Woolf v. Colonial Stores Inc.

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Woolf v. Colonial Stores Inc.

46 S.E.2d 620, 76 Ga. App. 565, 1948 Ga. App. LEXIS 418

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedFebruary 26, 1948

Docket31918.

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 46 S.E.2d 620 (Woolf v. Colonial Stores Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Woolf v. Colonial Stores Inc., 46 S.E.2d 620, 76 Ga. App. 565, 1948 Ga. App. LEXIS 418 (Ga. Ct. App. 1948).

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Opinions

Parker, J.

There is a motion to dismiss the bill of exceptions on the grounds: (1) said bill of exceptions has no entry of service thereon, nor was service waived; (2) the bill of exceptions *567 does not designate who is the plaintiff in error and who is the defendant in error, nor can the same be determined from a reading of the bill of exceptions. The motion to dismiss can not be sustained. There is now an acknowledgment of service on the bill of exceptions by the defendant’s attorney. While no plaintiff in error or defendant in error is designated as such in the bill of exceptions, it appears therefrom who was the plaintiff and who was the defendant in the trial court, that the general demurrer to the petition was sustained and the petition dismissed, and that the plaintiff excepted and brought the case to this court. Consequently, it can be determined from a reading of the bill of exceptions who is the plaintiff in error and who is the defendant in error. Joiner v. Singletary, 106 Ga. 257 (1) (32 S. E. 90); Rosenheim Shoe Co. v. Horne, 10 Ga. App. 582 (1) (73 S. E. 953). The motion to dismiss is without merit.

The trial judge did not err in sustaining the general demurrer to the petition and in dismissing the plaintiff’s action, because the petition shows that it was an action for damages for slander. Paragraph 7 of the petition is as follows: “Plaintiff avers that by reason of the speaking of the false, malicious and defamatory words aforesaid he has been and is greatly injured in his said good name, reputation, fame and credit, and brought into public scandal, infamy, and contempt with and among his neighbors;” and paragraph 12 alleges: “Petitioner shows that said remarks of defendant’s agent were actionable in nature and damaging within themselves.” Other allegations in' the petition tend to indicate that it was based squarely on alleged slanderous words uttered respecting the plaintiff, amounting to a slander, and was not an action “for failure to protect the plaintiff as a customer lawfully upon the defendant’s premises from injuries caused by the misconduct of the defendant’s employees,” for which an action will lie under the rulings in Hazelrigs v. High Company, 49 Ga. App. 866 (176 S. E. 814), and other cases.

This case is controlled by the ruling in Behre v. National Cash Register Co., 100 Ga. 213 (27 S. E. 986, 62 Am. St. R. 320), that “A corporation is not liable for damages resulting from the speaking of false, malicious, or defamatory words by one of its agents, even where in uttering such words the speaker was acting for the benefit of the corporation and within the scope of the duties of *568 his agency, unless it affirmatively appears that the agent was expressly directed or authorized by the corporation to speak the words in question.”

Judgment affirmed.

Felton, J., concurs. Sutton, C. J., concurs specially.

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Parker, J.

There is a motion to dismiss the bill of exceptions on the grounds: (1) said bill of exceptions has no entry of service thereon, nor was service waived; (2) the bill of exceptions *567 does not designate who is the plaintiff in error and who is the defendant in error, nor can the same be determined from a reading of the bill of exceptions. The motion to dismiss can not be sustained. There is now an acknowledgment of service on the bill of exceptions by the defendant’s attorney. While no plaintiff in error or defendant in error is designated as such in the bill of exceptions, it appears therefrom who was the plaintiff and who was the defendant in the trial court, that the general demurrer to the petition was sustained and the petition dismissed, and that the plaintiff excepted and brought the case to this court. Consequently, it can be determined from a reading of the bill of exceptions who is the plaintiff in error and who is the defendant in error. Joiner v. Singletary, 106 Ga. 257 (1) (32 S. E. 90); Rosenheim Shoe Co. v. Horne, 10 Ga. App. 582 (1) (73 S. E. 953). The motion to dismiss is without merit.

The trial judge did not err in sustaining the general demurrer to the petition and in dismissing the plaintiff’s action, because the petition shows that it was an action for damages for slander. Paragraph 7 of the petition is as follows: “Plaintiff avers that by reason of the speaking of the false, malicious and defamatory words aforesaid he has been and is greatly injured in his said good name, reputation, fame and credit, and brought into public scandal, infamy, and contempt with and among his neighbors;” and paragraph 12 alleges: “Petitioner shows that said remarks of defendant’s agent were actionable in nature and damaging within themselves.” Other allegations in' the petition tend to indicate that it was based squarely on alleged slanderous words uttered respecting the plaintiff, amounting to a slander, and was not an action “for failure to protect the plaintiff as a customer lawfully upon the defendant’s premises from injuries caused by the misconduct of the defendant’s employees,” for which an action will lie under the rulings in Hazelrigs v. High Company, 49 Ga. App. 866 (176 S. E. 814), and other cases.

This case is controlled by the ruling in Behre v. National Cash Register Co., 100 Ga. 213 (27 S. E. 986, 62 Am. St. R. 320), that “A corporation is not liable for damages resulting from the speaking of false, malicious, or defamatory words by one of its agents, even where in uttering such words the speaker was acting for the benefit of the corporation and within the scope of the duties of *568 his agency, unless it affirmatively appears that the agent was expressly directed or authorized by the corporation to speak the words in question.”

Judgment affirmed.

Felton, J., concurs. Sutton, C. J., concurs specially.

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Bluebook (online)

46 S.E.2d 620, 76 Ga. App. 565, 1948 Ga. App. LEXIS 418, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/woolf-v-colonial-stores-inc-gactapp-1948.

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