Worth Engineering Co. v. United States

144 Ct. Cl. 470, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 37, 1959 WL 7613
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJanuary 14, 1959
DocketNo. 48866
StatusPublished

This text of 144 Ct. Cl. 470 (Worth Engineering Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Worth Engineering Co. v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 470, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 37, 1959 WL 7613 (cc 1959).

Opinion

Madden, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This claim arises under the War Contract Hardship Claims Act, known as the Lucas Act, 60 Stat. 902, as amended, 62 Stat. 992, 41 U. S. C. Sec. 106 note. On July 12, 1956, the [471]*471court made findings of fact and rendered an opinion on the sole issue of the adequacy of the plaintiff’s written requests for relief within the meaning of the Lucas Act. 135 C. Cls. 843. The court held that the plaintiff had filed an adequate request for relief in connection with Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation Purchase Order A-16545 and the case was remanded for a trial of the remaining issues under that purchase order.

Purchase Order A-16545 was issued on December 31,1942, by Grumman Aircraft to Seal-O-Strain Corporation for the machining of parts for aircraft under Grumman’s prime contract with the Navy Department, No. 90071. Purchase Order A-16545 had a total value, including a tooling allowance of $1,320, of $8,088.

After acceptance of the purchase order from Grumman, Seal-O-Strain became involved in bankruptcy proceedings and on February 17,1943, its plant and equipment were leased to the plaintiff, Worth Engineering, for an indefinite term. Under the terms of the lease, plaintiff did not assume an obligation to perform work orders previously accepted by Seal-O-Strain, but by voluntary agreements with prime contractors, plaintiff completed the Grumman purchase order and five other small uncompleted work orders with other prime contractors. On the small five work orders, plaintiff sustained a loss of $3,152.98.

At the time the plaintiff was prevailed upon by Grumman to perform the work under Order A-16545, work thereunder was in process only to the extent that tools had been provided. As noted in our prior decision, supra, plaintiff immediately applied to Grumman for a price increase. Action on the request was deferred until after completion of the work and at that time the requested price increase was denied.

Plaintiff satisfactorily completed work on Purchase Order A-16545 on May 22,1943, at a total cost of $31,239. Through no fault or negligence on its part, plaintiff sustained a loss on this order of $23,582.46.

The plaintiff was wholly engaged on war contracts with the Government and on work subcontracts with Government prime contractors during the Lucas Act period. Its overall [472]*472loss on such, work totaled $96,368.25 of which. $23,582.46 represented the plaintiff’s loss on the Grumman purchase order.

The Government contends that the loss suffered by plaintiff in connection with the Grumman purchase order was a capital loss rather than a performance loss on the theory that the taking over by plaintiff of the Grumman purchase order was a part of a lease-purchase agreement between plaintiff and the bankrupt original contractor, Seal-O-Strain. If, as contended by the defendant, plaintiff’s loss was incidental to the purchase of the Seal-O-Strain assets rather than a loss incurred in the performance of the Purchase Order, the loss would not be covered by the Lucas Act.

The plaintiff leased the Seal-O-Strain plant and equipment located at 254 Navy Street, Brooklyn, New York, on February 17, 1943. The lease was to continue for at least 15 months, i. e., from February 15, 1943, to May 14, 1944. The lease provided for an average monthly rental of $5,666.67 for the first 15 months and for rent at the rate of $5,000 per month thereafter.

On the same day, February 17, 1943, that plaintiff leased the plant and equipment from Seal-O-Strain, plaintiff’s parent corporation, Industrial Finance Corporation obtained from Seal-O-Strain an option to purchase the plant and equipment for $190,000 less all rentals paid by the plaintiff as lessee of Seal-O-Strain up to the date upon which option to purchase might be exercised. On January 17, 1945, Industrial Finance’s option to purchase the Seal-O-Strain plant was cancelled and a new option to purchase the same property was executed under which Industrial Finance had the right to purchase the property for $45,000 but only after rentals had been paid by the plaintiff to Seal-O-Strain up to and including April 17, 1945. On the same day that the new option to purchase agreement was executed between Seal-O-Strain and Industrial Finance, the lease between Seal-O-Strain and plaintiff was amended to provide that after April 17, 1945, the monthly rentals would be reduced from $5,000 a month to $1,500 a month for the remainder of plaintiff’s occupancy.

[473]*473By April 17,1945, plaintiff had paid rent to Seal-O-Strain in the total amount of $145,000 and thereafter, in May 1945, plaintiff paid $1,500 for the lease month ending on June 14, 1945.

On June 13, 1945, Industrial Finance decided to exercise its option to purchase the Seal-O-Strain property at the option price of $45,000. Immediately after exercising its option, Industrial Finance transferred the property to the plaintiff, its subsidiary, at a price of $85,000 plus $1 for patents. The plaintiff paid its parent only $45,000 and received the difference of $40,000 from its parent as paid-in surplus. In the following year, during the period from January to March 1946, the plaintiff liquidated and sold the plant and its assets, including additional equipment purchased and installed in the plant for its operations, and it realized a net profit on the sale of $43,843.36 including the $40,000 of donated surplus which was reflected in the book value of its assets.

On the basis of the above facts, the defendant contends that since the rentals paid by plaintiff to Seal-O-Strain up to April 17, 1945, plus the actual cost of the property to plaintiff in June 1945 ($45,000) was equivalent to the original option purchase price of $190,000 agreed to by Seal-O-Strain and Industrial Finance, the rental payments of $145,000 made by plaintiff should be capitalized as a part of the cost to the plaintiff of the plant and the plaintiff’s acquisition should be made retroactively effective to February 17, 1943, the date on which the lease between plaintiff and Seal-O-Strain was executed and on which the original purchase option between Industrial Finance and Seal-O-Strain was executed. The defendant allowed depreciation in the amount of $64,837.54 for the entire period as an expense of performance in substitution for the rental payments made by plaintiff, but no allowance was made for interest, taxes and other normal ownership expenses. The difference of $80,162.46 between the plaintiff’s claimed expense of $145,000 for rent, and the $64,837.54 of depreciation allowed by the defendant, was applied by the defendant as a reduction of the claimed overall loss to plaintiff of $96,368.25 mentioned above, leaving plaintiff with a net loss of only $16,205.79. [474]*474By adjusting Purchase Order A-16545 for the allocable portion of this reduction, the defendant contends that the loss on this purchase order would be only $18,459.84 with recovery in this suit limited by the Lucas Act to the net overall loss of $16,205.79.

We do not accept the defendant’s analysis. Purchase Order A-16545 was completed in May 1943, at which time plaintiff was merely a lessee of Seal-O-Strain, and plaintiff’s parent, Industrial Finance, had not then exercised its option to purchase the Seal-O-Strain plant and equipment. In January 1945, the original option to purchase this property held by Industrial Finance was cancelled, and the purchase of the property in June 1945, was under an entirely new agreement.

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Related

Worth Engineering Co. v. United States
135 Ct. Cl. 843 (Court of Claims, 1956)

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Bluebook (online)
144 Ct. Cl. 470, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 37, 1959 WL 7613, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/worth-engineering-co-v-united-states-cc-1959.