UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOHN XIE,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 21-cv-1289 (DLF) KELU CHAO, Acting Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Agency for Global Media
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
John Xie brings claims against the United States Agency for Global Media under the
Rehabilitation Act. Before the Court is Acting Chief Executive Officer Kelu Chao’s Partial
Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 11. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the Motion in part
and deny it in part.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
John Xie joined the “China Branch” of Voice of America (“VOA”) in February of 1993
and was promoted to Supervisory International Broadcaster in May of 2016. Compl. ¶¶ 15–16,
Dkt. 1. VOA is a federally-funded station supported by the defendant United States Agency for
Global Media (“the Agency”). Id. ¶ 5.
Xie suffers from a rare disorder called Chiari 1 Malformation. Id. ¶¶ 21–22. This
condition causes a host of symptoms, including polyneuropathy, depressive disorder, anxiety
disorder, seizure disorder and a headache disorder. Id. ¶ 25. Stress can increase the severity of
his symptoms, including the stress induced by the fast-paced reporting of “hard news.” Id. ¶¶ 18, 24. Following a flare-up in symptoms, Xie reported his condition to Ernest Torriero, his superior
and Chief of the China Branch. Id. ¶¶ 30–31.
On July 31, 2018, days after learning of Xie’s illness, Torriero proposed a restructuring
of the China Branch. Id. ¶ 32. Under the proposal, Wei Hu, another VOA employee, would
replace Xie as sole supervisor of the morning A.M. News/Radio Team, stripping him of
supervisory and editorial authority. Id. ¶¶ 32–33. Torriero informed Xie that he made these
changes because of his health. Id. ¶ 32.
Xie appealed the proposal both to Torriero and to Torriero’s direct supervisor, Jing
Zhang. Id. ¶¶ 36, 40–41. Neither request was granted. Id. ¶¶ 38, 45. Xie then requested a
transfer to the Versioning Team, another division within VOA, on September 6, 2018. Id. ¶ 51.
The next day, Torriero declined this request. Id. ¶ 53. Xie sought an appeal from VOA’s Human
Resources Manager on September 24, 2018, but it appears that the appeal was never granted. Id.
¶¶ 54–57.
Torriero formally implemented the proposed reorganization of the China Branch on
October 9, 2018. Id. ¶¶ 60–62. From then on, Xie reported directly to Hu. Id. ¶ 64. On October
17, 2018, he requested a transfer to the Versioning or English Teaching teams or, alternatively,
the freedom to telework on days when his symptoms are present. Id. ¶¶ 68–69. These requests
were not granted. Id. ¶¶ 70–71, 85–86. Unable to obtain a transfer, Xie began to use sick leave
on days when he experienced symptoms. Id. ¶ 71.
Tensions between Xie and Toerriero intensified in the days and weeks that followed.
Frustrated by the Agency’s treatment of his situation, Xie visited Torriero’s office on October
22, 2018. Id. ¶¶ 73–74. During this meeting, Torriero allegedly “became angry” and called
Xie’s use of sick leave “disruptive.” Id. ¶ 76. He stepped toward Xie “in an aggressive and
2 threatening manner,” causing Xie to move backwards in fear. Id. ¶ 77. Torriero then “loudly
and aggressively” ordered Xie to leave his office. Id. ¶ 78. Xie immediately reported the
incident to both Zhang and Jenessa Coleman, a VOA Human Resources professional, promising
to take legal action. Id. ¶¶ 79–80. Coleman advised Xie that he could continue to use sick leave
for his condition. Id. ¶ 80. Still, the next day, Torriero instructed Xie not to use sick leave, as
doing so was “disruptive” to the operation of the China Branch. Id. ¶ 83.
On October 26, 2018, Xie met with Torriero, Coleman, and Leslie Corbin, a professional
within the Agency’s Office of Civil Rights, to discuss his requests for accommodation, including
his requests to transfer to the Features Team, Versioning Team, or English Teaching Team. Id. ¶
85. While Agency officials denied those requests for accommodation, id. ¶¶ 85–86, they did
explain that the removal of his supervisory duties was an “unofficial accommodation,” id. ¶ 89.
Corbin noted that Xie had offered insufficient medical documentation to support his request for
accommodation and gave him until December 3, 2018 to substantiate his request with stronger
documentation. Id. ¶¶ 93, 95. Xie obtained additional documentation from his neurologist on
November 5, 2018. Id. ¶¶ 99–101.
Xie’s symptoms persisted, and around November 25, 2018, his condition caused him to
make an error on a news piece. Id. ¶¶ 104–05. The next day, Xie’s Managing Editor, Joseph
Chen, accused him of not taking his job seriously and placed a counseling letter describing the
incident in his personnel record. Id. ¶¶ 108–09. A few days later, he used a sick day to visit the
emergency room to address his worsening condition. Id. ¶ 111. Having learned of his
hospitalization, Torriero and Chen emailed him the following day, informing him that he had
violated VOA’s sick leave policy. Id. ¶ 112.
3 Throughout 2018 and the spring of 2019, Xie continued to ask for accommodations for
his condition. These requests were never granted. Id. ¶¶ 113–15.
B. Procedural History
On October 29, 2018, Xie initiated EEO Counseling with the VOA Broadcasting Board
of Governors. Id. ¶ 97. He received notice of his right to file a formal EEO complaint on
February 28, 2019, which he filed on March 11, 2019. Id. ¶ 9. On February 10, 2021, the EEOC
found in favor of the Agency. Id. ¶ 13. Xie filed suit in this Court on May 10, 2021, alleging
several claims under the Rehabilitation Act, including intentional discrimination, failure to
accommodate, hostile work environment, retaliation, and interference. See id. ¶¶ 121–43.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain factual matter
sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facially plausible claim is one that “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard does not amount to a specific probability requirement,
but it does require “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see
also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.”). A complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but
alleging facts that are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability . . . stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 Well-pleaded factual allegations are “entitled to [an] assumption of truth,” id. at 679, and
the court construes the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471,
476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). An “unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is not credited; likewise, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
III. ANALYSIS
The Agency moves to dismiss the intentional discrimination claim in Count I, the hostile
work environment claim in Count II, and the retaliation claim in Count III. Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss at 6. The Court will address each claim in turn.
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Rehabilitation Act requires a person alleging a violation to exhaust administrative
remedies by filing an administrative charge before bringing a civil suit. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1);
see also Crawford v. Duke, 867 F.3d 103, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2017). This exhaustion requirement
“serves the important purposes of giving the charged party notice of the claim and narrowing the
issues for prompt adjudication and decision.” Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). A defendant may raise exhaustion
as an affirmative defense in a motion to dismiss “when the facts that give rise to the defense are
clear from the face of the complaint.” Smith–Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 578
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
5 The employee must first initiate contact with an EEO counselor within 45 days of the
allegedly discriminatory act. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). Here, Xie initiated EEO counseling
on October 29, 2018. Compl. ¶ 97. But the Court agrees with the Agency that he failed to
exhaust administrative remedies for some of his claims. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 7–9. At least
two alleged acts occurred before September 14, 2018: the July 31, 2018, proposed restructuring
of the China Branch and the September 7, 2018, denial of Xie’s September 6 request to transfer
to the Versioning Team. Compl. ¶¶ 32, 53, 97. To the extent the July 31 reorganization proposal
constitutes a discrete act of discrimination, it took place outside the required 45-day window and
is thus no longer actionable.
While Xie did not exhaust the September 7 denial, he did, contrary to the Agency’s
claim, see Def.’s Reply at 6, Dkt. 17, exhaust a later, October 17, 2018 transfer denial. This
request to transfer to the Versioning or English Teaching teams, Compl. ¶ 68, was denied on
October 26, 2018, id. ¶¶ 85–86. Xie alleges that his October 17 request was a “reaffirm[ation]”
of his earlier one, id. ¶ 68, but the proposals were not identical, as he added the English Teaching
Team as an option. Id. And the September request had already been denied. Id. ¶ 53.
Accordingly, the September 7 and October 26 denials are “discrete discriminatory acts” that
“start[ed] a new clock for filing charges alleging [each] act.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002); see also Owens-Hart v. Howard Univ., 220 F. Supp. 3d 81,
93 (D.D.C. 2016) (“A new request for the same accommodation will restart the statute of
limitations clock” for failure-to-accommodate claims). Xie timely exhausted the latter, but not
the former, denial.
6 Thus, the Court will grant the Agency’s motion to dismiss Xie’s discrimination and
retaliation claims to the extent they include the July 31, 2018, restructuring proposal and the
September 7, 2018, transfer request denial.
B. Failure to State a Discrimination Claim
Xie argues that the Agency intentionally discriminated against him by restructuring the
China Branch. Pl.’s Opp’n at 10, Dkt. 13; Compl. ¶¶ 60–62.1 To state an intentional
discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff must allege that he suffered an
adverse employment action because of his disability. Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191,
1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008).2 An “adverse employment action” involves “a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Baird v.
Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Welch v. Skorton, 299 F. Supp. 3d 102, 111 (D.D.C. 2018) (same standard applies for
Rehabilitation Act claims); Chambers v. District of Columbia, 35 F.4th 870, 872 (D.C. Cir.
2022) (holding that a transfer decision can constitute an adverse employment action without any
showing of “objectively tangible harm”).
1 It appears that Xie’s discrimination claim is based only on the China Branch restructuring. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 6 (“Mr. Xie’s claims of disability discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment stem from a reorganization of the leadership in the China Branch[.]”). Thus, the Court does not address whether the October 26 denial of his transfer request qualifies as an adverse employment action for purposes of the discrimination claim. 2 The plaintiff must also allege that he has a disability within the meaning of the Act and that he was “otherwise qualified for the position with or without reasonable accommodation.” Drasek v. Burwell, 121 F. Supp. 3d 143, 160 (D.D.C. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Agency does not contest either factor, nor does it challenge that the reorganization occurred because of Xie’s disability.
7 Xie sufficiently alleges that the China Branch reorganization was an adverse employment
action. Because he was stripped of editorial decision-making authority and placed under the
direct supervision of a new employee, he alleges that the restructuring caused his demotion.
Compl. ¶¶ 63–64; 89–91. “[T]he abrogation of . . . supervisory duties and other responsibilities”
constitutes an “adverse employment action.” Hutchinson v. Holder, 815 F. Supp. 2d 303, 312
(D.D.C. 2011). Xie does not allege a change in grade, nor has he reported a drop in income, see
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 9–16, but “withdrawing an employee’s supervisory duties” can alone
“constitute[] an adverse employment action,” Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 427 (D.C. Cir.
2003).3 And even though, as the Agency notes, the reorganization shifted “only some of
Plaintiff’s duties to the new supervisor,” Def.’s Reply at 6, a plaintiff need not allege that all of
his job responsibilities were changed by reorganization. “[A] material reduction of supervisory
responsibilities, no less than a total deprivation of such responsibilities, can amount to an adverse
employment action.” Ohal v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Dist. of Columbia, 100 Fed. App’x 833, 834
(D.C. Cir. 2004). Taking Xie’s allegations that he lost editorial and supervisory authority as true,
3 After briefing concluded in this case, the D.C. Circuit decided Chambers, 35 F.4th 870, which holds that a transfer decision can constitute an adverse employment action without any showing of “objectively tangible harm,” id. at 872. The Agency urges the Court not to apply Chambers and instead look to “the text of the federal sector provisions of Title VII” to find that the reorganization is not an adverse action. Def.’s Supp’l Authority at 2, Dkt. 19. But to agree with Xie, the Court need not consider Chambers, which controls only lateral transfer cases, as opposed to those involving effective demotions, see Harbour v. Univ. Club of Washington, No. 21-cv-2047, 2022 WL 2304033, at *6 n.4 (D.D.C. June 27, 2022). By alleging that he lost editorial and supervisory duties, he was left with “significantly different” and “diminished” responsibilities. See Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007). That is enough to show an adverse employment action even pre-Chambers. See id. Further, the Court would not come to a different conclusion under Title VII’s federal sector provision. The China Branch reorganization qualifies as a “personnel action” because it left Xie with a “significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).
8 as the Court must at this stage, he has shown that the restructuring qualifies as an adverse action.
Thus, the Court will deny the Agency’s motion to dismiss Xie’s intentional discrimination claim.
C. Failure to State a Hostile Work Environment Claim
Xie also alleges that the Agency created a hostile work environment. A hostile work
environment exists where a plaintiff's employer subjects him to “discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult” that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment.” Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201 (quoting
Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). In assessing whether a hostile work
environment exists, courts “look[] to the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of
the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an
employee’s work performance.” Id.
Xie alleges that multiple VOA employees contributed to a hostile work environment. He
points to the following acts or events to support his claim:
denying common requests for telework; subjecting him to hyper-scrutiny in his use of disability necessitated leave; labeling him as problematic; displaying violent outbursts towards him and culminating in an incident where Mr. Torriero displayed aggressive and threatening behavior towards Mr. Xie in a manner that constitutes legal assault; ongoing targeting and defamatory accusations of journalistic malfeasance; disparate and negative placement of information in his personnel file and harassing him while in the emergency room in regards to the Agency’s leave policy, and mock[ing] his health.
Pl.'s Opp’n at 15; Compl. ¶¶ 68–72; 76–78, 83, 86, 108–12. These allegations do not
suffice to state a hostile work environment claim.
Denying requests for telework, scrutinizing the use of sick days, requesting medical
information, and questioning work product are actions no more “severe” or “pervasive” than “the
removal of important assignments, lowered performance evaluations, and close scrutiny of
assignments by management.” Nurriddin v. Bolden, 674 F. Supp. 2d 64, 94 (D.D.C. 2009); see
9 also Tyes-Williams v. Whitaker, 361 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2019) (“[A] plaintiff's being denied
an award, the opportunity to telecommute, certain training, and a transfer [come] nowhere near
satisfying the . . . standard for a hostile work environment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Saulsberry v. Barr, 468 F. Supp. 3d 340, 350 (D.D.C. 2020) (“[S]elective enforcement of
[telework] policies does not necessarily indicate conduct giving rise to a hostile work
environment claim.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Torriero’s alleged threats and aggressive behavior also did not create a hostile work
environment. While Title VII, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act prohibit discrimination, they
do not guarantee civility in the workplace. See Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199. Indeed, “[b]osses may
be harsh, unfair and rude” without creating a hostile work environment. Peters v. District of
Columbia, 873 F. Supp. 2d 158, 188 (D.D.C. 2012). Because of this high bar, “single incidents
are rarely severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment.” Ham v. Ayers,
No. 15-cv-1390, 2019 WL 1202453, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2019). Those rare cases “tend to
involve acts of serious, physical violence or sexual assault.” Fields v. Vilsack, 207 F. Supp. 3d
80, 94 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d 1238, 1242–44 (10th Cir.
2001) (a single incident of sexual assault created a hostile work environment); Smith v. Sheahan,
189 F.3d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 1999) (serious physical assault created a hostile work environment)).
Torriero’s conduct does not rise to the same level. He neither made contact with Xie nor
caused him any physical harm. Rather, he stepped toward Xie in an aggressive manner and
loudly instructed him to leave the office. Compl. ¶¶ 76–78. This behavior is closer to an
“ordinary tribulation[] of the workplace” than a serious physical assault. Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (internal quotation omitted). Such incidents have not
generally been held to create a hostile work environment. See Akosile v. Armed Forces Ret.
10 Home, 938 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Negative interactions with supervisors, even
when a supervisor yells and uses profanity, generally do not meet the [severe or pervasive]
standard.”); Brooks v. Grundmann, 851 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6–7 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 748 F.3d 1273
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that supervisors did not subject plaintiff to a hostile work environment
when they “raised their voices during meetings” and “threw a notebook in her direction”);
Fields, 207 F. Supp. 3d at 94 (holding that a supervisor did not create a hostile work environment
when he “screamed” and “slammed the door so hard that it shook the walls of the office”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, the Court will grant the Agency’s motion to dismiss the hostile work
environment claim.
D. Failure to State a Retaliation Claim
Finally, Xie alleges that the Agency retaliated against him through discrete action and
through a retaliatory hostile work environment.
1. Discrete Retaliation Claim
The Rehabilitation Act makes it unlawful to “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere
with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or an account of his or her having exercised
or enjoyed . . . any right granted or protected by this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b). An
employee claiming a violation of this provision must establish that “(i) []he engaged in
statutorily protected activity’; (ii) ‘[]he suffered a materially adverse action by h[is] employer’;
and (iii) ‘a causal link connects the two.’” Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(alterations in original) (quoting Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). A
“materially adverse action” is similar to, but slightly broader than, an “adverse employment
action” as that term is used in the discrimination context. Indeed, the antiretaliation provision is
11 “not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.”
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006). A plaintiff establishes a
“materially adverse action” if the employer’s conduct “might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Id. at 68 (quoting Rochon v.
Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). While a retaliation claim can be grounded in
harms inflicted outside the employment sphere, “[p]urely subjective injuries, such as
dissatisfaction with a reassignment, public humiliation, or loss of reputation, are not adverse
actions.” Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
The Agency does not contest that Xie engaged in protected activity and instead
challenges the second prong. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 9–16. The Court agrees that Xie
does not point to any actionable conduct. First, Xie alleges that the denial of his request for
accommodation was itself a form of retaliation. Compl. ¶ 138. But plaintiffs cannot “double
count” a single discrete act under the Rehabilitation Act. See Floyd v. Lee, 968 F. Supp. 2d 308,
334 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[I]f the denial of a request for accommodation could itself support a claim
of retaliation based on the request, then every failure-to-accommodate claim would be
doubled.”).4
Nor does the November 2018 counseling letter constitute a materially adverse action.
Routine discipline or criticisms do not typically constitute retaliation. To qualify as a “materially
adverse action,” letters of counseling must be “abusive in tone or language or a predicate for a
more tangible form of adverse action.” Hyson v. Architect of Capitol, 802 F. Supp. 2d 84, 102
4 Xie appears to concede that Floyd bars the argument that the denial of the accommodation request counts as a retaliatory act. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 13 (“[Floyd v. Lee] does little to help Defendant in this matter in that many of [Xie’s] allegations go to actions other than the denial of the reasonable accommodation request.”).
12 (D.D.C. 2011). Xie argues that the letter was “harmful in that [it] would be used to determine
[his] ratings, opportunities, and further discipline.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 13. But his complaint does
not allege that the letter promised financial or other job-related consequences or was used to
justify such a result. See Compl. ¶¶ 108–09. Nor does he claim that the letter was abusive. Id.
He alleges only that the letter, placed in an “ePerformance” file, recounted his editing mistake.
Id. This is not enough to make it an adverse act.
Accordingly, the Court grants the Agency’s Motion to Dismiss the discrete retaliation
claim.
2. Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment Claim
Xie also alleges that the discriminatory conduct that occurred after he first requested an
accommodation constituted a retaliatory hostile work environment. Pl.’s Opp’n at 15 n.10. He
urges the Court to adopt different standards for weighing retaliatory and substantive hostile work
environment claims. Id. at 14 n.9. While the latter is governed by the “severe” or “pervasive”
standard, he argues that the former is measured by the discrete retaliation standard: whether the
environment “might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.’” White, 548 U.S. at 64 (quoting Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219).
The Court disagrees. Courts in this circuit hold that a retaliatory hostile work
environment claim is governed by the same “severe” or “pervasive” standard. See Coady v.
Chao, No. 16-cv-2010, 2019 WL 4706908, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2019), aff'd, No. 19-cv-5292,
2020 WL 3409651 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2020); Bergbauer v. Mabus, 934 F. Supp. 2d 55, 79
(D.D.C. 2013) (“Courts in our circuit typically apply the same legal standard as that used in the
discriminatory harassment context to determine whether retaliatory harassment is actionable.”);
Bonnette v. Shinseki, 907 F. Supp. 2d 54, 80 n.11 (D.D.C. 2012). Because the Court finds that
13 Xie has not stated a substantive hostile work environment claim, it will also dismiss his
retaliatory hostile work environment claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Agency’s Partial
Motion to Dismiss. A separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this
memorandum opinion.
________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH United States District Judge August 22, 2022