, supra,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[553]*553JOHNSON, J.
Plaintiff instituted this cause against defendant Mathews for payment of a promissory note in the amount of $5,000 and for foreclosure of his security interest in an automobile formerly owned by defendant Mathews. He also sought an order directing defendants Baumgartner and Multnomah County to deliver the subject vehicle to plaintiff, or if they were unable to deliver the vehicle, a judgment against Baumgartner and the county for $5,000 plus interest. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiff against Mathews for $5,000 plus interest, but against plaintiff with respect to Baumgartner and the county. Plaintiff appeals the latter judgment.
The Multnomah County District Attorney seized the vehicle in June 1974 and held it in custodia legis pursuant to a criminal proceeding. Plaintiffs security interest attached on December 3, 1974. Plaintiff notified county counsel by letter dated May 29,1975 of his security interest and filed his initial complaint on June 13, 1975, seeking foreclosure against the county and Mathews. The district attorney released the vehicle from custodia legis to the county sheriff on August 22, 1975. On September 9, 1975, the county sold the vehicle to Baumgartner pursuant to writ of execution by a judgment creditor of Mathews. We concur with the trial court that Baumgartner purchased the vehicle free and clear of plaintiffs security interest since the security interest was not perfected at that time and Baumgartner had no knowledge thereof.
Although plaintiff attempts to characterize his claim for damages against the county as a contract action, it was in fact a tort action for conversion, i.e. for unlawfully depriving plaintiff of his property interest in the vehicle. The trial court concluded that the action was barred by ORS 30.275(1)1 because the [554]*554first notice to the county of the damage claim did not occur until plaintiff filed his second amended complaint on April 9, 1976, more than 180 days after the sale. We agree with the trial court that the letter to county counsel and plaintiffs initial complaint did not constitute a notice of a tort claim under ORS 30.275(1) because at that time the county had legal possession of the vehicle. However, the trial court overlooked the fact that plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 26,1975, 78 days following the judicial sale to Baumgartner.* 2 The amended complaint described the plaintiffs security interest in the vehicle and further alleged:
[553]*553"(1) Every person who claims damages from a public body for or on account of any loss or injury within the scope of ORS 30.260 to 30.300 [554]*554shall cause to be presented to the public body within 180 days after the alleged loss or injury a written notice stating the time, place and circumstances thereof, and the amount of compensation or other relief demanded. Claims against the State of Oregon or a state officer, employe or agent acting within the scope of his employment or duties shall be presented to the Attorney General. Claims against any other public body shall be presented to a person upon whom process could be served in accordance with subsection (3) of ORS 15.080. Failure to state the amount of compensation or other relief demanded does not invalidate the notice.”
"That the defendant Multnomah County since the filing and service of the complaint and summons herein and on or about September 9,1975 wrongfully delivered the aforedescribed vehicle to the defendant Jerry Baumgartner and the said Jerry Baumgartner is now in the possession thereof.”
We hold that this was sufficient notice under ORS 30.275(1) which provided prior to amendment in pertinent part:
"(1) Every person who claims damages from a public body * * * shall cause to be presented to the public body within 180 days after the alleged loss or injury a written notice stating the time, place and circumstances thereof, [555]*555and the amount of compensation or other relief demanded. * * * Failure to state the amount of compensation or other relief demanded does not invalidate the notice.”
The amended complaint alleges "the time, place and circumstances” of the alleged conversion. The prayer for relief is for return of the vehicle and there is no allegation of damages. ORS 30.275(1) expressly provides that "failure to state the amount of compensation or other relief demanded does not invalidate the notice.” The county argues that, in spite of this provision, the notice must indicate that a claim for damages is being asserted. We disagree. In Urban Renewal Agency v. Lackey 275 Or 35, 549 P2d 657 (1976) the court stated that substantial compliance with the statutory notice requirements is sufficient to satisfy ORS 30.275(1). In that case, the court held that a counterclaim to a suit by a governmental body containing the requisite information was sufficient notice. There is some suggestion in the Supreme Court’s opinion that under other circumstances there might be a requirement of written notice filed separately from the complaint in order to encourage out of court settlements. However, the court pointed out that the purpose of the notice requirement is to enable public bodies to make timely investigation. That purpose is served whether the notice is given in a separate writing or in a complaint. ORS 30.275(1) merely requires that the notice be in writing. It is difficult to see how separate notice will encourage out of court settlements. A claimant could submit his notice and a moment later file a complaint. The filing of a complaint does not deter settlement of claims. We see no reason for judicially engrafting upon the written notice requirements of ORS 30.275(1) an additional requirement that the notice be submitted separately from the complaint.3 The amended com[556]*556plaint was sufficient notice because it set forth the time, place and circumstances and advised the county that plaintiff was seeking legal redress against it for the alleged tortious act. The county was adequately advised that there was a potential claim for damages.
A corollary issue, however, is whether plaintiff was required to plead the notice. In Johnson v. Smith, 24 Or App 621, 625-26, 546 P2d 1087, rev den (1976), we held that pleading timely notice of the claim is jurisdictional under the Tort Claims Act. There is no allegation of timely notice in the complaint here. In [557]*557Urban Renewal Agency v. Lackey, supra, the court held that the jurisdictional requirements of notice were satisfied by a counterclaim that was filed within 180 days of the alleged tort. We hold that where the complaint is filed within the 180 days, it is unnecessary and superfluous to plead notice, inasmuch as the complaint on its face satisfies the notice requirement.
On the merits, there was no liability in the county for the sale of the vehicle. The lien of Mathews’ judgment creditor attached before plaintiff’s security interest was perfected.4 Once the judgment creditor’s writ of attachment issued, the county was under a duty to execute the writ and sell the vehicle. ORS 29.170. The judgment creditor stands in the position of purchaser in good faith of the attached vehicle. ORS 29.150. He had no notice of plaintiffs security interest prior to issuance of his writ. The county was under no legal duty to inform the judgment creditor of plaintiffs interest or to perfect that interest. Thus, there was no conversion because plaintiffs security interest in the vehicle was inferior to the judgment creditor’s lien. We do not need to reach the issue of whether the county would be liable to plaintiff for any proceeds from the sale in excess of the judgment creditor’s lien. The record here indicates that there was no excess.
Affirmed.