Yuasa-General Battery Corp. v. United States

661 F. Supp. 1214, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 382, 11 C.I.T. 382, 1987 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 95
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedMay 22, 1987
DocketCourt 85-04-00483
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 661 F. Supp. 1214 (Yuasa-General Battery Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Yuasa-General Battery Corp. v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1214, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 382, 11 C.I.T. 382, 1987 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 95 (cit 1987).

Opinion

Opinion & Order

AQUILINO, Judge:

The U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) has reached a preliminary determination that there is no reasonable indication that an industry in

the United States is materially injured or threatened with material injury ... by reason of imports from Taiwan of 127-volt motorcycle batteries, provided for in item 683.05 of the T[SUS] ..., which are alleged to be sold in the United States at less than fair value (LTFV). 1

The companies who petitioned the ITC for relief commenced this action for judicial review of the foregoing negative determination. Their motion for judgment on the agency record, however, relies heavily on an issue of law which has since been resolved by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in a manner adverse to plaintiffs’ position.

I

The standard of judicial review of a preliminary ITC determination is whether it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(A).

Plaintiffs’ transcendent point is that the scope of the Commission’s authority in making a preliminary determination under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 is circumscribed by a showing of mere “possibility” of injury on their part and by a proscription of weighing of conflicting evidence on the ITC’s part in accordance with Republic Steel Corporation v. United States, 8 CIT 29, 591 F.Supp. 640 (1984), and Jeannette Sheet Glass Corporation v. *1216 United States, 9 CIT -, 607 F.Supp. 123 (1985).

The plaintiffs contend that the ITC failed to follow these cases in reaching its determination. The record herein supports this contention, and the defendants admit as much. See generally Defendants’ Memorandum, pp. 12-40. That is:

The Commission respectfully renews its contention that, in a preliminary anti-dumping or countervailing duty ... investigation, the Commission may — indeed, must — evaluate all of the evidence on the record, including evidence obtained from parties opposing the petition for relief, in order to determine whether there is reasonable indication of material injury, or threat thereof, by reason of allegedly unfair imports____
The Commission respectfully notes its disagreement with the Court’s rulings in Republic Steel Corp. ... regarding the parameters of the “reasonable indication” standard applicable to Commission preliminary investigations ... that an affirmative preliminary determination merely “commences” an investigation____ Thus, under that ruling, the Commission’s preliminary determination is “pre-investigatory” ... and the Commission may not conduct an “investigation” by obtaining and weighing conflicting evidence to reach its determination. Id. at 12-14 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).

This position of the ITC has now been sustained on appeal. That is, American Lamb Company v. United States, 9 CIT -, 611 F.Supp. 979 (1985), followed Republic Steel and Jeannette on the basis of stare decisis. The court, however, certified an interlocutory appeal from its remand order which resulted in a decision by the Federal Circuit that the “ITC’s method of proceeding in applying the statutory reasonable indication standard does not contravene but accords with clearly discernible legislative intent and is sufficiently reasonable.” American Lamb Company v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 1004 (Fed.Cir.1986). In other words, “Congress intended application of a narrow judicial review standard” id., and a “reviewing court- must accord substantial weight to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers”, 785 F.2d at 1001, citing Zenith Radio Corporation v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450-51, 98 S.Ct. 2441, 2445, 57 L.Ed.2d 337 (1978), and Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965). Thus, the holding of Republic Steel relied on below in American Lamb and in other actions was reversed.

This decision also resolves — negatively — plaintiffs’ primary point. See American Lamb Company v. United States, 785 F.2d at 998, n. 4.

II

As indicated above, the plaintiffs presented their motion for judgment prior to the decision of the Court of Appeals, which necessarily has an impact on their other points:

A. Definition of Like Product

The plaintiffs challenge the ITC’s analysis of the merchandise at issue. The Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A), defines “industry” in general to mean “the domestic producers as a whole of a like product”, which term is defined in subparagraph (10) of section 1677 as

a product which is like, or in the absence of like, most similar in characteristics and uses with, the article subject to an investigation under this subtitle.

The plaintiffs characterize the proceeding below as having been “directed against Taiwanese motorcycle batteries being sold or offered for sale in the replacement motorcycle market” 2 . Their petition stated further:

... This replacement market is separate and distinct from the market for original equipment manufacturers (“OEM”). To date, the Taiwanese product has not been sold, or offered for sale, in the OEM market. Consequently, this petition is addressed to the problems of the U.S. *1217 manufacturers selling in the replacement market. R.Doc.l, p. 11, n. 3.

Despite this attempted refinement, the ITC determined to define the merchandise under investigation in such a manner as to encompass the entire market for 12-volt motorcycle batteries in the United States, not just that for replacements. See Pub. 1654 at 3-4. Counsel for the defendants contend:

Under section [1677] (10), the Commission’s decision regarding like product is made on the basis of the characteristics and uses of the product under investigation, not on its marketing and distribution. There are no differences in characteristics and uses between 12-volt motorcycle batteries sold in the original equipment (OE) market, and those sold in the replacement market. 12-volt motorcycle batteries sold as original equipment are identical in characteristics to 12-volt motorcycle batteries with the same specifications sold as replacement parts.

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Related

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661 F. Supp. 1214, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 382, 11 C.I.T. 382, 1987 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 95, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/yuasa-general-battery-corp-v-united-states-cit-1987.