Worth Engineering Co. v. United States

135 Ct. Cl. 843, 1956 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 186, 1956 WL 8313
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 12, 1956
DocketNo. 48866
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 135 Ct. Cl. 843 (Worth Engineering Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Worth Engineering Co. v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 843, 1956 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 186, 1956 WL 8313 (cc 1956).

Opinion

Littleton, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This claim arises under the War Contract Hardship Claims Act, popularly called the Lucas Act, 60 Stat. 902, as amended by 62 Stat. 992, 41 U. S. C. sec. 106 note. By order of the court dated October 12, 1955, the issue referred to a commissioner of this court was limited to the adequacy of the written requests for relief within the meaning of the Lucas Act.

The Lucas Act provides, in part, as follows:

That where work, supplies, or services have been furnished between September 16, 1940, and August 14, 1945, under a contract or subcontract, for any department or agency of the Government which prior to the latter date was authorized to enter into contracts and [844]*844amendments or modifications of contracts under section 201 of the First War Powers Act, 1941 (50 U. S. C., Supp. IV, app., sec. 611), such departments and agencies are hereby authorized * * * to consider, adjust, and settle equitable claims of contractors, including subcontractors and materialmen performing work or furnishing supplies or services to the contractor or another subcontractor, for losses * * * incurred * * * in the performance of such contracts or subcontracts. * * *
Sec. 3. Claims for losses * * * shall be limited to losses with respect to which a written request for relief was filed with such department or agency on or before August 14, 1945, but a previous settlement under the First War Powers Act, 1941, or the Contract Settlement Act of 1944 shall not operate to preclude further relief otherwise allowable under this Act.

In previous decisions1 of this court it has been held that a “request for relief” within the meaning of the Lucas Act must be a request sufficient to put the Government on notice that the contractor or subcontractor was asking for relief of an extralegal character, that is, relief not allowable under the contract, such as might have been granted under section 201 of the First War Powers Act.

The plaintiff in this case was a subcontractor to a number of companies having prime contracts with the Government. For the most part, the prime contracts have not been identified in the record and it is not known whether they were fixed-price contracts or cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts. That, however, does not appear important here. Plaintiff has introduced in evidence a number of letters and memoranda, addressed to certain prime contractors with whom plaintiff had subcontracts in the form of purchase orders for the manufacture of various parts to be used by said contractors for the Government.

At the hearing before a commissioner of this court, plaintiff conceded that some of the letters listed in the petition and introduced in evidence were not requests for extralegal relief and, accordingly, such letters have not been included in the findings. Plaintiff also submitted, as Exhibit E to the petition, a copy of the adverse decision of the Navy De[845]*845partment War Contracts Relief Board, dated March 25, 1948. The purchase orders, which were in effect subcontracts and to which the numerous requests for relief are alleged to relate, were not put in evidence.

Purchase Order A-16545—Part No. 26137—Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp.

Sometime early in 1943, plaintiff acquired from the Seal-O-Strain Corporation, Purchase Order A-16545, issued by Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation in connection with Navy Department prime contract No. 90071. The subject matter of this purchase order was 400 right hand collars and 400 left hand collars. Beginning with a letter dated February 17,1943, plaintiff wrote to Grumman a number of times advising it that plaintiff was unable to manufacture the parts covered by the purchase order at the unit prices specified, without incurring a substantial loss. In the letter of February 17, plaintiff stated that it would like to raise to $12 the unit price of Part No. 26137 to be used on a Government war contract, and asked that such request be given consideration. The plaintiff was not, of course, in contract relation with the United States and had to go through the prime contractor to reach the United States, even under the War Powers Act.

On February 22, 1943, plaintiff again wrote to Grumman concerning the unit price for Part No. 26137 and requested that Grumman cancel the old order originally issued to Seal-O-Strain and issue plaintiff a new order at the unit price of $12, stating — “We trust that you will put through this increase so that we can finish the job.”

On March 27, 1943, Grumman issued a change order applicable to Purchase Order A-16545, reducing the number of right hand collars to 200 from the 400 called for under that purchase order. The number of left hand collars remained at 400, as originally specified. No increase in price was granted. At this point it does not appear what contact Grumman made with the United States about the matter of plaintiff’s claimed loss.

On May 5,1943, plaintiff wrote to Grumman thanking that company for its “communication of April 27, requesting that [846]*846we increase the quantity of part #26187 (left hand) collars covered by Purchase Order A-16545.” Plaintiff stated that it hesitated to accept the new order because the price at which the purchase order was being carried out was so low that plaintiff was suffering a considerable loss on production already delivered. Plaintiff stated that it feared acceptance of the additional order would only serve to increase its losses.

Plaintiff suggested that Grumman send its representative to plaintiff’s plant to check conditions of production in order to verify plaintiff’s statements concerning the losses being suffered so that Grumman might be able to consider an “upward revision in price which will tend either to alleviate or to remove the burden which production of this part has placed upon us.”

In a memorandum to Grumman dated May 19,1943, plaintiff reviewed the facts relating to the production of Part No. 26137, under Purchase Order A-16545, and stated the reasons for the losses being incurred. Plaintiff again asked Grumman to look into the matter with a view to having the prices readjusted “in such a way that our losses won’t be so terrific.”

On June 28,1943, Mr. J. A. Stamm, Director of Purchases for Grumman, wrote the following memorandum to Lieutenant R. M. Kelly, a United States Navy cost inspector:

Will you please review the attached and let us have your comment. We feel that Worth has acted properly and are entitled to an increase. If you require any further details we will dig them out.

' Mr. Stamm testified at the hearing for plaintiff, but was unable to state specifically just what documents were attached to and transmitted by the above memorandum to Lieutenant Kelly. However, it appears likely, and this is an entirely reasonable assumption, that some if not all of the above-described communications from plaintiff to Grumman, and a cost statement (made a part of plaintiff’s Exhibit 30), accompanied the memorandum.2

At the hearing before the commissioner of the court, Mr. Stamm, plaintiff’s witness, testified that he did not remem[847]

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Related

Worth Engineering Co. v. United States
144 Ct. Cl. 470 (Court of Claims, 1959)

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Bluebook (online)
135 Ct. Cl. 843, 1956 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 186, 1956 WL 8313, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/worth-engineering-co-v-united-states-cc-1956.