Woodward Iron Company v. Patterson

173 F. Supp. 251, 3 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1427, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3315
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedMay 11, 1959
DocketCiv. A. 8494
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 173 F. Supp. 251 (Woodward Iron Company v. Patterson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Woodward Iron Company v. Patterson, 173 F. Supp. 251, 3 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1427, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3315 (N.D. Ala. 1959).

Opinion

LYNNE, Chief Judge.

After consideration of the pleadings, stipulation of the parties and the evidence adduced upon the trial of this cause, the Court makes and enters the following findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment:

Findings of Fact Jurisdiction, Parties Assessment and Collection of Taxes

1. Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business is at Woodward, Jefferson County, Alabama.

2. The defendant, George D. Patterson, is District Director of Internal Revenue for the District of Alabama. The said defendant is a resident and inhabitant of Jefferson County, Alabama, within the Southern Division of the Northern District of Alabama.

3. The plaintiff throughout the period here involved maintained its books and accounts and reported its income, for United States income and excess profits tax purposes upon the accrual basis, and has established a taxable year ending on December 31. Plaintiff duly filed (a) with the then Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Alabama its income and excess profits tax returns for the calendar year 1951 and (b) with the defendant, its income and excess profits tax returns for the calendar years 1952 and 1953, and duly paid to said Collector and to said Director the following amounts respectively on account of the plaintiff’s income and excess profits tax liabilities disclosed on said returns, viz.:

Taxable year Amount

1951 $6,720,247.76

1952 2,897,984.01

1953 3,213,296.58

4. Thereafter, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue notified plaintiff that deficiencies in plaintiff’s income and excess profits tax liability had been determined for the years 1951, 1952 and 1953. In accordance with such determination the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed, and plaintiff duly paid to the defendant Patterson, District Director of *253 Internal Revenue for the District of Alabama, additional income and excess profits taxes, with interest thereon, in the amounts set out below, viz.:

5. Said additional income and excess profits taxes arise out of adjustments made by the Commissioner in the method employed by plaintiff in computing the deduction for percentage depletion of its coal and iron ore properties.

6. In filing its tax returns for the year 1951, plaintiff computed the gross income from its coal mining properties and the percentage depletion deduction allowable with respect thereto under I.R. C. (1939) Sections 23(m) and 114(b)(4) 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 23(m), 114(b)(4), on the assumption (a) that the portion of Sec. 29.23 (m)-l(e) (3) of Reg. Ill which measures the gross income from mining by the representative market or field price of a mineral product of like kind and grade as taxpayer’s mineral product validly applied to the determination of plaintiff’s depletion base (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the “market price” part of the Regulation) and (b) that there were in fact representative market or field prices for coking coal of like kind and grade as the coking coals produced from taxpayer’s Mulga and Dolomite mines. The coal prices assumed by plaintiff to be applicable and used by it in filing its income and excess profits tax returns for 1951 resulted in a deduction in the amount of $194,428.07 for percentage depletion of coal properties. In the examination and audit by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of plaintiff’s return for 1951, such deduction was reduced to the sum of $75,119.-44 by reason of the lower representative market prices which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue held were applicable to plaintiff’s Mulga and Dolomite coking coal.

7. In filing its tax returns for the calendar years 1952 and 1953 the plaintiff used the so-called “proportionate profits” method provided by Sec. 29.23 (m)-l(e)(3) of Reg. 118 in computing its deduction for percentage depletion of coal for said years. The Commissioner, in auditing said returns, determined that the aforementioned market price portion of the Regulation validly applied to determination of plaintiff’s depletion base during said years; also that there were in fact during such years representative market or field prices applicable to coal which was of like kind and grade as plaintiff’s Pratt seam coal produced from its Mulga and Dolomite mines. The actual costs per ton incurred by the taxpayer during the period 1952-3 in producing its washed Pratt seam coal from both its Dolomite and Mulga mines exceeded the representative market or field prices per ton therefor, as determined by the Commissioner. As a result of the application of the statutory limitation that the percentage depletion allowance shall not exceed 50% of the net income of plaintiff from the property, plaintiff received no allowance for percentage depletion on coal during such years.

*254 Filing and Disallowance of Claims.

8. On April 2, 1954, plaintiff duly filed in the office of the District Director of Internal Revenue for the District of Alabama, a claim for refund for the year 1951 claiming a refund of $182,069.91 which was based on an issue not involved in the subject proceeding. On April 26, 1956, plaintiff duly filed in the office of said District Director an amended claim for refund for the year 1951 claiming a refund of $1,259,051.31 and separate refund claims for the years 1952 and 1953 in the amounts of $823,073.17 and $1,-037,851.18, respectively. Said claims for refund were based on the ground that the allowances by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for depletion of coal mining properties and iron ore properties were insufficient. On July 31, 1956, plaintiff duly filed in the office of said District Director a second amended claim for refund for the year 1951 in the amount of $1,259,051.31, and separate amended claims for refund for the years 1952 and 1953 in the amount of $822,-413.66 and $1,037,851.18, respectively. Said amended claims for refund restated, amplified and clarified the grounds for its claim that the allowances made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for depletion of coal mining properties and iron ore properties for the taxable years 1951, 1952 and 1953 were insufficient.

9. All of said claims for refund were thereafter, in the manner provided by law, duly disallowed by the defendant.

10. Plaintiff has complied with all conditions precedent to the maintenance of this suit which are required by law or applicable regulations. The several claims for refund filed by plaintiff and described above set forth each ground for refund relied upon in plaintiff’s Complaint as amended in sufficient detail to apprise the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of the exact grounds of said claims and the reasons for the allowance thereof.

Summary of Plaintiff’s Facilities and Business.

11. During the calendar years 1951, 1952 and 1953, and for many years prior thereto, plaintiff was engaged in integrated operations for the production and sale of merchant pig iron. During the period 1951-1953 plaintiff’s operating properties consisted, irder alia, of the following:

(a) A furnace plant including four 1 blast furnaces with an annual rated capacity of 772,632 net tons of pig iron, slag granulating equipment, steam and electric generating facilities and repair shops.

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364 F. Supp. 1358 (S.D. Ohio, 1972)
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Bluebook (online)
173 F. Supp. 251, 3 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1427, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3315, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/woodward-iron-company-v-patterson-alnd-1959.