Filed 8/20/26 Wright v. Kokayi CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
DUSTAN WRIGHT, Plaintiff and Appellant,
A174297
v. TYEHIMBA KOKAYI et al., (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 25CV112257)
Defendants and Respondents.
This is the third appeal by self-represented appellant Dustan Wright in an extremely litigious dispute with the administrator of the estate of Mary Esther Bates and her heirs over Wright’s continued occupancy of Bates’s home located in Oakland, California for more than a decade following her death (hereafter, the Bates residence).
We previously affirmed a judgment of dismissal in a civil action for damages and foreclosure of a mechanics lien that Wright brought against the estate (Karewicz v. Wright (Jan. 28, 2025, A170145) [nonpub. opn.]), and we have recently affirmed a June 5, 2025 order by the probate court declaring that Wright has no interest in the property and requiring him to surrender possession (Estate of Bates (Aug. 19, 2026, A174159) [nonpub. opn.].). In that second appeal (hereafter, the probate appeal), we ruled the probate court did not err in adjudicating the estate’s ownership of the property notwithstanding Wright’s contention those proceedings in probate court
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should have been abated pending the conclusion of a separate civil lawsuit Wright had already filed to quiet title to the Bates residence in his name by adverse possession.
This is Wright’s civil action to quiet title, the lawsuit that Wright argued in the probate appeal should have been decided first.
Here, Wright appeals from a minute order entered in the quiet title case on June 17, 2025, 12 days after the court ruled against him in the probate case. The appealed minute order grants a motion to strike his quiet title complaint and sustains a demurrer to that complaint without leave to amend. Given the procedural complexities of these proceedings, the somewhat confusing briefing the parties have filed, as well as some omissions in this record, we let that minute order speak for itself. It states in relevant part:
“The Court, having taken the matter under submission on 06/13/2025, now rules as follows: [¶] The Motion to Strike (not initial pleading) Complaint filed by Tyehimba Kokayi, Administrator to the Estate of Mary Esther Bates on 05/15/2025 is Granted. [¶] The Demurrer filed by Tyehimba Kokayi, Administrator to the Estate of Mary Esther Bates on 05/15/2025 is Granted. [¶] The Demurrer and Motion of Defendant Tyehimba Kokayi, Administrator to Estate of Mary Esther Bates (‘Defendant’) to Strike is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND in light of the ruling by the probate court in the related case # RP21094469. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10[, subd.] (c).)
“In Estate of Mary Esther Bates, the Court granted Defendant’s Petition for Recovery of Possession of Real Property of an Estate and for Order of Ejectment, confirming that ‘Dustan Wright has no rights of ownership and/or possession to 846 Athens Avenue, Oakland, California
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94607-3428, APN: 3-11-3.’ (June 5, 2025 Order.) This squarely addresses Plaintiff Dustan Wright’s claims in this quiet title case and this defect cannot be cured on amendment as the only cure for this defect would be dismissal of the first-filed action with prejudice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c).)”
Wright now challenges the court’s ruling striking his complaint and sustaining the demurrer on several grounds. For the reasons below, he has not met his burden to show reversible error.1 DISCUSSION
As we explained in the prior two appeals, we presume that the trial court’s ruling is correct, and it is an appellant’s burden to persuade us of an error. (See Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1006 [calling such
1 Orders sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend are not appealable; we may review such rulings only on appeal from a subsequently entered judgment. (Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale (2024) 16 Cal.5th 643, 653.) And while “[a]n order granting a motion to strike is appealable as a final judgment if it removes the only cause of action alleged and leaves no issues to be determined” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2026) ¶ 2:246.2), we have some doubt as to whether that principle applies here because the June 17, 2025 minute order also directs the administrator to file a request for dismissal. Yet the record contains no actual judgment of dismissal.
We are nonetheless satisfied that we may decide this appeal. First, the register of actions reflects that a request for dismissal was subsequently filed, following which the court entered a judgment of dismissal. We will not prolong this appeal by directing the parties to procure a copy of the judgment. We are satisfied based upon the register of actions that we have appellate jurisdiction and will proceed to the merits. Alternatively, even if no such judgment exists, we have the power to deem the court’s nonappealable order to incorporate a judgment of dismissal and treat the notice of appeal as applying to the dismissal (Bullock v. City of Antioch (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 407, 411, fn. 1), and we would do so here.
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framework “[t]he most fundamental principle of appellate review”].) To do this, “ ‘an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.’ ” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146 (United Grand Corp.).) “Mere suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority other than general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for appellate review.” (Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078.) We are not required to develop an appellant’s argument for him and thus disregard conclusory arguments that either lack citation to any relevant legal authority or fail to spell out the appellant’s reasoning (or both). (United Grand Corp., at p. 153.) In short, when an appellant fails to “convince us, by developing his arguments, stating the law, and calling out relevant portions of the record, that the trial court committed reversible error,” the appellant’s argument is insufficient to demonstrate error. (See Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 893, 910.) Furthermore, the only issues we are required to consider are those clearly identified in an argument heading. If there are other arguments for reversal buried somewhere in the appellant’s opening brief they are forfeited because we aren’t required to ferret them out (even if, without any appropriately informative headings, we could). (See United Grand Corp., at p. 153; Tsakopoulos Investments, LLC v. County of Sacramento (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 280, 310.)
As in the two prior appeals, Wright’s briefing is difficult to understand.
His fundamental position, as we understand him, is that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and striking his
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complaint because this quiet title case “should have [taken] precedence over [the administrator’s] Probate Petition concerning the same subject-matter.”
The first problem with his argument is that we do not have a complete record of the proceedings. It is an appellant’s burden to “ ‘ “ ‘ “affirmatively show error by an adequate record” ’ ” ’ ” and “ ‘[w]e cannot presume error from an incomplete record.’ ” (Gonzalez v. Rebollo (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 969, 976, 977.) “The appellate court is limited to considering matters in the record of the trial proceedings; matters not presented by the record cannot be considered on the suggestion of the parties in their briefs.” (Id. at p. 976.) “Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].” (Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502.) In this case, the record does not contain any filings relating to the administrator’s motion to strike the quiet title complaint which the court granted, not even the motion itself. In addition, the record does not include several filings relating to the demurrer: a request for judicial notice the administrator filed, a request for judicial notice Wright filed, and the administrator’s reply in support of its demurrer. In addition, the entire matter was heard on June 13, 2025, and taken under submission but there is no record of the hearing.2 Lacking these many filings and a record of the hearing, the record is inadequate to review the court’s rulings. We can and do affirm on this basis alone. (See, e.g., Hernandez, at p. 502 [record that includes only a notice of court’s ruling on motion to strike but omits court’s order, defendant’s motion to strike and plaintiff’s opposition held inadequate]; Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 574 [“In
2 It is unclear from the register of actions whether the hearing was reported, but no reporter’s transcript was designated, and no settled statement of the hearing was prepared (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137).
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the absence of a proper record, which would include either a reporter’s transcript or settled statement (neither of which we have in this case), we must presume the trial court acted properly. Therefore, the judgment is correct and must be affirmed”].)
A second and related problem is that the record does not show that Wright opposed or objected on any ground whatsoever to the motion to strike his complaint, which was an alternative and independent basis for the court’s judgment of dismissal. No opposition to the motion to strike is in the record, and moreover the register of actions does not even list any opposition to the motion to strike. On the contrary, the register of actions indicates that on June 5, 2025, a “notice of non-opposition to motion to strike complaint” was filed by a party whose identity is unclear, but that filing is not in the record.3 A party cannot challenge a ruling to which they raised no objection. “ ‘Otherwise, opposing parties and trial courts would be deprived of opportunities to correct alleged errors, and parties and appellate courts would be required to deplete costly resources “to address purported errors which could have been rectified in the trial court had an objection been made.” ’ ” (Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 800.) Without a record showing that Wright opposed the motion to strike his complaint or in any way objected to an order striking his complaint (as distinct from opposing the demurrer), not even at the hearing, we presume that he did not oppose that motion. (See Elena S. v. Kroutik, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 575-576 [where record contains no reporter’s transcript of hearing, appellate court presumes that at hearing appellant
3As noted, the record also does not include the motion itself or the supporting memorandum of points and authorities, both filed on May 15, 2025.
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consented to procedure he asserts as error on appeal].) We thus deem any and all objections to the order granting the motion to strike his quiet title complaint forfeited. And because the motion to strike is an independent and alternative basis for the judgment of dismissal, our affirmance of it on this basis completely disposes of this appeal. We need not address any of the issues Wright attempts to raise in his brief.
Third, Wright’s legal argument on its face is unpersuasive. Citing the common law rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, he argues that “the trial court’s jurisdictions over [his] complaint should have [taken] precedence over the Probate Court’s later jurisdiction over [the administrator’s] probate petition concerning the same subject-matter.” Under that common law doctrine, as stated in the authority he cites, “even when two superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties involved in litigation, the first to assume jurisdiction has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved until such time as all necessarily related matters have been resolved.” (Halpin v. Superior Court (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 530, 545 (Halpin).)
But “ ‘[j]urisdiction’ ” in this context refers to a mandatory procedural rule, not to authority over the subject matter or parties in a fundamental sense.” (Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 675, 682.) “ ‘The rule is established and enforced not “so much to protect the rights of parties as to protect the rights of Courts of coordinate jurisdiction to avoid conflict of jurisdiction, confusion and delay in the administration of justice.” ’ [Citation.] Furthermore, when a court has fundamental jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties, but acts in excess of a jurisdictional rule, its judgment should be challenged directly and is generally not subject to collateral attack.” (Id. at p. 683, italics added.) We
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have reviewed and affirmed the probate court’s order determining the rights of the parties on direct appeal of that order, and Wright’s arguments in this case now invite us to collaterally review that ruling again, which is improper. (See ibid.)
In addition, the authority Wright cites concerning the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction (Halpin) did not involve a probate proceeding. Wright has made no attempt to reconcile application of that common law doctrine with Probate Code section 854. As discussed more fully in the prior probate appeal, that section requires the probate court to abate any petition if there is “a civil action . . . pending with respect to the subject matter of a petition filed pursuant to this chapter this part and jurisdiction has been obtained in the court where the civil action is pending prior to the filing of the petition,” unless the probate court “finds that the civil action was filed for the purpose of delay.” On its face, the statute thus appears to codify the common law doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction Wright relies upon here yet also carves out an exception for lawsuits filed for delay purposes. And, as explained more fully in the prior probate appeal, the probate court made a finding that this quiet title action was filed for the purposes of delay and therefore ruled it was not required to abate the probate proceedings while this case proceeded. And, as noted, we have now affirmed that ruling on appeal. Yet Wright does not cite or address Probate Code section 854.
A statute will be deemed to alter the common law if “ ‘ “ ‘its language “ ‘clearly and unequivocally discloses an intention to depart from, alter, or abrogate the common-law rule concerning the particular subject matter . . . .’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Shaw v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245, 258.) Without a developed legal argument attempting to
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explain why the “filed for purposes of delay” exception set forth in Probate Code section 854 does not displace the common law doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, and thus is not dispositive of the jurisdictional conflict, Wright fails to demonstrate the trial court erred in basically ceding jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute to the probate court.
Finally, Wright argues the court erred in sustaining the demurrer under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (c), which authorizes a demurrer on the ground that “[t]here is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.” Wright argues that the probate case itself was not an “action” within the meaning of this statute, and the authority he cites supports this position. (See In re Raymond’s Estate (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 305, 307 [“Proceedings for the settlement of estates not civil actions; they are special proceedings in rem and are covered by the provisions of the Probate Code rather than by the rules applicable to civil actions generally”].) But Wright has failed to show that any error in sustaining the demurrer has caused him a miscarriage of justice. And we conclude that it has not done so, for at least two reasons. First, as already explained, the court’s ruling striking his complaint is an independent and sufficient basis to affirm the judgment of dismissal irrespective of the demurrer ruling. And second, because the probate court has now definitively ruled against Wright on his claimed right to ownership of the Bates residence and we have affirmed that ruling, he would appear to be collaterally estopped from relitigating that issue all over again.4 Reversing the demurrer ruling would be pointless.
4 That doctrine “ ‘precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings’ ” when the issue is “ ‘identical to that decided in a former proceeding,’ ” the issue was “ ‘actually litigated in the former proceeding’ ”
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs.
and “ ‘necessarily decided,’ ” the prior decision was “ ‘final and on the merits,’ ” and the party to be collaterally estopped is “ ‘the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.’ ” (Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 511.) All of those elements appear to be met here.
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STEWART, P. J.
We concur.
RICHMAN, J.
MILLER, J.
Wright v. Kokayi (A174297)