Young v. Commissioner

6 B.T.A. 472, 1927 BTA LEXIS 3496
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedMarch 12, 1927
DocketDocket Nos. 4720, 3001, 3090, 3265.
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 6 B.T.A. 472 (Young v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Young v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 472, 1927 BTA LEXIS 3496 (bta 1927).

Opinion

[488]*488OPINION.

Trammell :

The first issue involved is the amount of profit, if any, realized by Curtis from the exchange of a lease on a certain placer mining claim and his interest in certain other placer mining claims for stock of the New York Oil Co.

We have held that the question whether the receipt of property as compensation for services results in taxable gain at the time received is dependent on the fact whether such property has a market value at that time. If it has no market value when received, no taxable gain results from its receipt. Appeal of William J. Gonlin, 1 B. T. A. 472; Appeal of M. J. Sullivan, 2 B. T. A. 1012. In such Gases the gain subject to tax is realized when the property is sold or exchanged for other property that has a market value. The transaction resulting in taxable gain or profit is not completed until such time. If the property had a market value when Curtis received it for services, the transaction would then have been completed and would have resulted in gain at that time. The gain, if any, resulting from the subsequent exchange of that property for stock in the New York Oil Co. would have been the difference between the value of the property when received and the value of the stock received in exchange there[489]*489for, if the stock then had a market value. If the property received for services had a market value at the time received, such value would have constituted a basis for determining gain or loss resulting from the subsequent exchange thereof for stock. Only the increase in value arising after its receipt is taxable when it is exchanged for other property or converted into cash.

It is upon the basis of these principles that this case has been tried by both parties in so far as it relates to the gain derived by Curtis from the exchange of his interest in claims for stock. The taxpayer contended that the interest in claims had a market value when received for services in 1917, resulting in taxable gain at that time, and that there was no increase in that value when the interest in such claims was exchanged for stock; but it is further contended that if there were an increase, still there would not be a taxable gain because the stock of the New York Oil Co. received in exchange did not have a market value. The Commissioner contends that the interest in claims received by Curtis for services had no market value when received and that the receipt of the stock in exchange therefor in 1919 constituted a realization of a taxable gain or profit.

With the exception of his interest in section 12, Curtis acquired from Bury for services on July 26, 1917, the interests in the claims which were transferred by him to the New York Oil Co. in 1919.

For the purpose of showing the value of the interest in the claims, evidence was introduced as to the history and development of the field, the nature of adverse and conflicting claims, and other relevant facts.

The Salt Creek oil field is located in Tps. 39 and 40 N., E. 79 W., Natrona County, Wyoming, about 40 miles north of Casper. Oil indications in the region were reported before 1880. Oil was first obtained from shale.

In 1908 a well was drilled into what is known as the First Wall Creek sand, which is an upper' sand underlying a portion of the field. Until 1917 this was the only productive sand in the field. Beneath and extending outside the limits of the First Wall Creek sand is what is known as the Second Wall Creek sand. While it was believed for several years that the Second Wall Creek sand contained oil, yet it was not proven until August, 1917, when the E. T. Williams Oil Co. brought in a well on sec. 11, T. 39 N., E. 79 W. This well, which was a good producer, also proved that the second sand extended outside the limits of the first sand.

The placer mining laws of the United States declared the land open to entry and location. From 1884 down to 1909 many conflicting mining claims were staked off and locations filed, and in some instances development was carried on in a limited way. On September 27,1909, President Taft issued Temporary Withdrawal Order [490]*490No. 5, withdrawing the field from entry, location and settlement under the mineral or nonmineral public land laws of the United States. The withdrawal order contained the express provision that “All locations or claims existing and valid on this date may proceed to entry in the usual manner after field inspection and examination.”

In 1910, William Fitzhugh, who had come from California, went over the field and he, together with William Henshaw and his associates, made locations on all the valuable sections of it. These locations were made after the Taft withdrawal order, but Fitzhugh or his successors in title took possession of large portions of the field, held it with the assistance of armed guards, and by force maintained possession against those who claimed to have acquired interests at earlier dates.

In a division of the claims to the locations filed by Fitzhugh and Henshaw and associates, Fitzhugh took the northwest 40 acres of each quarter section and Henshaw took the remaining 120 acres.

Upon the division, Fitzhugh, in 1911, for a cash consideration of $10,000, conveyed his 40 acres of each quarter section to the Midwest Oil Co., a corporation organized by Yerner Z. Eeed in 1911. Henshaw and his associates conveyed their 120 acres of each quarter section, for $325,000, to the Eeed companies, which were corporations also organized by Verner Z. Eeed. These purchases were made upon the strength of a legal opinion that the Taft withdrawal order was invalid.

The United States Supreme Count on February 23, 1915, in the case of the United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, held that the Taft withdrawal order was valid.

Evidence was introduced for the purpose of showing the market value on July 26, 1917, of the lease of the NW. % of sec. 7, T. 40 N., E. 79 W., which was conveyed by Curtis to the New York Oil Co. on May 16, 1919. This evidence apparently was introduced on the supposition that Curtis acquired the lease from Bury at the same time he acquired his interest in a number of other parcels of land. The instrument, dated July 26, 1917, by which Bury conveyed his interests in certain lands to Curtis, does not show that this lease was included. There being no evidence showing when or from whom Curtis acquired the lease, or the consideration therefor, its market value on July 26, 1917, if proven, is not shown to be the proper basis to be used in computing the profit from its exchange for stock in the New York Oil Co. The Commissioner’s determination, therefore, in so far as it relates to the gain or profit received from the exchange of the léase, must be approved.

On the question of the market value of the claims on July 26j 1917, when Curtis received his interest therein, it is contended that prior to July 26, 1917, to wit, in August, 1916, a well drilled by the New [491]*491York Oil Co. had demonstrated that the Second Wall Creek sand was commercially productive and that this made the mining claims located outside the area of the First Wall Creek sand of considerable value.

In our opinion, the evidence introduced does not establish the taxpayer’s contention.

In August, 1916, the New York Oil Co. drilled a well below the First Wall Creek sand on the NW. % of sec. 27, T. 40 N, E. 79 W.

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Young v. Commissioner
6 B.T.A. 472 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1927)

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Bluebook (online)
6 B.T.A. 472, 1927 BTA LEXIS 3496, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/young-v-commissioner-bta-1927.