Yudiesky Machado Gonzalez v. Warden, Florida Soft Side South Detention Center

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

YUDIESKY MACHADO

GONZALEZ,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-00806-SPC-NPM

WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH DETENTINO CENTER,

Respondent, /

OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court are petitioner Yudiesky Machado Gonzalez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response (Doc. 6). Machado Gonzalez is a native of Cuba who was paroled into the United States on April 10, 2004. Machado Gonzalez has multiple convictions for alien smuggling and has served prison sentences ranging from 10 to 24 months. An immigration judge ordered him removed on March 4, 2008. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) was unable to remove him, so it released him under an order of supervision. On November 18, 2025, Machado Gonzalez reported to ICE for a routine check-in, and ICE revoked his release and arrested him. He is currently detained at Alligator Alcatraz. Machado Gonzalez challenges the legality of his detention because removal is not likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. “Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney

Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)). The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period, which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id. Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely.

In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. 678, 700-01 (2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its

statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably foreseeably removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a

“presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day removal period plus an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention: After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the showing.

Id. The government argues Machado Gonzalez’s petition is premature because his current detention has not exceeded 180 days. They assume the

six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention resets each time a noncitizen is detained. That assumption is inconsistent with Zadvydas. It would effectively allow DHS to detain noncitizens indefinitely and avoid judicial scrutiny by releasing and re-detaining them every 180 days. As the

Eleventh Circuit recognized, “[t]he Supreme Court’s stated rationale for establishing a presumptively reasonable ‘6-month period’ for detention pending removal supports our conclusion that this period commences at the beginning of the removal period.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052

n.3 (11th Cir. 2002). Because the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention has expired, Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Machado Gonzalez has carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe

there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. ICE was unable to remove him in 2008, it has not obtained travel documents or made travel arrangements since his re-detention in November. The burden thus shifts to the government, but it makes no attempt at rebuttal.

The Court finds no significant likelihood Machado Gonzalez will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. However, assuring the presence of a noncitizen at the moment of removal is not the only statutory justification for immigration detention. “The second

justification—protecting the community—does not necessarily diminish in force over time.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. The Supreme Court has “upheld preventative detention based on dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural protections.” Id. Given

Machado Gonzalez’s criminal history, the Court will give ICE an opportunity to determine whether his detention is necessary to protect the community. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:

Yudiesky Machado Gonzalez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) remains under advisement. 1. Within 30 days of this Order, ICE shall conduct a custody review to determine whether Machado Gonzalez poses a danger to the

community sufficient to justify continued detention. 2. Within seven days of the custody review, the respondents shall file a supplemental response, addressing the results of the review and any updates on removal efforts.

3. Machado Gonzalez may file a reply within three days of the supplemental response. DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 9, 2026.

tite WObLatrat he UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-1 Copies: All Parties of Record