Yasiel Nieto Guerra v. Director Florida Soft Side Detention Center, Secretary Kristi Noem, Pamela Jo Bondi, Acting Director Todd Lyons, Garret Ripa

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

YASIEL NIETO GUERRA,

Petitioner, Case No. 2:26-cv-756-KCD-NPM v.

DIRECTOR FLORIDA SOFT SIDE DETENTION CENTER, SECRETARY KRISTI NOEM, PAMELA JO BONDI, ACTING DIRECTOR TODD LYONS, GARRET RIPA,

Respondents, /

ORDER Petitioner Yasiel Nieto Guerra has filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his detention by U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement. (Doc. 1.) He claims that the Attorney General is holding him without a bond hearing in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and his continued detention without a hearing circumvents the Fifth Amendment. (Id. at 10-11.)1 Respondents oppose the petition. (Doc. 6.) I. Background Guerra illegally crossed the border without inspection in 2021. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Border Patrol agents apprehended him immediately. They processed

1 The habeas petition is not paginated. For ease of reference, then, the Court will cite the page numbers generated by its electronic filing system. him, issued charging documents, and a month later, released him on his own recognizance. (Doc. 6-1.)

For nearly four years, Guerra lived in the United States. That period of liberty ended in November 2025, when Florida authorities arrested him for a state offense involving illegal dumping. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Shortly after his arrest, ICE stepped in and took him into federal custody. He currently sits at the

Florida Soft-Sided Facility (a.k.a. Alligator Alcatraz) waiting for his removal proceedings to conclude. (Id.) II. Legal Framework The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to

issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).2 “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its

protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). “Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025).

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. III. Discussion Guerra’s habeas petition raises two substantive claims. First, his

detention violates the INA because he is eligible for a bond hearing but ICE has withheld such relief. (Doc. 1 at 10.) Second, his detention without a bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Id. at 11.) These issues are addressed in turn.

A. INA Sections 1225 and 1226 of the INA govern the detention of noncitizens before a final order of removal. The former provision covers “inadmissible arriving aliens” who are “present in the United States [but have] not been

admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). So-called “‘applicants for admission’ in the language of the statute.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018). Pertinent here, § 1225 “mandate[s] detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded.” Id. The only exception is release

“on parole for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” Id. at 288. So aliens falling under § 1225 are not entitled to a bond hearing. On the other hand, § 1226 has historically “authorize[d] the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the

outcome of removal proceedings[.]” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added). Section 1226(a) sets out a discretionary detention framework for aliens arrested and detained “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). While the arresting immigration officer makes an initial custody determination, noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) may appeal that

decision in a bond hearing before an immigration judge. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1). “Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306.

According to Guerra, he is entitled to a bond hearing, and § 1226 is the vehicle through which he would obtain such relief. But this argument runs headlong into the facts. Guerra was apprehended at the border. That puts him squarely under § 1225. See, e.g., Lopez v. Hardin, No. 2:25-CV-830-KCD-

NPM, 2025 WL 3022245, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2025) (“[Section] 1225 applies to noncitizens arriving at a border or port and are presently seeking admission into the United States.”). An alien “who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a

designated port of entry[)] shall be deemed . . . an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Guerra concededly meets this definition. (See Doc. 1 at 5.) He was stopped at the border, had no legal status, and sought entry. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (“[A]n alien who arrives in the United States . . .

but has not been admitted, is treated as an applicant for admission.”). Applicants for admission who are inadmissible must be detained pending removal proceedings. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297. The Government has only one alternative under this framework—it can temporarily release the noncitizen on parole. Id. at 288. But make no mistake, this is not a lawful

entry. A paroled noncitizen has not been admitted to the country. Instead, the law treats them as if they never crossed the threshold. When the parole ends, they return to custody and are treated “in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). So,

while Guerra may have physically spent time in the interior of the United States after his release, the law places him exactly where he started—at the border, subject to § 1225. See Campbell v. Almodovar, No. 1:25-CV-09509 (JLR), 2025 WL 3538351, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2025). “[A]lthough aliens

seeking admission into the United States may physically be allowed within its borders pending a determination of admissibility, such aliens are legally considered to be detained at the border and hence as never having effected entry into this country.” Moore v. Nielsen, No. 4:18-cv-01722-LSC-HNJ, 2019

WL 2152582, at *3 (N.D. Ala. May 3, 2019); see also Singh v. Noem, No. CIV 25-1110 JB/KK, 2026 WL 146005, at *36 (D.N.M. Jan. 20, 2026). Guerra tries another escape route. He points to his release paperwork from the border. Because an immigration officer released him on his own

recognizance rather than officially designating him as paroled, Guerra suggests that § 1225 no longer governs his case, dropping him instead into the bond-eligible world of § 1226. (See Doc. 1 at 7-8.) Although clever, this argument flouts the statutory framework. When an inadmissible alien arrives at the border and seeks admission, like here, §

1225 gives the Government exactly two choices. Option one: mandatory detention. Option two: temporary release “on parole.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. There is no option three. Congress did not write a “release on recognizance” exception into the statute for arriving aliens.

So what happens when an immigration agent releases an arriving alien on recognizance anyway? The answer is simple: the statute still controls. A border agent’s paperwork choice—whether born of administrative convenience or a slip of the pen—cannot circumvent a congressional mandate.

See I.N.S. v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883-85 (1988); Savoury v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 449 F.3d 1307, 1318 (11th Cir. 2006). An executive branch official does not possess the power to rewrite the INA one checked box at a time. Because parole is the sole legal mechanism Congress provided to release an applicant

for admission, the law must treat Guerra’s release as a parole. And when that period of liberty ends, he goes right back to where the statute demands. See Liang v. Almodovar, No. 1:25-CV-09322-MKV, 2025 WL 3641512, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2025) (“Whatever ‘grace’ Congress and the Executive

Branch have thus far bestowed upon Petitioner, including not only his initial parole but also his examination by an immigration officer under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) itself, bestows no additional rights.”). Guerra—who has never been admitted and was found by an “examining immigration officer” to be “not clearly and beyond a doubt

entitled to be admitted” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)—is properly in custody under §1225(b). Section 1225 says nothing “whatsoever about bond hearings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297. So Guerra’s continued detention without a bond hearing cannot be in violation of the INA.

B. Due Process Even if Guerra’s detention without a bond hearing is authorized by the INA, he argues it violates the Due Process Clause. (Doc. 1 at 11.) The Court cannot agree.

The Fifth Amendment requires the government to provide due process before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. Dep’t of State v. Munoz, 602 U.S. 899, 909-10 (2024). It is “well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v.

Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693-94 (2001) (“[T]his Court has held that the Due Process Clause protects an alien subject to a final order of deportation.”). At the same time, the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged

that “the nature of protection [under the Due Process clause] may vary depending upon [immigration] status and circumstance.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 694; see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[A]n alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application . . . . [H]owever, once an alien

gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”). For noncitizens who arrive at the border without lawful status—even if they manage to physically enter the country—the Due Process Clause is

constrained. The Supreme Court’s decision in Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam shows exactly how this works. 591 U.S. 103 (2020). The petitioner in that case tried to cross the border illegally and was apprehended a mere 25 yards into the United States. The government placed him in

expedited removal proceedings under § 1225(b)(1) and kept him in continuous custody. Id. at 114. When his asylum claim failed, he turned to federal court. He filed a habeas petition asking for a do-over—a court order directing the government to give him another opportunity to apply for asylum relief. Id. at

115. The Supreme Court said no, holding (among other things) that the Due Process Clause did not guarantee the petitioner judicial review of his asylum denial. Id. at 139. The Court explained that granting procedural due process

rights to arriving aliens beyond what Congress had prescribed “is contrary to more than a century of precedent.” Id. at 138. That precedent establishes a stark but unyielding rule: for foreigners who have never been admitted into the country, “the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.” Id.

(emphasis added). This approach stems from a simple constitutional reality— the political branches hold plenary authority over our borders. And if you have the sovereign power to keep someone out, you necessarily possess the power to set the procedural ground rules for making that determination. Id.

at 139. The takeaway from Thuraissigiam is plain: an arriving alien “has only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.” Id. at 140; see also Mendoza-Linares v. Garland, 51 F.4th 1146, 1167 (9th Cir.

2022) (explaining that any rights “an alien seeking initial admission to the United States” may have “in regard to removal or admission are purely statutory in nature and are not derived from, or protected by, the Constitution’s Due Process Clause”).

As explained above, Guerra is legally no different from an applicant standing at the border. Meaning he can claim “only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.” Jandres-Ordonez v. Bondi, No. 6:25-CV-084-H, 2026 WL 274493, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2026); see

also Liang, 2025 WL 3641512, at *5; Ayala v. Harper, No. 1:26-CV-204-CLM- GMB, 2026 WL 501113, at *10 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2026). Section 1225 provides the procedural boundaries Congress set for applicants for admission, like Guerra. “[A]liens falling within the scope of §

1225(b)(2) shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297. The statute “mandate[s] detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded” and says nothing “whatsoever about bond hearings.” Id. Since Congress drew the blueprint for arriving aliens,

choosing mandatory detention, Guerra cannot invoke the Fifth Amendment to demand a bond hearing. For an applicant legally standing at the nation’s door, the statutory text provides the beginning and the end of the constitutional inquiry. That means Guerra’s due process challenges

necessarily fail. See Arana v. Arteta, No. 1:26-CV-240-GHW, 2026 WL 279786, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2026). Guerra invokes Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) to argue that his continued custody without a bond hearing has become unlawfully

indefinite. (Doc. 1 at 11.) In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that the government cannot hold an alien indefinitely under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)— the statute governing detention after a final order of removal has been entered. To avoid serious constitutional concerns, the Court read an implicit

time limit into that statute, requiring release if removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. But Zadvydas provides Guerra no help here for a simple and fundamental reason: he is detained under a completely different statutory

scheme. Guerra does not yet have a final order of removal. Instead, because his release was revoked, he is treated as an applicant for admission detained pending the outcome of his removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). See Diaz Patino v. Villegas, No. 1:25-CV-276-H, 2026 WL 673166, at *4 (N.D.

Tex. Mar. 9, 2026). And the Supreme Court has rejected the attempt to transplant Zadvydas’s implicit time limits onto § 1225(b). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 296-99; see also Erbite v. Ripa, No. 2:26-CV-558-JES-NPM, 2026 WL 776143, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2026).

The Court in Jennings explained that the two statutes are drafted entirely differently. The post-removal statute at issue in Zadvydas states that the government “may” detain certain aliens, a permissive word that left the Court room to impose a reasonable temporal limit. Jennings, 583 U.S. at

299-300. But § 1225(b) is unequivocal. It mandates that applicants for admission “shall be detained” until their removal proceedings conclude. Id. at 297. As the Supreme Court put it, the text of § 1225(b) says nothing “whatsoever about bond hearings” and leaves no interpretive room for a

Zadvydas-style saving construction. Id.; see also Gueye v. Sessions, No. 17- 62232-CIV, 2018 WL 11447946, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2018) (“Zadvydas did not analyze detention in the context of expedited removal proceedings.”). To be sure, Jennings did not resolve every question in this arena. When the Supreme Court declined to rewrite § 1225 to include an implicit bond

hearing, it explicitly left for another day the constitutional fallback: whether prolonged mandatory detention under that statute might independently violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 312. And immediately following Jennings, some courts did find that aliens proceeding under § 1225(b) have at

least some base level of due process rights against unreasonable detention. See, e.g., Padilla v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 953 F.3d 1134, 1147 (9th Cir. 2020) (upholding a preliminary injunction to a class of §1225(b) detainees because “plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that they are

constitutionally entitled to individualized bond hearings before a neutral decisionmaker”). But the Supreme Court has since firmly closed that door in Thuraissigiam. That case shows how the Due Process Clause operates—or,

more accurately, how it is constrained—when it comes to individuals, like Guerra, who have not been lawfully admitted. The interplay between the two decisions is straightforward. Jennings hypothesized that, at some point, prolonged detention might offend due

process. But Thuraissigiam clarified exactly what process is “due” to an arriving alien. As mentioned, the Court reaffirmed its “century-old rule” that “Congress is entitled to set the conditions for an alien’s lawful entry into this country and that, as a result, an alien at the threshold of initial entry cannot claim any greater rights under the Due Process Clause.” Thuraissigiam, 591

U.S. at 107, 139. That rule resolves the constitutional question here. Because Guerra’s temporary release was terminated, the law treats him as though he is still standing at the border, knocking on the door. Id. at 139 (“[A]liens who arrive

at ports of entry—even those paroled elsewhere in the country for years pending removal—are treated for due process purposes as if stopped at the border.”). For individuals in this posture, the Due Process Clause is not a roving mandate for federal judges to construct a balancing test. Instead, an

arriving alien’s constitutional rights are coextensive with his statutory rights. And because Congress unequivocally mandated detention for arriving aliens in § 1225 without providing for a bond hearing, the Due Process Clause does not step in to supply one. In this specific context, the statutory floor is also

the constitutional ceiling. See, e.g., A.E. v. Powell, No. 7:26-CV-337-EGL- NAD, 2026 WL 782294, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 19, 2026); de la Rosa Espinoza v. Guadian, No. 20-3126-JWL, 2020 WL 3452967, at *6 (D. Kan. June 24, 2020).

One can certainly understand Guerra’s frustration with his current position, waiting in a detention cell for months while his immigration case inches forward. Yet this Court cannot use judicial fiat to conjure a due process claim just to ease the wait. We are not staring down the barrel of indefinite detention—the constitutional danger the Supreme Court found so

problematic in Zadvydas. Guerra’s current custody has a clear statutory endpoint: it lasts only “until removal proceedings have concluded.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 299. And if he eventually receives a final order of removal only to have his deportation stall, the doors of the courthouse will open for him to

seek relief under Zadvydas. Because the existing framework comes with a built-in expiration date, there is no reason to engineer a constitutional workaround. IV. Conclusion

A federal court’s role in a habeas proceeding is to ensure that the government is playing by the rules. Here, it is. Congress wrote a strict set of rules for noncitizens arriving at our borders, mandating their detention and authorizing their administrative arrest. However frustrating Guerra may

find the wait, his ongoing custody violates neither the INA nor the Constitution. Because the law forecloses the relief he seeks, the habeas petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment, terminate any pending motions, and close this case. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 7, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek United States District Judge