Xufeng Zhu v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 18, 2026
• Docket: 21-70239
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

XUFENG ZHU, No. 21-70239

Petitioner, Agency No. A208-728-314

v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 13, 2026** Honolulu, Hawaii

Before: BYBEE, R. NELSON, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Xufeng Zhu, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a

decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration

Judge (IJ)’s denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

Where, as here, “the BIA cites [Matter of] Burbano but adds its own analysis,

we review factual findings by both the BIA and the IJ for substantial evidence.”

Bondarenko v. Holder, 733 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing Matter of

Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (B.I.A. 1994)). We may reverse the agency’s factual

findings only if “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary based on the evidence in the record.” Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850

F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citations omitted). We review the

agency’s legal determinations de novo. Route v. Garland, 996 F.3d 968, 975 (9th

Cir. 2021).

1. Asylum. To qualify for asylum, an applicant must establish that “a central

reason” for the persecution alleged is one of several protected grounds: “race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, [and] political

opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th

544, 551 (9th Cir. 2023). Zhu contends that Chinese authorities demolished his

family’s home and that he was beaten and arrested after he contested the inadequate

compensation the government provided for it. He asserts that he is entitled to relief

from removal because he has suffered—and will suffer—harm in China based on

his political opinion. Specifically, he contends that Chinese authorities have imputed

to him “an anti-government, anti-eminent domain political opinion.” See Parada v.

2 Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 910–11 (9th Cir. 2018) (recognizing “imputed political

opinion” as a basis for establishing a nexus between persecution and a protected

ground). Zhu, however, did not produce any direct evidence from which the agency

was compelled to conclude that such a political opinion was imputed to him. Though

he was referred to by at least one government official as a “troubled citizen” who

“did not comply with the government’s rules and the regulations,” this statement

does not necessarily reflect a belief that Zhu’s noncompliance was ideologically

motivated. The same is true of Zhu’s arrest for “doing illegal petition.”

Zhu’s indirect evidence is also inadequate. His mistreatment by government

officials in response to his compensation-seeking efforts, while unfortunate, could

have happened for reasons unrelated to imputed political opinions. Likewise, the

political nature of Zhu actions does not necessarily mean that his persecutors

understood his actions to reflect his political opinions rather than his personal

interests. See Song v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 837, 842–43 (9th Cir. 2017) (suggesting

that a court may consider whether the alleged persecutor would perceive the

applicant to be acting for the benefit of others in assessing whether a political opinion

had been imputed to the applicant). Thus, we conclude that the agency’s conclusion

that Zhu failed to establish the requisite nexus for his asylum claim was supported

by substantial evidence.

2. Withholding of Removal. Our conclusion with respect to withholding of

3 removal is the same as with respect to asylum. Withholding of removal is appropriate

where “a petitioner . . . demonstrate[s] that his ‘life . . . would be threatened in that

country because of [the petitioner’s] race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion.’” Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 1059

(9th Cir. 2019) (as amended) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)). Where, as here,

the agency properly found that there was no nexus whatsoever to a protected ground,

any distinctions between asylum and withholding of removal fall away. See Barajas-

Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that both asylum

and withholding claims are appropriately denied when there is “no nexus at all”).

Accordingly, we also conclude that the denial of Zhu’s request for withholding of

removal was supported by substantial evidence.

3. Convention Against Torture. To have removal deferred under CAT, “an

applicant must establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured

if removed.” Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 768–69 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation

omitted). “To constitute torture, an act must inflict severe pain or suffering, and it

must be undertaken at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a

public official.” Id. at 769 (citation omitted). Relevant evidence for this inquiry

includes—but is not limited to—“past torture inflicted upon the applicant,” the

possibility “that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal

where he or she is not likely to be tortured,” and any indications of “gross, flagrant

4 or mass violations of human rights within the country of removal.”

8 CFR § 1208.16(c)(3). The threshold for torture is high, and “even instances of

significant physical abuse [may] not constitute torture.” Hernandez, 52 F.4th at 769.

In support of his position that he is likely to be tortured on return to China,

Zhu points to his prior beating by government actors. But this event did not constitute

“torture,” as it did not rise to the level of “extreme cruel and inhuman treatment . . .

result[ing] in severe pain or suffering.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th

696, 706 (9th Cir. 2022). Our conclusion is supported by numerous decisions

denying CAT relief in cases involving more severe abuse. E.g., id. at 700, 706; Vitug

v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1060, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2013); Ahmed v. Keisler, 504

F.3d 1183, 1188–89, 1201 (9th Cir. 2007); Kumar v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1043,

1055–56 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, we conclude that the agency’s denial of Zhu’s

request for deferred removal under CAT was also supported by substantial evidence.

PETITION DENIED.