Wrather v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.

214 S.W.2d 112, 147 Tex. 144, 1948 Tex. LEXIS 427
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedJune 23, 1948
DocketNo. A-1470.
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 214 S.W.2d 112 (Wrather v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wrather v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 214 S.W.2d 112, 147 Tex. 144, 1948 Tex. LEXIS 427 (Tex. 1948).

Opinions

Mr. Justice Folley

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a Rule 37 suit, brought by the respondent, Humble Oil & Refining Company, against the petitioners, John Wrather and the Railroad Commission of Texas, to set aside and enjoin further operation under the order of the Railroad Commission granting the petitioner, John Wrather, a permit to drill Well *146 No. 4 on a 40-acre portion of the Butts 1.14-acre tract, in exception to the 10-acre (660’-330’) spacing rule applicable to the East Texas Field, which permit, dated December 6, 1940, recites that it was granted on grounds of preventing confiscation of property and waste. The trial court, in a trial without a jury, upheld the permit, but the Court of Civil Appeals set it aside and granted an injunction restraining further production from the well, which had been drilled upon the faith of the permit. 205 S. W. (2d) 86.

It was urged by petitioners in the courts below that the 0.4-acre strip was not a subdivision of the Butts 1.14-acre tract of which it was a part; but the Court of Civil Appeals held that the Wrather tract was severed from the larger tract subsequent to the effective date of the order of the Railroad Commission prohibiting such subdivisions, and thus it was not entitled to be considered as a separate drilling unit and that no confiscation of property was shown. The petitioners assign no error in this respect and have abandoned the confiscation theory. They continue to insist, however, that well No. 4 is necessary to prevent waste, and further assert that Humble has no real or substantial interest in the controversy sufficient to authorize it to maintain the suit within the meaning- of Sec. 8 of Art. 6049c, V. A. C. S. The latter contention was overruled both in the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals. We shall first direct our attention to this jurisdictional question.

The Court of Civil Appeals held that in the absence of findings of fact by the trial court no presumption prevails from the take-nothing judgment therein that respondent was not an interested party. We agree with that holding for the reason stated by that court, which was that if the trial court had concluded that Humble was not an interested party the proper judgment would have been to dismiss the suit. Thus if any presumption arises it is that the trial court found that the respondent was an interested party within the meaning of the statute. We shall therefore detail only the evidence tending to support the presumed finding that Humble was an interested party authorized to prosecute the suit.

The respondent owns what is known as the Dura Thomas lease which is not adjacent to the Butts tract but is 239 feet and 274 feet respectively from its nearest corners and 408 feet from the Wrather Well No. 4. The Dura Thomas lease lies north of the Butts 1.14 acres, and extends some farther east and a considerable distance to the northwest, to a lower structural *147 position than Wrather No. 4. Part of the Dura Thomas lease is within the eight-times circular area of the Butts tract. Humble also owns other leases situated to the west, northwest and southwest, known as the Knowles, Laird, Peterson, Grim and Strong, at distances ranging from 2000 or 3000 feet up to about 14.000 feet of the Butts tract. In fact, Humble owns approximately 10% of the entire East Texas Oil Field. It was shown that if Well No. 4 is allowed to produce it will ultimately yield 100.000 barrels of oil from the common reservoir of the field, which witnesses estimated would result in a net loss to Humble of 10,000 barrels. The water pressure in the field is from the west to the east. The drainage of oil from the west side is not limited to due west, but tends to fan out to the northwest and southwest, in the direction of the Humble owned properties. Those who are receiving the net loss from the production on the east side are those on the west, from the north end to the south end of the field, and the more wells drilled on the east side, the greater will be the drainage from them. On cross-examination of petitioners’ own witness, Gordon Griffin, it was brought out that the Butts tract has been replenished with oil by drainage from the west side of the field, and that the faster it is withdrawn from the Butts tract the faster it will be drained from the west side; that the Wrather production causes a loss to leases situated five miles to the west, the entire width of the field at this point; that some of the Humble leases will never recover their recoverable oil in places, due to the eastward migration from them; that the owners who are receiving the net loss from this production on the east side are those on the west; and that the more wells drilled on the east side, the greater will be the drainage from them.

It was shown that the Wrather Well No. 4 would cause an additional drainage of 100,000 barrels to the Butts tract from other properties in the field during the next 20 years; that in the early part of this period this additional drainage will come primarily from leases west of the center of the field where oil is being replaced by water, and as depletion continues the area from which it will come will gradually move farther east, until at the last stages the drainage will be mostly from leases immediately surrounding the Butts tract; that thereby ultimately the Dura Thomas lease of Humble’s would be adversely affected; that the effect of drilling and operating Wrather No. 4 will be to lower the pressure, cause uneven water encroachment, which results in entrapment of oil, and will shorten the flowing life of the wells and reduce rather than increase recovery from this area of the field.

*148 Sec. 8 of Art. 6049c provides, in part, as follows:

“Any interested person affected by the conservation laws of this State relating to crude petroleum oil or natural gas, and the waste thereof, including this Act, or by any rule, regulation or order made or promulgated by the Commission thereunder, and who may be dissatisfied therewith, shall have the right to file a suit in a Court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County, Texas, and not elsewhere, against the Commission, or the members thereof, as defendants, to test the validity of said laws, rules, regulations or orders . . .”

By that statute the Legislature has limited the right to contest, a rule, regulation or order of the Commission to be interested persons affected thereby. The petitioners make the contention that the right to sue is limited to adjoining or adjacent operators whose leases or holdings are subject to immediate net drainage. That contention is not justified either by the language of the statute or by the decisions on the subject.

In Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Railroad Commission, 94 S. W. (2d) 1240, writ refused, it was held that a lessee whose property was 430 feet from the permittee’s lease, and nearly 900 feet from the involved location, was an interested party. Similar holdings were made in Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 169 S. W. (2d) 791, and in Potter v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 173 S. W. (2d) 309.

The right to sue is not limited to holders of adjoining leases. In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Edgar, 62 S. W. (2d) 359, 361-362, writ refused, the court employed this language:

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
214 S.W.2d 112, 147 Tex. 144, 1948 Tex. LEXIS 427, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wrather-v-humble-oil-refining-co-tex-1948.