Wright v. Galipeau

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedFebruary 13, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-00071
StatusUnknown

This text of Wright v. Galipeau (Wright v. Galipeau) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wright v. Galipeau, (N.D. Ind. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

RON ERIC WRIGHT,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:24-CV-71-DRL-MGG

J. GALIPEAU et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER Ron Eric Wright, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three defendants. ECF 1. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotations and citations omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Mr. Wright, who has been housed at Westville Correctional Facility since November 16, 2023, alleges he is being subjected to deplorable living conditions. ECF 1 at 2. He states Westville is infested with cockroaches, rats, and mice, the showers are covered in black mold, and the drains are backed up in almost every building. Id. The heat does not work, the windows are broken, and the water barely works. Id. Mr. Wright asserts the tap water is contaminated, the ceilings are falling in, and the electrical wiring hangs out of the walls and is a fire hazard. Id. Mr. Wright seeks money damages in the amount of $25,000 and asks to be transferred to another facility. Id. at 3.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement that deny inmates “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). In evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim, courts conduct both an objective and a subjective inquiry. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective prong asks whether the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” that the action or inaction of a prison official leads to “the denial of the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (citations omitted). Although “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), inmates are entitled to adequate food, clothing, shelter, bedding, hygiene materials, and sanitation, Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009); Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006). On the subjective prong, the prisoner must show the defendant acted with

deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. As the Seventh Circuit has explained: [C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.

Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1999) (when inmate complained about severe deprivations but was ignored, he established a “prototypical case of deliberate indifference.”). In this case, Mr. Wright has sued three defendants. With respect to Warden John Galipeau, it appears he is trying to hold Warden Galipeau liable because he is the top

official at the prison. Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is based on personal responsibility, however, and the Warden cannot be held liable for damages solely because of his position. Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2018); Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). There is insufficient factual content from which the court could plausibly infer that Warden Galipeau personally engaged in conduct akin to criminal recklessness with respect to the conditions Mr. Wright describes. He has not stated an

Eighth Amendment claim for damages against Warden Galipeau. Nevertheless, the complaint can be read to allege that Mr. Wright is requesting injunctive relief to remedy alleged unconstitutional conditions at the prison. The Warden is a proper defendant for such a claim. See Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011). Mr. Wright will be permitted to proceed against Warden Galipeau in his

official capacity to obtain permanent injunctive relief needed to remedy the alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement he describes. Mr. Wright has also named the Indiana Department of Correction as a defendant, but the State of Indiana and its agencies are not “persons” who can be sued for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491

U.S. 58, 70 (1989). Additionally, state agencies have Eleventh Amendment immunity from a claim for damages in federal court. de Lima Silva v. Dep’t of Corr., 917 F.3d 546, 565 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars private litigants’ suits against nonconsenting states in federal courts, with the exception of causes of action where Congress has abrogated the states’ traditional immunity through its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. This immunity extends to state agencies and state officials in their official

capacities. There is no dispute that the DOC is a nonconsenting state agency, and Congress has not abrogated [Indiana’s] Eleventh Amendment immunity for plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Mr. Wright may not proceed against the Indiana Department of Correction. Furthermore, Mr. Wright has named Westville Correctional Facility as a defendant. However, the prison is a building, not a “person” or policy-making body that

can be sued for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Smith v. Knox County Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012). Because Westville is not a suable entity, he may not proceed on this claim. For these reasons, the court: (1) GRANTS Ron Eric Wright leave to proceed against Warden John Galipeau in

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Related

Rhodes v. Chapman
452 U.S. 337 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Gonzalez v. Feinerman
663 F.3d 311 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Anthony N. Smith v. Knox County Jail
666 F.3d 1037 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Orrin S. Reed v. Daniel McBride
178 F.3d 849 (Seventh Circuit, 1999)
Herbert L. Board v. Karl Farnham, Jr.
394 F.3d 469 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Burks v. Raemisch
555 F.3d 592 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Townsend v. Fuchs
522 F.3d 765 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Knight v. Wiseman
590 F.3d 458 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Roy Mitchell, Jr. v. Kevin Kallas
895 F.3d 492 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Silva v. State
917 F.3d 546 (Seventh Circuit, 2019)

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Wright v. Galipeau, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wright-v-galipeau-innd-2024.