McFADDEN, Justice.
ON REHEARING
Plaintiff-respondent Yacht Club Sales and Service Inc., an Idaho corporation engaged in the sales and service of boats, motors and accessories at Coeur d’Alene, instituted this action against defendant-appellant, The First National Bank of North Idaho. Respondent sought compensatory and punitive damages against appellant for appellant’s dishonor of two series of checks written by respondent, payable to and presented by various parties to appellant Bank. Following a jury trial on the issues presented by the pleadings of the parties and the pretrial order of the court, the jury returned a special verdict wherein the jury answered certain interrogatories. The checks involved in this action break down into two separate classifications, the first being exhibits 6A, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, which were stipulated to have been dishonored by appellant Bank. At the close of all the evidence, the trial court ruled that this first series of checks had been wrongfully [855]*855dishonored as a matter of law. The second classification is a series of checks, exhibits 14B, 14C, 17,18,19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26 and 30, which the jury by its answer to an interrogatory in the special verdict, held had not been dishonored without lawful excuse or reason.
In its special verdict, the jury held that respondent was entitled to $20,000 as compensatory damages for appellant’s dishonor of the first series of checks (exhibits 6A, 7, 8, 9,10,11,12 and 13), and also that respondent was entitled to punitive damages in the amount of $30,000. Judgment was entered in favor of respondent for $50,000 on this verdict. Appellant timely filed its motions for new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which motions were denied, and this appeal was taken by appellant from the judgment and from the order denying its motion for new trial. Respondent cross-appealed from the ruling of the trial court denying its motion for attorney fees in the amount of $9,500 under I.C. § 12-121, and also seeks attorney fees on this appeal.
The principal issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury in various regards. It is the conclusion of the court that there was error present in the instructions given and for that reason this case must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Respondent Yacht Club Sales and Service, Inc. (herein Y.C.S.S., Inc.), operated its business on land owned by “Yacht Club, Inc.” a different corporation, although similarly named. Charles Harris, the principal stockholder and president-manager of Y.C. 5.5., Inc. testified that he had operated Y.C.S.S., Inc. since November 1974, and prior to that time had operated the business as a sole proprietorship. Y.C.S.S., Inc. maintained a checking account with the Coeur d’Alene branch of appellant Bank. On Wednesday, June 18, 1975, at a time when there was $11,930.72 on deposit in the Y.C. 5.5., Inc. account with appellant Bank, the Bank was served by the sheriff’s office of Kootenai County with a sheriff’s notice and a writ of execution1 upon which Yacht Club, Inc. was named as the judgment debt- or on behalf of James W. Givens, trustee for J. E. Hall Contractors, Inc., the judgment creditor. An interrogatory served with the writ inquired:
“At the time of the service of the Notice upon you, had you in your possession or under your control any property, money [856]*856or effects of the within named Defendant (or either of them)? If so, state which property, what money or effects, how much and what value.
Mr. Cyril Thornycroft, vice-president and manager of the Coeur d’Alene office, answered as follows:
“We are holding funds in the name of Yacht Club Sales & Service, Inc. in the amount of $11,930.72, pending clarification as to whether Yacht Club Sales & Service, Inc. and Yacht Club, Inc. are one and the same.”
At trial, Mr. Thornycroft testified that upon receipt of the writ he contacted his superior, Mr. Lane, the cashier in the head office of the bank at Wallace, and was advised by Lane to respond to the interrogatory in the manner Thornycroft did. Mr. Lane testified that it was his belief that under the existing facts, it was the obligation of the court to resolve the issue presented by the similarity of names of Yacht Club, Inc., the judgment debtor, and Yacht Club Sales and Service, Inc., appellant’s customer.
The same day appellant Bank answered the interrogatory and returned it to the sheriff, Wednesday, June 18, the Bank placed a “hold” on respondent’s account, but neither Mr. Harris, nor any other employee of respondent Y.C.S.S., Inc., was notified that such action was taken. Respondent continued making deposits into the account in the amount of $39,873.82 between June 23 and June 25, and these funds were also affected by the “hold” without respondent’s knowledge.
Eight checks drawn on respondent’s account (i. e. the first series of checks, exhibits 6A-13) were presented to appellant Bank between June 19 and June 23. These checks were returned with the notation, “refer to maker.” Mr. Harris first learned of appellant Bank’s action on Wednesday, June 25, a week after the “hold” took effect, when an employee of the Farmers and Merchants Bank of Spokane contacted him and informed him that checks drawn on the Y.C.S.S., Inc. account were being returned. Farmers and Merchants Bank had accepted two small checks of Y.C.S.S., Inc., from the payees on the checks (these two checks are included in the first series of checks), but when they were forwarded for collection the checks were returned unpaid.
When Mr. Harris learned that Y.C.S.S., Inc., checks were being returned unpaid, he immediately sent his attorney to see Mr. Thornycroft at appellant’s Coeur d’Alene office. Following the attorney’s visit, Mr. Thornycroft, for the first time since service of the writ and placing the “hold” on the account, contacted the sheriff’s office and the bank’s attorney. Mr. Thornycroft testified that the bank did nothing sooner because it was his belief the writ required the bank to hold respondent’s funds until the court determined whether the judgment debtor named in the writ, Yacht Club, Inc., and respondent Y.C.S.S., Inc. were one and the same.
The bank removed the “hold” from respondent’s account on the afternoon of June 26, after their attorney advised them to release the “hold” because Yacht Club, Inc., and Y.C.S.S., Inc. were two separate entities. However, due to a computer error, respondent’s funds were not released until June 27.2 Eleven checks drawn on respondent’s account which were presented to the Bank on or after June 24 (i. e. the second series of checks), were then paid on June 27. Seven of the eight checks in the first series of checks (exhibits 7, 8, 9,10,11,12, and 13) were also paid on June 27. (Apparently a new check for exhibit 6A was issued and later paid.)
On appeal, the Bank contends that the trial court erred in several regards in its [857]*857instructions to the jury. First, appellant contends that instruction no. 14, regarding a bank’s duty when served with a writ of execution, is erroneous. Instruction no. 14 states:
“YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that when a Writ of Execution is served upon a bank, the bank must
(1) either deliver and surrender the funds in the name of the judgment-debt- or that are on that day in the possession of the bank, minus any amount of money that the bank claims is owed to it from that judgment-debtor, or,
(2) answer that it has no funds in the name of the named judgment-debtor, or
(3) answer that it does not know. In the said third event if the officer serving the Writ of Execution does not demand the funds, the bank should continue to handle its depositor’s demand account in the usual and ordinary course of business.”
Appellant contends that paragraph (3) of the above instruction is an incorrect statement of the law because it requires a bank to handle its customer’s account in the usual and ordinary course of business when it does not know whether its customer is the judgment-debtor named in the writ. It is appellant’s position that once it gave a qualified answer to the interrogatory, it was entitled to treat its customer’s account as impounded until there was a judicial determination as to whether such account belonged to the judgment-debtor. Otherwise, appellant claims, it would be exposed to inconsistent liabilities because it would have to ignore either the writ of execution, at the risk of being held liable to the judgment-creditor, or the demands of its customer, at the risk of being held liable for wrongful dishonor. We disagree.
A bank that is served with a writ of execution cannot be held liable to a judgment-creditor unless it handles funds in the name of the judgment-debtor (i. e. the defendant named in the writ of execution) in disregard of the writ. German Nat. Bank v. National State Bank, 5 Colo.App. 427, 39 P. 71 (1895); Pascagoula Nat. Bank v. Eberlein, 161 Miss. 337, 131 So. 812 (1931); O’Neil v. New England Trust Co., 28 R.I. 311, 67 A. 63 (1907). The one exception to this rule is in cases where there is proof that the bank had actual knowledge that the debtor named in the writ and its customer are one and the same. German Nat. Bank v. National State Bank, supra. Thus, the duty of a garnishee bank is to find out whether the defendant named in the writ of execution has funds on deposit with it, and it need not examine the affairs of any person other than the one named in the writ. O’Neil v. New England Trust Co., supra. In German Nat. Bank v. National State Bank, supra, the judgment-creditor of W. G. Motley incorrectly identified him as W. J. Motley, resulting in a writ of attachment that ran against W. J. Motley. The garnishee bank was served with process of garnishment, with notice to answer indebtedness to W. J. Motley. Although at the time of the service of notice, the bank had funds of W. G. Motley in its possession, the court held that the answer of the garnishee that the bank was not indebted to W. J. Motley was legally and technically correct. Ruling that a writ of attachment and notice of garnishment against “W. J. Motley” «muid not reach moneys due “W. G. Motley,” the court explained the rationale of such a rule as follows:
“In the intricate and complicated business of banking, absolute exactness and particularly in regard to names is absolutely indispensable, not only for the security of the bank, but of those doing business with it. In many instances there are many of the same surnames, and frequently with the same first initial letter; and, where the full name is not used, it frequently occurs that the second or intermediate initial is all that distinguishes one name from another; and a bank disregarding the middle initial as a part of the name would be very likely to find itself in trouble by allowing one man to draw upon the account of another. If such trouble occurred, no bank could shield itself from responsibility by ignoring the only distinctive difference between the names of two persons. When [858]*858banks are necessarily held to such strict accountability, it is not asking too much that in proceedings against them the individual sought to be reached should be so designated as to leave no doubt in regard to the identity. Banks cannot presume that John A. Smith and John W. Smith are the same person. Creditors are supposed to know the names of their debtors, especially when, as in this case, the indebtedness is evidenced by a promissory note, and in bringing suit should be held to bring the suit against the proper person, or suffer the penalty of their own negligence..... [A] garnishee is totally unaffected by any notice which may be served upon him, unless it properly runs with an accurate description against the individual to whom he may be indebted, unless it be in those cases where the proof may show that the garnishee had actual knowledge of the identity of the debtor and the person named in the process.” 39 P. at 72.
The interrogatory in question was couched in the terms of the statute,3 and states:
“At the time of the service of this Notice upon you, had you in your possession or under your control any property, money or effects of the within named Defendant (or either of them)? If so, state what property, what money or effects, how much and what value.”
As discussed in German Nat. Bank v. National State Bank, supra, banks are held to a strict accountability as to their depositor’s funds. By the same token creditors are under a like obligation to be certain of the names of their debtors, and if the bank is going to honor any garnishment notice, it must ascertain that the judgment debtor is one and the same as its depositor.
The interrogatory here asked whether the appellant bank had any property belonging to the defendant named in the writ of execution. The defendant (judgment debtor) named in the writ was Yacht Club, Inc. Thus, under the existing facts and the law just stated, the appellant bank could have answered that it had no funds in the name of the named judgment debtor. This course of action was set forth in paragraph (2) of Instruction no. 14. The onus would thereafter be upon the judgment creditor to take further action; without such action there is nothing upon which garnishment liability of the bank could be premised. Twin Falls Realty Co. v. Brune, 45 Idaho 579, 582-3, 264 P. 382 (1928); Eagleson v. Rubin, 16 Idaho 92, 100 P. 765 (1909). I.C. § 8-515.
In the alternative, the bank could have answered in a qualified manner, as provided for in paragraph (3) of Instruction no. 14, stating that it did not have funds in the name of that judgment debtor but had funds in a name similar to that set forth in the writ. However, so answering would not give rise to an ability or right on the part of the bank to “hold” the funds of its similarly-named customer pending possible resolution of any confusion as to the identity of the judgment debtor. Again, it is up to the judgment creditor to take action in this regard, and until he does so and the court orders to the contrary, the bank is not liable under the writ for continuing to handle the ungarnished customer’s account in the ordinary course of business. Twin Falls Realty Co. v. Brune, supra.
In the present fact situation, for example, the judgment creditor could have taken ex[859]*859ception to the sufficiency of the answer or could have denied the answer. I.C. §§ 8-513, 514. (We are here merely noting alternatives, not suggesting the merit, if any, in such action.) The issues thus raised by the creditor as to the relationship between Yacht Club, Inc. and Y.C.S.S. would then be tried and in due course a judgment would be rendered regarding the liability of the bank as garnishee. I.C. § 8-514; Eagleson, supra 16 Idaho at 97-100, 100 P. at 766-8. If the court decided that the Y.C.S.S., Inc. account indeed constituted a garnishable debt of the judgment debtor, only then would the bank be justified in placing a hold on the account of its customer.4
But absent any affirmative action on the part of the judgment creditor and court, the bank is not entitled to treat the account as impounded. The writ sought no relief against Y.C.S.S., Inc. and the bank is powerless to extend, sua sponte, the reach of the writ.
As we have noted, any “risk” to the bank in this situation can be avoided by its answering in the manner provided for in Instruction no. 14, continuing to treat the account in the normal manner, and leaving the next step, if any, to the judgment creditor and court. While the instruction is not fully correct, it is the conclusion of the court that there was no error in the giving of Instruction no. 14.
Next appellant bank contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on its liability to respondent. I.C. § 28-4-402 governs a bank’s liability to its customer for the wrongful dishonor of a check. It states:
“Bank’s liability to customer for wrongful dishonor. — A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor of an item. When the dishonor occurs through mistake liability is limited to actual damages proved. If so proximately caused and proved damages may include damages for an arrest or prosecution of the customer or other consequential damages. Whether any consequential damages are proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor is a question of fact to be determined in each case.”
First, appellant claims that the trial court erred in refusing to give the following proposed instruction:
“You are instructed that when a bank dishonors a check by mistake, the bank’s liability is limited to actual damages proved.”
Although in light of the second sentence of I.C. § 28-4^402 the above instruction is a correct statement of the law, we find no error in the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on dishonor by mistake.
“Mistaken dishonor” means a wrongful dishonor done erroneously or unintentionally. Allison v. First Nat. Bank, 85 N.M. 283, 511 P.2d 769 (1973) rev’d on other grounds, 85 N.M. 511, 514 P.2d 30 (1973). Dishonors resulting from inadvertent bookkeeping errors and other unintentional employee errors would be mistaken dishonors. Cf. Schaffner v. Ehrman, 139 Ill. 109, 28 N.E. 917 (1891) (bookkeeping mistake); Crites & Crites v. Security State Bank, 52 Mont. 121, 155 P. 970 (1916) (credit of deposit to wrong account); Nealis v. Industrial Bank of Commerce, 200 Misc. 406, 107 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1951) (credit of deposit to wrong account). On the other hand, where a dishonor is caused by a set-off or charge made by a bank under an erroneous belief that it had a legal right to do so, the wrongful dishonor resulting from the improper setoff or charge is not classi[860]*860fied as mistaken. Meinhart v. Farmers’ State Bank, 124 Kan. 333, 259 P. 698 (1927); Wildenberger v. Ridgewood Nat. Bank, 230 N.Y. 425, 130 N.E. 600 (1921). In accord with the above-cited cases is White and Summers’ treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code, wherein the authors state:
“We would ... find the bank guilty of willful dishonor ... any time it dishonored its Customer’s checks because it had previously reduced his account through its own improper setoff, improper garnishment or the like. Moreover we would find such reduction ‘improper’ even though the bank acted in a good faith but mistaken belief that the garnishment or setoff was valid. Although such dishonors might be the result of a ‘mistake’ in the sense that the bank official was mistaken about his legal rights, we would classify them as willful for they represent the bank’s deliberate judgment to sacrifice the customer’s interest to those of some other party.” White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, § 17—4 at 673 (2d ed. 1980).
Ordinarily, whether a dishonor is willful or intentional is a question of fact for the jury. Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat. Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966); Woody v. Nat. Bank of Rocky Mount, 194 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 150 (1927). However, when the evidence on an issue of fact is undisputed, and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are plain and not open to doubt by reasonable men, the issue is no longer one of fact to be submitted to the jury, but becomes a question of law. Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat. Bank, supra. In the instant case it is uncontroverted that appellant Bank intentionally dishonored eight of respondent’s checks, although it did so with the belief that it was legally entitled to do so. Under the authorities cited above, the Bank’s action cannot be classified as simply a mistaken dishonor. We therefore hold that the trial court was correct when it implicitly ruled that as a matter of law the eight checks had not been dishonored by mistake and we find no error in its refusal to instruct the jury as to the mistake language of the wrongful dishonor sections, I.C. § 28—4—402.
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the definition of “negligence.” Appellant argues, and this court agrees, that the concept of negligence is inapplicable to the instant case because a bank’s liability for the wrongful dishonor of a check is exclusively governed by I.C. § 28—4-402. Cf. Allison v. First Nat. Bank, supra; First Nat. Bank of Bellaire v. Hubbs, 566 S.W.2d 375 (Tex.Civ. App.1978). Comment 4 to I.C. § 28-4-402 provides:
“Wrongful dishonor is different from ‘failure to exercise ordinary care in handling an item,’ and the measure of damages is that stated in this section, not that stated in Section 4-103(5).”
However, it is our opinion that instructing the jury on the definition of negligence was harmless error in the instant case since the jury’s award of damages for respondent was based solely on the first series of checks which the trial court held had been wrongfully dishonored as a matter of law. Finding no prejudicial error, this court will not reverse the trial court’s judgment on this ground. Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533, 567 P.2d 1284 (1977); Annau v. Schutte, 96 Idaho 704, 535 P.2d 1095 (1975).
Appellant’s argument in regard to the trial court’s application of I.C. § 28—4-402 to the instant case concerns the instruction given to the jury on the burden of proving injury. Instruction no. 23 states:
“In this case the plaintiff has also alleged damages for loss of its credit and business standing as a result of the bank’s conduct in refusing to pay checks that were drawn on the plaintiff’s bank account during the period of time in question.
“You are instructed that if you find that the Defendant bank dishonored checks drawn on the Plaintiff’s checking account then the Plaintiff is not required to prove any particular amount of damage for harm to its credit and business standing, but that the Defendant has the burden of proving that the Plaintiff has [861]*861not had its business and credit standing damaged.” (Emphasis added.)
This instruction sets forth the common law rule, under which a “merchant or trader” was allowed to recover substantial damages for wrongful dishonor without proof of actual injury. Schaffner v. Ehrman, supra 28 N.E. 917; Crites & Crites v. Security State Bank, supra, 155 P. 970; Holland, An Analysis of the Legal Problems Resulting from Wrongful Dishonors, 42 Mo.L.Rev. 507 (1977). The rule was usually based on the theory that dishonor of a “merchant or trader’s” check involved an imputation of insolvency, dishonesty, or bad faith and thus defamed him in his trade or business. Schaffner v. Ehrman, supra. This rule, which became known as the “trader rule,” was also supported on the ground that a dishonor necessarily resulted in an impairment of the credit of a merchant or trader and that the impairment of credit constituted a substantial injury for which the trader was entitled to recover more than nominal damages. Browning v. Bank of Vernal, 60 Utah 197, 207 P. 462 (1922). This court’s opinion in First Piedmont Bank and Trust Co. v. Doyle, 97 Idaho 700, 551 P.2d 1336 (1976), contains dicta to the effect that the “trader rule” applied in actions brought under I.C. § 28-4-402 and the court below relied on Piedmont in instructing the jury that the burden of proof of lack of damage or loss is on the bank when it dishonors a customer’s check.
Contrary to the Piedmont statement however, this state had in effect prior to the adoption of the U.C.C. a statute which provided
“Liability for nonpayment of checks. — No bank shall be liable to a depositor because of the nonpayment through mistake or error and without malice of a check which should have been paid unless the depositor shall allege and prove actual damage by reason of such nonpayment, and in such event, the liability shall not exceed the amount of damages so proved.” Former I.C. § 26-1013.
This particular provision was enacted in 1925. Credit for its drafting has been given the American Banking Association, and the perceived design of the statute was to negate the “trader rule” on dishonored checks. Daniels, Bank Liability for Wrongful Dishonor: UCC Section 4-402 — Is Revision Necessary? 8 Ind.L.R. 802, 810-811 (1975); 10 Am.Jur.2d, Banks, §§ 574-5, pp. 544 — 5. Accord Abramowitz v. Bank of America, 131 Cal.App.2d Supp. 892, 281 P.2d 380, 382 (1955). The adoption in Idaho of I.C. § 28-4-402 thus was not a radical departure from pre-existing law. Although, as stated in Skov v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 407 F.2d 1318, 1319 (3d Cir. 1969), § 4-402 of the Uniform Commercial Code (I.C. § 28-4-402) “is not a model of clarity in its reference to ‘damages proximately caused’, ‘actual damages proved’, and ‘consequential damages,’ ” it, like the former Idaho statute, appears clear in intent.
Respondents have cited the case of American Fletcher Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick, 146 Ind.App. 122, 252 N.E.2d 839 (1969), for the proposition that Comment 3 to U.C.C. 4-4025 did not actually abolish the so-called “trader rule.” However, the decisive issue in the view of that court was one of causation, not burden of proof, and that court did not consider whether U.C.C. 4-402 abolished the rule. Similar reliance is placed on White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, supra at § 17-4, pp. 669-71, who take the position that while Comment 3 purports to “reject” the trader rule, their view is to say the section “narrows” the rule; that is, that the burden of proof of lack of damage or loss would be on the bank when the wrongful dishonor of a customer’s check results not from mistake or [862]*862inadvertance but from the willful action of the bank.
Contrary to this approach, however, other courts and authors have given efficacy to the rejection of the trader rule in Comment 3 of U.C.C 4 — 102 without engaging in the White & Summers’ distinction between wrongful dishonor caused by mistake and that stemming from willful action. Continental Bank v. Fitting, 114 Ariz. 98, 559 P.2d 218 (Ariz.App.1977), held that liability for wrongful dishonor of a check was limited to damages actually proved. To reach the result, that court ruled that a prior case, Valley Nat’l Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 121 P.2d 414 (1942), which recognized the trader rule in Arizona was no longer controlling in the face of that legislature’s enactment of U.C.C. 4-402 [A.R.S. § 44-2628]. See also First Nat’l Bank of Bellaire v. Hubbs, 566 S.W.2d 375 (Tex.Civ.App.1978); Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435 5.W.2d 57 (Ky.App.1968). As is stated in 5A Michie, Banks and Banking, Ch. 9, § 243a at p. 641-2:
“Depositor a Merchant or Trader.
Formerly the rule was, if a depositor, whose check was dishonored by a bank when he had funds on deposit sufficient to meet it, was a merchant or trader, it was presumed, without further proof, that substantial damages were sustained, and such damages could have been recovered, even though the refusal was caused by mistake, and there was no evidence of special damage or of ill will or malice and notwithstanding the depositor was a corporation. This rule proceeded upon the fact, commonly recognized, that the credit of the person engaged in such a calling was essential to the prosperity of his business, and the dishonoring of his check was plainly calculated to impair it and to inflict a most serious injury. In common opinion, substantial damage was the natural and probable consequence of the act, and therefore a substantial recovery could.have been had without pleading or proof of special injury .... This is no longer the rule because the Uniform Commercial Code rejects the decisions where the merchant and trader were placed in a special position when a bank wrongfully dishonored an item. In all cases for wrongful dishonor by a bank, damages are limited to those actually proved or proximately caused by the dishonor.” (Emphasis added.)
In light of the Idaho Legislature’s enactment of the U.C.C. and under our interpretation of the language of the section here involved, it is the conclusion of the court that the dicta in First Piedmont Bank & Trust Co. v. Doyle, supra, is wrong and that portion of the decision to the extent that its discussion of I.C. § 28-4-402 is inconsistent with this opinion is disavowed.
It is the court’s conclusion that I.C. § 28-4-402 requires the bank’s customer to introduce evidence of damages proximately caused by the bank’s wrongful dishonor of its check in order to recover compensatory damages. See, Joler v. Depositors Trust Co., 309 A.2d 871, 877 (Me.1973); Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat’l Bank, supra, 418 P.2d at 198. The jury must be so instructed. If the trier of fact thereafter finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the customer was injured as a proximate result of the bank’s wrongful dishonor, it should award such damages as it shall find to be reasonable compensation for the injury proved. Evidence of the exact dollar amount of damages resulting from the injury is not necessary to support a compensatory award. Meinhart v. Farmers’ State Bank, supra, 259 P. at 701. Rather, the amount of damages is to be determined by the sound discretion and dispassionate judgment of the jury. Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat. Bank, supra.
Instruction no. 226 correctly placed the “burden of proof” on the respondent as to [863]*863the amount of damages, as well as the burden of establishing causal connection between the wrongful return of a check and the damages. Instruction no. 23, however, requires that “the Defendant [appellant] has the burden of proving that the Plaintiff [respondent] has not had its business and credit standing damaged.” This latter instruction conflicts with the correct statement of law in Instruction no. 22, and we cannot say that the jury award of $20,000 compensatory damages was not based on, or influenced by, Instruction no. 23.
We have previously held that where instructions are given which are contradictory on material matters, as Instructions no. 22 and 23 were here, the conflict between them and the resultant ambiguity and uncertainty constitutes prejudicial error and requires reversal. Ossmen v. Commercial Credit Corp., 72 Idaho 355, 365, 241 P.2d 351 (1952). The argument posed by the respondent that the other instructions set forth the correct rule of law on burden of proof and therefore Instruction no. 23 can be ignored is not a correct statement of the law. A materially incorrect statement of law in one instruction cannot be cured by a correct statement in another instruction. Pigg v. Brockman, 85 Idaho 492, 502, 381 P.2d 286 (1963). As this court noted in Cook v. Lammy, 73 Idaho 445, 253 P.2d 244 (1953), the conflict between the improper instruction and the correct rule in another instruction would necessarily tend to confuse and mislead the jury, and it would be impossible to tell which statement of the law they followed since both came from the court and presumably carried equal weight before the jury. 73 Idaho at 449, 253 P.2d at 246 citing Shallis v. Fiorito, 41 Idaho 653, 240 P. 932 (1925). Accord, Hall v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 80 Wash.2d 797, 498 P.2d 844, 849 (1972); Smith v. Rodene, 69 Wash.2d 482, 418 P.2d 741, 744 (1966). We therefore reverse the $20,000 compensatory award and remand this case for a new trial on the issue of whether respondent was injured as a proximate result of appellant’s wrongful dishonor of exhibits 6A, 7, 8, 9, .10, 11, 12 and 13 (the first series of checks). If the jury finds that respondent was injured, and that such injury Was proximately caused by appellant’s wrongful dishonors, it should award respondent such damages as it finds to be fair and reasonable compensation for the injury proved.
Appellant bank next presents a double issue for resolution, i. e., whether the issue of punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury, and if so, whether the award of $30,000 was excessive. It is to be noted, however, that appellant does not challenge the phraseology of the instruction given by the trial court on punitive damages, other than arguing it should not have been given at all.
I.C. § 28 — 4-402 provides “A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximately caused by the wrongful dishon- or of an item.” This provision has reference to “compensatory damages” which are distinct from “punitive damages” and does not expressly allow for awards of punitive damages. However, I.C. § 28-1-103 provides in part that “[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this act [the U.C.C.], the principles of law and equity ... shall supplement its provisions” and I.C. § 28-1-106(1) states in relevant part that “penal damages may [not] be had except as specifically provided in this act or by other rule of law.” Thus, if a customer can recover punitive damages for wrongful dishonor under the common law of its jurisdiction it will not be precluded from their recovery by I.C. § 28-4 — 402. Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank, 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 123 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1975); Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat’l Bank, supra; Northshore Bank v. Palmer, 525 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Civ.App.1975).
[864]*864In Idaho, punitive damages are recoverable in a tort action if the evidence clearly shows “that the action of the wrongdoer is wanton, malicious, or gross and outrageous, or where the facts are such as to imply malice and oppression ...” Unfried v. Libert, 20 Idaho 708, 728, 119 P. 885 (1911). Punitive damages may be awarded for breach of contract if there is clear evidence of fraud, malice or oppression, or if there is other sufficient reason for doing so. Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902,453 P.2d 551 (1969). I.C. § 28-4-402 does not specify whether a bank’s liability for dishonor is based on the theory of breach of contract or tort. I.C. § 28-4 — 402, Comment 2. Nonetheless, the court is of the opinion that in this action, where the record reflects that a “hold” was placed on respondent’s bank account with no prior consultation by the bank with its attorney, or with no inquiry or notice by the bank to respondent, there was sufficient evidence to justify submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury under either theory, and the court finds no error by the trial court in submitting this issue to the jury.
As previously discussed, the judgment in this action awarding compensatory damages must be reversed, and thus the judgment awarding punitive damages must likewise be reversed for further proceedings; for this court has adhered to the concept that there must be some reasonable relationship between the amount of compensatory damages awarded and the amount of the punitive damage award that will be sustained when attacked for being excessive. Williams v. Bone, 74 Idaho 185, 259 P.2d 810 (1953); Driesbach v. Lynch, 74 Idaho 225, 259 P.2d 1039 (1953); see also Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 496 P.2d 939 (1972). When the base against which punitive damages is to be measured is reversed for further proceedings, of necessity the award of punitive damages likewise must be reversed for further proceedings.
It is recognized that the phrase “reasonable relationship” as referred to above is an imprecise one for measurement of punitive damages as against actual damages. In Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496 P.2d 682 (1972), and Jolley v. Puregro Company, supra, this court endeavored to remove a little of such uncertainty. Language pertinent here is to be found in Jolley v. Puregro, 94 Idaho at 708-709, 496 P.2d 939:
“As this court noted in Cox v. Stolworthy, supra, other authorities recognize that the predominant purpose of exemplary damages is to deter the defendant and others similarly situated from indulging in comparable conduct in the future. Any vindictive or vengeful punishment aspect of an exemplary damages award is de-emphasized by this line of authority. Cox v. Stolworthy, supra; See C. Morris, ‘Punitive Damages in Tort Cases,’ 44 Harv.L.R. 1173 (1931). We prefer to accentuate those cases which define the purpose of exemplary damages as a deterrent to the defendant and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. We concede that any exemplary damages assessed against a defendant will appear to him to be punishment. However, we feel that the courts in these civil cases should be motivated primarily by a purpose of deterrence and not by a purpose of punishment. In other words, the assessment of exemplary damages should be prompted by the court’s or jury’s desire to assure, to the extent possible via the imposition of a monetary penalty, that similar conduct does not occur in the future. Punishment, per se, should be left to the criminal law. D. Hodel [44 Ore. L.R. 175] at 178-82.” (Footnote omitted.)
This statement is later followed by the admonition in Jolley v. Puregro Company:
“By our specific attention to the facts in Boise Dodge [Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969)] and Village of Peck [Village of Peck v. Denison, 92 Idaho 747, 450 P.2d 310 (1969)] cases, we do not preclude the possibility that there may be other similar situations in which aggravating and dire circumstances necessitate the departure from the general rule of exemplary damages in Cox v. Stolworthy. However, the [865]*865awarding of additional exemplary damages, in excess of those provided in that general rule, should be limited to the most extreme circumstances such as the calculated commercial fraud in Boise Dodge and the threat to the health, safety and welfare of a large number of persons represented in the Village of Peck case.” 94 Idaho at 711, 496 P.2d 939.
Since we are remanding this case in order that the jury may reconsider the amounts to be awarded as compensatory and punitive damages, we need not address appellant’s claim that the award of punitive damages is excessive and the award of compensatory damages is not supported by the evidence. Also, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing to submit appellant’s requested special interrogatories to the jury, since evidence of the exact dollar amount of damages resulting from appellant’s wrongful dishonors is not necessary to support an award of compensatory damages.
Finally, appellant urges this court to grant a new trial on the ground that counsel for respondent violated I.C. § 10-111. That statute forbids the amount of general damages sued for to be disclosed to the jury. This statute was not violated during the trial of this case and appellant’s argument to the contrary is without merit.
This court declines to award either party attorney fees on appeal on the basis of the guidelines set forth in Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 591 P.2d 1078 (1979).
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs to appellant.
DONALDSON, C. J., and BAKES, J., concur.