Young at Heart LLC v. Atlatl Group LLC

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided June 4, 2020·No. 2:20-cv-00918·Unknown

Opinion

WO

Young at Heart LLC, No. CV-20-00918-PHX-MTL

Plaintiff, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER v.

Atlatl Group LLC, et al.,

Defendants. The Court has considered Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint, Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, the supporting exhibits, and the arguments of Plaintiff’s counsel at the June 2, 2020 status conference. The Court will enter a temporary restraining order for the reasons described herein. The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. Whitman v. Hawaiian Tug & Barge Corp./Young Bros., Ltd. Salaried Pension Plan, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (D. Haw. 1998). A plaintiff seeking a temporary restraining order must establish that it is likely to succeed on the merits, likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of temporary relief, that the balance of equities tips in its favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). These elements are balanced on a sliding scale. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F. 3d 1127, 1131, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2011). The movant bears the burden of proof on each element of the test. See Envtl. Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000). The Court makes the following findings of fact and law. 1. YAH is likely to succeed on the merits. The Court finds that YAH is likely to succeed on the merits of its breach of contract claim against Defendant The Atlatl Group, LLC dba Bravada Yachts (“Bravada”), as set forth in the Verified Complaint (Doc. 1), because Bravada failed to deliver the houseboat that it agreed to construct for YAH (the “Houseboat”) by April 1, 2020, pursuant to the parties’ Houseboat Construction Agreement dated October 23, 2018, and as amended by the Amendment to Houseboat Construction Agreement dated August 1, 2019 (the “Agreement”). While the correspondence attached to YAH’s Verified Complaint indicates Bravada believes a $155,000 change order payment is due and owing, no evidence has been provided to the Court that YAH certified the progress to which the change order pertains, and there appears to be at least an argument from the Agreement that such certification is required. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the sum of $155,000 constitutes a proper amount of security for this Order, as required by Rule 65(c). 2. YAH will likely suffer irreparable harm without this relief. Furthermore, a review of the Agreement attached to the Verified Complaint reveals that the parties clearly intended for the Houseboat to be unique and one-of-a-kind. Indeed, in one of the letters attached to the Verified Complaint, Bravada’s attorney describes the Houseboat construction process as “a long, collaborative process of customization and accommodation.” (Doc. 1-5 at 1.) Courts have found irreparable harm to exist in the face of threatened disposal of unique and rare items. See, e.g., Mellen Inc. v. Loan, No. 2:16-CV-00648-DLR, 2016 WL 3144165, *6 (D. Ariz., June 6, 2016) (finding irreparable harm sufficient to enjoin a defendant from selling a unique and rare diamond in the face of competing claims of rights to the diamond); FTC v. Kutzner, No. 8:16-CV-00999-DOC-AFM, 2017 WL 5188334, *9 (C. D. Cal., Mar. 10, 2017) (enjoining receiver from selling a men’s Rolex watch, two Chanel watches, and a Boucheron necklace valued at a total of $119,633, because they were “valuable and unique pieces of jewelry” and their sale would constitute irreparable harm). Furthermore, the nearly $1 million in IRS tax liens against Bravada and the existence of another lawsuit alleging Bravada has yet to begin construction of a houseboat for that plaintiff, despite substantial payment,1 together suggest that Bravada may not be able to collect any monetary judgment that it might secure against Bravada. Therefore, because the Houseboat is unique and one-of-a-kind, and because any monetary judgment that YAH may secure against Bravada may very well by pyrrhic, this Court finds that YAH would suffer irreparable harm if the requested temporary restraining order were not granted. 3. The balance of equities favors YAH. The Court finds that a balance of the equities favors YAH. YAH has, to date, paid $917,500 to Bravada, yet Bravada retains possession both of the Houseboat (in whatever form it now exists) and the $917,500, despite a contractual obligation to deliver the Houseboat on or before April 1, 2020. Bravada has now threatened to sell the Houseboat instead (see Doc. 18, Ex. A, at 2; see also Doc. 1-2 ¶¶ 10.1.2, 10.2), and while Bravada offered to pay $817,500 to YAH over six months, Bravada gave no indication that it has the money on-hand and could pay YAH today. The fact that Bravada appears to have almost $1 million in IRS tax liens levied against it renders dubious any promise of future payment. The balance of equities, to at least preserve the status quo by preventing the threatened sale of the Houseboat, favors YAH. 4. This Order is in the public interest. Finally, the public has an interest in upholding enforceable contracts. Ajilon Professional Staffing, LLC v. Griffin, No. 2:09-CV-00561-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 976522, *4 (D. Ariz. April 10, 2009) (quoting Universal Engraving, Inc. v. Duarte, 519 F.Supp.2d 1140, (D. Kan. 2007)). Whatever the competing claims of the parties may be, it is clear

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