Yasumeda Freeman v. Clark County, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: March 18, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00006
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 Yasumeda Freeman, Case No. 2:25-cv-00006-JAD-BNW

5 Plaintiff, ORDER and REPORT AND 6 v. RECOMMENDATION

7 Clark County, et al.,

8 Defendants.

9 10 Plaintiff brings suit against several defendants alleging they violated her constitutional 11 rights. Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No.1. She submitted the 12 declaration required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing an inability to prepay fees and costs or give 13 security for them. Her request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) will, therefore, be 14 granted. This Court next screens Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1-1) as required by 28 U.S.C. 15 § 1915(e)(2). 16 I. Screening standard 17 Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the complaint 18 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In screening the complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims 19 and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be 20 granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard 22 for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 23 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient 24 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft 25 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court liberally construes pro se complaints and may only 26 dismiss them “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 27 his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 1 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of 2 material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wyler 3 Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 4 Although the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff 5 must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 6 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. 7 Unless it is clear the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se 8 plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s 9 deficiencies. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 10 Section 1983 creates a cause of action against a “person who, under color of any [state 11 law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any [person] to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 12 or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 does not 13 create any substantive rights; rather it is the vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by 14 governmental officials.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff 15 bringing a claim under § 1983 must show that “(1) the action occurred ‘under color of state law’ 16 and (2) the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right.” 17 Id. (citation omitted). 18 There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 19 connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 20 362, 371, 376 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). 21 II. Screening the Complaint 22 Plaintiff’s complaint arises from a speeding citation issued to her on April 2, 2024, by Las 23 Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Officer Michael Springer, which she attempted to contest. 24 Plaintiff alleges she filed a motion to dismiss challenging the court’s jurisdiction. She claims 25 court personnel and judicial officers mishandled or altered filings, rejected her motions, issued a 26 default judgment, and failed to provide notice of orders. She also alleges that her filings were 27 altered (including removal of her signature), docket entries were inaccurate, and court records 1 were temporarily removed from public access. The claims that follow are largely based on those 2 alleged procedural irregularities in the handling of the traffic case. 3 Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) denial of access to courts under the Fourteenth 4 Amendment, (2) a violation of the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment, (3) 5 violation of her procedural due process rights under Article 1, Section 8 of the Nevada 6 Constitution (4) violation of Article 1, Section 21 of the Nevada Constitution and (5) fraud on the 7 court, (6) tampering with public records, (7) civil RICO, (8) abuse of power, (9) fraudulent 8 misrepresentation, (10) malfeasance, and (11) misfeasance. She seeks monetary, equitable, and 9 injunctive relief. 10 I. Claims against Defendant Clark County Justice Court 11 At the outset, this Court notes Plaintiff names Clark County Justice Court as a Defendant 12 in her complaint. Justice Courts are “arms of the state” of Nevada and are entitled to sovereign 13 immunity from damages. Williams v. Feldman, No. 222CV01675APGNJK, 2023 WL 36190 (D. 14 Nev. Jan. 3, 2023) (collecting cases). As a result, this Court recommends that claims against this 15 Defendant be dismissed with prejudice as amendment would be futile. 16 II. Claims against Defendants Clark County and Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 17 Department 18 Next, Plaintiff names Clark County and Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department as 19 Defendants. A municipality (such as Clark County) or a municipal entity (such as METRO) may 20 be liable under § 1983 only if the municipality itself caused the violation at issue. City of Canton, 21 Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social 22 Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Thus, to state a claim against these Defendants, Plaintiff must 23 allege that she suffered a constitutional deprivation that was caused by a policy or custom 24 attributable to Clark County or Metro. But the complaint simply alleges conclusory allegations of 25 systematic conduct—it does not identify a policy or ordinance or specify a pattern of similar 26 conduct. As a result, claims against these Defendants will be dismissed with leave to amend. 27 / / 1 III. 1983 claims A. Claim No. 1: Access to courts under the Fourteenth Amendment due 2 process clause 3 The right of access to courts is protected by the First Amendment right to petition and the 4 Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 5 (9th Cir. 2011). Claims for denial of access to courts may arise from either the frustration of “a 6 litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (a forward-looking claim), or from “an opportunity 7 already lost” (a backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413–14 (2002). 8 In either case, “the very point of recognizing any access claim is to provide some effective 9 vindication for a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief for some wrong.” Id. at 414–15. 10 In any access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a “nonfrivolous,” “arguable” underlying 11 claim, pled “in accordance with [Rule] 8(a), just as if it were being independently pursued”; (2) 12 the official acts that frustrated the litigation of that underlying claim; and (3) a plain statement 13 describing the “remedy available under the access claim and presently unique to it.” Id. at 415– 14 18. 15 Plaintiff alleges that after she was cited for speeding, she filed a motion to dismiss for lack 16 of jurisdiction. She further alleges Defendants improperly rejected or failed to acknowledge the 17 motion. She further alleges that despite her filing the motion, the court entered a default judgment 18 against her without providing a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Plaintiff also claims that 19 defendants failed to provide adequate notice of rulings on her motions, created confusion 20 regarding the nature and venue of the proceedings by sending correspondence from different 21 court divisions, and otherwise mishandled the docket and processing of her filings. According to 22 Plaintiff, these actions deprived her of notice and a fair opportunity to present her jurisdictional 23 defense in the traffic case, resulting in the loss of meaningful access to the courts and causing 24 emotional, reputational, and financial harm. Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to 25 support this claim. 26 Of note, Plaintiff does not identify which specific individuals are responsible for this 27 alleged violation in the section following her first claim; instead, she attributes the claim 1 Out of the remaining Defendants, it is not clear what connection (if any) Kevin McMahill, 2 Michale Springer, or Steve Wolfson could possibly have with this claim. As a result, this claim 3 against these Defendants will be dismissed. But Plaintiff will be given leave to amend should she 4 be able to connect the allegations giving rise to this claim to these Defendants. 5 Lastly, this Court turns to Defendants Cynthia Cruz (judge), David Brown (hearing 6 master), Jessica Gurely (court clerk) and Charles Mapp (court clerk). “Judges and those 7 performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed 8 in their official capacities.” See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 9 Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (clerks enjoy 10 absolute quasi-judicial immunity “when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial 11 process”). Most of the allegations reflect procedural irregularities performed in the scope of the 12 different Defendants’ judicial duties. The remaining allegations are conclusory in nature and, at 13 bottom, do not state forth that that the judges or clerks acted outside the scope of their judicial or 14 quasi-judicial roles. As a result, this Court will dismiss this claim with leave to amend. 15 B. Claim No. 2: Equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment 16 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 17 the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or 18 purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class. Jensen 19 v. Brown, 131 F.4th 677, 700 (9th Cir. 2025). “An equal protection claim will not lie by 20 ‘conflating all persons not injured into a preferred class receiving better treatment’ than the 21 plaintiff.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). 22 Plaintiff does not claim that she was discriminated against based on her membership in 23 any protected class. Instead, she alleges that she was “treated differently than similarly situated 24 individuals.” But this is not a sufficient to state an Equal Protection claim. As a result, this Court 25 will dismiss this claim with leave to amend. 26 C. Claim Nos. 3 and 4: violations of Nevada State Constitution 27 When a violation of state law causes the deprivation of a right protected by the United 1 of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1482 n.22 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the violation of a state law 2 requiring a post-arrest hearing before a magistrate judge constituted a cause of action under 3 Section 1983). 4 Claim number three alleges a violation of Article 1, Section 8 of the Nevada State 5 Constitution, which, like the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, provides that, inter 6 alia, “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 7 Claim number four alleges a violation of Article 1, Section 24 of the Nevada State Constitution, 8 which, like the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, provides that equality of the law 9 will not be denied or abridged based on membership in protected classes. 10 Both of these claims are similar to claims one and two, respectively. As a result, this Court 11 recommends that they be dismissed without leave to amend as duplicative. 12 IV. Remaining federal claim 13 A. Claim No. 7: Civil RICO 14 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. 15 provides a private right of action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property” by a RICO 16 violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). However, “Congress enacted RICO “to combat organized crime, 17 not to provide a federal cause of action and treble damages” for every tort plaintiff. Chaset v. 18 Fleer/Skybox Int’l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “The elements of a 19 civil RICO claim are as follows: (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of 20 racketeering activity (known as ‘predicate acts’) (5) causing injury to plaintiff's business or 21 property.” Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 22 2005) (citation omitted). Moreover, “some nexus to interstate or foreign commerce is required as 23 a jurisdictional element of a civil RICO claim.” Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 24 Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 153–54 (1987) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b), (c)). The offenses constituting 25 “racketeering activity” are contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). 26 27 1 There are a few problems with Plaintiff’s factual allegations. The conduct complained of 2 does not qualify as racketeering activity,1 and the injury was not caused to a business or property. 3 As a result, this Court recommends that this claim be dismissed with prejudice as amendment 4 would be futile. 5 V. State claims 6 The supplemental jurisdiction statute provides that, “in any civil action of which the 7 district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction 8 over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction 9 that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 10 Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Courts in this circuit have explained that where state law 11 claims arise from the same nucleus of operative fact as federal claims, a district court may 12 properly invoke its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See Bahrampour v. 13 Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). 14 Since Plaintiff must successfully state a federal claim to proceed with her case, this Court 15 will not screen her potential state court claims at this time. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 16 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated 17 before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine— 18 judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise 19 jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”). 20 It will note, nevertheless, that several of her state claims are duplicative. In addition, there 21 are “claims” that are not recognized under Nevada State law. Moreover, claim number five, 22 “fraud upon the court” is a basis for rescission or relief from a final judgment or order, rather than 23 an independent cause of action for damages.” Lake v. Scheidt, No. 20-cv-00850, 2021 WL 24

25 1 As relevant to this complaint, “racketeering activity” means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or 26 dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled 27 Substances Act), which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under specific provisions of Title 18 of the United 1 35559453, at *1 (D. Or. Aug. 11, 2021). Lastly, as to claim number six, to the extent Plaintiff is 2 trying to assert a violation of NRS § 239.300, Plaintiff does not have a private right of action. 3 Black v. Sciver, No. 1:16-cv-00841-DAD-JLT, 2016 WL 4594981, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016) 4 (“The majority of published decisions found by the court have declined to find a private civil 5 cause of action created by a bare criminal statute.”) 6 VI. Leave to Amend 7 If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, she must read this order carefully and 8 attempt to cure the deficiencies that are present in her complaint. Importantly, she must allege 9 facts showing how each named defendant is involved in each of the claims. Lastly, this Court 10 reminds Plaintiff of her need to comply with Rule 8—this Court typically would not have 11 screened a complaint (as this one) which was unnecessarily long. It did so because it recognizes 12 that Plaintiff has been waiting for a while to obtain this order and rejecting it on that basis would 13 have caused additional delay to her. In sum, should Plaintiff choose to amend, her complaint must 14 be concise and to the point. 15 Plaintiff is further advised that if she files an amended complaint, the original complaint 16 (ECF No. 1-1) no longer serves any function in this case. As such, if she files an amended 17 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. This 18 Court cannot refer to a prior pleading or to other documents to make his amended complaint 19 complete. The amended complaint must be complete in and of itself without reference to prior 20 pleadings or to other documents. 21 VII. Conclusion 22 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application (ECF No. 23 1) is GRANTED. 24 IT FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court must detach and separately file 25 Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1-1). 26 IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Clark County Justice 27 Court be dismissed with prejudice as amendment would be futile. 1 Metropolitan Police Department be dismissed with leave to amend. 2 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim No. 1 be dismissed with leave to amend. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim No. 2 be dismissed with leave to amend. 4 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Claim Nos. 3 and 4 be dismissed without 5 leave to amend as duplicative. 6 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Claim No. 7 be dismissed with prejudice as 7 amendment would be futile. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remaining state-based claims are dismissed with 9 leave to amend.2 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff wishes to file an amended complaint, she 11 must do so by April 20, 2026. Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation 12 that this case be dismissed. 13 / / 14 / / 15 / / 16 / / 17 / / 18 / / 19 / / 20 / / 21 / / 22 / / 23 / / 24 / / 25 2 There is some misnumbering in the complaint. This Court is dismissing fraud on the court 26 (which Plaintiff numbers as Claim No. 5), tampering with public records (which Plaintiff 27 numbers as Claim No. 6), abuse of power (which Plaintiff numbers as Claim No. 10), fraudulent misrepresentation (which Plaintiff numbers as Claim No.11), malfeasance (which Plaintiff also ] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with good cause appearing, the undersigned recuses 2 || herself in this action. This action is referred to the Clerk for random reassignment of this case for 3 || all further proceedings. 4 5 NOTICE 6 This report and recommendation is submitted to the United States district judge assigned 7 || to this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party who objects to this report and recommendation 8 || may file a written objection supported by points and authorities within fourteen days of being 9 || served with this report and recommendation. Local Rule IB 3-2(a). Failure to file a timely 10 || objection may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 11 |) 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 12 13 DATED: March 18, 2026 14 15 □□ □□□ BREN KSLER 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28