Yates v. Dixie Fire Insurance

173 N.C. 473
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedMay 9, 1917
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 173 N.C. 473 (Yates v. Dixie Fire Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Yates v. Dixie Fire Insurance, 173 N.C. 473 (N.C. 1917).

Opinion

Clark, C-. J.

The defendant insurance company, is the owner of the lots marked on the annexed plot as the “Hughes” lot and the “Martin” lot facing on Sycamore Street in Greensboro, and also of an easement in an alley 10 feet wide between these two lots, holding title under mesne conveyances from C. G. Yates, who died in 1882.

[475]*475Tbe heirs o£ Yates, in conveying the Martin lot, added thereto the conveyance of an easement in the alleyway as follows: “Together' with right of way over, under and through an alleyway 10 feet wide, west of and adjoining the above described property running from Sycamore Street to Carrie G. Yates’ property.” In the mesne conveyances through which the Martin lot became vested in the defendant this conveyance of an easement in the alleyway as appurtenant to the ownership of said lot was continued.

C. G. Yates also owned the lot north of the “Hughes” lot, which is marked on the map as the “old postoffice lot,” and in his will provided that this alleyway should be laid out as appurtenant to the ownership of said postoffice lot 15 feet wide; but the owner of said lot has entered into an arrangement and accepted and recorded a conveyance reducing the width of the alley to 10 feet, with the right reserved therein to the owners of the Martin lot to build an archway over said alley.

The defendant, owning the lots on both sides of said alleyway and by virtue of the ownership of the Martin lot owning also an easement in said alleyway, has proceeded to build 10 feet above the surface a connecting building so as to enable it to use as one building the structure covering both lots. The plaintiffs, who are heirs at law of C. G. Yates, contend that this is a forfeiture, ór at least an unwarranted use, of the alleyway, for which it is entitled to recover the possession of the alleyway or at least the possession of the building placed above the alleyway by the defendant; and the defendant has contended that the right of the plaintiffs, if any, is an abstraction, because it could not recover the atmosphere beginning 10 feet above the surface of the alleyway and could make no use of it, and that the court would not adjudge damages for the theoretical right which the plaintiffs could not exercise, or be [476]*476benefited by in any way, since they could, not erect any structure themselves on the alleyway, the unobstructed use of the surface of which belongs to the defendant, and that the plaintiffs can prove no damages sustained by them.

This point was ably discussed before' us by the very learned counsel on both sides, but we do not find it necessary to consider the interesting question presented. On 1 October, 1899, the present plaintiffs or those under whom, they claim, .and at that time the owners of the “Martin” lot (except E. M. Selden, who has since conveyed to one of the plaintiffs), executed a conveyance and contract to Carrie G. Yates, who was then, and still is, owner of the “postoffice lot” (marked on the plat), by which conveyance the alleyway, which under the will of C. 0. Yates was to be of the width of 15 feet, was reduced to 10 feet in width and the following stipulation made therein, as part consideration of the deed and contract, which was duly registered. “Nevertheless, it is expressly understood and agreed that the parties of the first part reserve the.right to themselves and their heirs and assigns to arch over and use all of the space above the alleyway 10 feet from the surface of the ground,” and said Carrie G. Yates, who was then and is still the owner of said postoffice lot, has consented to the construction and erection of the archway and building above said alleyway. On 7 May, 1901, two years after said contract between said Oarrie G. Yates and the plaintiffs, they and those under whom they claim joined in the execution of a fee-simple deed for the Martin lot, in which they conveyed all their right, title, and interest in said lot, “together with the right of way forever over, under, and through an alleyway 10 feet wide west of and adjoining the above described property running from Sycamore Street to Oarrie G. Yates’ property.” The defendant has acquired the title to said Martin lot under such conveyance from the plaintiffs by mesne conveyances and holds the right to build the said archway as fully as the plaintiffs themselves possessed it.

It is objected by the plaintiffs that the said deed between the owners of the Martin lot and Carrie G. Yates is not valid because the grantors therein are not named, but we do not think that this contention is well founded. The language of the deed is as follows:

NORTH CAROLINA — GüILFORD CoUNTT.

This indenture, made this 1 October, 1899, by and between-, parties of the first part, and Carrie G. Yates, party of the second part: 'Witnesseth, That the said parties of the first part for, and in consideration of the sum of $1 to them paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowleged, have given and granted and by these presents do give and grant and convey unto the said party of the second part a right'of [477]*477way oyer tbe alleyway-feet wide, described as follows: Beginning on Sycamore Street at tbe southeast corner of tbe lot of land sold to J. E. Hughes and now owned by Katz, said corner being 108 feet from tbe east side of South Elm Street, and running thence north with Katz’s line to the line of the party of the second part, known as the old post-office property, thence east with the line of the said postoffice lot-feet to a stake, thence south in a line parallel with first line to East Sycamore Street, and thence west along East Sycamore Street to the beginning, with the right of ingress, egress, and regress over said alley, to the said party of the second part, her tenants, heirs and assigns forever. Nevertheless, it is expressly understood and agreed that the parties of the first part reserve the right to themselves, their heirs and assigns, to arch over and use all the space above the alleyway 10 feet above the surface of the ground.

In witness whereof the said parties of the first part have hereunto set their hands and seals of the day and year first above written.

M. E. 'Yates. [seal.]

Peter P. Yates, [seal..]

Kate C. Yates. [seal.]

It is objected by the plaintiffs to the above deed that it is void for want of parties, but Carrie G. Yates is named as grantee therein, and she is bound by accepting the same with the reservation of the right to narrow the lot to 10 feet and that the owners of the Martin lot should build over said alleyway, and has recorded the deed and is still assenting to said reservation and has since joined in the conveyance of the Martin lot with the easement in said alley. As to the grantors, the language is, “the parties of the first part,” and though a blank follows in the beginning of the deed, they are made certain by the final clause, “In witness whereof the said parties of the first part have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written,” followed by their names and seals. It was not necessary that the names of the grantors should be set out in the first line of the deed when they are designated by the final clause and by their signatures thereunder. Moreover, the clerk of the court in his certificate, upon which the deed was recorded, certified that “M. E. Yates, Peter P. Yates, and Kate C. Yates (his wife), grantors, personally appeared before me this day and acknowledge the execution of the foregoing deed of conveyance” (the certificate further setting out the privy examination of Kate C. Yates).

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173 N.C. 473, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/yates-v-dixie-fire-insurance-nc-1917.