Yonas Fikre v. Fbi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: September 20, 2018
• Docket: 16-36072
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 20 2018 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YONAS FIKRE, No. 16-36072

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:13-cv-00899-BR

v. MEMORANDUM* FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 9, 2018 Portland, Oregon

Before: RAWLINSON, M. SMITH.,** and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** Following Judge Garbis’s retirement, Judge Smith was drawn by lot to replace him. Ninth Circuit General Order 3.2.h. Judge Smith has read the briefs, reviewed the record, and listened to oral argument. Fikre alleged that in June 2011, he was detained by the secret police in the

United Arab Emirates and subjected to interrogation and torture for 106 days.1

This episode was instigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Fikre sued the

government contending, among other things, that it illegally surveilled him in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court dismissed this claim and

Fikre timely appealed. We have jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.2

Fikre’s fifth amended complaint pleaded that the “[FBI’s] actions were not

authorized by a warrant satisfying the Fourth Amendment, were not supported by

probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and were unreasonable.” These allegations

are vague and conclusory and, in the absence of “further factual enhancement,” do

not give rise to a “plausible claim for relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 557 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); see Krainski v.

Nev. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 969 (9th

Cir. 2010). And because Fikre “had several opportunities to amend [his] complaint

and repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies,” the district court did not abuse its

1 On a motion to dismiss, we take all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010). As the parties are familiar with these allegations, we do not recount them here. 2 We resolve Fikre’s due process claims in a concurrently filed opinion. 2 discretion by dismissing his Fourth Amendment claim with prejudice. Telesaurus

VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010).

AFFIRMED.