Wyles v. WIlliams Law

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 5, 2026
• Docket: 24CA2168
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA2168 Wyles v Williams Law 03-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2168 Jefferson County District Court No. 15CV31262 Honorable Tamara S. Russell, Judge

Terrence Wyles,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Williams Law P.C., d/b/a The Vasilco Law Group, Patrick Vasilco, Michael Williams, and T.J. Carney,

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Yun and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 5, 2026

Ventola Law, Samuel Ventola, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Nevin A. Seeger, P.C., Nevin A. Seeger, Loveland, Colorado, for Defendants- Appellees Williams Law, P.C., d/b/a The Vasilco Law Group, Patrick Valisco, and Michael Williams

Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, Franz Hardy, Abigail H. Kregor, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee T.J. Carney ¶1 Plaintiff, Terrence Wyles, appeals the district court’s order

awarding attorney fees and costs to defendants, Williams Law P.C.,

d/b/a the Vasilco Law Group; Patrick Vasilco; Michael Williams;

and T.J. Carney, following the disposition of Wyles’s claim against

the defendants for professional negligence. We affirm.

I. Background and Procedural History

¶2 We draw the following factual summary from the record and

the opinion in Wyles v. Williams Law, P.C., (Colo. App. No.

23CA0081, Jan. 25, 2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e))

(Wyles I).

¶3 Wyles, a patent attorney, retained Williams Law to represent

his “interests in connection with [an] initial investigation and

potential action” against his former employer, Aluminaid

International, A.G., and certain related individuals and entities.

Vasilco, the manager of Williams Law, arranged for Carney, an

attorney with experience in complex employment and intellectual

property cases, to serve as special counsel in Wyles’s matter.

¶4 For reasons not relevant to this appeal, Carney never filed a

lawsuit on Wyles’s behalf. Then, after Aluminaid sued Wyles in

1 California, Williams Law returned Wyles’s retainer and terminated

its representation of him.

¶5 Later, Wyles filed suit against all four defendants here, alleging

breach of contract and negligence.1 The thrust of Wyles’s claim was

that, due to Carney’s failure to promptly file a lawsuit in Colorado

on Wyles’s behalf, Wyles “incurred significant damages and losses”

because, once Aluminaid had sued him in California, he suffered a

“significant strategic litigation disadvantage.”

¶6 Williams Law, Williams, and Vasilco (the Williams defendants)

and Carney filed separate motions for summary judgment. Wyles

filed a joint response to both motions and Carney and the Williams

defendants filed separate replies. The court granted the motions.

Shortly thereafter, the Williams defendants and Carney both

requested an award of attorney fees and costs. Before the court

ruled on the motions, however, Wyles filed his notice of appeal of

the summary judgment order. The district court issued an order

holding the motions in abeyance “until the Court of Appeals

render[ed] its decision” on the appeal.

1 The district court dismissed the breach of contract claim,

concluding it was subsumed within the negligence claim.

2 ¶7 In their appellate briefing, the Williams defendants requested

an award of appellate attorney fees in the event they prevailed,

citing as support for this request the fee-shifting provision in the

Williams Law engagement agreement, C.A.R. 39.1, section 13-17-

102, C.R.S. 2025, and C.R.C.P. 11. Carney also sought appellate

fees, although his request was cursory and cited only the

engagement letter as support. A division of this court affirmed the

summary judgment order, Wyles I, slip op. at 5, but the division’s

opinion did not address either request for an award of appellate

attorney fees.2

¶8 After the division’s opinion was issued but before Wyles filed

his petition for a writ of certiorari, the Williams defendants filed a

motion requesting that the division refer their request for appellate

fees “to the trial court pursuant to C.A.R. 39.1.” Carney joined in

the motion, requesting that the division “refer the determination of

recovery of attorneys’ fees incurred during the appeal to the district

court upon issuance of the mandate.”

2 The Colorado Supreme Court subsequently denied Wyles’s petition

for a writ of certiorari.

3 ¶9 The division granted the motion as to Williams Law but denied

it as to the other defendants. Its order noted that while the

defendants all prevailed in the appeal, none of them explained why

nonparties to the engagement agreement would be entitled to

recover under the agreement’s fee-shifting provision. Thus, the

division ruled, “as the only prevailing party that is a party to the

agreement, Williams Law is the only defendant-appellee entitled to

recover its attorney fees pursuant to the agreement.”

¶ 10 Consistent with the division’s order, on remand, Williams Law

requested an award of attorney fees incurred in connection with

Wyles I, all the Williams defendants requested an award of costs

incurred in connection with Wyles I, and all the Williams

defendants and Carney requested an award of fees and costs

incurred in the district court. After rejecting Wyles’s argument that

the division’s order largely foreclosed any additional award of

attorney fees, the district court granted the motions. The award,

which relied on varying grounds depending on the defendant and

included applicable postjudgment interest for each amount,

consisted of the following:

4 • Under the fee-shifting provision of the engagement

agreement and, in the alternative, under the doctrine of

equitable estoppel, Carney was awarded $150,430.00 in

district court attorney fees against Wyles only.

• Carney was awarded $30,563.64 in district court costs

against Wyles only.

• Under the fee-shifting provision of the engagement

agreement, equitable estoppel, and section 13-17-

102(4), the Williams defendants were awarded

$106,914.51 in district court attorney fees against

Wyles and his attorney, jointly and severally.

• The Williams defendants were awarded $28,172.69 in

district court costs against Wyles and his attorney,

jointly and severally.

• Williams Law was awarded $38,261.50 in appellate

attorney fees against Wyles only.

• The Williams defendants were awarded $479.00 in

appellate costs against Wyles only.

¶ 11 Wyles appeals the award, arguing that (1) the division’s order

limiting the award of appellate attorney fees to Williams Law should

5 have foreclosed the award of district court attorney fees to the

remaining defendants; (2) the district court erred by awarding

attorney fees against Wyles and his attorney under section 13-17-

102(4); (3) the district court erred by awarding attorney fees under

the fee-shifting provision of the engagement agreement; and

(4) there was insufficient evidence to support the amounts of fees

and costs awarded. We address each contention in turn below.

II. The Scope of the Wyles I Division’s Order

¶ 12 Wyles contends that the district court acted contrary to the

mandate of the Wyles I division when, on remand, it awarded

attorney fees to parties other than Williams Law.3 As we

understand his argument — which consists of three scant

sentences in the opening brief — he asserts that because the

Wyles I division did not award appellate attorney fees to parties

other than Williams Law, those parties were not entitled to fees

associated with the district court proceedings either. As Wyles puts

3 Wyles does not contend that the Wyles I division’s order similarly

foreclosed the award of costs associated with the district court proceedings.

6 it in his opening brief, “the lack of sanctions for filing the appeal a

fortiori implies a lack of basis for sanctions for the original filing.”

¶ 13 We review de novo whether the district court followed the

previous division’s mandate. Thompson v. Catlin Ins. Co. (UK), 2018

CO 95, ¶ 20. Leaving aside the fact that only one aspect of the

court’s attorney fee award amounted to a “sanction” under section

13-17-102, we disagree with Wyles’s understanding of the appellate

mandate in Wyles I. Addressing a request for appellate attorney

fees under C.A.R. 39.1, the division ruled on only that issue. It did

not — and could not — consider the propriety of attorney fees in the

district court because, until the district court granted such fees, that

issue was not ripe for appellate review. See Kennedy v. Gillam Dev.

Corp., 80 P.3d 927, 929 (Colo. App. 2003) (“[A]n award of attorney

fees is distinct and separately appealable from the judgment on the

merits.”); Stone Grp. Holdings LLC v. Ellison, 2024 COA 10, ¶ 18 (“To

be considered final, a judgment or order must address both liability

and damages, and damages must be reduced to a sum certain.”

(citation omitted)).

¶ 14 To the extent that Wyles contends that the Wyles I order

compels the conclusion that his actions in the district court were

7 not sanctionable, we disagree. The division’s silence regarding

whether Wyles’s appellate arguments were frivolous, vexatious, or

otherwise sanctionable sheds no light on the district court

proceedings. See Front Range Home Enhancements, Inc. v. Stowell,

172 P.3d 973, 977 (Colo. App. 2007) (recognizing that “divisions of

this court have consistently applied a rule of awarding appellate

attorney fees only if the appeal itself is frivolous”).

¶ 15 Accordingly, we discern no error in the district court’s

conclusion that the Wyles I division’s ruling on appellate attorney

fees did not bar it from considering the defendants’ pending

requests for attorney fees arising from the district court phase of

the case.

III. Sanctions Under Section 13-17-102

¶ 16 Wyles contends that the district court erroneously sanctioned

him and his counsel under section 13-17-102 because there

8 “simply is not evidence to suggest that Plaintiff, or his counsel, had

the desire to simply harm the Defendants.” We discern no error.4

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 17 Section 13-17-101, C.R.S. 2025, “sets forth provisions for the

recovery of attorney fees . . . in courts of record when the bringing

or defense of an action . . . is determined to have been substantially

frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.” A

claim is substantially frivolous if the proponent can present no

rational argument based on the evidence or the law to support it.

W. United Realty, Inc. v. Isaacs, 679 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Colo. 1984).

Similarly, a claim is substantially groundless if the proponent’s

allegations are not supported by any credible evidence. Id. A

vexatious claim or defense is one brought or maintained in bad

faith, which includes conduct that is arbitrary, abusive, stubbornly

litigious, aimed at unwarranted delay, or disrespectful of truth and

4 We reject the Williams defendants’ argument that Wyles’s

attorney’s “failure to preserve his own appeal, by either filing his own separate appeal or being added as an appellant, renders final the judgment against him.” See Cruz v. Benine, 984 P.2d 1173, 1181 (Colo. 1999) (reversing dismissal of appeal of attorney fees award against attorney that was entered jointly and severally against attorney and attorney’s client where notice of appeal listed only client, not attorney).

9 accuracy. See Zivian v. Brooke-Hitching, 28 P.3d 970, 974 (Colo.

App. 2001). The trial court has discretion in determining whether

to award attorney fees, and its determination will not be disturbed

on review if supported by the evidence. See Crissey Fowler Lumber

Co. v. First Cmty. Indus. Bank, 8 P.3d 531, 535 (Colo. App. 2000).5

B. Analysis

¶ 18 Wyles contends that the district court abused its discretion by

imposing sanctions because there was no proof that he “brought or

maintained” his claim “in bad faith to annoy or harass,” and

because he presented evidence of the defendants’ delay and

malpractice via the expert opinion of a law professor.

¶ 19 In concluding that the complaint was substantially frivolous

and groundless, the court noted that Wyles presented no credible

evidence that the defendants breached their duty of care or that

their actions caused his alleged injuries. The premise of Wyles’s

5 We reject Wyles’s assertion that we should review de novo the

district court’s award of attorney fees as a sanction. The case that Wyles cites as support for this proposition says just the opposite. Munoz v. Measner, 247 P.3d 1031, 1032 (Colo. 2011) (“We find that the trial court’s denial of the Measners’ fee request was supported by sufficient findings, including the proper claim-by-claim analysis, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request.”).

10 malpractice lawsuit was that preemptively suing Aluminaid in

Colorado would have given him a litigation advantage and reduced

the likelihood that he would have to defend against a suit filed by

Aluminaid in a less convenient forum. But as the court pointed

out, Wyles offered nothing more than “speculation and conjecture”

that winning the race to the courthouse would have prevented

Aluminaid from filing its own suit in California — particularly given

that “the California case was completely different than this case.”

Indeed, although Wyles’s expert report baldly asserted that, had

Wyles filed first in Colorado, he would “have been able, promptly

and at a reasonable cost,” to transfer the California action to

Colorado, it ignored the fact that the California case involved

allegations of “computer fraud and abuse, conversion,

misappropriation of trade secrets, [and] intentional interference

with economic advantage,” none of which “had anything to do with

this case.” The record contains ample support for these findings.

In short, Wyles’s claims were frivolous and groundless because he

offered no rational argument or evidence to support the allegations

in his complaint.

11 ¶ 20 As for vexatiousness, the district court found that Wyles’s

malpractice lawsuit “smack[ed] of retaliation” because he “wanted

Mr. Carney to be punished.” Given the disconnect between the

malpractice allegations, the evidence that Wyles marshaled, and the

course of his conduct during the litigation, we agree with this

inference. Not only did Wyles refuse to dismiss claims that were

clearly legally barred — for example, his claim for noneconomic

damages, see Aller v. Law Off. of Carole C. Schriefer, P.C., 140 P.3d

23, 26-27 (Colo. App. 2005) — but he also pursued claims against

individual attorneys who had no direct involvement in the

underlying case.

¶ 21 In sum, because the district court’s finding that Wyles’s

malpractice lawsuit was substantially frivolous, groundless, and

vexatious has substantial record support, we perceive no abuse of

discretion.

IV. Award of Fees Under the Terms of the Engagement Agreement

¶ 22 Next, Wyles contends that the district court could not award

fees under the fee-shifting provision of the engagement agreement

because “Williams Law dismissed its contract claim.” In the

alternative, he appears to argue that the district court lacked

12 jurisdiction to award fees under the engagement agreement because

that agreement provides in part that “[a]ny fee dispute will be

submitted to binding arbitration.”

¶ 23 We decline to address Wyles’s first argument because it is

unpreserved. See Laleh v. Johnson, 2016 COA 4, ¶ 8 (generally,

appellate courts do not address unpreserved issues in civil cases),

aff’d on other grounds, 2017 CO 93. Wyles never argued in the

district court that, by withdrawing their counterclaims for breach of

contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment, the Williams defendants

terminated the fee-shifting provision of the engagement agreement.

And his claim that “[t]he issue was raised on multiple occasions

including at the hearing” is not borne out by the record citations he

provides.6

6 In his reply brief, Wyles asserts that this argument was preserved

because, in response to a motion filed by the Williams defendants to amend the written order to incorporate certain oral findings, he argued for the first time that, although “[d]efendants’ proposed order also seeks to establish liability for attorney’s fees pursuant to contract,” they had previously “voluntarily dismissed their contract claims.” This argument was raised too late to preserve it for appeal. See Briargate at Seventeenth Ave. Owners Ass’n v. Nelson, 2021 COA 78M, ¶ 66 (“Arguments made, as here, for the first time in a post-trial motion are too late and, consequently, are deemed waived for purposes of appeal.”).

13 ¶ 24 As for Wyles’s alternative argument, we agree with the district

court’s conclusion that his malpractice lawsuit against the

defendants was not a “fee dispute” as contemplated by the

engagement agreement.

¶ 25 Finally, to the extent that Wyles asserts for the first time in his

reply brief that the district court erroneously awarded fees to

Carney under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, we decline to

address the argument because it is not properly before us. See

Meadow Homes Dev. Corp. v. Bowens, 211 P.3d 743, 748 (Colo.

App. 2009) (“[W]e do not consider arguments raised on appeal for

the first time in a reply brief.” (citation omitted)).

V. Calculation of Fees and Costs

¶ 26 Wyles contends that the district court “erred in its calculation

of fees and costs” because “[d]efendants offered no testimony or

other evidence establishing the reasonableness of their claimed

costs, principally consisting of alleged expert fees paid to a witness

that did not testify or offer evidence at any point in the proceeding.”

¶ 27 We perceive no error. Indeed, Wyles’s claim that the district

court’s fees and costs award lacks evidentiary support is directly

refuted by the record, which contains detailed billing reports

14 accompanied by affidavits and legal argument. Wyles did not

challenge this evidence in the district court, nor does he develop

any substantive legal argument on appeal as to why it should have

been excluded. See Taylor v. Taylor, 2016 COA 100, ¶ 13 (refusing

to address appellate contention that is “unsupported by any

substantial argument”). Accordingly, we leave the district court’s

calculations of attorney fees and costs undisturbed.

VI. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 28 The Williams defendants and Carney both request their

appellate attorney fees and costs. Because both sets of defendants

prevailed on appeal, we grant their requests. See Kennedy v. King

Soopers Inc., 148 P.3d 385, 390 (Colo. App. 2006) (“When a party is

awarded attorney fees for a prior stage of the proceedings, it may

recover reasonable attorney fees and costs for successfully

defending the appeal.”); see also 1046 Munras Props., L.P. v. Kabod

Coffee, 2025 COA 71, ¶ 39 (“Colorado appellate courts routinely

award appellate attorney fees to parties who successfully defend an

attorney fee award on appeal.”). We remand this matter to the

district court to determine and award the defendants their

15 reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs under C.A.R. 39.1 and

C.A.R. 39(c)(1).7

VII. Disposition

¶ 29 The order is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the district

court under C.A.R. 39.1 and C.A.R. 39(c)(1) for a determination of

reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred during this appeal.

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

7 Although it is a close call given the shortcomings in Wyles’s

briefing discussed throughout this opinion, we decline to grant appellate fees and costs under section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2025, for two reasons. First, Carney does not request fees under that statute. Second, while the Williams defendants do seek an award of appellate fees under section 13-17-102, their argument is not well developed. See C.A.R. 39.1 (2025) (“[T]he principal brief of the party claiming attorney fees must include a specific request, under a separate heading, and must explain the legal and factual basis for an award of attorney fees. Mere citation to this rule or to a statute, without more, does not satisfy the legal basis requirement.”).