Xanthe M Garcia v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedSeptember 19, 2024
DocketSF-0714-18-0445-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Xanthe M Garcia v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Xanthe M Garcia v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Xanthe M Garcia v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

XANTHE MONETTE GARCIA , DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0714-18-0445-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: September 19, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Sheila Brown , North Hills, California, for the appellant.

Maya Soloway , Los Angeles, California, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained her removal. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review. We REVERSE the initial decision’s findings regarding the agency’s removal action and find that the removal action is NOT

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

SUSTAINED as it is not in accordance with law. We AFFIRM the administrative judge’s findings regarding the suspension action.

BACKGROUND In August 2002, the agency appointed the appellant to the excepted service position of Licensed Vocational Nurse with its Greater Los Angeles Healthcare System. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 7, 133-34. On February 9, 2018, the agency issued the appellant a 14-day suspension based on charges of absence without leave and inappropriate conduct. Id. at 91-97. On February 26, 2018, it proposed her removal under the authority of 38 U.S.C. § 714 based on charges of failure to properly carry out [her] duties as Licensed Vocational Nurse (two specifications) and inappropriate conduct (one specification). Id. at 28-30. The appellant served the 14-day suspension beginning March 4, 2018, and returned to duty on March 18, 2018. Id. at 85-86. On March 21, 2018, the deciding official sustained the appellant’s removal, effective April 9, 2018. Id. at 21, 23-26. On April 13, 2018, the appellant filed the instant Board appeal challenging her 14-day suspension and removal. IAF, Tab 1. In an order summarizing the prehearing conference, the administrative judge notified the appellant that the Board does not have jurisdiction over suspensions of less than 15 days. IAF, Tab 20 at 2. Following a hearing on her removal appeal, the administrative judge issued an initial decision on August 27, 2018, sustaining the agency’s charges and the penalty of removal. IAF, Tab 24, Initial Decision (ID) at 10. On October 2, 2018, the appellant submitted a petition for review of the initial decision via e-Appeal, along with an explanation related to the untimely filing of her petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 3-4. Concerning her reasons for requesting review, the appellant reargues that she did not commit the misconduct charged by the agency in its removal action and suggests that the administrative judge erred in analyzing the hearing testimony. Id. at 5-7. The agency has responded, requesting that the Board dismiss the 3

appellant’s petition for review based on untimeliness, and arguing that she did not show any material factual error in the initial decision or any other criterion for granting a petition for review. PFR File, Tab 3.

ANALYSIS

We waive the time limit for the filing of the appellant’s petition for review. A petition for review generally must be filed within 35 days after the date of the issuance of the initial decision or, if the appellant shows that the initial decision was received more than 5 days after the initial decision was issued, within 30 days after the date the appellant received the initial decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). The Board will waive this time limit only upon a showing of good cause for the delay in filing. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g). The length of the delay is a factor that must be considered in every good cause determination, and a minimal delay favors a finding of good cause. See Walls v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 29 F.3d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994). To establish good cause for the untimely filing of a petition, a party must show that she exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular circumstances of the case. See Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980). To determine whether an appellant has shown good cause, the Board will consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of her excuse and her showing of due diligence, whether she is proceeding pro se, and whether she has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond her control that affected her ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty or misfortune which similarly shows a causal relationship to her inability to timely file her petition. See Moorman v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62-63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table). We find that the extremely minimal nature of the delay, along with the appellant’s explanation for the delay, supports a finding of good cause in this case. The appellant concedes that she received the initial decision within 5 days 4

of its issuance on August 27, 2018. ID; PFR File, Tab 1 at 3. Thus, her petition for review was due on October 1, 2018. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). The date of filing for pleadings filed via e–Appeal is the date of electronic submission. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(l). All pleadings filed via e–Appeal are time stamped with Eastern Time, but the timeliness of a pleading will be determined based on the time zone from which the pleading was submitted. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14( l)(1). The appellant’s petition for review, submitted via e-Appeal on October 2, 2018, is time-stamped 03:10:47. PFR File, Tab 1. As her address of record at the time was in the Pacific Time Zone, we find that her appeal was submitted at 12:10:47 a.m. Pacific Time and, thus, was untimely by only 10 minutes. Furthermore, the appellant, who is represented by her union representative, stated that she filed her petition for review without the assistance of her union representative after her union representative informed her that she was having trouble accessing e-Appeal. IAF, Tab 8 at 3; PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. Although an appellant is generally responsible for any purported deficiencies related to her representation, see Reaves v. Department of Veterans Affairs , 92 M.S.P.R. 352, ¶ 7 (2002), we find that the appellant’s actions of submitting a petition for review herself via e-Appeal only 10 minutes after the deadline demonstrated due diligence under the circumstances. Accordingly, we find good cause for her untimely filing. If good cause has been demonstrated, the Board will determine whether the agency has shown it would be prejudiced by a waiver of the time limit. See Moorman, 68 M.S.P.R. at 63.

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Xanthe M Garcia v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/xanthe-m-garcia-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.