Young v. Berryhill

District Court, N.D. California·Decided September 27, 2019·No. 4:18-cv-01721·Unknown

Opinion

MARY ANN YOUNG, Case No. 18-cv-01721-DMR Plaintiff, v. ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Re: Dkt. Nos. 18, 19 Defendant.

Plaintiff Mary Ann Young moves for summary judgment to reverse the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (the “Commissioner’s”) final administrative decision, which found Young not disabled and therefore denied her application for benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. [Docket Nos. 18 (“Pltf. Mot.”), 20 (“Pltf. Reply”).] The Commissioner cross-moves to affirm. [Docket No. 19 (“Def. Mot.”).] For the reasons stated below, the court grants Young’s motion, denies the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and remands this case for further proceedings. Young filed an application for Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits on January 28, 2014, which was initially denied on June 3, 2014 and again on reconsideration on August 19, 2014. Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 69-90, 94-100, 147-54. On August 21, 2014, Young filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A.R. 106-07. A hearing was held on June 9, 2016, at which Young was represented by an attorney. A.R. 33-68. After the hearing, ALJ E. Alis issued a decision finding Young not disabled. A.R. 10-25. The ALJ determined that Young has the following severe impairments: history of cerebrovascular accident, migraine headaches, and gastrointestinal disorder status post surgeries. A.R. 15. The ALJ [T]he claimant ha[s] the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except that she could lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand and walk a maximum of four hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit for six hours in an eight- hour day. She could occasionally climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, and occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She could perform work that allowed her to sit and stand at will, but she would not need to leave the workstation and would not be off task. She should use a cane when ambulating more than 50 feet. A.R. 16. Relying on the opinion of a vocational expert (“VE”) who testified that an individual with such an RFC could perform Young’s past relevant work as a resident supervisor, the ALJ concluded that Young is not disabled. A.R. 20. The Appeals Council denied Young’s request for review on January 17, 2018. A.R. 1-6. The ALJ’s decision therefore became the Commissioner’s final decision. Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2011). Young then filed suit in this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). II. THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful activity1 and that is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). The impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing the work she previously performed and incapable of performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The steps are as follows: 1. At the first step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s work activity, if any. If the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not disabled. 2. At the second step, the ALJ considers the medical severity of the claimant’s impairment(s). If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement in [20 C.F.R.] § 416.909, or a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not disabled. 3. At the third step, the ALJ also considers the medical severity of the claimant’s impairment(s). If the claimant has an impairment(s) that meets or equals one of the listings in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 [the “Listings”] and meets the duration requirement, the ALJ will find that the claimant is disabled. 4. At the fourth step, the ALJ considers an assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and the claimant’s past relevant work. If the claimant can still do his or her past relevant work, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not disabled. 5. At the fifth and last step, the ALJ considers the assessment of the claimant’s RFC and age, education, and work experience to see if the claimant can make an adjustment to other work. If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, the ALJ will find that the claimant is not disabled. If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, the ALJ will find that the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99. A. Young’s Testimony Young was fifty-seven years old at the time of the June 9, 2016 hearing. A.R. 35. She testified that she had last worked in January 2010, as a residential assistant. A.R. 38. While she held that position, she would have “sporadic” headaches that would sometimes prevent her from working. A.R. 38. Young testified that she would miss work due to her headaches anywhere between once a week and an entire week. A.R. 39. Eventually, she and the management team agreed that it was in both their best interest if she resigned, as she faced the danger of injuring herself onsite due to her headaches. A.R. 39. Young stated that she had never before been terminated from any job. A.R. 39. She has not worked since she resigned from the residential assistant position. A.R. 40. A.R. 41. She described herself as “paranoid, in terms of driving alone,” since her headaches can cause her to become disoriented and lose some or all of her vision. A.R. 41. When she was working, she would often have to be taken home by a supervisor or a coworker, or have her husband come and pick her up. A.R. 55. She testified that she has been pulled over many times for erratic driving, including at least five times while she was employed as a residential assistant. A.R. 56. Young said that she is now “really cautious when it comes to driving, because [she has] no control.” A.R. 56. “I get disoriented and I get nervous, and . . . once I get disoriented, I’m lost and I just don’t know which direction to go,” she explained. A.R. 56. However, she does occasionally drive short distances. A.R. 42. She said that the furthest she has driven in the last five years was about 10 minutes from her home. A.R. 42. Young testified that in the last five years, she has traveled out of the Bay Area once, when she wen

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