Woolfolk v. St Vincent De Paul

District Court, D. Idaho·Decided May 1, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-00021·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

WILLIE G. WOOLFOLK, Case No. 1:20-cv-00021-DCN Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND v. ORDER

ST. VINCENT DE PAUL,

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Willie G. Woolfolk’s Complaint (Dkt. 2) and Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Dkt. 1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915, the Court must review Woolfolk’s request to determine whether he is entitled to proceed in forma pauperis—which permits civil litigants to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee or to pay the filing fee over time. Rice v. City of Boise City, No. 1:13-CV-00441- CWD, 2013 WL 6385657, at *1 (D. Idaho Dec. 6, 2013). Because he is filing to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must also undertake an initial review of Woolfolk’s Complaint to ensure it meets the minimum required standards. For the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT Woolfolk’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and will allow him to pay the filing fee over time. Further, the Court finds Woolfolk’s Complaint legally sufficient to survive initial review. II. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS “[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, . . . without prepayment of fees or security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In order to qualify for in forma pauperis status, a plaintiff must submit an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets she

possesses and indicates that he is unable to pay the fee required. The affidavit is sufficient if it states that the plaintiff, because of his poverty, cannot “pay or give security for the costs” and still be able to provide for himself and dependents “with necessities of life.” Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Numours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). The affidavit must “state the facts as to affiant’s poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.”

United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court has examined Woolfolk’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and finds it does not conclusively establish his indigence. Woolfolk lists his monthly income as $2426.00 and his monthly expenses as $1,735.00. Dkt. 1, at 2, 4. In short, Woolfolk has

approximately $700 in discretionary income each month. Thus, the Court determines Woolfolk is not indigent and cannot proceed without pre-payment of the filing fee.. That said, the Court will allow Woolfolk to pay this fee over time to reduce any financial burden. Woolfolk must pay the fee in $200 monthly installments. III. SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT

The Court is required to screen complaints that are brought by litigants who seek in forma pauperis status. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i–iii). To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a plaintiff’s complaint must include facts sufficient to show a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009).

During this initial review, courts generally construe pro se pleadings liberally, giving pro se plaintiffs the benefit of any doubt. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,447 (9th Cir. 2000). Even so, plaintiffs—whether represented or not—have the burden of articulating their claims clearly and alleging facts sufficient to support review of each claim. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). Additionally, if amending the

complaint would remedy the deficiencies, plaintiffs should be notified and provided an opportunity to amend. See Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 2003). This Court is a Court of limited jurisdiction and as such, can only hear cases and controversies that involve a federal question (28 U.S.C. § 1331) or satisfy federal diversity jurisdiction requirements (28 U.S.C. § 1332). The Court will have original jurisdiction “of

all civil action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. Additionally, the Court will have supplemental jurisdiction “…over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Here, Woolfolk accuses St. Vincent de Paul (his former employer) of violating his

civil rights. Dkt. 1, at 11. As part of his Complaint in this case, Woolfolk included his United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Dismissal and Notice of Suit Rights. Dkt. 2-2. In those submissions, Woolfolk states he was discriminated against “because of [his] race.” Dkt. 2-3, at 3. Woolfolk contends St. Vincent de Paul discriminated against him multiple times from approximately June 1, 2016, to September 7, 2018. Dkt. 2-3, at 3. In the EEOC’s dismissal paperwork, it noted it was closing the file of Woolfolk’s accusations because “[b]ased upon its investigation, the EEOC is unable to

conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes. This does not certify that the respondent is in compliance with the states. No finding is made as to any other issues that might be construed as having been raised by this charge.” Dkt. 2-2, at 1. Additionally, it appears Woolfolk filed a charge of discrimination with the Idaho Human Rights Commission on April 8, 2019 (Dkt 2-3, at 6), however, he did not include any

determination from the Idaho Human Rights Commission in his documentation to this Court. At face value, Woolfolk’s complaint contains issues all arising from violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 42, Chapter 21, Subchapter VI—a federal statute— which provides this Court with jurisdiction under § 1331. Woolfolk accuses St. Vincent de

Paul of discriminatory conduct—specifically that he was “denied promotion, subject ted to harassment, unfair discipline, retaliation, and discharge.” Dkt. 2, at 4. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 states, in relevant part, that “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . .

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