Youmans v. DIST. CT. IN & FOR CTY. OF DENVER

589 P.2d 487, 197 Colo. 28, 1979 Colo. LEXIS 630
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
DecidedJanuary 22, 1979
Docket28260
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 589 P.2d 487 (Youmans v. DIST. CT. IN & FOR CTY. OF DENVER) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Youmans v. DIST. CT. IN & FOR CTY. OF DENVER, 589 P.2d 487, 197 Colo. 28, 1979 Colo. LEXIS 630 (Colo. 1979).

Opinion

MR. JUSTICE LEE

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an original proceeding in which petitioners seek to prohibit further proceedings in the district court pending arbitration. We issued a rule to show cause and now make the rule absolute.

Hudson Moore, a registered representative but a non-member of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), brought an action in the Denver District Court against petitioners. Moore sought to recover damages on his claims for alleged failure to pay commissions owed him, conspiracy to withhold those commissions and to induce a breach of contract and termination of employment, refusal to pay vested benefits under a profit-sharing plan, confiscation of business records, unfair competition, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and physical injuries resulting therefrom.

In response, petitioner Bosworth, Sullivan & Company, Inc., a member of the NYSE, and the individual petitioners filed a motion to stay proceedings and to compel arbitration. In addition, petitioner Investment Advisors, Inc. filed a motion to stay proceedings and to compel arbitration. In addition, petitioner Investment Advisors, Inc. filed a motion to stay proceedings against it until a determination was rendered regarding whether the dispute between Moore and the other petitioners was subject to arbitration. The district court denied the motions of all petitioners.

The question before us is whether a member of the NYSE can compel a non-member registered representative of the NYSE to arbitrate a controversy between them arising out of the employment or termination of employment of the registered representative by the member. We answer affirmatively.

Crucial to our determination is the interaction between Rule 347 of the NYSE and the Constitution of the NYSE. Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

“Any controversy between parties who are members, allied members, member firms or member corporations shall, at the instance of any such party, and any controversy between a non-member and a member or allied member or member firm or member corporation arising out of the business of such member, allied member, member firm or member corporation, or the dissolution of a member firm or member corporation, shall, at the instance of such non-member, be submitted for arbitration *30 in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the rules of the Board of Directors.” (Emphasis added.)

Rule 347 provides:

“Any controversy between a registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such registered representative by and with such member or member organization shall be settled by arbitration, at the instance of any such party, in accordance with the arbitration procedure prescribed elsewhere in these rules.” (Emphasis added.)

The district court held that the Constitution’s provision requiring arbitration “at the instance of such non-member” protects a non-member from compulsory arbitration upon demand of a member. Rule 347, in the view of the district court, conflicts with the Constitution and is therefore void because it allows for arbitration of a controversy between a nonmember registered representative and a member at the instance of a member. We do not agree with the district court’s interpretation when, as here, the registered representative agreed to abide by the rule.

Moore signed an application for approval of employment which contained the following agreement:

“I am familiar with the constitution, rules, regulations and practices of the New York Stock Exchange, and I agree to abide by such constitution, rules, regulations and practices as the same have been or shall be from time to time amended. ” (Emphasis added.)

Moore contends that because he signed the application for approval of employment prior to the adoption of Rule 347 he is not bound thereby. We do not agree. See Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, (3rd Cir. 1976); Moritz v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 Minn. 523, 189 N.W.2d 487 (1971).

A similar situation was before this court in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. District Court, 190 Colo. 239, 545 P.2d 1035 (1976), where it was stated:

“Rule 347(b) provides for arbitration at the instance of either the member or the non-member. This rule simply requires that a special class of nonmembers (registered representatives) in a particular type of controversy (employment disputes) agree to exercise the right to elect to arbitrate which is granted by the constitution. This is not inconsistent with the constitution; nor are the two provisions ambiguous, requiring rules of construction to come into play.”

By agreeing to abide by the rule, as Moore has done in his application for approval of employment, he waived his protection against arbitration at the instance of a member.

Moore’s agreement to abide by a rule providing for arbitration at the instance of either party is essentially no different than the specific agreements executed by registered representatives to arbitrate *31 controversies with members, which have been upheld by many courts. See Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348 (2nd Cir. 1978); Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971); Katz v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Rust v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 352 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. District Court, supra; Crawford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 35 N.Y.2d 291, 319 N.E.2d 408, 361 N.Y.S.2d 140(1974).

We hold, therefore, that the controversy between petitioner Bosworth, Sullivan & Company, Inc., a member of the NYSE, and Hudson Moore, a non-member registered representative, is subject to arbitration. Accordingly, the district court is directed to stay proceedings with regard to petitioner Bosworth, Sullivan & Company, Inc., pending completion of arbitration between Bosworth, Sullivan & Company, Inc. and plaintiff Moore.

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Bluebook (online)
589 P.2d 487, 197 Colo. 28, 1979 Colo. LEXIS 630, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/youmans-v-dist-ct-in-for-cty-of-denver-colo-1979.