Wright v. Mallet

2025 Ohio 1729

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 15, 2025
• Docket: 113980
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Wright v. Mallet, 2025-Ohio-1729.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

ANDREW J. WRIGHT, ET AL., :

Plaintiffs-Appellants, : No. 113980 v. :

RAYMOND JAMES MALLET, :

Defendant-Appellee. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 15, 2025

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-23-979071

Appearances:

Andrew J. Wright, pro se.

Tayeh Law Offices, LLC, and Ziad Tayeh, for appellee.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

Appellant Andrew Wright appeals the judgment of the Cuyahoga

County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of appellee

Raymond Mallet (“Mallet”) on Wright’s complaint against him and granting default

judgment against Wright on Mallet’s counterclaim.

Wright raises six assignments of error for review: 1. The court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denying Wright’s mechanic’s lien payment for labor or service, equipment, and materials furnished pursuant to R.C. 1311.06 including using various methods for claiming lien payment under R.C. 1311.02.

2. The appellant’s conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence for Wright’s performance of duty and Mallet’s fraudulent actions in rescission.

3. The appellant’s conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence for Wright’s performance of duty and Mallet’s fraudulent actions in rescission or payment reversal.

4. The court erroneously interpreted the “punitive damages” doctrine and improperly assessed costs.

5. The court erred in awarding damages to Mallet without sufficient evidence to support his claims of negligently performed services or the need for equitable relief.

6. The court erred in granting Mallet’s Motion for Default Judgment based on an “excusable neglect” of Wright’s illness and the presence of court records showing Wright took multiple actions to file mechanic’s lien claims.

After a thorough review of the applicable law and facts, we reverse the

judgment against Wright and remand for further proceedings.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Wright and Systems Mechanical L.L.C. (“SM”) entered into an

agreement with Mallet where Wright and SM would perform HVAC services at

Mallet’s property pursuant to a written estimate.

There was a dispute as to whether Wright and SM fully and properly

performed the work pursuant to the agreement. Wright filed a mechanic’s lien

against Mallet’s property, and later Wright and SM filed suit against Mallet to foreclose on the mechanic’s lien, alleging that Mallet owed $7,297 plus interest for

labor and materials furnished. Mallet filed an answer denying the claims and

asserted a counterclaim against Wright and SM, raising claims of breach of contract,

unjust enrichment, consumer violations, and slander of title. Mallet alleged that he

had fully paid Wright and SM and that they had negligently performed and/or failed

to complete the services under the parties’ agreement.

Wright and SM sought multiple extensions of time to respond to the

counterclaim, which were granted, but no response was filed by Wright and SM.

Mallet then moved for summary judgment as to Wright and SM’s claims and default

judgment on his counterclaim.

The court held a telephonic hearing on the motions for summary

judgment and default judgment. As a result of this hearing, the court granted

Wright and SM an extension of time to file a brief in opposition to Mallet’s motion

for summary judgment and to file a response to Mallet’s counterclaim.

Wright did not file a conventional brief in opposition to the motion for

summary judgment and motion for default judgment, but, within the time allotted,

filed his own affidavit setting forth his narrative of the case and disputing Mallet’s

allegations.

Mallet filed a motion to strike the affidavit, which Wright opposed. The

trial court never ruled upon the motion to strike.

The trial court granted Mallet’s motion for summary judgment on

Wright and SM’s complaint. The court further granted Mallet’s motion for default judgment on the counterclaim and awarded damages against Wright and SM, jointly

and severally, consisting of $10,024.72 in compensatory damages, $5,000 in

punitive damages, and $3,000 in attorney fees.

Wright then filed the instant appeal, raising six assignments of error

for review.

II. Law and Analysis

Preliminarily, we note that Wright and SM had been initially

represented by counsel, but early in the proceedings, their counsel was permitted to

withdraw. It appears that Wright and SM remained unrepresented in the matter

with Wright submitting filings on behalf of himself and SM. However, Wright is not

an attorney, and while he may represent his own interests in court, he cannot

represent the interests of SM, a corporate entity. See Arnoff v. PAJ Ents., L.L.C.,

2022-Ohio-1759, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), citing Mun. Realty Corp. v. Ergur, 2014-Ohio-

1557, ¶ 7 (6th Dist.). Accordingly, any filings submitted by Wright must be

considered solely with regard to his interests and have no bearing on the interests of

SM.

Moreover, the notice of appeal was filed only by Wright. Because

Wright cannot represent the interests of SM and SM did not file its own notice of

appeal through counsel, SM is not a party to this appeal. The judgments relating to

SM are therefore not subject to review, and we will consider the assignments of error

solely as they relate to Wright. For ease of discussion, we will address the assignments of error out of

order.

A. Default Judgment

In his sixth assignment of error, Wright argues that the trial court

erred in granting default judgment on Mallet’s counterclaim.

In his motion for default judgment, Mallet asserted that Wright had

been properly served and failed to respond to the counterclaim within 28 days of its

filing. “A default judgment may be entered against a defendant who has failed to

answer or otherwise defend against allegations raised in a complaint.” Berube v.

Richardson, 2017-Ohio-1367, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), citing Ohio Valley Radiology Assocs.,

Inc. v. Ohio Valley Hosp. Assn., 28 Ohio St.3d 118, 121 (1986); Civ.R. 55(A). Civ.R.

55 provides in pertinent part:

(A) Entry of judgment. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules, the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply in writing . . . to the court . . . . If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper and shall when applicable accord a right of trial by jury to the parties.

“[A] default judgment is proper [under Civ.R. 55] when . . . a defendant

has not contested the plaintiff’s allegation by pleading or ‘otherwise defend[ing]’

such that no issues are present in the case.” Reese v. Proppe, 3 Ohio App.3d 103,

105 (8th Dist. 1981). We review a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for default judgment under an abuse of discretion. Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Courey, 2010-

Ohio-246, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.).

This court has previously noted:

Pursuant to Civ.R. 8(D), “[a]verments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading.” However, this rule must be read in conjunction with the remaining sections of Civ.R. 8. Peppertree Farms, L.L.C. v. Thonen, 2020-Ohio- 3042, ¶ 58 (5th Dist.). Civ.R. 8(B) provides that “[a] party shall state in short and plain terms the party’s defense to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies,” and that the pleader has the option “to make the denials as specific denials” or “the pleader may generally deny all the averments except the designated averments . . . the pleader expressly admits . . . .” Additionally, Civ.R. 8(F) states that “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.” As explained in the staff notes, “Rule 8(F) emphasizes the fact that pleadings shall be construed liberally in order that the substantive merits of the action may be served.” Staff Notes to Civ.R. 8(F). As recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court, “[t]he spirit of the Civil Rules is the resolution of cases upon their merits, not upon pleading deficiencies.” Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 175 (1973).

Montefiore Home v. Fields, 2021-Ohio-3734, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.).

“Generally, default judgments are disfavored and should be imposed

only when the actions of the defaulting party create a presumption of willfulness or

bad faith.” Forty-Fourth Props. L.L.C. v. Demyan, 2012-Ohio-3085, ¶ 10 (8th

Dist.), citing Suki v. Blume, 9 Ohio App.3d 289, 290 (8th Dist. 1983); Haddad v.

English, 145 Ohio App.3d 598, 603 (9th Dist. 2001). “[I]t is a fundamental tenet of

judicial review in Ohio that courts should decide cases on the merits.” Goodwin v.

Goodwin, 2011-Ohio-3263, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), quoting DeHart v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,

69 Ohio St.2d 189, 192 (1982). Without disregarding the Rules of Civil Procedure, we acknowledge that litigants appearing pro se can be afforded some degree of

latitude. “‘[P]ro se litigants should be granted reasonable leeway such that their

motions and pleadings should be liberally construed so as to decide the issues on the

merits, as opposed to technicalities.’” Millennia Hous. Mgt. Ltd. v. Johnson, 2012-

Ohio-1044, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), quoting Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Paluch, 2012-

Ohio-334, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.), quoting Sherlock v. Myers, 2004-Ohio-5178, ¶ 3 (9th

Dist.).

In the instant case, Mallet’s counterclaim alleged conduct by Wright

that required a responsive pleading. The complaint specifically alleged that Mallet

had paid Wright the full amount of the agreement and had to additionally pay over

$8,000 to complete and remedy the services negligently performed by Wright. In

his affidavit, Wright disputed Mallet’s allegations and raised the issue that Mallet

had reversed or “charged back” some of the payments made to him. While the

affidavit did not take the conventional form of an answer, it was filed within the

extension granted by the trial court, generally denied the allegations, and should

have been liberally construed as an answer, particularly in a default situation.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting the motion for default

judgment against Wright. Wright’s sixth assignment of error is sustained, and the

default judgment against Wright is reversed. B. Motion for Summary Judgment

In his first assignment of error, Wright argues that the trial court erred

in granting Mallet’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint for foreclosure

on the mechanic’s lien.

This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. Snyder

v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, 2014-Ohio-3942, ¶ 2. For de novo review, we

independently “examine the evidence to determine if as a matter of law no genuine

issues exist for trial.” Brewer v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio App.3d 378, 383

(8th Dist. 1997).

Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted,

it must be determined that no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be

litigated and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This occurs

when it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one

conclusion, viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party the nonmoving

party, that the moving party is entitled to judgment. Temple v. Wean United, Inc.,

50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977).

The moving party has the burden to show that no genuine issues of

material fact exists. K.S. v. Pla-Mor Roller Rink, 2016-Ohio-815, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.),

citing Redeye v. Belohlavek, 2007-Ohio-85, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing Harless v. Willis

Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66 (1978). After the moving party has met

his or her burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to put forth evidence

“on any issue for which that party bears the burden of production at trial.” Robinson v. J.C. Penney Co., 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2633, 14 (8th Dist. May 20, 1993). If the

nonmoving party “fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” summary

judgment in favor of the moving party is proper. Brandon/Wiant Co. v. Teamor,

125 Ohio App.3d 442, 446 (8th Dist. 1998).

Mallet sought summary judgment on both claims of Wright’s

complaint. The first claim stated that Mallet owed Wright $7,927 plus interest for

labor and materials furnished. The second count alleged that an affidavit for

mechanic’s lien had been filed and a notice to commence suit had been served on

Wright by Mallet.

“A mechanic’s lien can be entered against an owner’s interest in real

property if the owner or the owner’s agent fails to pay for work done to improve the

property.” Silberhorn v. Flemco, L.L.C., 2020-Ohio-913, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing

Cuspide Properties, Ltd. v. Earl Mechanical Servs., 2015-Ohio-5019, ¶ 27 (6th

Dist.), citing R.C. 1311.02.

Mallet argued in his motion for summary judgment that the evidence

demonstrated that he had performed all of his obligations under the agreement,

including paying Wright at least $12,024.72, and that Wright breached the

agreement by failing to complete the services and/or negligently performing the

services. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Mallet submitted his own

affidavit outlining the dealings between himself and Wright, receipts reflecting payments to Wright of $3,600.72, $2,160, and $6,264, text messages between the

two, and the mechanic’s lien.

As noted above, Wright submitted his own affidavit within the

extension of time granted by the trial court. While not a conventional brief in

opposition, the affidavit should have been construed as a response to the motion for

summary judgment. In the affidavit, Wright provided his own statement of the facts

and circumstances of the case. He further presented a chart depicting his response

to each line of Mallet’s affidavit, whether it was undisputed or disputed. Of note,

Wright testified that Mallet had “charged back” two of the payments made to Wright

and presented an email referencing two disputed credit card charges in the amount

of $2,160 and $3,600.72. These two amounts were the same as the amounts in two

of the payment receipts presented by Mallet.

On their face, Mallet’s motion for summary judgment and

accompanying affidavit and exhibits met his initial burden of demonstrating the

absence of any genuine issues of material fact remaining regarding Wright’s

complaint for foreclosure of mechanic’s lien. However, construing Wright’s affidavit

as an opposition to the motion, we believe that Wright has demonstrated the

existence of a genuine issues of material fact regarding the work performed and

payments that he claims were reversed by Mallet. While Mallet moved to strike the

affidavit, the court never ruled on the motion and thus we presume that it was

denied. See Rosett v. Holmes, 2023-Ohio-606, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.) (noting that a motion

that is not ruled upon is deemed to be denied). Wright’s first assignment of error is sustained, and the judgment

granting summary judgment against Wright on Wright’s complaint is reversed.

C. Remaining Assignments of Error

The remainder of Wright’s assignments of error are rendered moot.

Judgment reversed in part, and this matter is remanded for further

proceedings.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR