KATZ, Bankruptcy Judge:
The instant appeal, while couched in terms of whether or not MRS. WYMER, plaintiff/appellee, has a non-dischargeable claim for accrued but unpaid child support against MR. WYMER, defendant/appellant, raises the issue of whether appellee even has an assertable claim against appellant.
The appellant alleges that any monies he owed to appellee prior to October 31, 1979, were in fact assigned by operation of law to the County of Los Angeles and to the State of California, as a result of appellee receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Hence, appellant argues that the appellee has no claim against him and further, that the claim having been so assigned is dischargeable in his bankruptcy [499] proceeding pursuant to § 523(a)(5)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.1
As a subsidiary issue, the appellant alleges that even if we find no assignment to the county and to the state, by virtue of the fact that the appellee assigned 50% of her recovery to her attorney as part of a contingent fee contract, at least that portion is dischargeable under § 523(a)(5)(A).
Since, for reasons hereinafter stated, we have determined that the appellee has no claim against the appellant for any sums due for child support prior to October 31, 1979, the judgment will be reversed on those grounds and we need not discuss the issue of dischargeability under § 523(a)(5) (A).
FACTS
On January 22,1974, in an action entitled WYMER vs. WYMER, Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Action # EAD34766, an Interlocutory Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage was entered which, among other things, ordered JOSEPH P. WYMER, JR., the appellant, to pay child support in the amount of $25.00 per week. Pursuant to California Civil Code § 4702(a)2 the child support payments were ordered to be made through the office of the Court Trustee.
From the date of the Interlocutory Judgment of Dissolution until October 31, 1979, the date on which AFDC to MRS. WYMER ended, the appellant made no child support payments pursuant to that judgment. In order to provide support for herself and the minor child of the parties, MRS. WYMER applied for and was granted aid under the AFDC Program.3
On September 26, 1979, appellee sought and obtained the issuance of a writ of execution for child support which had accrued to that date in the amount of $6,800.00 plus $1,342.05 in interest and $4.00 in costs.
Armed therewith she caused the Marshal of San Bernardino County to levy on a number of vehicles belonging to appellant.
When the efforts of the appellant to quash execution and vacate levy and to. claim those vehicles as exempt failed, he filed the instant Petition for Relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., on November 13, 1979, thereby invoking the provisions of § 362(a)(1) & (2).4
[500] The appellee then commenced an action to have her claim for the accrued but unpaid child support determined to be non-dis-chargeable. After trial, William H. Hyer, Bankruptcy Judge, determined the claim of MRS. WYMER to be non-dischargeable and entered judgment in her favor for $8,146.05 plus interest and costs. Judge Hyer also vacated the stay imposed by § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code thereby permitting the appellee to proceed with her state court action.
The instant appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The crucial issue seems to be whether MRS. WYMER had as of September 26, 1979, a claim against MR. WYMER.
Put another way, if the claim for child support had been assigned to the County of Los Angeles and to the State of California, it seems that these are the entities to assert the claim, unless those entities have somehow given up their rights thereto and restored such to MRS. WYMER.
If the county or state assert their rights on the claim, which they have not, it is clear from reading § 523(a)(5)(A), that the claim is dischargeable. For, although the statutory history of that section is scant, it teaches us that § 523(a)(5)(A) was enacted in its present form to overcome judicial decisions such as Williams v. Department of Social and Health Services, State of Washington, 529 F.2d 1264 at 1265 (9th Cir. 1976), which held that a claim for child support assigned to a state agency was non-dischargeable under § 17(a)(7)5 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7).
Therefore, § 523(a)(5) specifically provides that child support assigned, by operation of law or otherwise, to an entity, [which, according to § 101(14)6 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(14), includes a governmental unit], is to be discharged. The plain wording of § 523(a)(5) is such as to deny discharge of child support or alimony only if the duty to pay is directly to the person to whom the money is owed. Therefore where a state or county has been assigned such support rights in return for financial relief, such as AFDC, it is apparent that Congress intended that the debtor’s burden of making those support payments to the assignee governmental agency be dischargeable in recognition of the fact that such an agency can better absorb the loss than can the debtor. This is in concert with the philosophy of giving the debtor a “fresh start unencumbered by the debts of the past.” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt 292 U.S. 234, 54 S.Ct. 695, 78 L.Ed. 1230 (1934).
Since neither the county nor the state are asserting a claim against MR. WYMER, we come to the question of MRS. WYMER’S ability to assert the claim she is here pursuing.
In examining the California law on the subject, it appears that in conformity with the 1975 changes made in 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26),7 receipt of AFDC after September 20, 1975, required an assignment by operation of law to the County of Los An-geles and to the State of California, of MRS. WYMER’S rights to receive child sup[501] port from MR. WYMER. California Welfare and Institutions Code, § 11477(a);8 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A); 45 CFR §§ 232.119 and ... 302.51(f).10 In addition, for any amount accruing under her support rights prior to September 20, 1975, the county and state would have held an equitable assignment of, or subrogation right to, those sums. County of Santa Clara v. Support, Inc., 89 Cal.App.3d 687, 152 Cal.Rptr. 754 (1979); In re Marriage of Shore, 71 Cal.App.3d 290, 139 Cal.Rptr. 349 (1977).
The court below, in conformity with the law as outlined above, found that such an assignment did in fact exist. (See Finding of Fact No. 9). It then went on to find that after termination of AFDC on October 31, 1979, “moneys received by plaintiff representing delinquent child support are not assigned to another entity, either voluntarily or by operation of law, or otherwise.”
Based on that finding, together with the further findings
“5. That the policy of the Department of Public Social Services of Los An-geles County is that after termination of an AFDC grant that no claim for reimbursement of moneys paid under said grant is made against the AFDC recipient.”
“6. That the Department of Public Social Services of Los Angeles County has not in the past and does not contemplate in the future making any claim against Plaintiff, RHONDA B. WYMER, from any of the proceeds from execution sale of ve-hides in the custody of the Marshal’s Office in San Bernardino County of California,, in said proceeding.
and
“7. That the proceeds of the execution sale will be paid to Plaintiff, RHONDA B. WYMER.”
Judge Hyer concluded that the claim for child support belongs to MRS. WYMER and is non-dischargeable.
We agree with the finding that there was an assignment to the County of Los Ange-les of MRS. WYMER’S claim for child support.
We conclude however, that the assignment is still valid and in force, that therefor MRS. WYMER has no claim against MR. WYMER, the claim is yet owned by the County of Los Angeles and by the State of California.
The evidence upon which Judge Hyer reached his factual findings is the testimony of one Charles H. Van Natter, Deputy District Director for the Department of Public Social Services, Los Angeles County, California. It is the testimony of Mr. Van Natter which convinced Judge Hyer that as of October 31, 1979, the date receipt of AFDC by MRS. WYMER terminated, there existed no assignment to the county by MRS. WYMER for present or past accrued, but unpaid, child support. Mr. Van Natter’s testimony apparently led Judge Hyer to find and conclude that either the County of Los Angeles had waived its rights under the assignment or that it had reassigned any rights it had to MRS. WYMER. No [502] specific finding was made as to the status of the assignment on September 26, 1979, the date of issuance of the writ of execution to MRS. WYMER.
An examination of Mr. Van Natter’s testimony must be made to ascertain whether that testimony is sufficient to sustain the lower court.
The burning question is whether Mr. Van Natter’s testimony, taken as a whole, can •be construed to constitute either a waiver by the county and the state of their rights under the assignment or an outright reassignment in favor of MRS. WYMER. If it can properly be so construed, appellee should prevail. We find however, that such a construction is not proper for the reasons hereinafter stated.
Mr. Van Natter’s testimony, couched in the form of a hypothetical question, was as follows:
Q “(BY MR. SHIRLEY:) Mr. Van Natter if you could assume the factual situation where an individual was receiving AFDC for a period of years, during which period of time a child support order of the Superior Court was in effect and that virtually none of the court-ordered child support had been paid. And that after the person terminated the AFDC program, the same individual applied to the Superior Court for the execution and would thereafter, after the termination of aid, receive monies representing the delinquent child support.
Would the county or state government have a claim to those monies?
A No.
Q And can you tell us the reason behind that? Perhaps distinguish between AFDC and county relief programs.
A Well, Aid to Families with Dependent Children is a program that comes under the Social Security Act of 1935, and part of the basic — one of the basic premises in the Social Securities Act is that assistance to families with dependent children, once rendered, is not repayable...
Q All right. And so what you’re saying is the money representing the back child support would be paid directly to the
mother under those circumstances without claim by either the county or the state government?
A Yes, Sir.
Q All right. Now, at the end of the aid, what is the effect of that assignment?
A Well, it becomes in effect nullified. We send a notice to the district attorney relating to the aid payment and we notify the district attorney that the family is no longer receiving assistance and they close their case.
Q All right. So what you’re saying is at the termination of aid, the assignment is also terminated?
A Uh-huh.
' Q (BY MR. SHIRLEY:) Has any action been taken on the part of the Department of Public Social Services to recover monies representing delinquent child support that may be received by RHONDA B. WYMER?
A No, the case is closed.
Q Is there any action contemplated to recover those monies?
A MR. VAN STOCKUM: Objection, your Honor. This witness has qualified himself as an expert in the field of providing aid in the Aid to Dependent Children act. Their agency does not provide the enforcement, and under this act that’s the district attorney’s area. And he would not be qualified to testify as to whether or not the district attorney is going to act.
MR. SHIRLEY: Your Honor?
THE COURT: Maybe he can answer from the standpoint that he can notify anyone to that.
MR. SHIRLEY: You mean intend to notify?
THE WITNESS: We have notified them that the aid is discontinued and that the case is closed.
Q (BY MR. SHIRLEY:) -All right. Have you taken any action to seek recovery from RHONDA B. WYMER of the funds representing delinquent child support?
[503] A No.
******
Q (BY MR. SHIRLEY:) All right. So that as of the present time, that assignment is no longer operative?
A No. Because the assignment is for aid received during the while they were receiving public assistance.
* * * * * *
Based on the quoted testimony the court concluded that the assignment by operation of law, which is mandated by California Welfare and Institutions Code § 11477(a) and the Social Security Act under which AFDC is granted federal funds, for all accrued child support as of the date of commencement of AFDC and all child support accruing during receipt of such aid, terminated retroactively and ab initio on the date appellee stopped drawing aid. That is, once MRS. WYMER stopped receiving AFDC the county waived all rights in the moneys she had previously assigned to the county by operation of law.
The statutory scheme of AFDC is intended both to assure that non-custodial parents will be held to their ongoing support obligations for their children and that agencies providing aid to such children, where the non-custodial parent fails to do so, will be reimbursed for their expenditures. California Welfare and Institutions Code § 11477; 45 CFR 232.11(b). That statutory scheme clearly spells out that the district attorney’s office has the sole enforcement responsibility of collecting support payments due an AFDC recipient from a non-custodial parent. County of Santa Clara v. Support, Inc., 89 Cal.App.3d 687, 700-701, 152 Cal.Rptr. 754; Welfare and Institutions Code § 11475.1.11
Plaintiff/appellee urges upon us that Mr. Van Natter’s testimony is susceptible to the interpretation put thereon by the court below and that those findings are entitled to be affirmed unless clearly erroneous because of their purely factual nature. FRCP 52(a); U. S. v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948).
We do not agree with this analysis. Moore’s Treatise on Federal Practice teaches us that an appellate court is only bound by the “clearly erroneous” rule as to questions of fact, but not as to questions of law. 5A Moore’s Federal Practice § 52.05(1), 2d Ed. (1979).
Mixed questions of fact and law, that is, legal inferences to be drawn from the facts, have been held to be outside of the limitation of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states the “clearly erroneous” rule standard. 9 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2589, pp 753 (1973).
It is often difficult to differentiate what is “fact” from what is “law.” It is even more difficult to determine mixed questions of fact and law. The differentiation however, must be made to apply the correct standard of appellate review.
As was said in Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Company, 291 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1961):
“.... but when the factual determination is primarily a matter of drawing inferences from undisputed facts or determining their legal implications, appellate review is far broader than where disputed evidence and questions of credibility are involved.”
Thus, findings of fact based on erroneous view of the law are not binding, nor are findings on mixed questions of law and fact which involve an error of law. In re Lurie, 385 F.Supp. 784 (E.D.N.Y.1974).
We think that, at best, the issues here are mixed questions of fact and law. They involve at the least an application of the [504] clear import of the various bodies of the law governing AFDC to the testimony adduced. Thus we conclude that our range of review is much broader than the “clearly erroneous” rule would permit.
Mr. Van Natter’s testimony cannot be taken in a vacuum. It must be construed in light of the statutory scheme under which AFDC is governed. The import of Mr. Van Natter’s testimony was to the effect that his office would be taking no action against MRS. WYMER as a result of the assignment. However his department is not the department charged with enforcing assignments under AFDC. That is clearly the province of the district attorney. There is no showing on the part of Mr. Van Natter that he had, or has, authority to reassign or waive either the county’s or the state’s rights. Neither is there a showing that he was authorized to speak for, or was an agent of, the district attorney. In fact, Mr. Van Natter’s department was not the as-signee of these rights, nor was it the department to which the Superior Court ordered the child support payments made.
Despite his expertise in distributing AFDC funds and his department’s case management procedures, Mr. Van Natter was not in a position to set forth, nor did he articulate, the collection practices of the district attorney’s office in the case of MRS. WYMER, or for that matter in AFDC cases generally. Nor did he state by implication or otherwise that MRS. WYMER’S ease would be given preferential treatment or be handled somehow differently from ■ other AFDC cases. Therefore, if we conclude, as did the court below, that Mr. Van Natter waived, by his testimony or the conduct of his office, the county’s or the state’s rights, it might indicate a waiver or reassignment in all AFDC cases.
Mr. Van Natter is not a lawyer, hence his words are to be given their ordinary meanings.
His testimony that the assignment was “nullified” must be read together with his testimony that his department operated under the laws and regulations of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. When that is done, it seems to us that the clear import of his testimony was that at the termination of AFDC the assignment of Welfare and Institutions § 11477 terminates or is nullified as to future support due from the non-custodial parent. That interpretation is in full harmony with the statutory scheme. As the court stated in County of Santa Clara v. Support, Inc., 89 Cal.App.3d 687, at p. 700, 152 Cal.Rptr. 754, referring to In re Marriage of Shore, 71 Cal.App.3d 290, 139 Cal.Rptr. 349:
“We held such arrearages were assigned in full to the county and that the assignment remained in effect after the family went off aid, until the county is reimbursed.”
Even though such cases as In re Marriage of Shore and County of Santa Clara v. Support, Inc., are cases in which the county was a party and actively sought to collect the past due child support, their holdings are appropriate here where the case seems to be between the husband/appellant and the wife/appellee only.
In both Shore and Santa Clara County the custodial parent and AFDC recipient had assigned her rights to collect support to a collection agency. Yet it was that parent who was attempting ultimately to collect the child support arrearages which had been previously assigned to the county and to the state. This case is no different. Here, MRS. WYMER is trying to collect child support arrearages directly, in derogation of the rights of the assignee county and state.
As the court stated in County of Santa Clara, at p. 697, 152 Cal.Rptr. 754
“The right of a county to collect past due payments from a custodial parent does not terminate when a custodial parent ceases to receive aid under the AFDC program.”
An assignment by operation of law has the ultimate effect of passing title to a cause of action (here MRS. WYMER’S right to collect child support from MR. WYMER) from one person to another. Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal.2d 632, 639-640, 7 Cal.Rptr. 377, 354 P.2d 1073 (1960).
[505] Once a person has assigned a right, he cannot thereafter apply it for his own benefit without incurring liability to the assignee. Nineteenth Realty Co. v. Diggs, 134 Cal. 278, 25 P.2d 522 (1933). Nor may an assignor maintain action on a claim after making an absolute assignment of it to another; his right to demand performance is extinguished, the assignee acquires such right, for to assign ordinarily means to transfer title or ownership to property. McCown v. Spencer, 8 Cal.3d 216, 225, 87 Cal.Rptr. 213 (1970).
As indicated earlier, the issue thus becomes whether the County of Los Ange-les and the State of California, to which the claims for support against MR. WYMER were assigned by operation of law, are, as of the time of trial, still the owners thereof.
For if they are, the MRS. WYMER, according to the authorities, owns nothing which she can enforce against MR. WYM-ER, either within or without this bankruptcy proceeding.
To answer that question, it must be determined whether Mr. Van Natter’s testimony may reasonably be interpreted as a release, waiver or reassignment.
It has been held in one New York case, Wood v. Rocker, 100 Misc.2d 890 (1979), interpreting an assignment by operation of law for child support that such assignment is taken in the assignee’s official capacity and cannot by him be assigned to the former recipient of public assistance. We agree.
If the right of the county and the state, as assignees to collect, does not cease, in the absence of a showing of satisfaction, waiver, or reassignment, the county and the state remain the obligees and owners of the claim. MRS. WYMER is not the owner of the claim and has no right to proceed to collect it.
The county (at its own option) may collect spousal support, the collection of which is not mandated by state law, as well as child support. “Should the county elect not to collect spousal support, a release can be given as soon as reimbursement from child support is obtained.” (Emphasis added). County of Santa Clara v. Support, Inc., 89 Cal.App.3d 687, 701, 152 Cal.Rptr. 754 (1979).
In other words, it seenis that the county could waive its right to collect assigned spousal support, but not assigned child support.
If MRS. WYMER, as custodial parent desires to collect the accrued but assigned child support directly for her own benefit, she must first show that the county’s and the state’s claim are satisfied. This can be accomplished by either obtaining an affidavit from the district attorney’s office that there are no moneys owing to the county and state or obtaining a release from the county’s family support division in full and complete satisfaction of unreimbursed expenses on account of past assistance. County of Santa Clara v. Support, Inc., 89 Cal.App.3d 697, 152 Cal.Rptr. 754. Neither was done here at the time of the issuance of the writ of execution, the trial of this matter or at the time this appeal was argued.
The appellant established beyond doubt that an assignment existed up to October 31, 1979. The appellee failed to establish that this assignment has been satisfied or that it has been released by the county.
An assignment once made, cannot be canceled or modified without the assent of the assignee. In re Marriage of Shore, 71 Cal.App.3d 290, 139 Cal.Rptr. 349. No such assent is present here, by implication or otherwise.
As we indicated earlier, the issue of whether the assignment has been nullified, terminated or canceled for all purposes is a mixed question of fact and law. Hence the trier of fact must apply the statutory scheme to the evidence presented. Such application would, in our opinion, lead to the conclusion that MRS. WYMER has not carried the burden of showing that the assignment is no longer valid as it applies to accrued but unpaid child support as of October 31, 1979, and certainly not as of September 26, 1979, the date upon which she obtained the writ of execution.
[506] Counsel for plaintiff/appellee has, in his brief filed herein and at' oral argument raised the issue of res judicata as that issue relates to a determination allegedly made by the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles on the question of the assignment of MRS. WYMER’S support rights to the County of Los Angeles, State of California.
The issue is first raised by appellee in the complaint filed before the Bankruptcy Court on December 4,1979, seeking a determination of nondischargeability of the child support herein in question.
In paragraphs 8 and 9 of that complaint, appellee alleges that by virtue of appellant having voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court for a determination of his Claim of Exemption and Motion to Quash Writ of Execution, both of which were denied by the Superior Court, that the doctrine of res judicata now prevents him from relitigating the question of the assignment to the County of Los Ange-les.
However, plaintiff/appellee subsequently filed an Amendment to Complaint which superseded the original complaint on file. It was this amended complaint which was answered and which formed the basis of the trial in this matter.
We therefor conclude that the res judica-ta issue was never properly raised or brought before Judge Hyer.
Hence Judge Hyer could not, and in fact did not make any Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on this issue.
Our appellate review is similarly restricted to the record before us. But for the allegations in a superseded complaint which were not tried on their merits and a brief argument on the issue in appellee’s brief, the record is devoid of any mention of res judicata. We therefor follow the lead of the trial judge in refusing to address the issue.
Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedures, Rule 10(a), the record on appeal consists of “[t]he original papers and exhibits filed in the district court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, and á certified copy of the docket entries prepared by the clerk....”
The law seems to indicate that an appellate court may only adjudicate issues contained in the trial court record and that it may not, sua sponte, raise matters outside the record. T. V. T. Corporation v. Basiliko, 257 F.2d 185 (D.C.Cir.1958); Eistrat v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co., 224 F.2d 784, (9th Cir. 1955).
The judgment is reversed with directions to enter judgment for defendant/appellant in conformity with this opinion.