Ympoka v. United States Department of Interior

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: July 21, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2000
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PYJAI SAKATU YMPOKA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:24-cv-2000 (TNM)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se prisoner Pyjai Ympoka is detained pending trial on murder charges in the Virgin

Islands. He alleges that a host of government actors and his current defense counsel have

conspired to violate his rights as a member of an indigenous group. Some Defendants move to

dismiss. 1 Others have not responded to the Complaint. But regardless, Ympoka’s allegations

are so disconnected from reality that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain them. So the Court

will grant in part the motions to dismiss from two sets of Defendants and sua sponte dismiss

Ympoka’s Complaint as to the remaining Defendants.

I.

Ympoka’s legal name is Jerome Wallace III. Andrews Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 15, at 2.

He is incarcerated in the Virgin Islands awaiting trial on murder charges. See Andrews Ex. 1,

ECF No. 15-1 (listing his July 2020 arrest for “Murder in the First Degree”); People of the Virgin

Islands v. Jerome Wallace, SX-2020-CR-00163 (V.I. Super. Ct.).

1 Because Ympoka is pro se, the Court entered orders under Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1988), for both motions to dismiss. ECF Nos. 8 and 16. Ympoka describes the situation differently. He protests that he is “currently in forced

detention” in the Virgin Islands, despite never having “agreed to” be subject to the laws of the

United States. Compl., ECF No. 1, at 2. As a member of the “Maipuri Arauan Nation of the

Americas,” he contends that he is not a citizen of the United States and “has never signed any

agreement with” the United States to “relinquish [his] rights as a natural born Arawak.” Id. So

he “demands freedom from th[is] forced identity in violation of international protections, which

forbid[] piracy, human trafficking, and apartheid.” Id.

Much of Ympoka’s Complaint invokes the Alien Tort Statute, which lets non-citizens

bring suit for torts “committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”

28 U.S.C. § 1350. His claims are diverse, ranging from “Environmental Racism” to “Ethnic

Cleansing,” and from “land theft” to “piracy.” Compl. at 4–6. But the overarching theme is

Ympoka’s belief that the United States and its actors are “systemically forcing fraudulent

identity” on him so they can improperly detain him. Compl. at 5. As a remedy for these many

wrongs, he “demands to know the true nature and jurisdiction of the tribunal” that is “committing

piracy and human trafficking against” him, plus over $500 million in damages. Compl. at 23.

Ympoka names a long list of Defendants including the United States, various federal

agencies and officials, the Virgin Islands and a collection of its officials, and the judge in his

murder trial—the Hon. Alphonso Andrews. Ympoka also alleges ineffective assistance of

counsel against Ronald Russell, his current defense counsel. His primary concern is that his

lawyer has excluded Ympoka’s non-lawyer “tribal advocate” from being involved with

Ympoka’s defense strategy. Compl. at 21–22, 29–30. The tribal advocate wrote Russell a letter

protesting Ympoka’s treatment, and then sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction in Ympoka’s

2 criminal case. Compl. Exs., ECF No. 1-1, at 56–65. The court promptly struck the motion and

issued Ympoka’s associate a cease-and-desist order. Id. at 67–69.

In this case, the United States moved to dismiss for all federal Defendants. Gov’t Mot.

Dismiss, ECF No. 7. It says the Court lacks jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure because Ympoka’s Complaint is “patently insubstantial.” Id. at 10.

The Government further urges dismissal under Rule 8, which requires pleadings to include “a

short and plain statement” outlining the Court’s jurisdiction and the plaintiff’s entitlement to

relief. Id. at 9. Finally, the Government says the Complaint fails to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6). Id. at 14–16.

Judge Andrews also moves for dismissal. See Andrews Mot. Dismiss. His defenses run

the gamut of Rule 12. See id. at 1. He alleges a lack of both personal and subject-matter

jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficient service of process, and failure to state a claim. See id.

The remaining Defendants—Ympoka’s defense counsel, the Virgin Islands, and various

officers of the Virgin Islands—have not responded to the Complaint or entered notices of

appearance. Ympoka moves for default judgment against them. Mots. for Default J., ECF Nos.

19 and 23. All motions are ripe for decision.

II.

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . . [and it] is to be presumed that a

cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S.

375, 377 (1994). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that a federal court has jurisdiction.

See id. “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court

must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). When assessing jurisdiction, a court can look

3 beyond the complaint and “consider materials outside the pleadings.” Jerome Stevens Pharms.,

Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

Courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over complaints that are “patently insubstantial,

presenting no federal question suitable for decision.” Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). Claims are patently insubstantial if they are “essentially

fictitious” or otherwise “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.”

Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330–31 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,

536–37 (1974)). Examples include allegations that advance “bizarre conspiracy theories,”

“fantastic government manipulations of [someone’s] will or mind,” or “supernatural

intervention.” Id. at 330.

More, courts have an independent obligation to screen complaints from prisoners who are

suing the government or government officials. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. “On review, the court

shall” dismiss “any portion of the complaint” if it is “frivolous.” Id. § 1915A(b)(1). Review and

dismissal under § 1915A must be done sua sponte even if the defendant has not yet responded to

the complaint. See Davis v. Dist. of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

When evaluating pro se filings, courts must be mindful that any “document filed pro se is

to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (cleaned up). Still, even pro se plaintiffs must adequately plead their complaints to

avoid dismissal. Yellen v. U.S. Bank, Nat’l Assoc., 301 F. Supp. 3d 43, 47 (D.D.C. 2018).

III.

Ympoka puts forward a baseless theory that being part of a made-up indigenous group is

a get-out-of-jail-free card that halts even a murder prosecution in its tracks. His Complaint is

4 “essentially fictitious” and so “devoid of merit” that the Court lacks jurisdiction under Rule

12(b)(1). Best, 39 F.3d at 330–31. His ineffective assistance of counsel claim has additional

jurisdictional deficiencies too. Even if the Court did have jurisdiction, the screening requirement

in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A would still require dismissal because Ympoka’s claims are frivolous.

A.

Ympoka’s Complaint is difficult to parse, but his basic theory seems to be that he is

beyond the reach of the United States because of his membership in the Maipuri Arauan Nation.

See Compl. at 2. While many of his allegations are nebulous—“Environmental Racism,” “land

theft under covert means,” “Destruction of safe and productive existence”—Ympoka repeatedly

takes aim at his “forced racial and citizenship designation.” Compl. at 5. So as best the Court

can discern, he is alleging that the Virgin Islands is improperly characterizing him as a citizen

and relying on his citizenship to exert criminal jurisdiction over him.

There are many problems with this theory, not the least of which is that the Maipuri

Arauan Nation is a recently formed organization that carries no legal significance. The group

was created in 2020 and its founding document purports to herald the “unification and

independence” of a collection of “Americas aboriginal people.” Compl. Exs. at 4, 5. Ympoka

may, of course, self-identify however he chooses. But labeling himself an “Arawak American

inhabitant of the Antilles’ [Virgin Islands] territory of AyeAye,” Compl. at 7, does nothing to

divest him of United States citizenship or shield him from criminal prosecution in the Virgin

Islands. After all, the “[l]aws of the United States apply to all persons within its borders. Even if

[Ympoka] were not a citizen of the United States . . . he would be obliged to respect the laws of

this nation.” United States v. James, 328 F.3d 953, 954 (7th Cir. 2003).

5 Nor does Ympoka’s membership in the Maipuri Arauan Nation make him an “alien” for

the jurisdictional purposes of the Alien Tort Statute. 28 U.S.C.§ 1350; see Yousuf v. Samantar,

552 F.3d 371, 375 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009), aff'd and remanded, 560 U.S. 305 (2010) (“According to

the plain statutory language, one precondition for subject-matter jurisdiction to be conferred

under the ATS is that suit be filed by an alien, not a citizen.”). Instead, the record shows that

Ympoka is a United States citizen born in the Virgin Islands. Andrews Ex. 1 (listing “St. Croix”

in the Virgin Islands as his place of birth); 8 U.S.C. § 1406(b) (“All persons born in the Virgin

Islands of the United States . . . on or after February 25, 1927, . . . are declared to be citizens of

the United States at birth.”). In short, he has no colorable basis to claim that his membership in

the Maipuri Arauan Nation immunizes him from criminal prosecution for allegedly murdering

someone in the Virgin Islands.

Ympoka’s argument is a different ethnic flavor of the oft-dismissed claims of “Moorish”

citizens. These plaintiffs have made similar frivolous claims that an unrecognized aboriginal

status prevents the United States or a state within it from criminally prosecuting or detaining

them. See, e.g., Williams v. Biden, 2024 WL 3534705, at *1 (D.D.C. July 24, 2024) (dismissing

as “inherently frivolous” the allegations of a prisoner who claimed he was a “Moorish American

National” “beyond the reach of” state criminal laws); El Bey v. New Jersey, 2014 WL 4197572,

at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2014) (dismissing as “patently frivolous” a pro se plaintiff’s claims that

his status as an “aboriginal Indigenous Moorish-American” prevented a state from detaining him

on criminal charges); United States v. Toader, 409 F. App’x 9 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the claim

from a “Moorish National Citizen” that federal courts lacked criminal jurisdiction over him).

Ympoka uses different labels, but his legal theory remains just as hollow and warrants the same

outcome.

6 The rest of Ympoka’s Complaint is no better. It serves up a disjointed smorgasbord of

meaningless legal incantations. He invokes the Pope, declaring that “the Doctrine of Discovery

and the Doctrine of Slavery were denounced, abolished, and rescinded by Pope John Paul in

2009.” Compl. at 7. He references an Executive Order that, according to Ympoka, “describe[s]”

“unlawful possession of human beings to be used as human capital.” Compl. at 4. In reality, the

Order created a commission to study capital budgeting and it lacks the nefarious import Ympoka

assigns to it. See Exec. Order No. 13037, 62 Fed. Reg. 10185 (March 3, 1997). And he protests

that the United States’ acquisition of the Virgin Islands in 1916 was “an act of international

piracy and human trafficking” in violation of international law. Compl. at 9. It is against this

backdrop that he repeatedly accuses Defendants of conspiring to deprive him of his indigenous

rights. See, e.g., Compl. at 19 (accusing the United States and the Governor of the Virgin Islands

of conspiring to “force [him] to accept and adhere to, unlawful standards of life”).

Ympoka’s claims are “absolutely devoid of merit.” Best, 39 F.3d at 331. Much of his

Complaint is barely coherent, and the facts he puts forward live comfortably in the realm of the

“essentially fictitious.” Id. at 330. The Complaint also includes a classic hallmark of patent

insubstantiality—a sweeping government conspiracy to commit “piracy and human trafficking”

against him, complete with a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act

claim against his defense counsel and Judge Andrews. See Compl. at 23, 25, 30, 31. The Court

must dismiss Ympoka’s Complaint because it lacks jurisdiction over his patently insubstantial

claims under Rule 12(b)(1). And even if the Court did have jurisdiction, it would dismiss

Ympoka’s Complaint as frivolous under the screening requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

7 B.

Ympoka’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim also has other jurisdictional

deficiencies. He relies on the Sixth Amendment to bring this challenge as part of his efforts to

end his incarceration. See Compl. at 29–30. At best, the Court could construe this as a habeas

petition under either 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or § 2254. See generally Brian R. Means, Federal

Habeas Manual § 1:34 (June 2025) (explaining that § 2254 applies when a “person is in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court,” while § 2241 applies when a person “is in custody

pursuant to something other than a judgment of a state court” including “pre-trial detention”).

But Ympoka does not explain how this Court, situated in Washington, D.C., has jurisdiction

under either statute to review the ongoing detention of a criminal defendant in the Virgin Islands.

See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004) (“[F]or core habeas petitions challenging

present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement.”);

Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 633–34 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that Congress has given the

District Court of the Virgin Islands the power issue habeas writs).

More, the Court would abstain from hearing Ympoka’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim even if it could. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) (discussing the

“longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings”).

Under the Younger doctrine, “a federal court must abstain [from interfering] when there is an

ongoing state proceeding 2 . . . which implicates important state interests and provides an

adequate opportunity to raise federal defenses.” Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Richie, 794 F.3d 185,

192 (1st Cir. 2015).

2 “Younger applies in the context of a territory’s proceedings as well,” including in the Virgin Islands. Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 130 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009).

8 Ympoka’s situation does not warrant federal interference. He is the defendant in an

ongoing territorial murder case, and the Virgin Islands has a strong interest in prosecuting

murder charges. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 51–52 (states have an interest in “carrying out the

important and necessary task of enforcing . . . laws against socially harmful conduct”). And not

only can Ympoka raise his Sixth Amendment claim in a Virgin Islands court, but he must do so

before bringing it via a habeas petition in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)

(requiring a federal habeas applicant in state custody to first “exhaust[] the remedies available in

the courts of the State”); 5 V.I.C. § 1303 (giving the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands the

power to grant writs of habeas corpus).

Even if the Court were to read the allegations against Russell as something else—a tort

claim, perhaps—the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. Russell is not local, so the Court must

look to Washington, D.C.’s long-arm statute for jurisdiction. Thompson Hine, LLP v. Taieb, 734

F.3d 1187, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The long-arm statute “provide[s] jurisdiction to the full extent

allowed by the Due Process Clause” so the analysis collapses “into a single” constitutional

inquiry. Id. Thus, for personal jurisdiction, Ympoka needs to show that Russell has “minimum

contacts” with this forum and has “purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting

activities within [Washington], thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Id.

(cleaned up). But Ympoka gives no indication his defense counsel has even the slightest ties

here. Russell is a lawyer in the Virgin Islands, appearing in a Virgin Islands court to represent a

Virgin Islands client charged with crimes under Virgin Islands law. If Russell has any

connection to Washington, Ympoka has not identified it. These deficiencies add yet another

layer onto the reasons this Court lacks jurisdiction over Ympoka’s claims.

9 IV.

For these reasons, the Court will grant in part 3 the Government’s Motion to Dismiss and

Judge Andrews’s Motion to Dismiss. The Court will also deny Ympoka’s two Motions for Default

Judgment and dismiss his Complaint as to all Defendants without prejudice. A separate Order will

issue today.

2025.07.21 10:24:59 -04'00' Dated: July 21, 2025 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

3 The Government and Judge Andrews both moved for dismissal with prejudice, but the Court will dismiss without prejudice. See Kasap v. Folger Nolan Fleming & Douglas, Inc., 166 F.3d 1243, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction must be done without prejudice because it is not a decision on the merits).