Woolfolk v. State

644 S.E.2d 828, 282 Ga. 139, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 1483, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 359

Opinions

Melton, Justice.

Michael Jerome Woolfolk, Jr. appeals his convictions for the felony murder and aggravated assault of Jakesha Young.¹ Woolfolk’s case arises from the same set of facts considered in Stinchcomb v. State, 280 Ga. 170 (626 SE2d 88) (2006), where we affirmed the conviction of Woolfolk’s co-defendant, Mario Stinchcomb. There we set forth the relevant facts as follows:

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows that Jakesha Young was working as a prostitute in Fulton County. On November 6, 2002, she was called to a second-floor apartment by Stinchcomb. Michael Woolfolk, Max Stevens, and Randy Harris were also at the apartment. Shortly after Young arrived, she and Stinchcomb began to argue over the value of her services. Thereafter, Stinchcomb refused Young’s request for money, and instructed her to leave. Angered, Young left the apartment and retrieved a gun from her car as Stinchcomb and Harris watched from the outside stairwell. Young then fired a shot in the air above the onlookers’ heads. At that moment, Stinchcomb ran back to the upstairs apartment to get his gun. During this time, Young got into her car and began to drive away. When Stinchcomb reentered the apartment, he and Woolfolk began firing their guns at Young from the window. Woolfolk fired once before his gun jammed, and Stinchcomb fired three times. A bullet from Woolfolk’s gun hit Young in the head and killed her while she was seated inside the car.

Id. at 171 (1).

1. Based on these facts, the jury was authorized to find Woolfolk guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

Woolfolk nonetheless contends that his conviction for the felony murder of Young cannot stand, arguing that the evidence demanded a finding that he acted in self-defense. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, however, the evidence shows that Young was shot in the head after the confrontation had ended, she had retreated to her car, and was being driven away.

Therefore, by the time that Woolfolk and Stinchcomb began shooting, there was no longer an imminent threat to them justifying the use of deadly force, and the jury did not err by rejecting [Woolfolk’s] arguments that his actions were justified pursuant to the doctrine of self-defense. Broussard v. State, 276 Ga. 216 (2) (576 SE2d 883) (2003).

Stinchcomb, supra, 280 Ga. at 172 (1).

2. Woolfolk contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever the count of aggravated assault against a peace officer from all remaining counts regarding the crimes committed against Young, maintaining that the crimes are wholly unconnected and dissimilar. This argument is misplaced.

The record shows that, after receiving a tip, a police officer located Woolfolk on the day after the murder, approached Woolfolk, identified himself as a police officer, and attempted to ask Woolfolk about the crime against Young. Woolfolk immediately fled, and as he did so, he pulled out the same gun he had used to murder Young. After the police officer fired at him, Woolfolk then attempted to throw away the gun as he continued to flee. “This Court has upheld joinder of two crimes when one crime is a circumstance of the arrest on the other crime.” (Footnote omitted.) Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 368, 369 (3) (589 SE2d 563) (2003). Therefore, because Woolfolk’s alleged crime of aggravated assault against a police officer was a circumstance of his arrest for the crimes against Young and directly related to that crime, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Woolfolk’s motion to sever these offenses under the facts of this case. Id. Moreover, evidence of Woolfolk’s flight² and his possession and use of the handgun employed to murder Young would be admissible as evidence relating to the underlying murder, and “where the evidence of one crime would be admissible in the trial of the other crime, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for severance.” (Punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 257 Ga. 731, 733 (2) (c) (363 SE2d 540) (1988).

Arguing that the trial court erred by denying the motion to sever, the dissent misapplies the standard set forth in Benford v. State, 272 Ga. 348 (528 SE2d 795) (2000). In Benford, we found that, where the defendant was on trial for murder, the trial court erred by admitting evidence that, at the time of his arrest over a month after the crime, the defendant possessed a weapon not used to kill the victim. To support this holding, we stated:

[T]his Court has indicated that the admission of evidence which shows the commission of another crime may not automatically be admitted solely on the basis that the evidence was incident to an accused’s arrest where the evidence is wholly unrelated to the charged crime, the arrest is remote in time from the charged crime, and the evidence is not otherwise shown to be relevant.

(Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 350 (3). Benford addressed only the admission of evidence of another crime where that evidence is “wholly unrelated” to the charged crime for which the defendant is being prosecuted. It is well established that evidence of flight is related to the underlying offense, see, e.g., Hogans, supra, and it also cannot be maintained that subsequent possession and use of the murder weapon has no relevance to the underlying murder. Therefore, Benford addresses a circumstance not present here and simply has no application to this case. It did not involve the joinder or severance of crimes in any fashion, and it certainly provides no basis for finding that the trial court erred in this case by refusing to sever the wholly related charge that, while being arrested within 24 hours for Young’s murder, Woolfolk fled while in possession of the exact gun used to commit the murder and used that gun to commit aggravated assault on a pursuing police officer.

3. Woolfolk argues that the trial court erred by failing to find that the State improperly used its peremptory strikes against two African-American potential jurors, thereby violating the rules against racial discrimination set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). In order to show a Batson violation, a defendant must prove that the State purposefully engaged in racial discrimination through its use of peremptory strikes. Floyd v. State, 272 Ga. 65 (3) (525 SE2d 683) (2000). On appeal, great deference must be extended to a trial court’s determination that no Batson violation has occurred. Id. Following a defendant’s showing of a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the reasons provided by the State to overcome any such presumption of racial discrimination must be “concrete, tangible, race-neutral, and neutrally applied.” Ford v. State, 262 Ga. 558, 560 (3) (423 SE2d 245) (1992). See also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S. 765 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995). In some cases, however, “[a] trial court may . . . determine that improper discriminatory motive underlay the exercise of a peremptory challenge when the race-neutral explanation proffered by the strikes’ proponent is so implausible or fantastic that it renders the explanation pretextual.” (Citations omitted.) Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151 (2) (476 SE2d 252) (1996).

With regard to the first potential juror, the State explained that it chose to strike her because she was not stable in her life. This reason appears to be concrete and race-neutral on its face. Woolfolk argues, however, that the reason was pretextual. As evidence of the juror’s instability, the State pointed to the fact that Juror 3 was unemployed, a law school dropout, and she did not know where her husband, from whom she had been separated for two years, was located or what type of work he did. Although this testimony only questionably supports the State’s reason for striking the juror, our standard of review requires that great deference be given to the trial court’s determination that the State’s reason was not so wholly fantastic as to be pretextual. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err by denying Woolfolk’s Batson motion regarding this juror.

With regard to the second potential juror, the State explained that it struck him because he worked nights, appeared to be extremely fatigued, and actually slept through portions of the voir dire. This qualifies as a concrete race-neutral reason for striking this juror, and, as it is undisputed that the juror was, in fact, sleeping during voir dire, it cannot be said that the reason is either fantastic or implausible. Again, the trial court did not err. Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 153 (2).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, P. J., who dissents.

Footnotes

1

Woolfolk was indicted on February 4,2003 for the murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of Jakesha Young. He was also indicted for aggravated assault on a peace officer. Following a jury trial, Woolfolk was convicted on April 16, 2004 of the felony murder and aggravated assault of Young, and he was acquitted of the remaining charges. On the same day, the trial court merged Woolfolk’s conviction for aggravated assault into his felony murder conviction and sentenced Woolfolk to life imprisonment. Woolfolk’s motion for new trial, filed on April 23,2004 and amended on May 31,2006, was denied on August 7,2006. Woolfolk’s notice of appeal was timely filed on August 7, 2006, and his appeal, docketed in this Court on September 21, 2006, was orally argued.

2

“Flight is always a circumstance which may be shown and a jury is authorized to take into account in determining guilt or innocence of an accused, and evidence thereof is not inadmissible because it incidentally puts the defendant’s character in issue.” Hogans v. State, 251 Ga. 242, 243 (1) (304 SE2d 699) (1983).