OPINION
COCHRAN, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court
in which PRICE, WOMACK, JOHNSON, KEASLER, HERVEY and HOLCOMB, JJ., joined.
We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to resolve a conflict among the courts of appeals1 concerning whether Article 37.07, § 3(g),2 requires the State to give pretrial notice of “same-transaction contextual evidence” that it intends to offer in the punishment stage of a non-capital trial. We conclude that it does not. Building upon our prior opinion in Jaubert v. State,3 we hold that Article 37.07, § 3(g), which explicitly states that the notice requirement applies “in the same manner required by Rule 404(b),” refers to the scope of the evidence offered as well as to the timing of the evidence offered.4 Therefore, because pretrial notice of “same-transaction contextual evidence” is not required under Rule 404(b), it is also not required under Article 37.07, § 3(g). We affirm the court of appeals, which had, in essence, held the same.5
A. Facts
Appellant pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault of a child under the age of seventeen and requested that a jury assess punishment. The jury heard that appellant and his then-wife, Sherry Worthy, took fourteen-year-old R.T. into their Brownwood home. R.T.’s mother had died, and her father was in prison. R.T. was a friend of appellant’s daughter, Candice, and it was Candice who asked her parents to let R.T. live with them. R.T. was dropped off by two of her aunts with a single sack of clothes. Appellant and his wife provided for R.T. and gave her new clothes, her own room, and “more material things” than she had ever had. After R.T. told appellant she wanted to be a pilot, he took her up in a private plane.
Within a few months, appellant’s rough housing with R.T. became sexual in nature. They carried on a secret affair in the family home. About once a week, appellant would walk out of the front door and then sneak back in through R.T.’s bedroom window and have sex with her. Eventually, Sherry Worthy realized something nefarious was going on, and she kicked both her husband and R.T. out of the house. Sherry later divorced appellant.
[36]*36Appellant and R.T. then spent a couple of nights at motels, first in Comanche, then in Stephenville. Next, R.T. moved in with the Russells — a family who had previously taken in her twin sister. Appellant, meanwhile, moved in with his step-brother, Claude Sellers.
Over appellant’s objections, the jury heard that Sellers was himself a registered sex offender. While living with the Rus-sells, R.T. would pretend to spend the night with her girlfriend, Hannah, because Hannah lived close to Sellers’s apartment. Appellant would pick her up, and they would have sex at Sellers’s apartment. Appellant testified that he knew that taking R.T. to that apartment was a violation of his step-brother’s community supervision, but he said that he “took precautions.” Appellant explained that he used a separate entrance to the apartment and installed a padlock on his door so that Sellers “had no access to my room and he had no knowledge of what was going on.”
After a few weeks, R.T. and her sister went to live with their Aunt Christy in Santo, Texas. Appellant moved into a camper at the house for about a month. When Aunt Christy found out that R.T. and appellant still had a romantic relationship, she took R.T. to the police. In all, the sexual liaison lasted about nine months.
R.T., who was nineteen at the time of trial, testified that she had been in love with appellant, and he with her. R.T. told the jury, “I just don’t want anything to happen to him. That’s it.” Nonetheless, the jury sentenced appellant to eight years in prison on each count.
B. Direct Appeal
In the court of appeals, appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that his step-brother was a registered sex offender because the State failed to give pretrial notice of its intent to offer that evidence.6 The State had provided a document entitled “Notice of Intent to Offer Evidence of Prior Convictions and Extraneous Offenses” which listed (1) sexual offenses against R.T. that took place in Comanche and Erath Counties,7 (2) a threat appellant made against R.T., and (3) appellant’s admission that he had an ongoing sexual relationship with R.T. for several months. This admission encompassed the time period appellant lived with his step-brother, although Sellers is not explicitly named in the State’s notice.8
The court of appeals rejected appellant’s argument, holding that the evidence was same-transaction contextual evidence rather than extraneous-offense evidence:
The evidence that Worthy, in committing the offense for which he was charged, violated the conditions of his [37]*37stepbrother’s community supervision that an unsupervised child under seventeen not be at his place of residence— showing his disregard for conditions of community supervision and placing the complainant in jeopardy — is part of the context of the crime for which he was being tried and is not an extraneous bad act. Consequently, the State’s introduction of this evidence was not in violation of the trial court’s order, which only related to extraneous bad acts. As the State notes, the trial court appears to have been under the impression that the evidence was not contextual and was subject to the notice requirement and that adequate notice had been given. Because the evidence related to the context of the offense for which he was charged and not conduct that was extraneous to his commission of that offense, we conclude that the trial court was in error in its reasoning. We reject the assumption in Worthy’s arguments that this evidence consists of extraneous bad acts.9
Appellant asks this Court to resolve a conflict in the courts of appeals about whether Article 37.07, § S(g)’s notice requirement encompasses same-transaction contextual evidence. The Eastland (in this case) and Austin courts10 have held that it does not, while the Beaumont court has held that it does.11 We agree with the Eastland and Austin courts.
C. Article 37.07, § 3(g)’s notice requirement does not encompass same-transaction contextual evidence.
In discussing the admission of evidence during the punishment phase of a non-capital trial, Article 37.07, § 3(g) states, “On timely request of the defendant, notice of intent to introduce evidence under this article shall be given in the same manner required by Rule 404(b), Texas Rules of Evidence,” and then refers to an “extraneous crime or bad act.”12 Rule 404(b), in turn, provides that, in certain circumstances, “[ejvidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts” may be admissible “provided that upon timely request by the accused in a criminal case, reasonable notice is given in advance of trial of intent to introduce in the State’s case-in-chief such evidence other than that arising in the same transaction.”13 The question here, as in our prior Jaubert
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OPINION
COCHRAN, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court
in which PRICE, WOMACK, JOHNSON, KEASLER, HERVEY and HOLCOMB, JJ., joined.
We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to resolve a conflict among the courts of appeals1 concerning whether Article 37.07, § 3(g),2 requires the State to give pretrial notice of “same-transaction contextual evidence” that it intends to offer in the punishment stage of a non-capital trial. We conclude that it does not. Building upon our prior opinion in Jaubert v. State,3 we hold that Article 37.07, § 3(g), which explicitly states that the notice requirement applies “in the same manner required by Rule 404(b),” refers to the scope of the evidence offered as well as to the timing of the evidence offered.4 Therefore, because pretrial notice of “same-transaction contextual evidence” is not required under Rule 404(b), it is also not required under Article 37.07, § 3(g). We affirm the court of appeals, which had, in essence, held the same.5
A. Facts
Appellant pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault of a child under the age of seventeen and requested that a jury assess punishment. The jury heard that appellant and his then-wife, Sherry Worthy, took fourteen-year-old R.T. into their Brownwood home. R.T.’s mother had died, and her father was in prison. R.T. was a friend of appellant’s daughter, Candice, and it was Candice who asked her parents to let R.T. live with them. R.T. was dropped off by two of her aunts with a single sack of clothes. Appellant and his wife provided for R.T. and gave her new clothes, her own room, and “more material things” than she had ever had. After R.T. told appellant she wanted to be a pilot, he took her up in a private plane.
Within a few months, appellant’s rough housing with R.T. became sexual in nature. They carried on a secret affair in the family home. About once a week, appellant would walk out of the front door and then sneak back in through R.T.’s bedroom window and have sex with her. Eventually, Sherry Worthy realized something nefarious was going on, and she kicked both her husband and R.T. out of the house. Sherry later divorced appellant.
[36]*36Appellant and R.T. then spent a couple of nights at motels, first in Comanche, then in Stephenville. Next, R.T. moved in with the Russells — a family who had previously taken in her twin sister. Appellant, meanwhile, moved in with his step-brother, Claude Sellers.
Over appellant’s objections, the jury heard that Sellers was himself a registered sex offender. While living with the Rus-sells, R.T. would pretend to spend the night with her girlfriend, Hannah, because Hannah lived close to Sellers’s apartment. Appellant would pick her up, and they would have sex at Sellers’s apartment. Appellant testified that he knew that taking R.T. to that apartment was a violation of his step-brother’s community supervision, but he said that he “took precautions.” Appellant explained that he used a separate entrance to the apartment and installed a padlock on his door so that Sellers “had no access to my room and he had no knowledge of what was going on.”
After a few weeks, R.T. and her sister went to live with their Aunt Christy in Santo, Texas. Appellant moved into a camper at the house for about a month. When Aunt Christy found out that R.T. and appellant still had a romantic relationship, she took R.T. to the police. In all, the sexual liaison lasted about nine months.
R.T., who was nineteen at the time of trial, testified that she had been in love with appellant, and he with her. R.T. told the jury, “I just don’t want anything to happen to him. That’s it.” Nonetheless, the jury sentenced appellant to eight years in prison on each count.
B. Direct Appeal
In the court of appeals, appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that his step-brother was a registered sex offender because the State failed to give pretrial notice of its intent to offer that evidence.6 The State had provided a document entitled “Notice of Intent to Offer Evidence of Prior Convictions and Extraneous Offenses” which listed (1) sexual offenses against R.T. that took place in Comanche and Erath Counties,7 (2) a threat appellant made against R.T., and (3) appellant’s admission that he had an ongoing sexual relationship with R.T. for several months. This admission encompassed the time period appellant lived with his step-brother, although Sellers is not explicitly named in the State’s notice.8
The court of appeals rejected appellant’s argument, holding that the evidence was same-transaction contextual evidence rather than extraneous-offense evidence:
The evidence that Worthy, in committing the offense for which he was charged, violated the conditions of his [37]*37stepbrother’s community supervision that an unsupervised child under seventeen not be at his place of residence— showing his disregard for conditions of community supervision and placing the complainant in jeopardy — is part of the context of the crime for which he was being tried and is not an extraneous bad act. Consequently, the State’s introduction of this evidence was not in violation of the trial court’s order, which only related to extraneous bad acts. As the State notes, the trial court appears to have been under the impression that the evidence was not contextual and was subject to the notice requirement and that adequate notice had been given. Because the evidence related to the context of the offense for which he was charged and not conduct that was extraneous to his commission of that offense, we conclude that the trial court was in error in its reasoning. We reject the assumption in Worthy’s arguments that this evidence consists of extraneous bad acts.9
Appellant asks this Court to resolve a conflict in the courts of appeals about whether Article 37.07, § S(g)’s notice requirement encompasses same-transaction contextual evidence. The Eastland (in this case) and Austin courts10 have held that it does not, while the Beaumont court has held that it does.11 We agree with the Eastland and Austin courts.
C. Article 37.07, § 3(g)’s notice requirement does not encompass same-transaction contextual evidence.
In discussing the admission of evidence during the punishment phase of a non-capital trial, Article 37.07, § 3(g) states, “On timely request of the defendant, notice of intent to introduce evidence under this article shall be given in the same manner required by Rule 404(b), Texas Rules of Evidence,” and then refers to an “extraneous crime or bad act.”12 Rule 404(b), in turn, provides that, in certain circumstances, “[ejvidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts” may be admissible “provided that upon timely request by the accused in a criminal case, reasonable notice is given in advance of trial of intent to introduce in the State’s case-in-chief such evidence other than that arising in the same transaction.”13 The question here, as in our prior Jaubert decision, is when is pretrial notice required under Article 37.07, § 3(g)? The answer is that pretrial notice must be given under Article 37.07, § 3(g), only when pretrial notice is required under Rule 404(b).
In Jaubert, we held that, because Article 37.07, § 3(g), incorporates by reference [38]*38Rule 404(b)’s manner of giving notice and Rule 404(b)’s notice requirement encompasses only case-in-chief evidence, Article 37.07, § 3(g)’s notice requirement “appears on its face” to encompass only punishment case-in-chief evidence.14 We also recognized that extra-textual factors supported limiting Article 37.07, § 3(g)’s notice requirement to case-in-chief evidence. Drawing on the debate on the House floor, we concluded that the legislative history of Article 37.07, § 3(g)
indicates that the primary purpose of the statutory amendment was to clarify, after this'Court’s decision to the contrary in Grunsfeld [v. State, 843 S.W.2d 521 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) ], that evidence of unadjudicated extraneous offenses and prior bad acts is admissible at punishment. The notice provision was designed to reinforce existing law regarding notice of extraneous offenses, not to create a new and different requirement. ... At the time the statute was amended, Rule 404(b) described the existing law regarding notice of extraneous offenses.15
Thus, according to Jaubert, notice under Article 37.07, § 3(g), for punishment purposes must be given to the same extent and in the same manner as it is required under Rule 404(b) during the guilt stage.
Appellant mentions our decision in Jau-bert, but discounts its reasoning as being applicable only to rebuttal punishment evidence. Instead, he relies upon the Beaumont Court of Appeals’s opinion in Walt-mon v. State,16 which was delivered just one week after we had decided Jaubert. Waltmon, however, relied on language from the court of appeals’s opinion in Jau-bert — a decision that we reversed because it incorrectly concluded that the “in the same manner” language in 37.07, § 3(g), “ ‘relates only to the procedure governing a defendant’s request and the State’s response to that request, and not to the scope of the information to which the section applies.’ ”17 Appellant notes that Professors Dix and Dawson have recognized that Waltmon’s holding — that there is no same-transaction contextual evidence exception to Article 37.07, § 3(g) — is “somewhat questionable” in light of Jaubert.18 Nonetheless, appellant urges us to ignore Jaubert’s reasoning and adopt Waltmon’s. He argues that the plain language of 37.07, § 3(g), is contrary to the court of appeals’s position in this case because Rule 404(b) explicitly excludes evidence of matters “arising in the same transaction” from the notice requirement, but 37.07, § 3(g), does not explicitly do so. That is a distinction without a difference under Jaubert’s reasoning: Pretrial notice under Article 37.07, § 3(g) is required when and in the same manner as under Rule 404(b). The two notice rules serve the same purpose. They guard against “surprise and promote early resolution on the issue of admissibility” of uncharged misconduct, conduct that the defendant would not otherwise know [39]*39might be offered at trial, either during the guilt or punishment phase.19
Furthermore, “same-transaction contextual evidence” is intrinsic to the offense; it is not “an extraneous crime or bad act” to which Article 37.07, § 3(g), explicitly refers. Under the common law, this contextual evidence was treated as a distinct class — “res gestae” evidence — under the reasoning that the criminal act does not occur in a vacuum, and the jury has a right to hear the contextual evidence.20 Likely as a result, it was explicitly defined out of “other crimes, wrongs or acts” in Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), much as a party’s own statement is defined out of the hearsay rule in Rule 801(e)(2). It is not explicitly defined out of “other crimes, wrongs or acts” in its federal counterpart, but the cases interpret Federal Rule 404(b) to exclude notice of evidence that is “inextricably intertwined with” or “part and parcel of’ or “necessary to complete the story of’ the alleged offense.21 This is consistent with the notes of the federal advisory committee on the 1991 amendments that added the notice requirement, which made clear that the “amendment does not extend to evidence of acts which are ‘intrinsic’ to the charged offense ...”22
That said, prudent prosecutors provide pretrial notice of all evidence that could possibly be considered extraneous to the charged offense so that judges need not “engage in a hair-splitting debate” about whether some specific item is evidence of an extraneous offense or is same-transaction contextual evidence.23 The evidence in this case led to just such a hairsplitting debate.24 There were three [40]*40bench conferences about the admissibility of the evidence of Sellers being a registered sex offender. Initially, the trial judge ruled the evidence inadmissible under Rule 403, but ultimately he held that it was admissible bad-act evidence and that the State did comply with notice.25
As noted above, the court of appeals held just the opposite: The evidence concerning appellant’s step-brother was same-transaction contextual evidence. There is no bright line here. On the one hand, as the trial court pointed out, the evidence was not absolutely necessary to the jury’s understanding of the charged offense.26 On the other, it is not divisible in the way that evidence involving a different victim would have been;27 it is “intrinsic” — a circumstance of the defendant’s charged criminal act.28 It is somewhat like offering [41]*41evidence that the murderer killed his victim in a bordello; it is not essential in proving the offense of murder to show that it occurred in a bordello, but it certainly is an intrinsic circumstance surrounding that particular murder and it shows the context of the crime.
Because we agree that the court of appeals correctly concluded that pretrial notice of same-transaction contextual evidence is not required under Article 37.07, § 3(g), we affirm the judgment of that court.
KELLER, P.J., filed a concurring opinion in which MEYERS, J., joined.