NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-404
YMCA OF GREATER BOSTON, INC.
vs.
HYH'NES BAKRI.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a jury-waived trial, a judge of the Eastern Housing
Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, YMCA of
Greater Boston, Inc. (YMCA), against the defendant, Hyh'nes
Bakri (Bakri), on numerous claims in a consolidated action
relating to a tenancy dispute between the parties. 1 Bakri
appeals from this judgment, 2 asserting numerous errors on appeal
1YMCA states that two entities, Hallkeen Management, Inc., and Cruz Management Company, Inc., "were [also] parties in this action and join in on [YMCA's] [b]rief." While those entities were named as defendants to a small claims action brought by Bakri, which was consolidated with the Housing Court action brought by YMCA, those entities were not named as plaintiffs in YMCA's complaint and have not filed appearances in this appeal.
2Bakri filed her notice of appeal prior to final judgment entering below. We exercise our discretion to hear this appeal because the premature filing of the notice of appeal did not and requesting that the judgment be vacated and damages be
entered in her favor. We affirm.
As a preliminary matter, we decline to address a number of
Bakri's claims that fail to comply with the Massachusetts Rules
of Appellate Procedure, 3 fail to rise to the level of appellate
argument, 4 or were not raised below. 5 We recognize that Bakri is
prejudice YMCA. See Roch v. Mollica, 481 Mass. 164, 165 n.2 (2019).
3 These claims include her references to the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; G. L. c. 12, § 11H-11J; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 42 U.S.C. § 3604; G. L. c. 151B; and alleged violations of Housing Court orders. Bakri filed an informal brief pursuant to the Appeals Court Informal Brief Pilot Program (program) for self- represented litigants, but the program still requires compliance with the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Appeals Court Informal Brief Pilot Program, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/appeals-court-informal-brief- pilot-program.
4 These claims include "substantial civil rights injustice," "loophole disguised as procedure," and "plac[ing] the burden to fix [YMCA's] continued noncompliance" on Bakri. The program requires "adequate appellate argument," meaning that the "Appeals Court does not have to consider any argument that is not discussed in the brief or that lacks legal or factual support." Appeals Court Informal Brief Pilot Program, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/appeals-court-informal-brief- pilot-program.
5 These claims include violation of the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment; violation of art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and violation of due process. See Commonwealth v. Pares-Ramirez, 400 Mass. 604, 609 (1987). Generally, we do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal "if the record accompanying them is lacking, as is the case here, in
2 self-represented, but nonetheless, pro se litigants are held to
the same standards as all other litigants. See Brossard v. West
Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 417 Mass. 183, 184
(1994).
With regard to the majority of the remaining claims,
Bakri's arguments amount to a dispute with the weight that the
judge gave to certain evidence and with the judge's credibility
determinations. 6 However, "it is the trial judge who, by virtue
of his firsthand view of the presentation of evidence, is in the
best position to judge the weight and credibility of the
evidence." New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass.
671, 675 (1977). On appeal, we will not disturb such
determinations unless found to be clearly erroneous. Adoption
of Querida, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 771, 777 (2019). The judge found
in favor of YMCA on the contested claims largely because the
judge credited the testimony of YMCA and did not credit, or give
great weight to, the evidence that Bakri put forth to support
providing a basis for their intelligent resolution." Gagnon, petitioner, 416 Mass. 775, 780 (1994) (superseded by G. L. c. 123A, § 9).
6 As examples, Bakri claims that the judge erred in his conclusions regarding Bakri's claims of retaliation, in violation of G. L. c. 186, § 18; interference with quiet enjoyment (G. L. c. 186, § 14); harassment; discrimination; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress; breach of contract; and violation of G. L. c. 93A.
3 these claims. Bakri has not shown sufficient reason that the
judge's factual findings were clearly erroneous, and therefore
we do not disturb them and find no error in the judge's legal
conclusions.
For similar reasons, we disagree with Bakri's claims that
the judge erred in concluding there was no violation of the
Massachusetts Sanitary Code (code), or breach of the implied
warranty of habitability. The judge addressed these claims
together, as there is a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability when there is a material violation of the minimum
standards in the code. Whether there is a material breach or
violation of the code is a question of fact. See Boston Hous.
Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 200 (1973). Again, we
generally accept the findings of fact found by the judge in a
jury-waived case, unless shown to be clearly erroneous or unless
the evidence is entirely documentary. See Zaskey v. Whately, 61
Mass. App. Ct. 609, 614 (2004). Here, the judge found that
Bakri failed to meet her burden 7 regarding these claims because
no evidence was submitted regarding a violation of the code, nor
were there reports from inspectional services regarding defects
7 Bakri also argues that the judge erred in placing a burden on her to prove her claims. There was no error, where, generally, the party bringing a civil claim has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. See Goodman v. Atwood, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 655, 657 (2011).
4 on the premises. Given the deferential standard of review
applicable here, we do not disturb the judge's rulings on these
claims.
To the extent that Bakri claims that the Housing Court
violated Standing Order 1-04, identifying time standards for
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-404
YMCA OF GREATER BOSTON, INC.
vs.
HYH'NES BAKRI.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a jury-waived trial, a judge of the Eastern Housing
Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, YMCA of
Greater Boston, Inc. (YMCA), against the defendant, Hyh'nes
Bakri (Bakri), on numerous claims in a consolidated action
relating to a tenancy dispute between the parties. 1 Bakri
appeals from this judgment, 2 asserting numerous errors on appeal
1YMCA states that two entities, Hallkeen Management, Inc., and Cruz Management Company, Inc., "were [also] parties in this action and join in on [YMCA's] [b]rief." While those entities were named as defendants to a small claims action brought by Bakri, which was consolidated with the Housing Court action brought by YMCA, those entities were not named as plaintiffs in YMCA's complaint and have not filed appearances in this appeal.
2Bakri filed her notice of appeal prior to final judgment entering below. We exercise our discretion to hear this appeal because the premature filing of the notice of appeal did not and requesting that the judgment be vacated and damages be
entered in her favor. We affirm.
As a preliminary matter, we decline to address a number of
Bakri's claims that fail to comply with the Massachusetts Rules
of Appellate Procedure, 3 fail to rise to the level of appellate
argument, 4 or were not raised below. 5 We recognize that Bakri is
prejudice YMCA. See Roch v. Mollica, 481 Mass. 164, 165 n.2 (2019).
3 These claims include her references to the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; G. L. c. 12, § 11H-11J; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 42 U.S.C. § 3604; G. L. c. 151B; and alleged violations of Housing Court orders. Bakri filed an informal brief pursuant to the Appeals Court Informal Brief Pilot Program (program) for self- represented litigants, but the program still requires compliance with the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Appeals Court Informal Brief Pilot Program, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/appeals-court-informal-brief- pilot-program.
4 These claims include "substantial civil rights injustice," "loophole disguised as procedure," and "plac[ing] the burden to fix [YMCA's] continued noncompliance" on Bakri. The program requires "adequate appellate argument," meaning that the "Appeals Court does not have to consider any argument that is not discussed in the brief or that lacks legal or factual support." Appeals Court Informal Brief Pilot Program, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/appeals-court-informal-brief- pilot-program.
5 These claims include violation of the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment; violation of art. 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and violation of due process. See Commonwealth v. Pares-Ramirez, 400 Mass. 604, 609 (1987). Generally, we do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal "if the record accompanying them is lacking, as is the case here, in
2 self-represented, but nonetheless, pro se litigants are held to
the same standards as all other litigants. See Brossard v. West
Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 417 Mass. 183, 184
(1994).
With regard to the majority of the remaining claims,
Bakri's arguments amount to a dispute with the weight that the
judge gave to certain evidence and with the judge's credibility
determinations. 6 However, "it is the trial judge who, by virtue
of his firsthand view of the presentation of evidence, is in the
best position to judge the weight and credibility of the
evidence." New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass.
671, 675 (1977). On appeal, we will not disturb such
determinations unless found to be clearly erroneous. Adoption
of Querida, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 771, 777 (2019). The judge found
in favor of YMCA on the contested claims largely because the
judge credited the testimony of YMCA and did not credit, or give
great weight to, the evidence that Bakri put forth to support
providing a basis for their intelligent resolution." Gagnon, petitioner, 416 Mass. 775, 780 (1994) (superseded by G. L. c. 123A, § 9).
6 As examples, Bakri claims that the judge erred in his conclusions regarding Bakri's claims of retaliation, in violation of G. L. c. 186, § 18; interference with quiet enjoyment (G. L. c. 186, § 14); harassment; discrimination; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress; breach of contract; and violation of G. L. c. 93A.
3 these claims. Bakri has not shown sufficient reason that the
judge's factual findings were clearly erroneous, and therefore
we do not disturb them and find no error in the judge's legal
conclusions.
For similar reasons, we disagree with Bakri's claims that
the judge erred in concluding there was no violation of the
Massachusetts Sanitary Code (code), or breach of the implied
warranty of habitability. The judge addressed these claims
together, as there is a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability when there is a material violation of the minimum
standards in the code. Whether there is a material breach or
violation of the code is a question of fact. See Boston Hous.
Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 200 (1973). Again, we
generally accept the findings of fact found by the judge in a
jury-waived case, unless shown to be clearly erroneous or unless
the evidence is entirely documentary. See Zaskey v. Whately, 61
Mass. App. Ct. 609, 614 (2004). Here, the judge found that
Bakri failed to meet her burden 7 regarding these claims because
no evidence was submitted regarding a violation of the code, nor
were there reports from inspectional services regarding defects
7 Bakri also argues that the judge erred in placing a burden on her to prove her claims. There was no error, where, generally, the party bringing a civil claim has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. See Goodman v. Atwood, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 655, 657 (2011).
4 on the premises. Given the deferential standard of review
applicable here, we do not disturb the judge's rulings on these
claims.
To the extent that Bakri claims that the Housing Court
violated Standing Order 1-04, identifying time standards for
cases, it is without merit. See generally Housing Court
Standing Order 1-04 (2004). Housing Court Standing Order 1-04
provides that judges shall have discretion to "exercise sound
judgment in a manner that affords the parties a fair opportunity
to develop and present their claims to the court," and nothing
"shall limit the [judge's] authority, in appropriate cases where
the interests of justice require . . . to order that a
particular case not be or not remain subject to the time
standards set forth in this standing order." Bakri has failed
to articulate how the judge's management of the case constituted
an abuse of discretion, and we therefore conclude there was
none.
Finally, Bakri alludes to judicial and institutional bias
against her, and in favor of YMCA, throughout the proceedings.
Bakri's supposed evidence for this claim is solely that the
judge made rulings that were unfavorable to her. This claim is
without merit, as "[t]he mere fact that a party suffers adverse
rulings during litigation does not establish lack of judicial
5 impartiality." Clark v. Clark, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 737, 739
(1999). 8
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Meade, Hodgens & Allen, JJ. 9),
Clerk
Entered: May 20, 2026.
8 To the extent that we do not address other arguments, they "have not been overlooked. We find nothing in them that requires discussion." Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).
9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.