2017 IL App (1st) 160344 No. 1-16-0344 Opinion filed May 23, 2017
Second Division
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
) JERRY WYNN, Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. No. 12 L 9430 ) ) THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN ) SERVICES, The Honorable ) James E. Snyder, ) Defendant-Appellant. Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Neville and Pierce concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 For 13 years Jerry Wynn worked as a contract employee for the Illinois Department of
Human Services. Then his contract was not renewed. Wynn sued DHS under the whistleblower
provision of the State Officials and Employees Ethics Act (Ethics Act) (5 ILCS 430/1-1 et seq.
(West 2014). He contended that DHS terminated him in retaliation for reporting an improper
expenditure to an auditor. According to DHS, Wynn and others were terminated under an
agreement between the State and the American Federation of State and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) to place union employees in positions occupied by contractors and vendors. 1-16-0344
¶2 After a one-day bench trial, Wynn prevailed. The trial court held Wynn proved that his
protected activity—reporting an improper payment to the auditor—was a contributing factor in
DHS not renewing his contract and terminating him.
¶3 DHS argues the trial court erred as (i) nonrenewal of a fixed-term contract does not
amount to unlawful retaliation under the Ethics Act and (ii) the findings were against the
manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm. DHS committed retaliation under the Ethics Act’s
definition of “retaliation,” which includes a change in the terms or conditions of employment.
Further, the trial court’s findings square with the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 The evidence at trial established that Jerry Wynn began working as a contract employee
for DHS in December 1997. Wynn was the program administrator of the Chicago Healthy Start
Program, a federal grant program to reduce infant mortality and improve perinatal outcomes.
Wynn’s duties included assuring compliance with grant requirements and preparing grant
applications. Wynn worked in the Bureau of Maternal and Infant Health, an office in the division
of Community Health and Prevention (CHP). Wynn was widely praised by his supervisors, and
his job performance was deemed excellent.
¶6 Wynn worked under successive one-year personal service contracts with DHS except
when, for budget reasons, he was placed on the payroll of DHS vendors from 2003 to 2006
(Springfield Urban League) and from July 2009 through June 2010 (Catholic Charities). Whether
under a personal service contract or on a vendor payroll, Wynn’s position, day-to-day
responsibilities, and supervisor remained constant. Wynn expected his contract would be
renewed every year but he knew he was not entitled to renewal.
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¶7 The Fletcher Process
¶8 In early 2009, DHS began negotiating with AFSCME to replace a number of contract
employees with AFSCME members. This change was prompted by a lawsuit between AFSCME
and DHS, which alleged, in part, that the State had contractors and vendors doing union work
while union employees were being laid off. The circuit court issued an injunction ordering the
state and the union to work with a mediator to resolve the issue, which resulted in a mediated
resolution agreement (MRA). Under the MRA, the state was to make “all reasonable efforts to
terminate *** personal service and vendor contracts” that violated union agreements “no later
than December 31, 2010.”
¶9 DHS referred to the process of converting contract positions to union jobs as the
“Fletcher process” (after the arbitrator). Jeffrey Kunz, DHS’s director of Labor Relations, and his
staff negotiated with the union over contract and vendor positions. Kunz’s staff compiled a list of
DHS personal service contractors and vendors who arguably performed union work. The list,
referred to as a “grid,” included 700 to 800 names. It was fluid; contractors and vendors
continually started and ended during the process, and new names were added.
¶ 10 Beginning in August 2009, Kunz and his staff met with union representatives every other
month to determine, one-by-one, whether someone on the grid should be replaced by a member
of the union. Kunz and his staff had a document listing each contractor’s title, scope of duty,
salary, and start and end dates. If the union took the position that a contract position should be
eliminated because the classification involved union work, Kunz said “that was pretty much the
end of the discussion then. We had no argument to say that was our work.” He said that once a
position was designated as union work, the contractor could be extended temporarily but could
no longer be offered a year-long contract, as that would violate the collective bargaining
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agreement. DHS could retain contract workers who were on short-term contracts of less than one
year and those who performed professional, specialized work, such as information technology
and the practice of medicine.
¶ 11 Vendors did not have job classifications. Kunz said that it took more time to determine
whether a vendor had to be terminated. Kunz referred to Article 29 of the Memorandum of
Understanding with the union, which provided that an employer could “contract out any work it
deems necessary or desirable because of greater efficiency, economy, or other related factors.”
Kunz said that Article 29 applied only to vendors and gave the State some leeway in keeping a
vendor, even if his or her work resembled a union classified job.
¶ 12 Kunz’s job in the Fletcher process was “to advocate for management on behalf of DHS.”
DHS had an internal “Fletcher group,” some 20 to 25 liaisons representing divisions across DHS,
helping streamline the process. The liaisons would explain which contractors they believed were
not doing union work and why; Labor Relations would present that argument to the union. Dan
Blair, CHP’s fiscal manager, and Diane Deppe, a budget manager, were CHP’s liaisons to the
Fletcher group. At trial, Kunz testified that liaisons only provided Labor Relations with
information regarding salaries, contracts, and other necessary information, but acknowledged
that in his deposition he said liaisons made recommendations about which contract employees
should be retained.
¶ 13 Blair testified that as liaison he regularly attended Fletcher group meetings and met
separately with Kunz on several occasions. Kunz generally wanted to know where contract
employees worked, who they reported to, and their scope of duties. Blair and Kunz discussed
contractual information about employees—“the name, the job title, what it equated to, what their
function—you know just details about the job.” Blair could not recall whether he offered
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opinions about specific employees or played any role in decisions on whether a contract violated
the union’s collective bargaining agreement. Nor could Blair recall whether Kunz asked him if
CHP wanted to keep certain contract employees. Blair agreed that individual employee’s names
were discussed at the meetings, but said “it was more discussed on position rather than names.”
Blair also agreed that they would have discussed Wynn’s position, but he could not recall
anything specific that he and Kunz talked about. Blair acknowledged that he likely talked to
Wynn’s supervisors about Wynn’s position, but could not recall the substance of those
conversations.
¶ 14 Blair admitted that on January 14, 2010, he sent an email to the DHS Director, Kunz, and
others stating that 15 names, including Wynn’s, had been added to the Fletcher grid. He did not
know why they were added or who added them. Although the decision not to renew Wynn’s
contract was part of the Fletcher process, Blair could not recall who made the decision, when it
was made, when he heard about it, or who told him. Blair also could not recall if anyone told him
that he or she did not want Wynn to continue in his position.
¶ 15 Diane Deppe, CHP budget manner reported to Blair. She said that only she and Blair
provided information about whether there was money in the budget to continue to fund contract
positions.
¶ 16 Every job in the state system has a working title and classification title. Wynn’s working
title was “Healthy Start Program Administrator.” His classification title was Public Service
Administrator (PSA) Option 6. PSA Option 6 became a union title on December 2, 2008, when
the Illinois Labor Relations Board granted AFSCME’s petition to add it to the category of union
titles and the state agreed, with the exception of about 100 jobs. Wynn’s name appeared on a list
of contractors and vendors gathered by the Fletcher group on August 24, 2009.
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¶ 17 The Audit
¶ 18 In April 2009, around the same time the Fletcher process began, the Illinois Office of
Internal Auditors began auditing Healthy Start. Wynn’s supervisor, Glendean Sisk, asked Wynn
to “take the lead” and handle the audit’s “clinical side,” including issues regarding “client care.”
On November 9, 2009, an auditor called Wynn and asked about a nearly $100,000 payment to
the Springfield Urban League. Wynn told the auditor that he had not authorized the payment and
that the Springfield Urban League was not an approved Healthy Start contractor. Wynn told the
auditor he thought Dan Blair was responsible for the payment as Blair issued checks to Healthy
Start grantees.
¶ 19 Later that day, Wynn sent an email to Sisk, Myrtis Sullivan, CHP’s associate director,
and Ivonne Sambolin, CHP’s director, informing them of his conversation with the auditor.
Sullivan sent a reply email thanking Wynn and asking him to inform them of further inquiries.
Sisk forwarded Wynn’s email to Blair (and copied the other original recipients and Wynn),
asking Blair what he knew about the payment. In a reply email, Blair said the $100,000 payment
was for “technical assistance” and was “the contract [Wynn’s assistant] is paid from.” Wynn
wrote a reply email correcting Blair. Wynn’s assistant worked for Catholic Charities, and not
Springfield Urban League, and she did not begin working for him until May 2008. Blair replied.
He conceded that Wynn was correct, but thought the payment should be considered part of
“technical assistance.” Wynn again responded, telling Blair there was no technical assistance
from Springfield Urban League. That was Wynn’s last communication with Blair about the
payment.
¶ 20 The next day, Wynn saw Myrtis Sullivan, and she said to him, “We[’ve] got to meet with
you, me and the director [are] going to meet with you. You are going to make us lose Healthy
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Start.” Wynn said he asked her “Why? Because I wouldn’t go along with Dan Blair?” and
Sullivan shook her head and said, “Yes.” Wynn told Sullivan he would not lie to an auditor, and
Sullivan repeated that she and the director were going to meet with him, and walked away.
Sullivan had no recollection of this conversation but recalled that she was not upset at Wynn for
talking to the auditor or for sending the emails about the audit and the improper payment.
¶ 21 Wynn also saw Sisk that morning. She said to him, “Why did [you] have to say anything?
I’m sure this was just a one-time thing. Dan just needed to find some money.” Wynn testified
that Sisk criticized him for cooperating with the auditor and said that he should have told the
auditor, “I’ll just let Dan Blair answer that.” Sisk testified that she was not angry with Wynn but
thought Blair should handle questions about the audit. She also said Blair expressed “frustration
that he was not being allowed to respond to the auditor about this” and was perturbed that Wynn
did not refer the auditor to him.
¶ 22 Also that day, Sisk received an email from Deppe regarding a state-issued cell phone that
had been given to Wynn. Deppe explained that “[w]e were supposed to get the cell phones back
from employees that were not State employees.” Deppe reminded Sisk that “some time ago
[Blair] sent an email to you regarding returning [Wynn’s] cell phone since he is not a state
employee.” Sisk answered that Wynn told her he turned in the cell phone the previous week.
¶ 23 In March 2010, Wynn, Sisk, Blair, and others participated in a telephone audit exit
conference at which the auditors provided a summary of their findings. The day before, Sisk
called Wynn and told him to “be quiet as a church mouse” during the conference call and go
along with whatever Blair says. Sisk testified that neither she nor Wynn knew why the improper
payment was made, and she wanted Wynn to let Blair explain it. During the call, one of the
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auditors asked Wynn about the improper payment, and he replied, “let Dan Blair handle it” and
said nothing else about the matter.
¶ 24 Blair remembered the 2009 audit of the Healthy Start program but could not recall much
about it. He could not recall Wynn’s emails informing him that he was wrong about the
payments or an email from the auditor asking him to explain the payment. Blair acknowledged
he forwarded that email separately to Sullivan and Sambolin and asked them to call him, but he
could not recall if they did.
¶ 25 Blair denied personally making the payment to Springfield Urban League and said it was
an error by someone on his staff. He could not recall when he first told anyone else that the
payment was in error but said it would make sense that he told Sullivan and Sambolin in
November 2009. He could not recall if he informed the auditor or Wynn that the payment was
made in error. He discussed the error with Sisk but could not recall if he told her he was
perturbed with Wynn. He thought the auditor’s questions should have been directed to him but
said he was not “irritated” that Wynn answered and did not think Wynn did anything wrong.
¶ 26 Deppe testified that she was aware of the 2009 audit and, although Blair never discussed
it with her, she knew Blair was unhappy with some of Wynn’s responses to the auditor. She said
that Wynn’s participation in the audit was not discussed at the Fletcher meetings and did not play
a role in the information provided to Labor Relations.
¶ 27 On May 12, 2010, after the audit, Myrtis Sullivan sent DHS Director Sambolin an email,
noting Sisk’s concern with (i) the inaccuracy of Blair’s responses to the audit, (ii) Blair’s
attachment of blame for improper use of Healthy Start funds to the Bureau of Maternal and
Infant Health staff, and (iii) the use of the money to “cover bills that were due.”
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¶ 28 Wynn’s Termination
¶ 29 In April 2010, Wynn met with Sullivan and Sambolin, who told him his employment
would terminate as of December 31, 2010, because his position was being given to a union
member. Sullivan was upset about losing Wynn and contacted a federal officer involved in the
Healthy Start program to see if Wynn could be retained. She did not speak to anyone in Labor
Relations about retaining him.
¶ 30 Sisk testified that in early 2010, she, Blair, and Kunz met to discuss Wynn’s position. She
described Wynn’s day-to-day responsibilities, while Blair provided minimal information about
Wynn’s contract. Sisk could not recall advocating for keeping Wynn but had no reason to believe
she did not. She said she learned in April 2010 that Wynn’s contract would be terminated. She
requested that his contract be extended until December 31, 2010, because the division needed
someone in that position. Wynn was given a final contract, from July 1, 2010 until December 31,
2010, which paid a higher rate than his previous contracts.
¶ 31 Sisk encouraged Wynn to apply for the position when it was posted, which he did, but the
position went to someone else. Sisk said that in 2014, all Healthy Start programs were defunded,
and CHP’s application for new funding was not accepted. Sisk also testified that two contract
employees—Joanne Kelly and Xochild Martisoryan, personal service administrators who
reported to her and had been listed on the Fletcher grid with Wynn—stayed with CHP after
December 31, 2010, but were moved to the payroll of a state vendor.
¶ 32 On August 21, 2012, Wynn filed a complaint, which was later amended, alleging, among
other things, that DHS violated the Whistleblower section of the Ethics Act. (Wynn also named
Sisk, Sullivan, Sambolin, and Blair as defendants. The trial court dismissed all individual
defendants and all counts other than the one brought under the Ethics Act.) Specifically, Wynn
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contended that DHS violated section 15-10 of the Ethics Act, prohibiting “retaliatory action
against a State employee” who “[d]iscloses or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public
body an activity *** of any officer, member, State agency, or other State employee that the State
employee reasonably believes is in violation of a law, rule, or regulation.” 5 ILCS 430/15-10(1)
(West 2014).
¶ 33 DHS defended that non-renewal of a fixed-term contract did not constitute a retaliatory
action under the Ethics Act. “Retaliatory action” means “reprimand, discharge, suspension,
demotion, denial of promotion or transfer, or change in the terms or conditions of employment of
any State employee, that is taken in retaliation for a State employee’s involvement in protected
activity as set forth in section 15-10.” 5 ILCS 430/15-5 (West 2014). Moreover, DHS denied a
causal connection between Wynn’s report to the auditor and the decision to terminate his
contract, pointing to the ongoing negotiations with AFSCME.
¶ 34 The Verdict
¶ 35 The trial court held that Wynn engaged in protected conduct under the Ethics Act when
he informed the auditor and his supervisors about the improper payment to the Springfield Urban
League. The trial court found that Wynn reasonably believed he was reporting a violation of
federal law or regulations and proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his protected
conduct constituted a contributing factor in his termination.
¶ 36 The trial court found the evidence showed Blair had a motive to retaliate based on
Deppe’s testimony that (i) Blair was unhappy about Wynn’s response to the audit, which Sisk
corroborated, and (ii) she likely sent the email asking for Wynn’s cell phone at Blair’s behest.
The trial court also found evidence of motive in Wynn’s uncontroverted testimony that Sullivan
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told him that he was risking the Healthy Start program and Sisk’s instruction to be quiet during
the audit exit conference.
¶ 37 As to Blair’s involvement as a liaison to the Fletcher group, the trial court said that it
gave him the means to retaliate against Wynn, since Kunz relied on liaisons to determine what
position to take in negotiations with the union. The trial court noted that the ongoing practice of
transferring contractors to vendors discredited DHS’s claim that Wynn’s job classification
required that his position be converted to a union position. Two of Wynn’s fellow employees
were allowed to stay by way of this manner.
¶ 38 The trial court concluded that DHS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the Fletcher process would have eliminated Wynn’s job regardless of Wynn’s protected conduct.
The trial court stated DHS’s position would require him to believe that Blair had acted in a
neutral manner in transmitting information to Labor Relations about Wynn’s job. But the trial
court said “I do not believe Blair’s testimony. He was not credible.”
¶ 39 Three months later, after briefing, the trial court entered an order awarding Wynn back
pay in the amount of over $300,000, which it doubled under the Act. The court also imposed 5%
interest on the back pay and awarded attorney fees for a total award of $782,253.54.
¶ 40 ANALYSIS
¶ 41 Retaliation under the Ethics Act
¶ 42 It is undisputed that Wynn engaged in statutorily protected activity under the Ethics Act
when he told an auditor that a payment to a DHS vendor was unauthorized. It is also undisputed
that contract employees are covered under the Ethics Act, which defines an employee to include
“any person employed *** pursuant to a contract.” 5 ILCS 430/1-5 (West 2014). DHS contends,
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however, that Wynn has no cause of action because a decision not to renew an employee’s fixed
term contract does not constitute “retaliation” under the Ethics Act.
¶ 43 A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires ascertaining and giving effect to the
legislature’s intent. People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 36, 45 (2002). The plain
and ordinary meaning of the statutory language best provides the legislature’s intent. Id. Where
the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute without resort to other aids of
statutory construction and apply it as written. Id. at 45-46. A court may not annex new provisions
or substitute different ones or read into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions
unexpressed by the legislature. Hines v. Department of Public Aid, 221 Ill. 2d 222, 230 (2006).
The construction of a statute presents a question of law that we review de novo. In re Estate of
Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330 (2000).
¶ 44 DHS asserts that because the definition of “retaliatory action” does not use the word
“include” or “including,” the plain terms limit retaliation to seven actions and cannot be
expanded. See People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 328 (2007) (use of “includes” or “including,”
“when followed by a listing of items, means that the preceding general term encompasses the
listed items, but the list is not exhaustive.”).
¶ 45 Wynn acknowledges that no Illinois court has held that non-renewal of a contract
constitutes “retaliatory action” under the Ethics Act. But Wynn likens the anti-retaliation
provision to the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1991 (42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012)). In the absence of Illinois cases construing the Ethics Act, we may
look for guidance to federal courts interpreting analogous statutes. See Hosick v. Chicago State
University Board of Trustees, 924 F. Supp. 2d 956, 974-75 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“because the anti-
retaliation portion of the Ethics Act is analogous to the anti-retaliation portion of Title VII, the
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Court considers judicial interpretations of Title VII in resolving the issues presented in this
case.”) Under Title VII, an “adverse employment action” is one that “significantly alters the
terms and conditions of employment.” Threatt v. Donovan, 380 Fed. App’x. 544, 548 (7th Cir.
2010). Wynn contends federal courts have found that non-renewal of a contract constitutes an
adverse employment action (see, e.g., Leibowitz v. Cornell University, 584 F.3d 487, 501 (2d
Cir. 2009) (“non-renewal of an employment contract itself is an adverse employment action”)),
and so we should find that non-renewal of a contract constitutes retaliatory action under the
Ethics Act.
¶ 46 DHS asserts, however, that section 15-10 of the Ethics Act should be equated to the tort
of retaliatory discharge, which has been limited by Illinois courts and precludes an employee
from suing for non-renewal of a fixed term contract. DHS cites Crowley v. Watson, 2016 IL App
(1st) 142847, one of the few cases to interpret the Ethics Act, in which this court stated that a
claim of discharge in retaliation for protected activity is analogous to the tort of retaliatory
discharge, a narrow exception to the at-will employment. Id. ¶ 32. DHS asserts that it is
significant that, in the context of retaliatory discharge, this court has held a contract employee
who engaged in whistle blowing activity may not bring a cause of action for retaliatory discharge
when an employer fails to renew a written fixed-term employment contract. See Krum v.
Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc., 365 Ill. App. 3d 785, 788-89 (2006); Bajalo v.
Northwestern University, 369 Ill. App. 3d 576, 584-85 (2006).
¶ 47 In Krum, the plaintiff was an assistant athletic trainer for the Chicago Cubs, working
under a one-year employment contract. Krum alleged that after he complained to management
about violations of the Illinois Athletic Trainers Practice Act (225 ILCS 5/4 (West 2004)), the
Cubs “terminated” him in retaliation, even though they continued to pay his salary until the date
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his employment contract expired. Krum, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 787. We held, consistent with the
supreme court’s desire to restrict the common law of retaliatory discharge, that “absent a
statutory basis, contractual employees, such as Krum, cannot bring a claim for retaliatory
discharge when employers fail to renew an employment contract.” Id. at 790. Noting that the
Athletic Trainers Practice Act, on which Krum relied, did not contain any language “prohibiting
retaliatory employment conduct,” the appellate court dismissed Krum’s claim. Id.
¶ 48 Similarly, in Bajalo, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 580, we considered whether a contract employee
may bring a claim for retaliatory discharge when the employer fails to renew the employee’s
contract. The employee was hired as a research associate. The university renewed the
employee’s one-year contract twice; however, after the employee reported improper laboratory
procedures that she believed jeopardized the health and welfare of the animals to her supervisors
and to regulatory agencies, the university declined to renew her contract, and she was dismissed
after the term of her contract ended. Id. at 578. The university filed a judgment on the pleadings.
Recognizing “ ‘this is a new and novel situation,’ ” the trial court certified the following question
for interlocutory appeal: “ ‘May a contract employee who engaged in protected whistleblowing
activity bring a cause of action for retaliatory discharge when the employer fails to renew the
employee’s written contract[?]’ ” Id. at 579.
¶ 49 The appellate court agreed that the employee engaged in protected whistleblowing
activity—exercising her rights under the Federal Animal Welfare Act—but, after reviewing
Illinois Supreme Court cases that have limited the scope of the tort of retaliatory discharge, the
decision in Krum, and decisions in other jurisdictions, we refused to extend it to a claim of
failure to renew an employment contract. Id. at 582-585. Even though the employee had had a
working relationship with the employer, the employer was not liable for retaliatory discharge for
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choosing to discontinue a future employment relationship. Id. at 585. “In light of the clear trend
of retrenchment reflected in our supreme court decisions ***, we agree with the position taken in
Krum.” Id. See also Darchak v. City of Chicago Board of Education, 580 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir.
2009) (noting Illinois appellate courts have expressly refused to extend reach of retaliatory
discharge tort to cover nonrenewal of fixed-term contract).
¶ 50 DHS asserts that—like the plaintiffs in Krum, Bajalo, and Darchak—Wynn held a series
of fixed-term one-year contracts, knew that each contract would expire, and was not entitled to a
new contract unless DHS decided to offer him one. Further, DHS contends that allowing the
contract to expire does not amount to “discharge” under the Ethics Act because Wynn had no
expectation that it would be renewed. DHS asks us to decline to read “failure to renew a fixed
term contract” into the definition of “retaliatory action,” which DHS claims is exhaustively
defined in section 15-5.
¶ 51 Wynn contends that DHS’s reliance on Crowley is misplaced. First, Wynn notes that
Crowley involved neither a contract employee nor does its holding relate to contract employees.
Moreover, Wynn asserts we cannot “graft” the tort of retaliatory discharge onto the Ethics Act,
as doing so would make some of its language superfluous. Specifically, Wynn notes that under
the tort, an employee can prevail only if he or she has been discharged, while the Ethics Act
applies to an employee who has been reprimanded, demoted, or denied a promotion. He asserts
that under DHS’s interpretation, these prohibitions would be rendered naught, which we must
avoid in interpreting a statute.
¶ 52 We agree with Wynn. As noted, the Ethics Act covers contract employees. And although,
as DHS asserts, section 15-5 does not expressly include nonrenewal of a contract in defining
retaliatory action, it includes “change in the condition of employment,” a phrase akin to Title
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VII’s “significantly alters the terms of employment.” Nonrenewal of a contract qualifies as an
“adverse employment action” under Title VII because it is a “change in the terms and conditions
of employment.” Hence, nonrenewal constitutes retaliatory action. Also, as Wynn asserts, courts
limited the scope of the tort of retaliatory discharge for reasons that are inapplicable to cases
arising under the Ethics Act. Courts wanted to circumscribe the tort due to uneasiness with an
“ ‘ill-defined, and potentially all-encompassing concept of retaliatory conduct or
discrimination’ ”; otherwise, courts would “ ‘become increasingly involved in the resolution of
workplace disputes.’ ” Bajalo, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 584 (quoting Zimmerman v. Buchheit of
Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill. 2d 29, 39 (1994)). But that sort of uneasiness does not pertain to the more
narrowly tailored Ethics Act, which addresses a specific problem related to whistle blowing.
¶ 53 The Ethics Act seeks to encourage employees, including contract employees, to report
wrongdoing without fear of reprisal. There is no question that the State has discretion to not
renew an employee’s contract. But to further the purposes of the Ethics Act, employees subject
to renewal must be protected from pretextual discharge when the evidence supports a finding that
the decision not to renew was motivated by animus for whistleblowing activity. Moreover,
employees like Wynn, who lack protection from a union, can be more susceptible to intimidation
by the threat of nonrenewal. Accordingly, a decision by the State not to renew a contract
employee who engages in protected activity may constitute “retaliation” under the Ethics Act.
¶ 54 Evidence to Support Verdict
¶ 55 Alternatively, DHS argues that the trial court’s findings were against the manifest weight
of the evidence. Further, DHS contends that some alleged retaliatory actions against Wynn could
not be retaliatory—both reclassifying Wynn’s position and requesting his cell phone occurred
before he talked to the auditor. Lastly, DHS asserts that Wynn’s contract would not have been
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renewed regardless, since his position was converted to a union job to comply with the
agreement with AFSCME.
¶ 56 A trial court’s judgment after a bench trial will not be reversed unless it is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. Sharif, 2014 IL App (1st)
133008, ¶ 25. “Against the manifest weight of the evidence” means that, based on the record, the
judgment is arbitrary, unreasonable, not based on evidence, or the opposite conclusion is
apparent. Munson v. Rinke, 395 Ill. App. 3d 789, 795 (2009). We give great deference to the
finder’s credibility determinations and will not substitute our judgment for the fact finder’s.
Samour, Inc. v. Board of Election Commissioners, 224 Ill. 2d 530, 548 (2007) (“fact finder is in
the best position to evaluate the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses”). “[W]e may affirm the
judgment of the trial court on any basis in the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied
upon that basis or whether the trial court’s reasoning was correct.” Alpha School Bus Co. v.
Wagner, 391 Ill. App. 3d 722, 734 (2009). Nevertheless, we may not overturn a judgment on the
basis that we disagree with it or that, as the trier of fact, we might have arrived at a different
result. Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 271 (2002).
¶ 57 Under section 15-10, no officer, member, state employee, or state agency shall take any
retaliatory action against a state employee because that employee discloses, or threatens to
disclose, any activity by an officer, member, state agency, or other state employee that the state
employee reasonably believes is in violation of a law, rule, or regulation. 5 ILCS 430/15-10(1)
(West 2014). “Retaliatory action” is defined as “reprimand, discharge, suspension, demotion,
denial of promotion or transfer, or change in the terms or conditions of employment of any State
employee, that is taken in retaliation for a State employee’s involvement in protected activity, as
set forth in Section 15-10.” 5 ILCS 430/15-5 (West 2014).
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¶ 58 State employees, which include contract employees, may establish a violation only by
showing (i) they engaged in conduct described in section 15-10 and (ii) that conduct was a
“contributing factor” in the retaliatory action. 5 ILCS 430/15-20 (West 2014). A defendant may
refute the allegation of retaliation by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the
same unfavorable personnel action would have occurred in the absence of that conduct. Id.
Illinois courts have yet to define “contributing factor” under section 15-20, but federal courts
interpreting that phrase under employment statutes have found that a “contributing factor” refers
to something less than a substantial or motivating factor. Addis v. Department of Labor, 575 F.3d
688, 691 (7th Cir. 2009) (contributing factor standard provides complainant lower hurdle to clear
than bar set by other employment statutes). A “ ‘contributing factor is any factor, which alone or
in combination with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the decision. ’ ”
Araujo v. New Jersey Transit R. Operations, Inc., 708 F.3d 152, 158 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting
Ameristar Airways, Inc. v. Administrative Review Board, 650 F.3d 562, 567 (5th Cir. 2011).
Federal courts also recognize that an employee usually must rely on circumstantial evidence,
including suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, and “other bits and pieces from which an
inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn.” Troupe v. May Department Stores Co., 20
F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994).
¶ 59 The parties agree that Wynn’s conversation with the auditor about the improper $100,000
payment constituted protected activity under the Ethics Act. They disagree, however, about
whether the evidence supported the finding that this protected activity sufficed as a “contributing
factor" to his being terminated.
¶ 60 Before examining the finding of facts surrounding the nonrenewal of Wynn’s contract,
we address DHS’s contention that the trial court identified two additional retaliatory acts—the
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reclassification of Wynn’s job title (which occurred in 2008) and Deppe’s attempt to retrieve
Wynn’s cell phone (a follow-up to a request that had been made before Wynn spoke to the
auditor). DHS contends that it is contrary to the law and common sense and was contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence to find that actions taken ahead of the protected activity could be
in retaliation for it. We agree; nonetheless, the record shows that the trial court did not consider
these actions as retaliation, but as support for Wynn’s assertion that Blair was angry at him for
talking to the auditor. The trial court did not deem the job classification a retaliatory action;
rather, in its findings of fact, it cites Wynn’s reclassification to show that the Fletcher process
was not identity neutral, as DHS claimed. The point was that Blair’s office sent Wynn’s job
description to the Classifications Unit as well as his resume, a copy of his driver’s license, and
insurance card.
¶ 61 As for Deppe’s email asking for Wynn’s cell phone, again, the trial court did not consider
this as a retaliatory action, but as evidence that Blair was angry at Wynn for talking to the
auditor. The trial court notes that Deppe testified that “Blair was displeased with Wynn’s
response to the audit,” and that Sisk said Blair was “perturbed” and “expressed his frustration”
about “not being allowed to respond to the auditor.” The trial court found that Deppe’s email,
which she said she probably sent at Blair’s request, was “consistent with testimony from other
people that he was angry.” This was circumstantial evidence of motive, and not a finding of
retaliatory action.
¶ 62 Turning to the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court relied on both direct and
circumstantial evidence to support its finding that Blair was angry with Wynn and retaliated by
ensuring that he would be terminated. As noted, several witnesses testified that Blair was upset
about Wynn’s conversation with the auditor. Blair denied being upset or irritated with Wynn, but
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the trial judge, who was in the best position to evaluate Blair’s conduct and demeanor, viewed
Blair’s testimony as “not worthy of belief.” The trial court sits in a much better position than we
to determine witness credibility. Samour, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d at 548.
¶ 63 As for Blair’s actions, Wynn did not need to show the Blair caused him to lose his job but
was a “contributing factor.” 5 ILCS 430/15-20 (West 2014). The trial court found the evidence
established that Blair played a role in the classification of Wynn’s job, since (i) the classifying
unit acted on information supplied by Blair and reported back to him; (ii) Blair, as a liaison to
Labor Relations, could determine the position DHS took with the union about keeping
employees; and (iii) the process was subjective and diffuse enough to allow Blair to use it to
retaliate against Wynn.
¶ 64 DHS asserts the trial court erred in making this finding because Blair had no role in
classifying Wynn’s position, which was performed by the Classification Unit without reference
to employees’ names. Moreover, DHS notes that Wynn’s job was classified PSA Option 6 in
2008, before the audit. DHS also contends that the record does not support the trial court’s
finding that Blair advised Kunz about which employees to keep and that Kunz advanced Blair’s
arguments with the union. DHS also refers (i) to Deppe’s testimony that at Fletcher group
meetings with Blair, he only provided information about whether DHS had enough money for
certain positions, and (ii) to Kunz not testifying that Blair tired to influence him or advocate for
or against retaining Wynn.
¶ 65 We agree that Blair played no role in classifying Wynn’s position as PSA Option 6, and it
could not logically be deemed as retaliatory action. The record, however, belies DHS’s
contention that the Fletcher process was identity neutral and dependent solely on job
classification. Kunz testified that his job was to keep as many contract employees as the liaisons
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wanted, and the liaisons’ job was to give Labor Relations the argument for keeping a contract
employee. If the determination was based on job classification alone, Kunz and the liaisons
would have no argument for retaining contract employees whose job titles were deemed union
work. Moreover, Sisk testified that she met with Kunz and Blair to discuss Wynn’s role and
responsibilities and his contract, which at that time was with a vendor, Catholic Charities. If the
determination was based solely on job classification, this type of meeting would have been
unnecessary.
¶ 66 As for Blair’s role, as CHP’s liaison to the Fletcher group, he met privately with Kunz to
discuss certain positions. In his deposition, Kunz acknowledged that liaisons made
recommendations about which contractors should or should not be retained and testified that if a
liaison told him they had no problem eliminating a contractor, the contractor was terminated.
Further, Kunz testified that Labor Relations “negotiated” with the union and, although Kunz said
that a PSA Option 6 would be a tough sell, he did not rule it out.
¶ 67 DHS also contends that Blair lacked a motive to retaliate. There were no adverse
consequences to him or anyone else for the improper payment, and DHS points to Blair’s
testimony that audit findings were fairly common and were only serious if they involved an
intentional misuse of funds. Also, DHS refers to Sisk’s testimony that there were three findings
during the audit, including the Springfield Urban League payment. But the evidence shows that
parties involved were worried about it, as they tried to figure out why the payment was made,
and this anxiety continued after May 2010, when Sullivan sent an email to Sambolin expressing
Sisk’s concern that Blair was going to blame the improper payment on her department. Although
evidence about the audit was limited due to DHS’s pre-trial motion in limine, it strains credulity
to think that an audit finding of a $100,000 improper payment had no repercussions. Sullivan’s
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email, stating that Sisk didn’t want her department to be blamed, indicates the audit finding had
repercussions. And, the evidence shows Blair, head of fiscal services, was none too pleased with
Wynn identifying him as the source of the improper payment.
¶ 68 DHS argues the trial court’s finding that Sisk and Sullivan lacked retaliatory motive
negates a finding that nonrenewal of Wynn’s employment was motivated by animus. Sisk said
she valued Wynn as an employee and encouraged him to apply for the position and Sullivan tried
to keep him on by contacting a federal officer involved in the Healthy Start program. But to
prevail, Wynn was not required to show animus on their part. Still Sisk and Sullivan’s statements
and actions support the judge’s finding that Blair was angry. It is reasonable to conclude that
Sisk knew Blair was angry and for that reason asked Wynn why he said anything to the auditor
and told him to be “quiet as a church mouse” at the exit conference. This is supported by her
testimony that she thought Blair was frustrated and “perturbed.”
¶ 69 DHS asserts the termination of Wynn’s employment, coming five months after his
protected discussion with the auditor in November 2009, was too remote to support a finding of
causation. Additionally, DHS asserts that the judge erred in finding the March 2010 audit exit
conference was part of Wynn’s protected activity and then using it to shorten the temporal link
between his protected activity and termination.
¶ 70 Taking DHS’s second contention first, nothing in the record supports a finding that the
trial court found that the audit exit conference itself was protected activity. The trial court stated
that proximity in time between the audit exit conference and Wynn’s termination was indirect
evidence of protected activity and the reporting of an improper payment during the ongoing audit
served as a contributing factor in the termination decision. It would make sense that, in the
context of an audit, any retaliatory action would not occur until completion of the audit. The
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audit ended in March 2010; the following month, April 2010, Wynn was informed about his
impending termination.
¶ 71 Suspicious timing is one of many types of circumstantial evidence of wrongful
termination. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736. “A specified time period cannot be a mechanically applied
criterion. A rule that any period over a certain time is per se too long (or, conversely, a rule that
any period under a certain time is per se short enough) would be unrealistically simplistic.”
Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2003). DHS cites several cases in
which a short time span between the protected activity and the retaliation was deemed prima
facie evidence of retaliation. Be that as it may, DHS does not cite any authority to support its
contention that five months is too long. Indeed, courts have held that “[d]epending on the
circumstances, three to eight months is easily within a time range that can support an inference
of retaliation.” Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 977. Even an 11-month gap has been regarded as within
the range to support an inference that an employment decision was retaliatory. Id. (citing Allen v.
Iranon, 283 F.3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2002)). The audit took nearly a year to complete, so the
retaliatory action, coming five months after the protected activity and only one month after the
completion of the audit, follows sufficiently close enough to support an inference of retaliation.
¶ 72 Another DHS argument assumes Wynn would have been terminated even in the absence
of his protected activity, in light of the State converting contract employees to permanent union
employees. Because Wynn’s job title had been classified as a union title in 2008, DHS maintains
that Wynn could not have retained his job without violating the union’s collective bargaining
agreement.
¶ 73 Section 15-20 of the Ethics Act provides, “It is not a violation *** if it is demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence that the officer, member, other State employee, or State agency
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would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that conduct.” 5 ILCS
430/15-20 (West 2014). Courts have defined clear and convincing evidence as the degree of
proof that leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder as to the truth of the
proposition in question. Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213 (1995). Clear and convincing
evidence requires more proof than a preponderance while not quite approaching the most
difficult level of proof necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense. Id.
¶ 74 The trial court stated that accepting Wynn would have lost his position anyway requires
believing Blair was neutral in gathering and transmitting information and categorizing jobs. But
the trial court found Blair’s testimony not to be credible, noting that Blair could not recall
important events, including the audit exit conference. The trial court also found Blair’s denial
that he was upset with Wynn belied by the testimony of several witnesses.
¶ 75 Further, the evidence showed that at least two contract employees similarly situated to
Wynn remained employed after December 31, 2010, having been transferred to a vendor agency.
¶ 76 We agree with the trial court determination regarding DHS’s claim that Wynn’s job
classification mandated that his position be converted to a union position. This claim was
discredited by the continuing practice of transferring contractors to vendors and the evidence that
classification alone was not the sole factor in determining whether a position was deemed union
work. In sum, DHS failed to present clear and convincing evidence to show not that Wynn may
have lost his job regardless of his protected activity, but that he would have lost it.
¶ 77 Wynn did not need to prove Blair caused him to lose his job but only that he played a
role. The trial court’s finding that the evidence showed Blair had motive and opportunity to
terminate Wynn’s employment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We find no
basis for reversing the trial court’s findings of fact or its judgment.
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¶ 78 Lastly, in its reply brief, DHS cites two statutes, the Illinois Human Right Act and the
Illinois Whistleblower Act, to bolster its argument that the legislature made a deliberate decision
to exclude an employee’s discharge in the form of nonrenewal of a contract as retaliation under
the Ethics Act. Wynn filed a motion for leave to file a surreply, which we have taken with the
case, arguing that these DHS’s assertions regarding those statutes were waived because they
were not raised in the opening brief. We agree. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan.
1, 2016) provides that points not argued in appellant’s opening brief “are waived and shall not be
raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.” Because DHS failed to
raise those statutes in its opening brief, that point has been forfeited, and we will not consider it
further.
¶ 79 Affirmed.
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