Young v. Federa Bureau of Prisons

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 20, 2012
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2012-1886
• Status: Published

Opinion

FILED Novz azmz

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CO|I\'fS f0l` fhB DlSf|'lCf Of C(ll|lmbla

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David M. Young, ) )

Plaintiff, )

v. ) civil A@ri@n N<>.

Federal Bureau of Prisons et al. , ) )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of plaintiff s complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis. "l`he application will be granted and the case will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction See Fed. R. Civ. P. l2(h)(3) (requiring dismissal of an action "at any time" the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction).

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Federal Prison Camp in Forrest City, Arkansas, sues the Bureau of Prisons, the United States Marshals Service, and Assistant United States Attomey George May “under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), for violation [sic] of a Constitutional Right . . ., which caused psychological harm in the thought process during indictment proceedings [in 2009], which led to convictions [when] petitioner was actually innocent." Compl. at l. Plaintiff seeks $500,000 in monetary damages. Ia’. at 6.

The Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff constitutional claim because the United States has not consented to be sued for constitutional torts under the Federal 'l`ort Claims Act, 28

U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80. See 28 U.S.C. § l346(b)(1) (creating cause of action for personal

injury "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any [government] employee . . . under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant . . . ."); Jones v. U.S., 296 Fed. Appx. 82, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) ("Congress has not waived the United States's sovereign immunity as to constitutional tort claims.") (citing Clark v. Library ofCongress, 750 F.2d 89, 103 n.31 (D.C. Cir. l984)).

'l`o the extent that plaintiff is claiming negligence, see Compl. at 2-3, he fares no better for at least two reasons. First, an FTCA claim is cognizable only after the plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies by "first present[ing] the claim to the appropriate Federal agency. . . ." 28 U.S.C. §2675. This exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional. See GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 917-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Jackson v. United States, 730 F.2d 808, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Stokes v. U.S. Postal Service, 937 F. Supp. ll, 14 (D.D.C. 1996). Since plaintiff has not indicated that he exhausted his administrative remedies under the FTCA, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Aba’urrahman v. Engstrom, 168 Fed.Appx. 445, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("[T]he district court properly dismissed case [based on unexhausted FTCA claim] for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."); accord Jones, 296 Fed. Appx. at 83.

Second, this action is foreclosed because the underlying claims were adjudicated in a prior action. See Young v. Fed. Bureau of Pri'sons, Civ. Action No. 11-412, slip op. (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2011) [Dkt. # 47] (granting same defendants’ motion to dismiss case arising out of plaintiffs "pre-conviction detention" and his conviction and sentence). Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits in one action "bars any further claim based on the same ‘nucleus of facts’ . . .," Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting

Expert EIec., Inc. v. Levine, 554 F.2d 1227, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1977)), including claims "that could

have been raised in [the prior] action." Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original) (quoting AIlen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). "While it is true that res judicata is an affirmative defense, courts may dismiss sua sponte when they are on notice that a claim has been previously decided because of the policy interest in avoiding ‘unnecessary judicial waste.’ " Walker v. Seldman, 471 F. Supp. 2d 106, 114 n.l2 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000)). Since plaintiff could have brought his FTCA claim in the prior action, he is foreclosed from bringing it in a new action. Hence, this case will

be dismissed with prejudice. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Op inion.

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(}}ii\ted States District Judge Date: November 653 , 2012 ` l