Yantao J. v. Warden of the Golden State Annex, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 1:26-cv-00021
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 YANTAO J.,

11 No. 1:26-cv-00021-TLN-SCR Petitioner, 12 13 v. ORDER 14 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE ANNEX, et al., 15 Respondents. 16

17 18 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Yantao J.’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of 19 Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 1.) On January 6, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to file a 20 response to Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief. (ECF No. 3.) On January 15, 2026, 21 Respondents filed an opposition to Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 7.) 22 For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s petition is GRANTED. 23 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a native of China who entered the United States in August 2023 without 25 being admitted or paroled after inspection by an immigration officer. (ECF No. 7-1 at 9.) 26 Following apprehension, Petitioner was given a Notice to Appear and released on his own 27 recognizance. (Id. at 7–9.) On September 26, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained. (Id. at 1–5.) 28 /// 1 II. STANDARD OF LAW 2 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every 3 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) 4 (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in 5 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure 6 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas 7 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the 8 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has 9 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its 10 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a 11 district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. 12 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 13 III. ANALYSIS 14 Petitioner claims he is being unlawfully subjected to mandatory detention without a 15 hearing in violation of his due process rights. In response, Respondents argue Petitioner’s 16 detention is lawful as he is being detained pursuant to the mandatory detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 17 1225(b)(2) (“§1225(b)(2)”), and Matter of Yajure Hurtado.1 The Court will address each of these 18 arguments in turn. 19 A. Statutory Claim 20 The Court begins with the central dispute in this case: whether § 1225(b)(2) or 8 U.S.C. § 21 1226(a) (“§ 1226(a)”) governs Petitioner’s immigration detention. The issue turns on whether 22 Petitioner is an applicant “seeking admission.” Section 1225(b)(2) mandates detention during 23 removal proceedings for applicants “seeking admission” and does not provide for a bond hearing. 24 Section 1226(a) “provides the general process for arresting and detaining [noncitizens] who are 25 present in the United States and eligible for removal.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 26

27 1 Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 291 I. & N. Dec. 216, 225 (BIA 2025) (stripping Immigration Judges of authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States 28 without admission pursuant to a recent DHS policy mandating detention for those persons). 1 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). Under § 1226(a), the Government has broad discretion whether to release 2 or detain the individual. Id. Section 1226(a) provides several layers of review for an initial 3 custody determination and it confers “an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the 4 opportunity to be represented by counsel and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right 5 to seek a new hearing when circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1202. Until the U.S. 6 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) changed its policy in July 2025, the Government 7 consistently applied § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), to noncitizens residing in the United States who 8 were detained by an immigration authorities and subject to removal. See id. at 1196. 9 Courts nationwide, including this one, have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ 10 arguments and found DHS’s new policy unlawful. See e.g., Hortua v. Chestnut, et al., No. 1:25- 11 cv-01670-TLN-JDP, 2025 WL 3525916 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025); Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 12 25-CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (estimating over 350 13 cases ruled DHS’s July policy improper across 160 different judges sitting in about 50 different 14 courts nationwide); Mirley Adriana Bautista Pico, et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al., No. 25-CV-08002- 15 JST, 2025 WL 3295382, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting cases); Armando Modesto 16 Estrada-Samayoa v. Orestes Cruz, et al., No. 1:25-CV-01565-EFB (HC), 2025 WL 3268280, at 17 *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (collecting cases). 18 “These courts examined the text, structure, agency application, and legislative history of 19 1225(b)(2) and concluded that it applies only to noncitizens ‘seeking admission,’ a category that 20 does not include noncitizens like [Petitioner], living in the interior of the country.” Salcedo 21 Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 22 2025) (collecting cases). In comparison, “[t]he government’s proposed reading of the statute (1) 23 disregards the plain meaning of [§] 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between [§§] 24 1225 and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to [§] 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is 25 inconsistent with decades of prior statutory interpretation and practice.” Lepe v. Andrews, No. 26 1:25-CV-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (collecting 27 cases). This Court agrees with the well-reasoned and compelling decisions and finds no reason to 28 reconsider its prior rulings. 1 For these reasons, the Court finds Petitioner is not an applicant “seeking admission” 2 subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). Petitioner is subject to § 1226(a) and 3 therefore he is entitled to the statutorily permitted process including a bond hearing at minimum. 4 However, Petitioner has not been afforded a bond hearing, and Respondents maintain that 5 Petitioner is not eligible for one. Thus, the Court finds Respondents improperly subjected 6 Petitioner to mandatory detention without a hearing. 7 B. Due Process Claim 8 Petitioner also argues that his continued indefinite civil detention without a hearing 9 infringes upon his liberty in violation of due process. (ECF No. 1 at 16.) Respondents argue that 10 Petitioner is detained under § 1225(b)(2), which mandates detention. (ECF No. 7 at 2.) 11 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an 12 individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 13 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 14 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) 15 (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 16 noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). These 17 due process rights extend to immigration proceedings, including deportation proceedings. Id. at 18 693–94; see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). 19 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there 20 exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the 21 procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 22 Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); 23 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, 24 the question remains what process is due.”). 25 i. Liberty Interest 26 “Freedom from imprisonment — from government custody, detention, or other forms of 27 physical restraint — lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” 28 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or 1 over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their 2 liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025). 3 The Court finds Petitioner has a substantial liberty interest based on his release from 4 immigration custody. Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *6 (“Accordingly, a noncitizen 5 release from custody pending immigration proceedings has a protected liberty interest in 6 remaining out of custody.”). 7 ii. Procedural Due Process 8 Having found a protected liberty interest, the Court examines what process is necessary to 9 ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. The Court 10 considers three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) 11 “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 12 probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the 13 Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 14 that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 15 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Due process rights in the immigration context “must account for the 16 government’s countervailing interests in immigration enforcement.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 17 1206. 18 As to the first Mathews factor — Petitioner’s private interest — as discussed above, 19 Petitioner has been out of custody. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) The length of time Petitioner has been in 20 the United States, as well as his established relationships, create a powerful interest for Petitioner 21 in his continued liberty. See Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025). 22 As to the second Mathews factor — the risk of erroneous deprivation — the Court finds 23 the risk here be considerable. The risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest 24 is high where he has received virtually no procedural safeguards such as a bond or custody 25 redetermination hearing. A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at 26 *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025). This is particularly so where, as here, an immigration judge has 27 already determined that Petitioner is neither dangerous nor a flight risk. (ECF No. 6 at 4); see 28 R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2686866 at *6 (“Civil immigration detention, which is ‘nonpunitive in 1 | purpose and effect,’ is justified when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the 2 | community.”). 3 As to the third Mathews factor, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without a 4 | hearing before a neutral decisionmaker is negligible. R.D.7.M., 2025 WL 2686866 at *6. 5 | Custody hearings in immigration court are “routine and impose a ‘minimal’ cost.” “The 6 || government has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been determined not to 7 | be a danger to the community and whose appearance at future immigration proceedings can be 8 || reasonably ensured by [ ] bond or alternative conditions.”). Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994. 9 Having found that Respondents violated Petitioner’s statutory and constitutional rights, 10 | the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s petition. (ECF No. 1.) 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 13 1. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED; 14 2. Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner Yantao J. from custody. 15 | Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining Petitioner unless they 16 | demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral 17 | decisionmaker, that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that his physical 18 | custody is legally justified. Respondents must file a notice certifying compliance with this 19 | provision of the Court’s Order by January 17, 2026; and 20 3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Petitioner and close this 21 || case. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 | Date: January 15, 2026 24 Lau bly 26 TROY L. NUNLEY CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28