UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
NAZANIN YAZDAN POURI,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 26-cv-1339 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff is an Iranian physician who lawfully resides in Norfolk, Virginia as a derivative
beneficiary of her husband’s student visa. Decl. of Yazdan Pouri ¶¶ 1–2, ECF No. 4-1 (“Pouri
Decl.”). She has been admitted to the family medicine residency program at Eastern Virginia
Medical School, with orientation set to begin on June 10, 2026. Id. ¶ 1. On November 7, 2025,
Plaintiff applied to become a permanent resident (Form I-485) and for employment authorization
pending adjustment of status (Form I-765). Id. ¶ 2. But U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”) has indefinitely suspended the adjudication of all benefit applications filed
by noncitizens from 39 countries, including Iran. As a result, Plaintiff has been unable to obtain
the employment authorization needed to begin her residency. Id. ¶¶ 3, 8. She now moves for a
preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to adjudicate her Form I-765 within seven days. See
Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 4 (Pl.’s Mot.”). Defendants move to dismiss or to transfer
the case to the District of Maryland. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss or Transfer, ECF No. 7 (“Defs.’
Mot.”). For the following reasons, the court will DENY Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or
Transfer and GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
Page 1 of 22 I. BACKGROUND
In June 2025, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 10949 and restricted the
entry of noncitizens from 19 countries, including Iran. See Restricting the Entry of Foreign
Nationals to Protect the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and
Public Safety Threats, 90 Fed. Reg. 24497 (June 4, 2025). In December 2025, USCIS released a
policy memorandum directing all agency personnel to “place a hold on pending benefit requests
for [noncitizens] from countries listed in Presidential Proclamation 10949 . . . pending
comprehensive review.” USCIS Policy Memorandum, PM-602-0192 (Dec. 2, 2025),
https://perma.cc/M55Y-M7W4 (“December Memo”). Later that month, the President expanded
entry restrictions to individuals from 39 countries in Presidential Proclamation 10998. See
Restricting and Limiting the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United
States, 90 Fed. Reg. 59717 (Dec. 16, 2025). The following January, USCIS updated its policy
memorandum and expanded the adjudication hold to individuals from all countries listed in
Presidential Proclamation 10998. USCIS Policy Memorandum, PM-602-0194 (Jan. 1, 2026),
https://perma.cc/YQX2-VFKD (“January Memo”). The memo states that a hold on benefit
adjudication is necessary to conduct a review of screening procedures and ensure that
noncitizens from those countries “do not pose a threat to national security or public safety.” Id.
at 3. As a result of this indefinite suspension, USCIS has not adjudicated Plaintiff’s Form I-765
request for an Employment Authorization Document (“EAD”) pending adjustment of status. See
Pouri Decl. ¶¶ 3–4. Plaintiff will lose her residency if she does not have an EAD by June 10,
which would constitute a significant personal, professional, and financial setback. See id. ¶ 8.
Page 2 of 22 II. ANALYSIS
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Before it can address Defendants’ transfer request, or any other issue, the court must first
assure itself of subject matter jurisdiction. That is because “a court without subject matter
jurisdiction cannot transfer a case to another court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).” Integrated
Health Servs. v. THCI Co., 417 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2005); see also 15 Wright & Miller, Fed.
Prac. & Proc. § 3844 (4th ed. 2026) (“If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, Section 1404(a)
provides no power to do anything with the case” except dismiss it.).
Defendants contend that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips this court of subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s challenge to the policy memos. Defs.’ Mot. at 17–18. That
provision specifies that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any . . . decision or action”
entrusted to “the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Defendants note that a decision to grant or deny a noncitizen’s
petition for adjustment of status is committed to agency discretion. See Defs.’ Mot. at 18 (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1255). But Plaintiff does not challenge the discretionary denial of a petition for
adjustment of status; instead, she seeks judicial review of USCIS’s policy of categorically
withholding action on such petitions. See Pl.’s Mot. at 7. And § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) “appl[ies]
only to individualized immigration adjudications.” Miot v. Trump, 818 F. Supp. 3d 126, 153
(D.D.C. 2026). It does “not prevent judicial review of a generally applicable” agency policy. Id.
(cleaned up); see also Make the Road New York v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612, 630 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(noting that § 1252(a)(2)(B) bars “judicial review of challenges to orders denying discretionary
relief,” not “generally applicable rulemaking governing . . . procedures” (cleaned up)).
Page 3 of 22 Nor does § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bar a claim that USCIS has “fail[ed] to timely resolve” a
petition for adjustment of status. Ruhumuriza v. Higgins, 2026 WL 587636, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar.
3, 2026). Again, such a claim does not challenge a discretionary decision by USCIS; it
challenges the agency’s failure to timely make one. See id.; see also Venigalla v. USCIS, 2026
WL 145601, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2026) (“Although this court might lack jurisdiction to review
the discretionary denial of an equitable tolling request, the failure to consider such a request is
not a discretionary decision over which the court lacks jurisdiction—it is a failure to make a
discretionary decision altogether.”). The court is therefore satisfied that it has subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s challenge to the policy memos.
B. Venue
Defendants argue that venue in this District is improper, and that even if it were proper,
transfer to the District of Maryland would still be warranted. See Defs.’ Mot. at 13–17. The
court disagrees.
a. Venue is Proper.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A), a plaintiff may bring a civil action against “an agency
of the United States” or “an officer or employee” thereof “acting in his official capacity” “in any
judicial district in which . . . a defendant in the action resides.” Plaintiff has named the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) as a Defendant and there is no dispute that DHS is
located in the District of Columbia. See Rabelo v. Noem, 2025 WL 3171005, at *2 n.4 (D.D.C.
Nov. 13, 2025) (“Here, venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A) because
the Secretary of Homeland Security resides in the District of Columbia, where the Department is
headquartered.”). Defendants nevertheless contend that DHS should be dismissed from the suit
because the Secretary has “delegated authority for processing and adjudicating immigration
Page 4 of 22 applications to USCIS,” which issued the policy memos under review from its headquarters in
the District of Maryland, and with DHS dismissed, venue would no longer be proper. Defs.’
Mot. at 15; see also Wei Lai Dev. LLC v. USCIS, 2021 WL 2073403, at *3 n.5 (D.D.C. May 24,
2021) (noting that USCIS has relocated its headquarters to Camp Springs, Maryland and has had
“no . . . headquarters level offices within the District of Columbia since December 11, 2020”
(cleaned up)).
But Defendant cites no case law for the remarkable proposition that a parent agency is
not a proper defendant when a plaintiff directly challenges the nationwide policy of a component
agency. See Defs.’ Mot. at 14–17; see also Defs.’ Reply at 2–3, ECF No. 10. Instead, Defendant
relies almost exclusively on Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1993)—a case that
is far afield. There, a plaintiff sued federal officials, including the Attorney General, alleging
that they failed to provide him a medically necessary low-sodium diet at his federal prison in
Indiana. Cameron, 983 F.2d at 254. The D.C. Circuit transferred the case and warned courts in
this Circuit to “guard against the danger that a plaintiff might manufacture venue in the District
of Columbia” by “naming high government officials” like the Attorney General “as defendants”
in cases with no “connection to the District of Columbia at all.” Id. at 256.
In Cameron, however, the plaintiff did not allege that the Attorney General or other
officials in Washington “had participated in any decision or approved any policy that related to”
the prisoner’s treatment in Indiana. 983 F.2d at 258. Instead, he relied “essentially on the bare
assumption that policy decisions made in Washington might have affected [his] treatment” in
Indiana. Id. Here, by contrast, Plaintiff challenges a nationwide policy which purports to
implement Presidential directives. See Compl. ¶¶ 33–43, 64–88. And Plaintiff plausibly alleges
involvement by DHS leadership in the decision-making, which is plainly a reasonable inference
Page 5 of 22 considering the scope and magnitude of a policy indefinitely suspending benefits adjudication for
the nationals of 39 countries. See id. at 1 (DHS and USCIS “have adopted a blanket policy of
withholding adjudications of all benefit applications filed by individuals born in Iran”); see also
Pl.’s Opp’n at 3, ECF No. 8; Uni-Top Asia Inv. Ltd. v. Sinopec Int’l Petro. Expl. & Prod. Corp.,
600 F. Supp. 3d 73, 78 (D.D.C. 2022) (In evaluating venue, the court “may consider material
outside of the pleadings” as “petitioner is not required to address venue in its pleadings” because
“venue is an affirmative defense”). In other words, this is not a case about a prisoner’s diet in
Indiana.
Defendants’ reliance on MVP Sports, Inc. v. Cissna, 2020 WL 5816239 (D.D.C. Sept. 30,
2020) is similarly misplaced. There, a court held that “naming the director of an agency
headquartered in this district does not alone anchor venue in the District of Columbia . . . when
the named agency official was not personally involved in the challenged decision.” Id. at *2
(cleaned up). But that case involved “the denial of [a] Form I-129 petition,” a discrete decision
made by lower-level USCIS officials in California. Id. at *1. In fact, the court specifically
contrasted the case with one involving “a general, broad-based challenge to immigration policies
or regulations,” and acknowledged that venue could be proper in the District of Columbia under
the latter circumstances. Id. at *2. Accordingly, Defendants’ attempts to defeat venue fail to
persuade.
b. The Parties’ Convenience and the Interests of Justice Do Not Favor Transfer.
A court may, in its discretion, transfer a civil action to any other district “for the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,” if the transferee district is one
where the case “might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). But “the moving party ‘bears a
heavy burden of establishing that plaintiff’s choice of forum is inappropriate.’” Ruvulapalli v.
Page 6 of 22 Napolitano, 773 F. Supp. 2d 41, 55 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v.
Norton, 315 F. Supp. 2d 82, 86 (D.D.C. 2004)) (cleaned up). That is in part because “courts
normally afford substantial deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum,” at least as long as the
case bears “a significant nexus to the plaintiff’s preferred forum.” Barrera v. DHS, 2021 WL
5992098, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2021) (cleaned up).
There is no question that this case “might have been brought” in the District of Maryland.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Because Defendant USCIS is located there, venue would be proper. See
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A). But Defendants have “not carried [their] burden to show that this
case should have been filed” in Maryland. Barrera, 2021 WL 5992098, at *2. A balancing of
the private and public interest factors demonstrate that this court should retain the case.
i. Private Interest Factors
The private interest factors weigh strongly against transfer. To start, Plaintiff’s “choice
of forum must be afforded significant deference . . . because the District of Columbia is
relevantly connected to the controversy.” Defs. of Wildlife v. Salazar, 2013 WL 12316872, at *3
(D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2013). To be sure, USCIS is now headquartered in Maryland, and “a plaintiff
seeking to sue federal defendants in Washington, D.C. must demonstrate some ‘substantial
personalized involvement by a member of the Washington, D.C. agency’ before the court can
conclude that there are meaningful ties to the District of Columbia.” Western Watersheds Proj.
v. Pool, 942 F. Supp. 2d 93, 98 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Lewis,
845 F. Supp. 2d 231, 235 (D.D.C. 2012)) (cleaned up). But Plaintiff has done so. She has
adequately demonstrated that senior DHS officials were substantially involved in this major,
nationwide policy affecting noncitizens from 39 countries and which purports to implement
Presidential directives. See infra Part II.B.a.
Page 7 of 22 Defendants cite cases like Bourdon v. DHS, 235 F. Supp. 3d 298 (D.D.C. 2017), for the
proposition that courts in this district routinely transfer immigration-application cases to the
judicial district in which the relevant USCIS field office is located. But those cases are
inapposite because they did not involve direct challenges to nationwide policies. In Bourdon, for
example, the “gravamen of Plaintiff’s Complaint” was that the field office made “errors” in
denying his immigration benefit application—errors “which took place entirely within the
Southern District of Florida” and were, at most, possibly “influenced” by agency-wide policy
memos. 235 F. Supp. 3d at 307. Here, by contrast, a “nationwide” policy is “the primary
reason” that adjudication of Plaintiff’s application has been withheld. Barrera, 2021 WL
5992098, at *3. And as discussed above, this nationwide policy was “designed and shaped by
officials . . . in Washington, D.C.” Salha v. DHS, 2020 WL 5505350, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 11,
2020). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s suit bears “a significant nexus to this forum.” Barrera, 2021 WL
5992098, at *3.
“The remainder of the private interest factors are of limited value in this case because
Plaintiff’s claims are primarily legal in nature and likely to be based solely on the administrative
record.” Otay Mesa Prop. LP v. Dep’t of Interior, 584 F. Supp. 2d 122, 125 (D.D.C. 2008)
(cleaned up). Thus, the District of Maryland would not somehow be more convenient for the
Government’s witnesses because the Government is unlikely to have any witnesses. Nor is it
inconvenient for Defendants to litigate in the District of Columbia, which is where DHS is
headquartered and where both DHS and USCIS often litigate. See Defs. of Wildlife, 2013 WL
12316872, at *4. In sum, given the substantial deference to Plaintiff’s choice of forum, the
private interest analysis weighs against transfer.
Page 8 of 22 ii. Public Interest Factors
“To determine whether transfer is in the public interest, the court must consider the
following factors: (1) the transferee court’s familiarity with the applicable law; (2) the relative
congestion of the calendars of the transferee and transferor courts; and (3) the local interest in
deciding local controversies at home.” Wolfram Alpha LLC v. Cuccinelli, 490 F. Supp. 3d 324,
334 (D.D.C. 2020). On balance, these factors also weigh against transfer, but only slightly.
The first factor neither favors nor disfavors transfer. Although the “District of Columbia
has more expertise” and familiarity “with [] Administrative Procedure Act cases than” many
other districts, FMC Corp. v. EPA, 557 F. Supp. 2d 105, 112 (D.D.C. 2008) (cleaned up), both
“the District of Columbia and the District of Maryland are . . . presumed competent in all matters
of federal law.” Alakhfash v. Jaddou, 2024 WL 5044926, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2024). And
when, as here, “neither party contests that federal claims ‘could be handled competently by a
court in either district,’ . . . this factor is neutral.” Wolfram, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 335 (quoting
Aishat v. DHS, 288 F. Supp. 3d 261, 271 (D.D.C. 2018)) (emphasis in original).
The second factor—the relative congestion of each court—weighs slightly against
transfer. In 2023, the “District of Maryland maintain[ed] more cases per judge,” and the median
time from filing to disposition of civil cases in the District of Maryland was nearly twice as long
as it is in the District of Columbia. Alakhfash, 2024 WL 5044926, at *4 n.1.
The third factor—“the local interest in deciding local controversies at home”—is
“perhaps most important amongst the public [interest] factors.” Wolfram, 490 F. Supp. 3d at
338. Several considerations indicate that the District of Columbia has a local interest in this
controversy. First, although “the challenged decision was made” by USCIS in the District of
Maryland, at least formally, “there was personal involvement” by a senior official based in the
Page 9 of 22 District of Columbia—the Secretary of Homeland Security. Aftab v. Gonzalez, 597 F. Supp. 2d
76, 84 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Otay Mesa Prop., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 126). Plaintiff does, after
all, challenge to a prominent nationwide policy which seeks to implement policy goals
articulated across two Presidential Proclamations—not the adjudication of a single person’s
benefits application. See Alakhfash, 2024 WL 5044926, at *5; see also Aftab, 597 F. Supp. 2d at
84 (asking whether “the controversy has some national,” as opposed to purely local,
“significance” (cleaned up)); Rossville Convenience & Gas, Inc. v. Barr, 453 F. Supp. 3d 380,
389 (D.D.C. 2020) (“[T]here is also some interest in Washington, D.C. as the seat of the federal
government, where immigration policy is often developed and enforced.”). The District of
Maryland, by contrast, has no more a local interest than this district in adjudicating a challenge to
a nationwide policy brought by a resident of Virginia. Consequently, Defendants have failed to
meet their “heavy burden of establishing” that this case should have been brought elsewhere.
Ruvulapalli, 773 F. Supp. 2d at 55. Their Motion to Dismiss or Transfer will therefore be
DENIED.
C. Preliminary Injunction
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must make a clear showing that ‘he is likely
to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.’” Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)) (cleaned up). Plaintiff has done so here.
a. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Plaintiff is likely to succeed on her claim that her Form I-765 application has been
unreasonably delayed pursuant to an indefinite suspension policy that is arbitrary and capricious.
Page 10 of 22 i. APA Reviewability
Defendants first contend that Administrative Procedure Act review is not available for
Plaintiff’s challenge to the hold on Form I-765 applications. 1 See Defs.’ Mot. at 19–20. As they
note, the APA does not provide for judicial review of agency action that is “committed to agency
discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). In other words, APA review is unavailable “where the
relevant statute [or regulation] is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion” and consequently “no law to apply.”
Dep’t of Comm. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 772–73 (2019) (cleaned up). Defendants further
point out that federal law places the adjudication of Form I-765 applications “within the
discretion of USCIS.” 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(a)(1).
But although at least one court in this district has held that “approving or denying the I-
765 application, establishing the length of the [employment authorization] period, and deciding
whether to extend the [] period . . . are decisions committed to USCIS’s discretion and outside
the purview of judicial review,” Kondapally v. USCIS, 557 F. Supp. 3d 10, 26 (D.D.C. 2021),
this case does not involve any such decision. There has been no adjudication of a Form I-765
application at all. To the contrary, this case challenges a policy which indefinitely suspends such
adjudication. See Bowser v. Noem, 2026 WL 555624, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 27, 2026) (Plaintiffs
“do not contest the adjudication of their applications . . . for employment authorization; instead,
1 Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, “Section 701(a)(2) of the APA is not . . . a jurisdictional bar.” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 797 F.3d 1087, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
To the extent Defendants argue that the policy memos are not final agency action in their reply brief, see Defs.’ Reply at 4–5, that argument is forfeited. See Vasquez v. District of Columbia, 110 F.4th 282, 288 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (“Arguments raised for the first time on reply are forfeited.”); see also El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 632 F.3d 1272, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining that the APA’s final agency action requirement is not jurisdictional). Page 11 of 22 they seek review of the failure to adjudicate the applications.”). And there is plainly law to
apply to Plaintiff’s claim that her application has been unreasonably delayed pursuant to an
arbitrary and capricious policy. See Seeger v. Dep’t of Def., 306 F. Supp. 3d 265, 283 (D.D.C.
2018) (rejecting the argument that there was no law to apply as “nonsense” because the
“arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA is well established”); see also Telecomms. Rsch. &
Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“TRAC”) (establishing a well-known six-
factor test for evaluating claims of unreasonable delay). APA review is therefore available.
ii. Arbitrary and Capricious
This court joins a chorus of others in holding that the challenged policy memos are likely
arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Bowser v. Noem, 2026 WL 555624, at *6–9 (D. Mass. Feb.
27, 2026); Saghafi v. Edlow, 2026 WL 1127468, at *8–10 (D. Md. Apr. 24, 2026); Varniab v.
Edlow, 2026 WL 485490, at *18–20 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2026). Notably, Defendants do not
even attempt to defend the reasoning of those memos. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 20–21, ECF No. 6.
The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency
action” that is “arbitrary” and “capricious.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Although “the arbitrary and
capricious standard is ‘deferential,’” it still “requir[es] that agency action be ‘reasonable and
reasonably explained.’” Ramsingh v. TSA, 40 F.4th 625, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting POET
Biorefining, LLC v. EPA, 970 F.3d 392, 409 (D.C. Cir. 2020)) (cleaned up). “[T]he agency must
. . . articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (cleaned up). Moreover, although agencies “are free to change their existing policies,”
they must at least acknowledge any “serious reliance interests” that the previous policy
“engendered” and offer “a reasoned explanation . . . for disregarding” those reliance interests.
Page 12 of 22 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 222 (2016) (cleaned up). The record indicates
that USCIS likely failed to satisfy even these basic requirements.
In its barebones explanation, USCIS stated that a sweeping, indefinite suspension of
application processing was necessary “to ensure all [noncitizens] from high-risk countries of
concern who entered the United States do not pose a threat to national security or public safety.”
January Memo at 3. In support, the agency cited to the Presidential Proclamations restricting the
entry of individuals from those countries into the United States pending a comprehensive review
of vetting procedures. See id. But those Proclamations address a different problem than the one
facing USCIS. Although a “rational connection plausibly exists” between national security and
restricting who may enter the country, USCIS never explained how the same interest is served by
withholding employment authorization from people “who have already been admitted to the
United States.” Bowser, 2026 WL 555624, at *7 (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). It is not
clear how denying a work permit to someone already living in the United States reduces the
potential risk to national security. USCIS may be right that applicants from certain countries
need more vetting, but they have not explained why applicants already in the country cannot
legally work in the interim. To the extent there is an explanation, USCIS did not provide it and
this court “may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not
given.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
Worse yet, the policy memos “fail to sufficiently grapple with the serious reliance
interests at stake as a result” of abandoning USCIS’s prior policy of quickly adjudicating EAD
applications for people who had petitioned for adjustment of status. Bowser, 2026 WL 555624,
at *8. Plaintiff’s situation illustrates exactly what the agency failed to reckon with. She
“dedicated years of effort, sacrifice, and substantial financial resources to pursue a medical
Page 13 of 22 career in the United States, including completing required examinations and building a
competitive application for residency.” Pouri Decl. ¶ 7. Relying on USCIS’s established
practice, she submitted her applications for adjustment of status and employment authorization in
November 2025—only for USCIS to suddenly upend that practice before her applications could
be timely adjudicated. Id. ¶ 2. Without employment authorization, she will lose her residency,
and will not be able to obtain one for at least another year—a significant setback after years of
struggle. Id. ¶ 8.
To be sure, USCIS stated that its indefinite suspension “may result in delay to the
adjudication of some pending applications,” that it “weighed that consequence against the urgent
need for the agency to ensure that applicants are vetted,” and that “the burden of processing
delays that will fall on some applicants is necessary and appropriate . . . when weighed against . .
. national security.” January Memo at 4. But this is “plainly conclusory.” Bowser, 2026 WL
555624, at *8. And “conclusory statements that USCIS ‘considered’ the negative consequences
of the adjudicatory hold and ‘weighed’ the competing interests do not constitute a ‘reasoned
explanation’ where USCIS, neither in the Policy Memoranda nor the corresponding
administrative records, explained how it weighed the competing interests or how it concluded
that the burdens imposed by the adjudicatory hold were ‘necessary and appropriate.’” Saghafi,
2026 WL 1127468, at *9. Nowhere do the policy memos “actually reflect that the agency
considered the professional and other consequences and burdens imposed on applicants such as
Plaintiff[].” Varniab, 2026 WL 485490, at *19. Finally, the policy memos “also provide no
indication that USCIS considered ‘alternatives within the ambit of the existing policy’ to an
indefinite adjudicatory hold on all” EAD applications “filed by noncitizens from countries of
identified concern.” Saghafi, 2026 WL 1127468, at *10 (quoting DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of
Page 14 of 22 Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 30 (2020)) (cleaned up). Therefore, Plaintiff is likely to succeed on her claim
that the policy memos are arbitrary and capricious.
iii. Unreasonable Delay
The APA requires an agency “to conclude a matter presented to it” “within a reasonable
time.” 5 U.S.C. § 555(b). It further “authorizes [a reviewing] court to ‘compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.’” Kaufman v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1334, 1338
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)). A “claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a
plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.”
Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004). If the agency is required to take
the action, courts analyze whether the agency’s delay has been unreasonable using the six factors
laid out in TRAC v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984)—the “TRAC factors.” These “factors are
not ironclad, but rather are intended to provide useful guidance in assessing claims of agency
delay.” In re Core Commc’ns, 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (cleaned up).
Defendants do not dispute that they have a mandatory duty to timely adjudicate
applications for employment authorization. See Verma v. USCIS, 2020 WL 7495286, at *7
(D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2020) (noting that federal law “clearly envisions that USCIS will adjudicate all
covered applications for immigration benefits, including . . . Form I-765 applications . . . within
six months of filing” (quoting Nibber v. USCIS, 2020 WL 7360215, at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 15,
2020) (emphasis added)); see also Varniab, 2026 WL 485490, at *12 (“[A]lthough Defendants
have discretion as to whether to grant or deny particular applications for immigration benefits,
they do not have discretion to indefinitely and categorically delay or withhold adjudication of
such applications.”). Instead, Defendants contend that their nearly seven-month delay in
adjudicating Plaintiff’s application “is not long enough” to establish a “viable” claim for
Page 15 of 22 unreasonable delay. Defs.’ Opp’n at 20. The court disagrees. Plaintiff is likely to succeed on
her § 706(1) claim.
Although a nearly seven-month holdup would ordinarily be insufficient to establish
unreasonable delay, Plaintiff is correct that this is not a “garden-variety” processing delay. Pl.’s
Reply at 11, ECF No. 8. As the first TRAC factor makes clear, “the time agencies take to make
decisions must be governed by a rule of reason.” In re Core Commc’ns, 531 F.3d at 855
(emphasis added). “The court is not satisfied in this case that Defendants have utilized a rule of
reason.” Ahmed v. Blinken, 759 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2024). To the contrary, Defendants
have failed to timely act on Plaintiff’s application pursuant to a policy that is likely arbitrary and
capricious—“a failure that is ‘almost tautologically unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting Jingjing Liu v.
Mayorkas, 2021 WL 2115209, at *3 (D.D.C. May 25, 2021)). Although “a first-in, first-out . . .
procedure for processing applications can constitute a rule of reason,” USCIS’s indefinite
suspension of processing of applications filed by nationals of certain countries indicates that the
agency is not following such a procedure. Varniab, 2026 WL 485490, at *13. According to
recent USCIS data, adjudicating a Form I-765 application based on a pending I-485 adjustment
application took a median of 2.2 and 4.3 months in the last two fiscal years respectively. See
USCIS, Historical National Median Processing Time (in Months) for All USCIS Offices,
https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/historic-pt (last accessed on May 28, 2026). Therefore,
it appears Plaintiff’s nearly seventh-month delay means that she will receive final adjudication of
her application “after some later-filed applications submitted by applicants from other countries
that are not on hold”—not the first in, first out procedure USCIS once followed. Varniab, 2026
Page 16 of 22 WL 485490, at *13 (emphasis in original).2 The absence of a rule of reason—the “most
important” TRAC factor—weighs strongly in favor of a finding of unreasonable delay. In re
Core Commc’ns, 531 F.3d at 855.
The second factor—whether “Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of
the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed”—also favors Plaintiff. In re Core
Commc’ns, 531 F.3d at 855. Indeed, federal statute “clearly envisions that USCIS will
adjudicate all covered applications for immigration benefits, including . . . Form I-765
applications . . . within six months of filing.” Verma, 2020 WL 74952896, at *7 (quoting
Nibber, 2020 WL 7360215, at *6). Although this precatory sense of Congress language is non-
binding, “it still carries some weight in the overall balance.” Id. (cleaned up).
“The third and fifth factors concern the impacts of the delay on the plaintiff.” Ahmed,
759 F. Supp. 3d at 14. Specifically, “the third factor identifies whether human health and
welfare are at stake—in which case judicial intervention is more justified—and the fifth assesses
the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay.” Id. (cleaned up). These factors again
favor Plaintiff. She has averred that her continued inability to work and the potential loss of her
residency would exacerbate her and her husband’s “significant and ongoing financial hardship.”
Pouri Decl. ¶ 6. She has also indicated that the loss of her residency “would significantly and
permanently damage [her] medical career,” especially because there “is no guarantee that [she
2 Although Defendants now represent that Plaintiff has been scheduled for an interview on June 26, this development only arose after the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction was fully briefed, and given the unusual delay associated with Plaintiff’s application, the court can only conclude that she was impacted by the indefinite suspension. See Defs.’ Notice of Factual Update, ECF No. 11. Moreover, the June 26 interview would not be enough to help Plaintiff receive an EAD before the start of her residency program.
Page 17 of 22 would] be able to secure another residency position in the future.” Id. ¶ 8. Such injuries to
Plaintiff’s material and mental welfare are substantial.
The fourth TRAC factor, “the effect on competing agency priorities,” likewise indicates
that the delay has been unreasonable. Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Prog. Off., 80 F.4th 330, 343
(D.C. Cir. 2023). Although the D.C. Circuit has “refused to grant relief . . . where a judicial
order putting the petitioner at the head of the queue would simply move all others back one space
and produce no net gain,” this is not a case where granting Plaintiff relief would unfairly benefit
Plaintiff at the expense of others who have been waiting longer. Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal
Council v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). To the contrary,
applicants from nonrestricted countries have likely been able to receive decisions before Plaintiff
because they are from countries not impacted by USCIS’s indefinite suspension. Granting
Plaintiff relief would only help remedy this unfairness.
Finally, the sixth TRAC factor concerns “whether the agency’s bad faith caused the
delay.” Sawahreh v. Dep’t of State, 630 F. Supp. 3d 155, 164 (D.D.C. 2022). The court need
not assess whether USCIS has “acted with impropriety” because “the lack of plausible
allegations of impropriety [would] not weigh against Plaintiff.” Ahmed, 759 F. Supp. 3d at 14.
The court will instead assume this factor is neutral. All other factors are sufficient to establish
that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on her claim of unreasonable delay.
b. Irreparable Harm
To establish irreparable harm, a plaintiff must show that (1) the threatened harm is
“certain,” “great,” and “so imminent that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to
prevent” it, and (2) that the harm is “beyond remediation.” League of Women Voters v. Newby,
838 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Plaintiff has satisfied both requirements. If USCIS
Page 18 of 22 does not adjudicate her EAD application in the coming days, Plaintiff will lose her residency.
Pouri Decl. ¶ 8. She must either start orientation on time or forgo the position altogether. See id.
Thus, after June 10, a court would be unable to restore the opportunity. And the loss of that
hard-earned opportunity will delay Plaintiff’s career in American medicine by at least a year,
causing significant and long-lasting damage to her professional development. See id. Further,
she will remain categorically ineligible to work, meaning she will be unable to earn income to
alleviate her family’s significant economic hardship. See id. ¶ 6. “Under the circumstances of
this case, including [Plaintiff’s] showing of how loss of [] authorization to work will negatively
affect [her] own residency timeline and planned career path, [Plaintiff’s] imminent loss of work
authorization constitutes irreparable harm.” Varniab, 2026 WL 485490, at *22; see also Arizona
Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “limiting [a
plaintiff’s] professional opportunities” can constitute irreparable harm).
To be sure, the D.C. Circuit has held that “in the absence of special circumstances, . . .
recoverable economic losses are not considered irreparable.” Davis v. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Taylor v. Resolution Trust Corp., 56 F.3d
1497, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). But this case both presents “special circumstances” and threatens
economic losses that are not recoverable. Id. (quoting Taylor, 56 F.3d at 1507). First, “the harm
here extends beyond ordinary economic injury” because Plaintiff would not only lose one career
opportunity but be denied “the legal ability to work at all.” Miot, 818 F. Supp. 3d at 183. This
“implicate[s] Plaintiff’s fundamental ability to earn a livelihood, support [her] family, and
remain self-sufficient.” Id. “Plaintiff[] could not simply find another job” as she would remain
“categorically barred from lawful employment.” Id. And Plaintiff’s professional development
would suffer significantly. See Brewer, 757 F.3d at 1068. Moreover, if Plaintiff ultimately
Page 19 of 22 establishes that USCIS’s unreasonable delay did cost her the residency, there appears to be no
mechanism for Plaintiff to recover damages against USCIS. See District of Columbia v. Dep’t of
Agric., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1, 34 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Although as a general rule, economic harm does
not constitute irreparable injury, economic loss caused by federal agency action is an exception”
because “economic injury caused by federal agency action is unrecoverable because the APA’s
waiver of sovereign immunity does not extend to damages claims.”).
c. Balance of Equities and Public Interest Factors
The balance of the equities and the public interest factors “merge where, as here, the
Government is the opposing party.” Karem v. Trump, 960 F.3d 656, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). In weighing the equities, this court “must
balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting
or withholding of the requested relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (cleaned up). Here, these factors
favor issuance of an injunction.
Not only would Plaintiff experience significant professional and financial hardship if the
court withheld relief, but the public would also suffer. As twenty-four medical associations,
including the American College of Physicians and the Association of American Medical
Colleges, have noted, USCIS’s “indefinite adjudicative holds are forcing physicians to abandon
residency programs” in the United States, “leaving already strained communities without access
to care.” Pl.’s Ex. B at 1, ECF No. 4-2. These medical associations have explained that denying
work authorization to highly qualified doctors results in “severe and immediate” “consequences”
including disruptions to patient care—consequences that “are particularly troubling given the
national physician shortage.” Id. at 3.
Page 20 of 22 The policy memos, by contrast, “serve[] no public interest.” Susman Godfrey LLP v.
Exec. Off. of the Pres., 789 F. Supp. 3d 15, 57 (D.D.C. 2025). That is because there “is generally
no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action.” League of Women Voters, 838
F.3d at 12. “To the contrary, there is a substantial public interest in having governmental
agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their existence and operations.” Id. (cleaned up).
Accordingly, Defendants “cannot suffer harm from an injunction that merely ends an unlawful
practice.” TikTok Inc. v. Trump, 490 F. Supp. 3d 73, 85 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting R.I.L.-R v.
Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 191 (D.D.C. 2015)).
To the extent Defendants contend that a preliminary injunction would frustrate national
security, the court is not persuaded. It is true that national security is an area where courts
“typically defer” to executive judgment. TikTok Inc., 490 F. Supp. 3d at 85. But although
Defendants may have adequately explained why entry restrictions advance national security, they
have never explained how withholding employment authorization from people “who have
already been admitted to the United States” protects the homeland. Bowser, 2026 WL 555624,
at *7 (cleaned up); see also TikTok Inc., 490 F. Supp. 3d at 85 (“Here, the government has
provided ample evidence that China presents a significant national security threat, although the
specific evidence of the threat posed by Plaintiffs, as well as whether the prohibitions are the
only effective way to address that threat, remains less substantial.”). USCIS especially has not
explained how its security concerns apply with any force to the “narrow, highly vetted
population” of which Plaintiff is part: “medical students, resident physicians, and practicing
physicians.” Pl.’s Ex. B. at 1; see also Varniab, 2026 WL 485490, at *24 (“Defendants have not
identified any information specific to Plaintiffs to suggest they pose a threat to national security,
and in any event, withholding final adjudication of their . . . Form I-765 applications while
Page 21 of 22 Plaintiffs are already in the country would not serve national security interests.”). And indeed,
the fact that USCIS is still processing applications for “certain scientists and medical
researchers” demonstrates that “there is a mechanism already in place to continue to process
applications” notwithstanding national security concerns. Varniab, 2026 WL 485490, at *24.
The equities therefore favor issuance of an injunction.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction and order USCIS to adjudicate Plaintiff’s EAD application within seven days. A
separate order will follow this opinion.
Date: May 30, 2026
Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge
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