Young v. Ditech Financial LLC

Opinion

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE .

STEVEN K. YOUNG, CASE NO. C19-0867JLR Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE Vv. DITECH FINANCIAL, LLC, et al.,

. Defendants.

On September 3, 2019, the court ordered pro se Plaintiff Steven K. Young to show cause for the second time why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See 2d OSC (Dkt. # 23) at 1 (citing 1st OSC (Dkt. # 10).) Specifically, the court ordered Mr. Young to file a written response that: (a) asserts the citizenship of each member of Ditech [Financial LLC (“Ditech”)], and if any member of Ditech is itself a limited liability company, each of that company’s members, until each layer of limited liability company membership is reduced to the individual members; and (b) asserts specific facts from which the court can determine whether Mr. Young’s claim falls under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e.

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Ud. at 4.) The court cautioned Mr. Young that if he “fails to show cause once again, the court will dismiss his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” (Ud. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Rosales v. United States, 824 F.2d 799, 803 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987)).) Mr. Young filed his response on September 16, 2019. Qd OSC Resp. (Dkt. # 24).) Init, Mr. Young asserted the citizenship of “the following Board Members of Ditech who are citizens of the State of Pennsylvania.” (See id. at 2.) Mr. Young appears confuse “director” with “member.” LLC members are those with an ownership interest in the LLC, and are not necessarily directors. See, e. g., RCW 25.15.116. Mr. Young does not assert that the directors he lists are all Ditech members, and if so, whether the list of directors is the complete list of Ditech members. Therefore, Mr. } Young has again failed to assert “the citizenship of each member of Ditech.” (See 2d OSC at 4); see also Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 ) (9th Cir. 2006) (“We therefore join our sister circuits and hold that, like a partnership, an 14. LLC is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens.”) (emphasis added). Mr. Young also fails to assert “specific facts from which the court can determine || whether Mr. Young’s claim falls under 15 U.S.C. Section 16926.” (See generally id.; □□□ | □

also 2d OSC Resp. at 4.) Instead, Mr. Young requests that the court transfer “this proceeding/case to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Western District of Washington.” (See 2d OSC Resp. at 3.) The court does not reach Mr. Young’s request to transfer, because Mr. Young has not satisfied the court that it has subject matter jurisdiction in the first \//

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linstance.! See Rosales, 824 F.2d at 803 n.4 (holding that if a federal court. determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction at any time during a dispute, the court must dismiss the action). Mr. Young has had several opportunities to properly assert subject matter jurisdiction. (See Compl. (Dkt. # 1); OSC Resp.; 2d OSC Resp.) Still, he has not asserted sufficient facts for the court to conclude that it has either diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Although Mr. Young cites a federal statute as the basis of his Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claim, he has not alleged facts sufficient for the court to conclude that his claim arises under that statute. Notwithstanding Mr. Young’s repeated failures to properly assert subject matter jurisdiction, he appears to make a good-faith effort by (mistakenly) asserting the citizenships of Ditech’s directors. Considering Mr. Young’s pro se status, and his apparently good-faith efforts, the court will afford Mr. Young one final opportunity j\ properly assert the citizenships of each and every Ditech member, and to allege specific facts establishing that his purported FDCPA claim arises under 15 U.S.C, § 1692e. Accordingly, the court ORDERS Mr. Young to file a written response to this order within 14 days that (1) asserts the citizenship of each and every Ditech member, and (2) alleges specific facts establishing that his purported FDCPA claim arises under 15 U.S.C. ||

' Additionally, Mr. Young fails to explain how his claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is a proceeding “arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11.” See 28 USC § 157.

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1 § 1692e. Mr. Young is instructed to limit his response to this order to the sole question of 2 \jurisdiction, and refrain from making requests to transfer or seeking any further relief 3 from the court until the court has determined it has subject matter jurisdiction over this 4 case. If Mr. Young fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction after what will now be 5 Mr. Young’s fourth opportunity, the court will dismiss his complaint for lack of subject 6 matter jurisdiction. If the court does so, it will dismiss the case without prejudice to Mr. 7 Young filing proper claims in a court with jurisdiction over them. SL 8 Dated this 6 day of November, 2019. CDV_Z VO JAMES L. ROBART United States District Judge

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