York v. Emmarex CA2/5

Opinion

Filed 9/3/26 York v. Emmarex CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

SCOTT YORK, B348995

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.

v. 22STCV04279)

EMMAREX, LLC, et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, H. Jay Ford III, Judge. Affirmed.

Scott York, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.

Plaintiff Scott York (plaintiff) moved to certify a class of defendants allegedly involved in using “directed energy technologies/weapons” to manipulate his thoughts and actions.1 We consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for class certification.

I. BACKGROUND2

A. The Operative Complaint The operative second amended complaint, filed in October 2023, alleges 21 causes of action that repeat many of the same factual allegations throughout. The complaint alleges plaintiff’s thoughts and actions have been manipulated by directed energy weapons and this manipulation had various adverse effects. In addition to naming individual defendants, the complaint alleges putative defendant classes of attorneys, judges, and other community members are involved in this manipulation.

1 Although “[t]he most familiar kind of representative suit . . . is the plaintiffs’ class action[,] [a]ctions against a class of defendants are also authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 382, which provides, in pertinent part: ‘[W]hen the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.’” (Simons v. Horowitz (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 834, 844.) 2 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of plaintiff’s second amended complaint filed October 5, 2023, his motion for class certification filed January 3, 2025, his declaration in support of class certification filed January 3, 2025, and his amended declaration in support of class certification filed June 4, 2025. (Cal. Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d); 459, subd. (a).)

3

Soon after plaintiff filed his second amended complaint, he filed a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion in February 2024.3

B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Defendant-Class Certification Plaintiff filed a motion “for certification of defendant class action” in January 2025. The motion identifies three subclasses of defendants, which include attorneys, judges, and “‘community members’” allegedly involved in the use of directed energy weapons. Plaintiff’s definitions of these subclasses run multiple pages and are expansive in scope. They include, for example, all “licensed attorneys who have participated in and/or continue participating in” the alleged manipulation of plaintiff’s thoughts and actions, judges “who coordinated their conduct/actions” with the alleged manipulation, and countless others (including former colleagues, mental health professionals, members of 12-step programs, and neighbors) cooperating with those allegedly manipulating plaintiff and his environment.

Plaintiff argued the proposed defendant-class includes individuals named in a concurrently filed declaration and additional, unnamed individuals who “already know exactly what is happening with this instant litigation as they are working to actively coordinate and control it.” Plaintiff further argued the proposed defendant-class represents a well-defined community of interest because all members are part of the same alleged scheme

3 Although plaintiff argues in his opening brief that he “must be permitted to further amend the currently operative [c]omplaint,” the order denying his motion for leave to file a third amended complaint is not at issue in this appeal.

4

and certain attorney class members would assert common defenses.

C. The Trial Court’s Ruling The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for defendant-class certification in June 2025. The trial court observed it had “already found” plaintiff’s class allegations failed to state a cause of action as a matter of law in its ruling on a demurrer filed by one of the named defendants. Moreover, the court found, plaintiff did not “allege or show how any individual class representative (named or unnamed) could be a proper class representative,” “that there is an ascertainable class,” or “that there is a well- defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the defendants to be represented.” Plaintiff therefore “failed to meet his burden to obtain certification of any class.”

In addition to denying plaintiff’s motion for defendant-class certification, the trial court found defendant’s filings conceded “the individual defendants he sued as ‘tentative class representatives’ were ‘not named and/or served as an individual, but as a representative of the [d]efendant [c]lass . . . .’” Accordingly, the trial court ordered certain “class claims” stricken without leave to amend. The trial court also ordered various “named and unnamed ‘class representatives’” dismissed with prejudice.

II. DISCUSSION

We review a class certification order for abuse of discretion (Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955, 967-968), and

5

the trial court rightly concluded plaintiff did not demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable class.4 Like any party arguing for class treatment, a plaintiff seeking to certify a class of defendants “‘must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives. [Citations.] “In turn, the ‘community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.’”’ [Citation.]” (City of San Diego v. Haas (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 472, 500; Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021 [discussing class certification requirements generally].)

4 We invited the parties to submit supplemental letter briefs addressing whether any exception to the one final judgment rule permits this appeal taken from the order denying the motion to certify a defendant-class. Plaintiff submitted a letter brief arguing the death knell doctrine, which generally permits an appeal from an order denying certification of a plaintiff-class, also applies to an order denying certification of a defendant-class. There is authority to the contrary (Farwell v. Sunset Mesa Property Owners Assn., Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1552 [holding that an order “amount[ing] to the death knell of [the] action as a defendant class action” did not present “an appropriate case for the death knell doctrine”]), but we shall resolve this appeal on the merits as akin to a multi-party action in which a judgment leaves no issues as to some but not all parties (Ram v. OneWest Bank, FSB (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [one final judgment rule does not apply in such circumstances]).

6

Plaintiff has not satisfied the ascertainability requirement (and that makes it unnecessary to discuss the other certification requirements). A class is ascertainable “when it is defined ‘in terms of objective characteristics and common transactional facts’ that make ‘the ultimate identification of class members possible when that identification becomes necessary.’ [Citation.]” (Noel, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 980.) This focus on objective characteristics “promotes due process” by, among other things, “supplying a concrete basis for determining who will and will not be bound by (or benefit from) any judgment.” (Ibid.) Here, plaintiff proposes class definitions that encompass individuals who he claims are secretly cooperating in a project to manipulate him. Plaintiff’s suggestion that it is sufficient these individuals themselves know they are involved in the alleged scheme does not solve the problem that, at some point, courts need objective criteria by which to identify class members. (Id. at 981, fn. 12 [explaining that “a class defined by its putative members’ subjective states of mind, as opposed to objective facts,” is “problematic”].) Because nothing in the record reveals such criteria, the trial court correctly denied plaintiff’s motion to certify a defendant class for lack of ascertainability.

7

DISPOSITION

The order denying plaintiff’s motion for defendant-class certification is affirmed. All parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

MOOR, J.