Xerox Corp. v. United States

2015 CIT 132
United States Court of International Trade·Decided November 23, 2015·No. 05-00474·Published

Opinion

Slip Op. 15 - 132

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

:

XEROX CORP. :

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : Before: R. Kenton Musgrave, Senior Judge : Court No. 05-00474 UNITED STATES, :

:

Defendant. :

:

:

OPINION

[On customs duty classification of certain static converters, judgment for the plaintiff.]

Decided: November 23, 2015

John M. Petterson, Elyssa R. Emsellem, Maria E. Celis, Richard F. O’Neill, and Russell Andrew Semmel, Neville Peterson, LLP, of New York, NY, for the plaintiff.

Marcella Powell, Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S.

Department of Justice, of Washington DC, for the defendant. On the brief were Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and Amy M. Rubin, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was Chi S. Choy, Attorney, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel for International Trade Litigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, of Washington DC.

Musgrave, Senior Judge: Cross-motions for summary judgment before the court concerning an entry of two “pre-clean dicorotron high voltage power supply” units imported through the Port of New York in year 2004 dispute the customs duty classification thereof under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”).1 The parties agree that the power

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to headings, subheadings, chapters, sections, and notes are to those of the year 2004 version of the HTSUS.

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supplies are static converters covered by heading 8504 (“[e]lectrical transformers, static converters (for example, rectifiers) and inductors; parts thereof”) and suitable for physical incorporation into the plaintiff’s “iGen3 Digital Production Press.” The subheading appropriate for their classification depends upon the classification of the iGen3. Thus, the dispute is over whether the units are entitled to duty-free entry under subheading 8504.40.60 as “power supplies for automatic data processing machines or units thereof of heading 8471”, or whether they are subject to 1.5% ad valorem customs duties under subheading 8504.40.95 as “other” static converters (i.e., for machines not of heading 8471). U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) having classified the power supplies under the latterk, and having denied the plaintiff’s protest thereof, the plaintiff having timely filed and its summons and complaint, predicated upon payment of all liquidated duties, charges and fees,2 jurisdiction is here properly invoked upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(a) and 2631(a). For the following reasons, the plaintiff persuades that judgment in its favor is appropriate.

I. Standard of Review

The court reviews Customs’ protest decisions de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1).

Classification for customs duty purposes is a two-step process of determining the meaning of relevant tariff provisions (a question of law) and determining whether the “nature” of the merchandise (a question of fact) falls within the tariff provision as properly construed. E.g., Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Proper classification under the HTSUS is directed by the General Rules of Interpretation (“GRIs”) and, if relevant, the Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation (“ARIs”). E.g.,

2 See Compl. ¶3; Ans. ¶3.

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Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1437, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The GRIs are not optional but statutory,3 and they are applied in numerical order. See Honda of America Mfg. v. United States, 607 F.3d 771, 773 (Fed. Cir. 2010). GRI 1 provides that a tariff classification, “shall be determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative section or chapter notes.”4 GRI 6 also provides in relevant part that “the classification of goods in the subheadings of a heading shall be determined according to the terms of those subheadings and any related subheading notes and, mutatis mutandis, to the above rules, on the understanding that only subheadings at the same level are comparable.”

“The terms of the HTSUS are construed according to their common commercial meanings.” Millenium Lumber Distribution Ltd. v. United States, 558 F.3d 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Additional guidance, considered neither binding nor dispositive, may be found among the Explanatory Notes (“ENs”) of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (“HCDCS”) maintained by the World Customs Organization, which are considered “generally indicative of the proper interpretation of the [Harmonized Tariff System]”. Lynteq, Inc. v. United States, 976 F.2d 693, 699 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 549 (1988)), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1582. See also T.D. 89-80, 54 Fed. Reg. 35127,

3 See Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

4 GRI 1, HTSUS; see also Bauerhin Technologies Ltd. Partnership v. United States, 110 F.3d 774, 777 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“we begin our inquiry by examining the descriptions of the relevant headings, subheadings, and accompanying notes”); Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1437, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that the chapter and section notes of the HTSUS are statutory law, not optional interpretive rules).

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35128 (Aug. 23, 1989) (ENs “are generally indicative of the proper interpretation of these headings”).

In its analysis, the court also accords a measure of deference to Customs classification rulings in proportion to their “power to persuade”. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001), citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).5 In the final analysis, however, the court also has “an independent responsibility to decide the legal issue of the proper meaning and scope of HTSUS terms.” Warner-Lambert Co. v. United States, 407 F.3d 1207, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2005), citing Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United States, 267 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001). See Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

II. Undisputed Facts

Among the parties’ papers, the following are averred as material facts not in dispute.

The power supply unit controls the flow of electricity into the iGen3 from external power sources and also regulates the voltage within the interior of the iGen3. See Joint Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute (“JSMF”)6 ¶¶ 3 & 4. In its condition as imported, the power supply is in the form

5 “The weight [accorded to an administrative] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.

6 All citations in the JSMF to support the parties’ joint averments are omitted herein. To the extent a certain level of technical detail may be deemed relevant, the parties agree on the following: that the power supply unit (“Part No. 105K26780”) regulates the AC voltage of the dicorotron wire “over a range of 3920 to 6860 V rms, with voltage tolerances within +/- 3.5% of the set point over the output voltage range”, JSMF, ¶¶ 1, 9; that the AC voltage corresponds to an input voltage range of 0.4 to 4.6 VDC and an expected AC output current in a rms range of 0 to 30 mA, see id. ¶ 10; that the power supply unit regulates the DC current of the dicorotron shield over a range of -50 to -200 μA, with current tolerances within +/- 5% of the set point; id. ¶ 11; that the DC current corresponds (continued...)

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of a board-level assembly, with a 12 pin input power connector, a 50 pin signal connector, a high voltage output connector, and a high voltage return connector, all fastened to a steel mounting plate that allows it to be mounted in the iGen3. See id. ¶¶ 5 &6.

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