UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION
YAMIL VASALLO GONZALEZ
NORONA,
Petitioner,
v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-00837-SPC-NPM
WARDEN, SOUTH FLORIDA DETENTION FACILITY et al.,
Respondents, /
OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court are petitioner Yamil Vasallo Gonzalez Norona’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response (Doc. 4). For the below reasons, the Court grants the petition. A. Background Gonzalez Norona is a native of Cuba who was paroled into the country in 1994. Following a conviction for a drug possession charge, an immigration judge ordered Gonzalez Norona removed to Cuba on December 21, 2017. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) released him under an order of supervision on March 23, 2018. Since then, Gonzalez Norona has complied with all conditions of supervision and has not been charged or convicted of any crimes. ICE arrested Gonzalez Norona on July 23, 2025, when he reported to an ICE office for an appointment and applied for a stay of removal. He is currently
detained at Alligator Alcatraz. Gonzalez Norona challenges the legality of his detention under the Fifth Amendment and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). B. Jurisdiction
Before addressing the merits of Gonzalez Norona’s claim, the Court must address its jurisdiction. The respondents argue two sections of the INA strip the Court of jurisdiction over this action. They first points to a provision that bars courts from hearing certain claims. It states:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provisions of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). This jurisdictional bar is narrow. “The provision applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (“We did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim that technically can be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the language to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.”).
“When asking if a claim is barred by § 1252(g), courts must focus on the action being challenged.” Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 964 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020). The respondents also raise the INA’s “zipper clause,” which states:
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court should have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 or title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such question of law or fact.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The zipper clause only applies to claims requesting review of a removal order. See Madu v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding the INA did not divest the district court of jurisdiction over a § 2241 challenge to detention of the petitioner pending deportation). Gonzalez Norona does not challenge the commencement of a proceeding, the adjudication of a case, or the execution of his removal order. Nor does he ask the Court to review the removal order. Rather, Gonzalez Norona challenges the legality of his detention under a framework devised by the Supreme Court for district courts to apply. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (stating the Court’s limitation on post-removal detention “is subject to federal-
court review.”). A decision in Gonzalez Norona’s favor would not impair ICE’s ability to execute the removal order. The INA does not strip the Court of jurisdiction over this action. C. Legality of Detention
“Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)). The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period,
which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id. Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no
longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. at 700-01 (2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably foreseeably
removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day removal period plus an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention:
After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the showing.
Id. The respondents acknowledge the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention has expired, so Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Gonzalez Norona has carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The government was unable to remove him in 2018 because Cuba refused to repatriate him, there is no reason to believe Cuba will accept him now, and the government has made no progress towards removal since his re-detention in July. The burden thus shifts to the respondents, but they acknowledge they have no evidence or information relevant to potential removal. D. Conclusion
The Court finds no significant likelihood Gonzalez Norona will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION
YAMIL VASALLO GONZALEZ
NORONA,
Petitioner,
v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-00837-SPC-NPM
WARDEN, SOUTH FLORIDA DETENTION FACILITY et al.,
Respondents, /
OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court are petitioner Yamil Vasallo Gonzalez Norona’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s response (Doc. 4). For the below reasons, the Court grants the petition. A. Background Gonzalez Norona is a native of Cuba who was paroled into the country in 1994. Following a conviction for a drug possession charge, an immigration judge ordered Gonzalez Norona removed to Cuba on December 21, 2017. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) released him under an order of supervision on March 23, 2018. Since then, Gonzalez Norona has complied with all conditions of supervision and has not been charged or convicted of any crimes. ICE arrested Gonzalez Norona on July 23, 2025, when he reported to an ICE office for an appointment and applied for a stay of removal. He is currently
detained at Alligator Alcatraz. Gonzalez Norona challenges the legality of his detention under the Fifth Amendment and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). B. Jurisdiction
Before addressing the merits of Gonzalez Norona’s claim, the Court must address its jurisdiction. The respondents argue two sections of the INA strip the Court of jurisdiction over this action. They first points to a provision that bars courts from hearing certain claims. It states:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provisions of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). This jurisdictional bar is narrow. “The provision applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (“We did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim that technically can be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the language to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.”).
“When asking if a claim is barred by § 1252(g), courts must focus on the action being challenged.” Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 964 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020). The respondents also raise the INA’s “zipper clause,” which states:
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court should have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 or title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such question of law or fact.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The zipper clause only applies to claims requesting review of a removal order. See Madu v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding the INA did not divest the district court of jurisdiction over a § 2241 challenge to detention of the petitioner pending deportation). Gonzalez Norona does not challenge the commencement of a proceeding, the adjudication of a case, or the execution of his removal order. Nor does he ask the Court to review the removal order. Rather, Gonzalez Norona challenges the legality of his detention under a framework devised by the Supreme Court for district courts to apply. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (stating the Court’s limitation on post-removal detention “is subject to federal-
court review.”). A decision in Gonzalez Norona’s favor would not impair ICE’s ability to execute the removal order. The INA does not strip the Court of jurisdiction over this action. C. Legality of Detention
“Once a noncitizen’s order of removal becomes administratively final, the Government ‘shall’ remove the person within 90 days.” Singh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 945 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)). The government must detain the noncitizen during the 90-day removal period,
which begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id. Detention may continue after the removal period, but not indefinitely. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no
longer authorized by statute.” 533 U.S. at 700-01 (2001). If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its statutory purpose of “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The Court found it unlikely Congress “believed that all reasonably foreseeably
removals could be accomplished in [90 days].” Id at 701. So, “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” it established a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months—the 90-day removal period plus an additional 90 days. Id. Courts use a burden-shifting framework to judge the constitutionality of additional post-removal detention:
After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the showing.
Id. The respondents acknowledge the six-month period for presumptively reasonable detention has expired, so Zadvydas’s burden-shifting framework applies. Gonzalez Norona has carried his initial burden by showing a good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The government was unable to remove him in 2018 because Cuba refused to repatriate him, there is no reason to believe Cuba will accept him now, and the government has made no progress towards removal since his re-detention in July. The burden thus shifts to the respondents, but they acknowledge they have no evidence or information relevant to potential removal. D. Conclusion
The Court finds no significant likelihood Gonzalez Norona will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. He is entitled to release from detention under Zadvydas. If removal becomes likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, DHS can detain Gonzalez Norona to “assur[e] [his] presence at the moment of removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: Yamil Vasallo Gonzalez Norona’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. 1. The respondents shall release Gonzalez Norona within 24 hours of this Order, and they shall provide him telephone access so he can
arrange for transportation from the detention facility. 2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions and deadlines, enter judgment, and close this case. DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 7, 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-1 Copies: All Parties of Record