Xing v. Rosen

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedJanuary 22, 2021
Docket19-1613
StatusUnpublished

This text of Xing v. Rosen (Xing v. Rosen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Xing v. Rosen, (2d Cir. 2021).

Opinion

19-1613 Xing v. Rosen BIA Conroy, IJ A206 230 159

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 22nd day of January, two thousand twenty-one. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 8 Chief Judge, 9 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 10 STEVEN J. MENASHI, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 LIANG JIA XING, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 19-1613 18 NAC 19 JEFFREY A. ROSEN, ACTING UNITED 20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Thomas V. Massucci, Esq., New 25 York, NY. 26 27 FOR RESPONDENT: Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting 28 Assistant Attorney General; Claire 29 L. Workman, Senior Litigation 30 Counsel; Edward C. Durant, 1 Attorney, Office of Immigration 2 Litigation, United States 3 Department of Justice, Washington, 4 DC. 5 6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

9 is DENIED.

10 Petitioner Liang Jia Xing, a native and citizen of the

11 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 1, 2019,

12 decision of the BIA affirming a January 5, 2018, decision of

13 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Xing’s application for

14 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

15 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Liang Jia Xing,

16 No. A206 230 159 (B.I.A. May 1, 2019), aff’g No. A206 230 159

17 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 5, 2018). We assume the parties’

18 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

19 Under the circumstances, we have considered both the IJ’s

20 and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.”

21 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d

22 Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well

23 established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v.

24 Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).

25 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

2 1 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

2 determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of

3 the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the

4 applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the

5 applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . ,

6 [and] the internal consistency of each such statement . . .

7 without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or

8 falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any

9 other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see

10 also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163–64 (2d Cir.

11 2008). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination

12 unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain

13 that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse

14 credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; accord

15 Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence supports

16 the agency’s determination that Xing was not credible as to

17 his claim that police in China detained and beat him for

18 practicing Christianity.

19 The IJ reasonably found Xing’s demeanor hesitant and

20 evasive. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That finding

21 is supported by the record, which shows that, despite repeated

22 requests for details about the harm he suffered and the

3 1 conditions of his detention, Xing resisted and ultimately

2 failed to provide complete details of his alleged 15-day

3 detention and three beatings. See id.; Jin Shui Qiu v.

4 Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Where an

5 applicant gives very spare testimony . . . the IJ . . . may

6 fairly wonder whether the testimony is fabricated.”),

7 overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S.

8 Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2007).

9 The IJ’s demeanor finding and adverse credibility

10 determination as a whole were further supported by Xing’s

11 inconsistent evidence regarding where he was when he learned

12 about Christianity and where he hid after his release from

13 detention. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Likai

14 Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a

15 single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing

16 that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple

17 inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”); Li

18 Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir.

19 2006) (“We can be still more confident in our review of

20 observations about an applicant’s demeanor where, as here,

21 they are supported by specific examples of inconsistent

22 testimony.”). Xing could not compellingly explain these

4 1 inconsistencies and his attempts to do so were illogical and

2 confusing, thereby further impugning his credibility. See

3 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d

4 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer

5 a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to

6 secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-

7 finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal

8 quotations omitted)).

9 Having questioned Xing’s credibility, the agency

10 reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate his

11 testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. “An

12 applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may

13 bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in

14 general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony

15 that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v.

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Related

Biao Yang v. Gonzales
496 F.3d 268 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Hui Lin Huang v. Holder
677 F.3d 130 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey
534 F.3d 162 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Shi Liang Lin v. United States Department of Justice
494 F.3d 296 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Gao v. Barr
968 F.3d 137 (Second Circuit, 2020)
Gao v. Sessions
891 F.3d 67 (Second Circuit, 2018)
Y.C. v. Holder
741 F.3d 324 (Second Circuit, 2013)

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