Yang v. Shenzhen Hongfangrui Technology Co., Ltd.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedApril 3, 2025
Docket2:23-cv-13001
StatusUnknown

This text of Yang v. Shenzhen Hongfangrui Technology Co., Ltd. (Yang v. Shenzhen Hongfangrui Technology Co., Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Yang v. Shenzhen Hongfangrui Technology Co., Ltd., (E.D. Mich. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

HAOWEI YANG, Civil Action No.: 23-13001 Plaintiff,

vs. Honorable Linda V. Parker Magistrate Judge Kimberly G. Altman SHENZHEN HONGFANGRUI TECHNOLOGY CO. LTD, and SHENZHENSHIHEQILIANS- HENGJISHUYOUXIANGONGSI

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (ECF No. 32) AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION

This is a copyright infringement case which is currently before the Court on Haowei Yang’s (“Yang”) motion for entry of default judgement against Shenzhen Hongfangrui Technology Co. Ltd (“Shenzhen”) and Shenzhenshiheqilianshengjishuyouxiangongsi (“Shenzhenshihe”), collectively “Defendants.” (ECF No. 32.) Yang has asked for permanent injunctive relief pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) for his copyright infringement counts in addition to actual damages, a return of the funds to secure the temporary restraining order, attorney’s fees and costs. (Id., PageID.342-43.) The Court held a hearing on the motion on April 2, 2025, at which counsel for both parties appeared. Defendants do not contest the motion for default judgment.

At the hearing, the Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s motion and now issues this written order in line with that oral ruling. For the reasons stated on the record and set forth below, the Court GRANTS Yang’s motion for default judgment (ECF

No. 32) and issues a permanent injunction. I. BACKGROUND The Court set forth the factual background of this suit in its prior Opinion and Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for ex parte Temporary Restraining Order.

(See ECF No. 10.) The Court incorporates its prior factual recitation herein. The Complaint in this action was filed on November 27, 2023 and includes the following allegations. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.7.) Yang is the developer of a

popular video game controller, which is the subject of two U.S. Copyrights. (Id. at PageID.3.) The first copyright was assigned the Registration Number VAu 1-506- 850 (“the ’850 copyrighted photograph”) and a copy of the ’850 copyright registration was attached to the Complaint. (Id. at PageID.4.) The second relevant

copyright was assigned Registration Number Va 2-371-475, (“the ’475 copyrighted artwork”) and a copy of the ’475 copyright registration was attached to the Complaint. (Id. at PageID.5.)

In brief, Yang’s artwork is a videogame controller which includes “flashes of light” emanating from a circular area surrounding the joystick controllers. (Id. at PageID.3.) Defendants’ each sell the same video controller in the same

packaging and directly compete with Yang’s video game controller for sales to the public. (Id.) The Complaint and the Court’s prior order incorporated photographs of Yang’s video game controller, in addition to the controller sold by Defendants.

(ECF Nos. 1, 10.) The Complaint further alleges that both Defendants willfully and deliberately infringed the copyrights. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.8.) On December 8, 2023, Yang moved for a temporary restraining order which was granted on December 12, 2023. (ECF Nos. 8, 10.) On April 3, 2024, Attorney

Adam Urbanczyk filed an appearance on behalf of both Defendants. (ECF No. 15.) A status conference was then held on June 28, 2024, and a text only order was entered which states “Defendants have 14 days in which to answer or otherwise

respond to Plaintiff's complaint.” The deadline to file an answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint expired on July 12, 2024. Defendants were ultimately served pursuant to the Hauge Convention, and certificates of service for both Defendants were filed on July 9, 2024. (ECF Nos.

24, 25.) A Clerk’s Entry of Default for each Defendant was entered on February 14, 2025. (ECF Nos. 29, 30.) Defense counsel appeared at the hearing on the motion for default judgment and did not oppose Yang’s motion. II. JURISDICTION AND SERVICE The Court finds that both Defendants were properly served. Shenzhen was

served on March 21, 2024, and Shenzhenshihe was served on May 31, 2024 in the Peoples’ Republic of China in accordance with the Hague Convention. The respective proofs of service were filed on July 9, 2024. (ECF Nos. 24, 25.)

Furthermore, Adam Urbanczyk appeared as counsel for both Defendants in this action on April 3, 2024 and appeared at the hearing on the motion for default judgment. (ECF No. 15.) It is uncontested that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action, personal jurisdiction over both Defendants, and that

venue is proper. III. DEFAULT JUDGMENT STANDARD For purposes of determining whether judgment by default should be

entered, the Court takes all well-pleaded allegations of fact set forth in the Complaint as admitted by Defendants and should therefore enter judgment against Defendants if those factual allegations are sufficient to support a finding of liability as to Yang’s claims of copyright infringement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6).

To establish a claim for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501, Plaintiff must show “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” ATC Distrib. Grp., Inc. v.

Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 705 (6th Cir. 2005), quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Specific acts of copyright infringement include reproduction, public distribution,

and public display of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501(a). A certificate of copyright registration “establishes a prima facie presumption that the copyright is valid and subsisting and that plaintiff is otherwise entitled to

the protection afforded by law to the holder of a copyright.” Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Elcon Indus., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (citations omitted). “Direct evidence of copying is rare.” Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 1999). When no direct evidence of copying is available, a copyright owner

may establish the element of copying by showing that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that the copyrighted work and the allegedly copied work are substantially similar. Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 853–54 (6th Cir. 2003).

Access is essentially seeing or “having a reasonable opportunity to [see] the plaintiff['s] work and thus having the opportunity to copy.” Tree Publ'g Co. v. Warner Bros. Records, 785 F. Supp. 1272, 1274 (M.D. Tenn. 1991) (citation omitted).

Once access has been established, the fact finder determines whether the infringing work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work. In so doing, “the first step ‘requires identifying which aspects of the artist’s work, if any, are

protectible by copyright.’” Kohus, 328 F.3d at 855, quoting Sturdza v. U.A.E., 281 F.3d 1287, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Once the original protectable elements have been determined, the fact finder determines whether the infringing works are

substantially similar to the copyrighted works. Id.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Yang v. Shenzhen Hongfangrui Technology Co., Ltd., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/yang-v-shenzhen-hongfangrui-technology-co-ltd-mied-2025.