UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION
YU HIN CHAN, Case No. 1:25-cv-697 Plaintiff, Cole, J. Litkovitz, M.J. vs.
JOY CAMPANELLI, et al., REPORT AND Defendants RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a resident of Brooklyn, New York, has filed a civil complaint against Joy Campanelli, Richard Montelione, Kenneth Harton, and ReMax (Doc. 1-1 at PAGEID 4). By separate Order, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is now before the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint to determine whether the complaint or any portion of it should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Screening of Complaint A. Legal Standard In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328-29; see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action
has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328). Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however,
the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-
2 pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted). B. Plaintiff’s Complaint Plaintiff has tendered a 1-page complaint that alleges: 1. The current owner of the apartment where Plaintiff resides is Re/Max, pursuant to an affidavit from former owner,
2. Defendants conspired together and deprived Plaintiff of due process,
3. This Court has jurisdiction under the RICO Act.
(Doc. 1-1 at PAGEID 4). The complaint contains no other allegations against the defendants. As relief, plaintiff demands $1 billion. C. Resolution The undersigned is unable to discern from the sparse facts alleged in the complaint any federal statutory or constitutional provision that applies to give rise to an actionable claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff’s pro se complaint contains insufficient factual detail from which this Court can discern any plausible claim against any of the individual defendants. Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing how the individual defendants harmed him, and his 3 conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim for relief. See Hamilton v. City of Romulus, 409 F. App’x 826, 835 (6th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff’s allegations simply do not “give the defendant[s] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted), nor do they provide any factual content or context
from which the Court may reasonably infer that the named defendants violated plaintiff’s federal rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Assuming plaintiff is attempting to invoke the Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), the complaint reveals such jurisdiction is lacking. A district court has jurisdiction over a suit between citizens of different states when the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The complaint fails to allege the citizenship of any of the defendants to enable the Court to conclude there is complete diversity of citizenship in this matter. Therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship over any state law claims plaintiff may be alleging.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION
YU HIN CHAN, Case No. 1:25-cv-697 Plaintiff, Cole, J. Litkovitz, M.J. vs.
JOY CAMPANELLI, et al., REPORT AND Defendants RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a resident of Brooklyn, New York, has filed a civil complaint against Joy Campanelli, Richard Montelione, Kenneth Harton, and ReMax (Doc. 1-1 at PAGEID 4). By separate Order, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is now before the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint to determine whether the complaint or any portion of it should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Screening of Complaint A. Legal Standard In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328-29; see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action
has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328). Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however,
the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-
2 pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted). B. Plaintiff’s Complaint Plaintiff has tendered a 1-page complaint that alleges: 1. The current owner of the apartment where Plaintiff resides is Re/Max, pursuant to an affidavit from former owner,
2. Defendants conspired together and deprived Plaintiff of due process,
3. This Court has jurisdiction under the RICO Act.
(Doc. 1-1 at PAGEID 4). The complaint contains no other allegations against the defendants. As relief, plaintiff demands $1 billion. C. Resolution The undersigned is unable to discern from the sparse facts alleged in the complaint any federal statutory or constitutional provision that applies to give rise to an actionable claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff’s pro se complaint contains insufficient factual detail from which this Court can discern any plausible claim against any of the individual defendants. Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing how the individual defendants harmed him, and his 3 conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim for relief. See Hamilton v. City of Romulus, 409 F. App’x 826, 835 (6th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff’s allegations simply do not “give the defendant[s] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted), nor do they provide any factual content or context
from which the Court may reasonably infer that the named defendants violated plaintiff’s federal rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Assuming plaintiff is attempting to invoke the Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), the complaint reveals such jurisdiction is lacking. A district court has jurisdiction over a suit between citizens of different states when the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The complaint fails to allege the citizenship of any of the defendants to enable the Court to conclude there is complete diversity of citizenship in this matter. Therefore, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship over any state law claims plaintiff may be alleging.
Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT: 1. The complaint be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Plaintiff remains free to apply to proceed in forma pauperis in the Court of Appeals. See Callihan v. Schneider, 178
4 F.3d 800, 803 (6th Cir. 1999), overruling in part Floyd v. United States Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 277 (6th Cir. 1997).
Date; 10/6/2025 Herm K Kethow- Karen L. Litkovitz United States Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION
YU HIN CHAN, Case No. 1:25-cv-697 Plaintiff, Cole, J. Litkovitz, M.J. vs.
JOY CAMPANELLI, et al., Defendants.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).